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ABSTRACT
The dissertation addresses a fundamental question in the social sciences: Where do
economic interests and policy preferences come from? How do interests and preferences
shape political and economic behavior, government policy, firm strategy and ultimately
market outcomes? The dissertation addresses this question by analyzing political
contestation over foreign direct investment (FDI) rules in India from the late colonial
period through the present (1870-2012).
This dissertation employs extensive archival and field research to find that conventional
theoretical approaches that naturalize economic interests and deduce economic actors
preferences from their socio-economic structural position are inadequate to explain the
dynamic shifts in government and firm preferences towards FDI over the course of
India's modern economic history. Attention must be paid to the ways in which actors
make sense of the complexities of their institutional environment. The dissertation argues
that preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas: rationalized causal ideas
imbued with historically salient social meaning. These schemas posit causal and
historically meaningful means-ends relationships between the role of domestic and
foreign firms and industrial development outcomes. They serve as interpretive
frameworks through which business, state and societal actors make sense of the
complexities of the economy.
This dissertation assesses the sources of FDI policy preferences by identifying the origins
and evolution of rationalized causal ideass that posit the relative costs and benefits of
foreign and domestic capital and the cultural meaning systems in which these causal
ideas are embedded. However, it argues that there are competing theories and causal
ideas at play in the scholarly, policy and managerial discourse that shape actors' beliefs
about the economic effects of FDI. This creates significant uncertainty and opens the
door for massive contestation between rival actors wielding competing causal ideas.
However, there is a second cultural element of preferences that receives less analytic
attention in the literature. This cultural dimension plays a complementary role by
providing the socially meaningful and historically rooted cultural symbols, narratives and
tropes that are essential for motivating human action. The stress on agency and the
identification of this cultural dimension and the role it plays in preference formation,
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political contestation and policy and market outcomes is an important contribution this
dissertation seeks to make.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction, Methodology and Chapter Organization
I. Overview
The dissertation addresses a fundamental question in the social sciences: Where do
economic interests and policy preferences come from? How do interests and preferences
shape political and economic behavior, government policy, firm strategy and ultimately
market outcomes? The dissertation addresses this question by analyzing political
contestation over foreign direct investment (FDI) rules in India from the late colonial
period through the present (1870-2012).
For policymakers and other societal actors struggling to make sense of the complexities
and dynamics of the economy, the politics of foreign direct investment often comes down
to a single question: who are the legitimate economic actors through which the
development goals of the nation should be realized? That is, whose activities and
business practices contribute to the pursuit of industrial development? While these end
goals themselves are objects of societal contestation, a central element of the process is
determining the means through which policy ends should be achieved and the nature and
identity of the actors that should receive policy support. A similar set of questions also
holds for domestic firm actors: how should Indian capitalists respond to the threats and
opportunities presented by foreign firms? Contrary to many theories that naturalize
capitalists' interests, economic actors in fact face complex questions when determining
their preferences and formulating their strategies. Might it be more beneficial to have
foreign firms participate in the Indian economy so as to gain access to the valuable array
of financial, technological and organizational resources they might provide, or is the
competitive threat that foreign firms present too great? Ultimately, the question is not
only whether foreign firms should be allowed entry into the domestic economy, but
crucially should foreign firms be governed by the same rules as their domestic
counterparts or should conditions be placed on foreign firm's participation in the
domestic economy so as to maximize the hoped-for benefits and minimize much-feared
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costs? This uncertainty about how to regulate foreign firms provides insight to the long-
run historical variation in policies that oscillated between support for Indian private
capital and foreign firms from the late 19' century through the present.
This dissertation employs extensive archival and field research to find that conventional
theoretical approaches that naturalize economic interests and deduce economic actors
preferences from their socio-economic structural position are inadequate to explain the
dynamic shifts in government and firm preferences towards FDI over the course of
India's modern economic history. Attention must be paid to the ways in which actors
make sense of the complexities of their institutional environment. The dissertation argues
that preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas: rationalized causal ideas
imbued with historically salient social meaning. These schemas posit causal and
historically meaningful relationships between the role of domestic and foreign firms and
development outcomes. They serve as interpretive frameworks through which business,
state and societal actors make sense of the complexities of the economy.
This dissertation assesses the sources of FDI policy preferences by identifying the origins
and evolution of rationalized causal ideas that posit the costs and benefits of foreign and
domestic capital and the cultural meaning systems in which these ideas are embedded. It
analyzes the effect of these ideas and meanings on FDI policy and firm strategy: business
and state practices that structure the institutional environment. The analysis begins in the
period when the British Colonial Office consolidated control of the Indian colony in the
late colonial period through World War I (1870-1914) and continues through the inter-
war period (1914-1947), post-independence import substituting industrialization (1947-
1979) and the last three decades of economic liberalization (1980-2012). It shows how
rationalized ideas emerge from economic theories that posit causal relationships between
FDI and development outcomes. However, there are competing theories and causal ideas
at play in both the scholarly and policy discourse that shape actors' beliefs about the
economic effects of FDI. Two causal ideas are crucial. The first holds that foreign capital
not only contributes to industrial growth through investments in areas that advance
industrial development, but also as well as indirectly through a variety of spillover effects
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that benefit domestic firms and the wider economy (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003). By
contrast, a similarly compelling rationale posits foreign capital as constraining national
development by crowding domestic actors out of oligopolistic markets through abuse of
monopoly power, preventing them from acquiring new technological and organizational
capabilities that would advance the wider development project (Amsden and Hikino,
1994). These represent competing theories that numerous studies in the scholarly and
policy literature have been unable to resolve (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). However,
while this indeterminacy produces deadlock in scholarly debates, it facilitates political
contestation between economic and political actors wielding competing causal ideas as
they battle to shape the policy and institutional environment in their favor.
The importance of causal ideas in shaping actors preferences is increasingly recognized
in literature from across rational choice, historical institutional and sociological strands of
the new institutionalisms (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; North, 2005; Hall, 1993; Blyth,
1997; Blyth, 2002; Beland and Cox, 2011; Dobbin, 1993). However, there is a second
cultural element of preferences that receives less analytic attention. 1 This cultural
dimension plays a complementary role by providing the socially meaningful and
historically rooted cultural symbols, narratives and tropes that are essential for motivating
2human action. The identification of this cultural dimension and demonstration of the role
it plays in preference formation, political contestation and policy and market outcomes is
a major contribution this dissertation seeks to make.
Interestingly this dimension is recently being integrated in the economic sociology and organizational
studies literatures, highlighting the analytic utility of bring these literatures into productive conversation.
This is elaborated in the recent Special Issue of The Academy of Management Journal "Organizations and
their Institutional Environment - Bringing Meanings, Value and Culture Back In." 2010, Vol. 53, No.6 of
which Suddaby et al (2010) provides the introduction.
2 This cognitive element operates primarily in the mind of the individual, as compared with inter-
subjectively held social meanings and cultural symbols that are shared across members of a group.
Economic sociologists see these as complementary analytic approaches to understanding agency and
cognition (DiMaggio, 1997; Dobbin, 2004; Beckert, 1996). A growing literature in comparative and
international political economy is engaging with the theoretical architecture of cognitive frameworks (cf.
Abdelal et al, 2010) but less so the social and cultural, with some political scientists see this separation as
epistemological issue (cf. Rathbun, 2008). This dissertation aims to demonstrate how the two can be
productively integrated.
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These cultural devices provide salient representations of foreign and domestic firms that
have deep historical resonance in Indian society. These representations see foreign firms
either as 'traditional' economic actors that serve as neo-imperial instruments that prevent
India from achieving widely-held industrialization ambitions or instruments of
development that introduce modem technologies and managerial practices to the
domestic economy. Similarly, Indian firms are categorized as either economic actors
orientated towards 'traditional' trading and moneylending activities that have long been
considered as rapacious, abusive of the poor and constraining industrialization or as
modern 'captains of industry' that heroically overcome the constraints imposed by the
colonial state, import substitution and monopolistic multinational firms to boldly strike
out into new areas of industrial production. The legitimacy of these actors in the eyes of
state and society in turns determines the shape of the policy and institutional
environment, that is, whether their activities should be supported or restricted by state
policy. However, these categories of capitalist legitimacy are not given a priori, they are
products of social and political contestation amongst business and state actors.
The cognitive and cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy are briefly outlined in the
table below and expansively elaborated in the analysis over the course of the dissertation.
Each of these categories is underpinned by a causal logic that rationalizes the practices of
the given business actor, but the causal ideas are imbued with historically salient social
meanings that accord or deny legitimacy.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1870-2012)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: 'bazaar traders and speculators' Modem: 'captains of industry'
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modem: 'technology providers'
Finally, the construction of cognitive and cultural categories is a crucial mechanism
through which these socio-political processes occur. However, categories like wider
institutions don't just constrain action; they also serve as enabling cultural resources for
strategic action, as scholars from across the disciplines have increasingly shown (Swidler,
12
1986; DiMaggio, 1997; Fligstein 2001; Mullainathan et al, 2008). Much of the political
contestation observed in markets reflects economic actors competing to legitimize
themselves and their activities, practices and strategies in the eyes of the state and wider
public as a means of gaining access to valuable resources. This not only means self-
promotion, it is a competitive process that requires efforts to delegitimize others in the
policy domain. This is a crucial element of agency and socio-political contestation. This
approach allows us to make sense of what would otherwise seem to be idiosyncratic
fluctuations in policy, which in the political economy literature is too often unhelpfully
ascribed to battles between 'competing interests' and 'the push and pull of politics'.
1H. Analytic Framework, Research Design and Methodology
This dissertation provides a theoretical framework that explores the tension between
structure and agency, and materialist and constructivist conceptions of the sources
economic interests and policy preferences. It highlights the role of agency and
contestation in the process of preference formation and the evolution of institutions
governing foreign direct investment in India. This social and political theory of
preference formation is heavily attentive to historical processes. This section briefly
describes the analytic framework, research design and methodology that guided the
research.
Analytic Framework: Towards a Firm-centric Political Economy
This research is part of a recent move towards a more firm-centric political economy.
This literature reflects a shift from labor-centered 'corporatist and neo-corporatist'
theorizing about capitalism to increased concern with business politics and the role of
firms in the policymaking process. This trend of moving "beyond corporatism" (Thelen,
1994) grew in the field of comparative political economy through the 1990s (Soskice
1990; Swenson 1991; Crouch and Streeck, 1997), and perhaps was capped with Hall and
Soskice's (2001) influential statement about the role of firms in constructing different
institutional configurations or 'varieties of capitalism' across the industrialized world.
Like Hall and Soskice (2001:6), my approach to political economy is actor-centered,
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viewing the political economy as a field inhabited by a multiplicity of purposive actors
interacting with each other while seeking to understand and further their interests, though
doing so in complex environments under conditions of uncertainty. 3 Actors may be
individuals or groups, including firms, industry associations, labor unions or the state, as
long as they have the capacity to act cohesively. This firm-centered political economy
sees business as central agents of adjustment to technological change and international
competition by national political economies. After all, it is primarily the activities of
firms that aggregate into national level economic performance (Hall and Soskice, 2001:
6). This point is especially critical in the context of economic development where firms
are the sources of employment and income, and are the principal site of efforts to upgrade
technologically and develop the dynamic capabilities that would allow developing
countries to respond to the challenges of increased competition under globalization (cf.
Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1997; Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2008).4
However, despite the programmatic statement of firm-centricity in much of this
comparative political economy literature, even Hall and Soskice's (2001) varieties of
capitalism framework falls short of being a 'true' firm-level approach. Though it
conceptually takes firms as the unit of analysis, it operationalizes firms as "relational
networks" (Hancke, 2010:125) and empirically looks at industries and sectors in cross-
national comparative perspective. This dissertation goes a step further by identifying and
operationalizing key sources of firm level variation underpinning mechanisms of
preference formation and then showing how individual firms operate as political actors.
This approach to understanding FDI preferences complements Hart's (2004) call for an
individual firm-level approach to interest group politics and business-government
3 This approach is consistent with the analytic concept of the 'strategic action field' in economic and
political sociology (c.f. Fligstein, 2001; 2008). This analytic device is put to more explicit use in the
empirical chapters of the dissertation.
4 This is a point that is left out of consideration by much of the literature on economic nationalism, which
focuses primarily on the state level, even though the agents of economic nationalism are invariably
domestic firms, and nationalist policies are designed to benefit them relative to their foreign competitors.
5 It does so by drawing on both 'classic' international business literature on the politics of FDI
(Kindleberger, 1962; Hymer, 1976; Vernon, 1971) as well as the strategic management literature (Porter,
1980; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1986; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997). This facilitates analysis of the
relationship between market power, firm-level resources and business politics, thus providing a
sophisticated theoretical framework for understanding how material and constructivist factors interact in
shaping preferences in a firm-centric political economy.
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relations. Dominant approaches largely homogenize 'business' by operationalizing firms
through peak or trade associations. This assumes a significant degree of 'business unity'
and often relies on the 'structural power' of business or capital (both Marxist and non-
Marxist versions). A firm-level approach problematizes business collective action by
seeking to identify divergent and potentially opposing preferences and agency amongst
firms. Linking the politics and economics of firms is essential for a complete
understanding of dynamics of industrial upgrading, structural transformation and
economic growth in the developing world. As such, it is essential for the sub-discipline of
the political economy of development to develop a better understanding of firms and their
relations with the state. Finally, business represents a 'crucial case' (George and
Bennett, 2005) in the study of economic interests and policy preferences. Unlike voters,
the behavioral assumptions of firms are seen as particularly restrictive as they are subject
to competition and must focus on the bottom line in order to survive: the market forces
them to be 'rational' (Abdelal et al, 2005). Positing firm preferences as social constructs
rather than material realities thus presents a major test of social constructivist theories.
Research Methodology
This dissertation employs historical methods of institutional analysis. It follows the call
in comparative politics by political scientists Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt
(2010) and Amel Ahmed (2010) to 'read history forward,' rather than subjugating history
to sweeping trajectories via the elegant reductionism of 'strong theory'. 7 Sewell's (1996)
'evenemential' approach also denies the assumption of uniform causal laws operating
over time. He argues that events can change balance of causal forces and logic of
occurrences that generate historically important consequences. Events do so by
"transforming the very cultural categories that shape and constrain human action"
(Sewell 1996:16).8 However, the approach in this dissertation focuses less on the
6 As such, this dissertation follows Hall & Soskice (2001:5) in seeking to "build bridges between business
studies and comparative political economy, two disciplines that are often disconnected." This is done
throughout the dissertation, but perhaps most explicitly in the engagement with the strategic management
and international business literature in Chapter 5 on the political economy of joint ventures.
7 By contrast, these analysts consider 'reading history backwards' the approach of looking at outcomes and
analyzing them alongside the 'usual' correlates Cappoccia and Ziblatt and Ahmed (2010).
8 Sewell further agues that social causality is temporally heterogeneous not temporally uniform, and thus
differs from both experiental and teological approaches to temporality. Social relations characterized by
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identification and analysis of major events or critical junctures but rather emphasizes
sociopolitical processes of continuous contestation, which punctuated equilibrium models
utilizing critical junctures can often hide (cf. Thelen's recent critique). The objective is to
highlight the role of agency and contingency, and how these might operate alongside
structural imperatives.
'Reading history forward' represents a historical approach to causality, where the focus is
on "reconstructing the path that led to institutional choice to determine what actors were
actually fighting about" (Ahmed 2010:1061). It involves "sensitivity to actors' subjective
understandings of their situation and a recognition that choices made under conditions of
uncertainty may not make sense from the perspective of the finish line" (Ibid: 1061).
Analytic attention to uncertainty reveals challenges and possibilities. It critiques the
assumption embedded in other (primarily rational choice) approaches that actors know
the long-term consequences of their decisions, such as the design of institutions, whether
electoral systems in the democracy literature or FDI policy regimes in mine). In the case
of FDI policy, actors don't know the long-term consequences of a policy approach that
restricts or promotes FDI nor a firm strategy that seeks to partner with foreign firms
through equity joint ventures or eschew this approach to 'go it alone'. This uncertainty
hold even when political and economic actors they know the long term goals they want to
achieve, such as economic growth or firm survival. That is, actors are purposive and goal
oriented but face pervasive uncertainties.
Analytic approaches based on logic of cross-case statistical correlation that impute
preferences from observed outcomes (i.e. reading history backwards) have important
limitations in this respect. Instead, we need process-based evidence to reveal causal
mechanisms through 'systematic process analysis' (Hall 2003). This involves identifying
both path dependency and contingency, which he argues may be at best local in teological approaches (e.g.
Marxist or World Systems with their built in directionality and underlying causal forces), is central in the
eventful approach. Radical ruptures and continuities are interlaced; nothing is immune to change. He sees
this as approaching historians view of complexity, and being central to the 'historical turn' in the social
sciences. Evenemential sociology "... would put the question of how structures are transformed or
reconfigured by social action at the center of its inquiries." (1996:24) He concurs with Wallerstein on how
we need to " 'unthink'... our preference for elegant sparse laws over complex, dense interpretive schema"'
all of which Sewell sees as part of the 'historical turn'.
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the microfoundations of decision-making that considers how actors understand their
situations (Hall 2005; Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). Ahmed argues that "this
methodological move has important theoretical implications, the most significant of
which is that it allows us to account for the element of uncertainty in actors' decision
making and the unintended consequences that often result from this." (Ahmed, 2010:
1066). By contrast, "exclusively reading history backward from outcomes is analytically
problematic because such an approach suggests that actors either operated with high
levels of knowledge or were able to go back and adjust once they had more information."
(Ahmed, 2010:1066). In the dissertation I highlight the role of uncertainty in shaping
discursive battles between actors wielding competing economic theories, nationalist
narratives and conceptions of technology, and ultimate in generating policy and market
outcomes.
Linking Theory and Method
This dissertation follows Hall's (2010) call to align ontology and methodology and
Parson's (2007:171) advice on the importance of linking theory to method, where
particularistic claims related to certain theoretical positions -- particularly those that are
historical and contingent -- require within-case evidence and analysis for support or
falsification. This dissertation argues that preferences are formed endogenously through a
historically situated process of sociopolitical interaction between domestic and foreign
firms and the state. This inductive empirical approach is based on an analysis of history,
context and process. It provides a framework for understanding the evolution of
preferences over the course of Indian FDI liberalization where, contrary to structural-
material theoretical expectations, domestic incumbents are not simply 'following their
interests' by jealously guarding their home market from rapacious foreign predators.
Economic actors' policy preferences cannot simply be read from their material interests
or their structural position. The empirical reality is far more complex.
Contrasting theoretical assumptions have important implications for my choice of
methodology (Hall, 2003). The assumptions of deductive reasoning consider economic
actors to be rational profit maximizing agents with fixed material interests and
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preferences, interacting strategically within fixed institutional constraints. These analytic
assumptions make it difficult to build dynamism into models that posit interactions
through discrete staged moves. This view can be modeled game theoretically using the
economic tools of comparative statics rather than dynamically (c.f. Levi, 2008; also
Weingast, 2002:692 and Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). In this view an exogenous shock is
required to break the equilibrium and allow for the reformation of interests, preferences
and institutional constraints. This results in an ensuing period of (stable) interactions
based on newly determined and fixed interests, preferences and institutions.
As a result, these models are often biased towards static equilibrium and path
dependence. 9 By contrast, I propose a view based on malleable preferences induced from
analysis of historical processes that allows significant scope for agency and contestation.
Powerful actors have the capacity to test institutional boundaries, promoting changes in
preferences and institutions in an ongoing process of contestation. The historical and
contingent claims put forward in this dissertation require within-case evidence and
analysis for falsification or support. As such I utilize process tracing and case-based
methodologies, based on archival and interview based data collection methods (cf. Brady
and Collier, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2010).10
By contrast, the dissertation proposes a theoretical conception based on malleable
preferences induced from a process-based story, where historical developments matter
greatly for outcomes. The rationality assumptions are worth noting explicitly. In this
view, actors are not assumed to behave irrationally, but rather notions of rationality are
considered to be objects of analysis. This goes beyond considerations of rationality is
considered as bounded. Economic actors' interests are complex and malleable rather than
straightforward and fixed: actors' identities, interests and preferences are socially
constructed through interactions with foreign firms as well as with other domestic firms
9 There are important exceptions, as noted in the opening sections of this chapter. For a rational choice
approach to institutional change that incorporates many of the sociological concepts used in this
dissertation in dynamic game theoretic models see Grief (2006) as well as Bowles' (2009) evolutionary
game theoretic approach.
10 Future work will expand these methods to include causal process observations and within-case tracing of
causal mechanisms (Mahoney, 2010).
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and the government, and they have the capacity to test the boundaries of institutional
constraints (Thelen & Mahoney, 2009; Herigel .This approach does not require an
external shock to see a change in actors' interests, preferences or institutional constraints.
Change can arise endogenously through social interactions that are deeply inscribed with
the use of power, which in the context of this research can be defined as economic actors'
ability to shape the preferences of others (c.f. Weingast, 2002; Mahoney and Thelen,
2009).
A conception of ideas and beliefs as essential constitutive elements of policy preferences
along with the central role of temporality in the process of preference formation calls for
a historical social scientific approach. The empirical strategy to unearth these processes
involves tracing processes through which critical events and experiences shifts actors'
perceptions of the problems and the available solutions. In this way, policy is only partly
driven by material forces and the institutions that arose to cope with them; the ways in
which actors make sense of their interests and evaluate the policy options that might
allow them to be realized are socially constructed. Thus the empirical strategy to
understand how policy preferences are formed involves efforts to reveal the processes
and experiences that shift actors' perceptions of problems a firm, government or nation
faces and the available solutions. These need not be considered as critical junctures as in
a punctuated equilibrium model, but rather as transformative historical processes.
III. Dissertation Structure and Chapter Organization
This final section provides an overview of the chapters in the dissertation.
Chapter Two
Chapter Two is entitled Theorizing Preference Formation and Categorization. It provides
an extensive elaboration of the theoretical argument introduced in this chapter and made
in the dissertation. It does so by locating the argument firmly in the inter-disciplinary
literature on new institutionalism.
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Chapter Three
Chapter Three is entitled Institutional Origins: the Rise of Economic Nationalism in India
(1870-1905). This chapter identifies the institutional origins of Indian economic
nationalism in the late 19th century. It explains how Indian nationalists emerged, how
these actors' preferences towards foreign capital were shaped. The chapter lays the
foundations of the institutional environment in which the politics of industrial
policymaking in the post-independence import substituting industrialization and
economic liberalization periods took place. Empirically, the chapter proceeds by focusing
on the discourse and debates of the period. That is, it shows how these debates shaped the
emergence of nationalist preferences, and highlights the implications for economic
policy, industrial development and market outcomes in late colonial India.
The chapter begins to operationalize the theoretical framework introduced in the previous
chapter in two ways. First, it provides a balanced view of the structural and cultural
determinants of institutional origins by showing how institutions were mutually shaped
by subjective-cultural and objective-material factors. The approach captures the crucial
link between the concrete material processes of British imperial hegemony and the
uneven development it created, and the cultural categories of meaning and practice --
including those of imperial domination as well as nationalist resistance -- that co-evolved
in the late 19t century global political economy. Rather than assessing these material and
cultural factors as separate or competing explanations, as do strands of the political
economy literature from rational choice to pragmatic constructivism (cf. Lake and
Powell, 1999; Levi, 2009; Herrigel, 2008, 2010), it argues that they are in fact but "two
translations of the same sentence" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) that should be placed
in the same analytic framework (cf. Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992;
Fligstein, 2008). Social structure is thus "dually" comprised of structural-material as well
as cultural-constructivist resources. Second, the analysis places actors and agency at its
core. The chapter shows how Indian nationalist actors creatively combined indigenous
and foreign ideational and cultural resources to develop novel cognitive and cultural
schemas suited to their own political-economic context and used these to challenge
British imperial hegemony. Agents play a central role in this framework through their
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capacity to "reinterpret and mobilize an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas"
and to "transpose and extend [those] schemas to new contexts" (Sewell, 1992:19; see also
Goswami 2002:784). This agency-centric view contrasts with alternative cultural
approaches such as the 'world society' theories of Meyer et al (1997) that analyze the
diffusion of ideas but see the adoption by actors as passive imitation. (Go, 2012). This
chapter and the wider dissertation argue that the empirical reality was anything but. The
chapter thus begins to demonstrate the utility of the theoretical framework developed in
the previous chapter for providing richer explanations of political economic outcomes.
This agency-oriented cultural sociological approach accords well with political
economists' focus on conflict and contestation. The utility of the framework is revealed
in this chapter through the contradictions of the British colonial project and the entry
points it provided for nationalist agents who had knowledge of imperial cognitive and
cultural schemas, that is, the system of intellectual control that the British wielded
through science and economics. This knowledge empowered well-positioned actors to
devise creative critiques that informed the nationalist position. Thus actors' location in
social structure is important but is not deterministic as structural-functional theories
suggest. Instead, structural position in socially defined categories of class, race,
nationality, wealth, education, occupation and social prestige provide "knowledge of
different schemas and access to different kinds and amounts of resources and hence
different possibilities for transformative action" (Sewell, 1992:21).
Chapter Four
Chapter Four is entitled Constructing Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy:
Indigenous Economic Agents and Modernizing 'Indian Economic Man'. The objective of
this chapter is to describe the emergence of Indian capitalists as political actors in the
industrial policy domain. It builds on the analysis of imperialist-nationalist political
discourse in Chapter Three by examining the cultural construction of what British
colonial actors referred to as 'Indian Economic Man'. The chapter has both theoretical
and empirical goals. It continues the constructivist critique of political economy by
offering an alternative approach to understanding culture in the discipline while
21
providing insight to the emergence of indigenous capitalists as both economic and
political actors in the field of industrial development during the first three decades of the
20& century. This not only buttresses the analysis of the evolution of preferences towards
foreign capital in the Indian political economy, the cultural categories that were
developed and deployed in this period served as crucial factors in shaping the political
discourse that alternatively legitimated and delegitmized the role of both foreign and
domestic capital in the post-independence period. The legitimating representations and
social meanings that these categories provide are central for understanding Indian
preferences towards foreign capital.
The analysis draws on a combination of primary archival and secondary sources to
consider the relationship between three sets of actors: colonial authorities, nationalists
and indigenous capitalists. It begins by identifying a common problem that nationalist
and imperial actors faced: the 'traditional' economic conventions of 'Indian economic
man' were considered incommensurate with the institutions of modern capitalism and the
development ambitions of Indian economic nationalism. It shows how these competing
actors arrived at a similar binary view of Indian business actors despite their otherwise
diverging political aims. It does so by presenting the conflicting orientations and
objectives of colonial and nationalist actors before identifying how the dichotomy
between 'traditional' and 'modern' that shaped the legitimacy of foreign and domestic
capital nevertheless served both of their purposes.
The chapter also assesses the response of indigenous capitalists and highlights their
attempts to navigate this politically contentious and dynamic institutional environment.
While colonial and nationalist actors provided conflicting representations of emerging
Indian capitalists, it shows that they were neither political tools nor cultural dopes; they
displayed significant agency in resisting the attempts of modernizing imperial and
nationalist actors to categorize them as backward. They challenged this cultural
categorization by organizing and projecting an image of themselves as 'modern'
economic actors, thereby asserting a role as expert managers of the Indian economy and a
viable alternative to foreign capital in the nationalist pursuit of industrial development.
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Chapter Five
Chapter Five is entitled Contesting Modernity Amidst Global Uncertainty: Competing
Visions of India's Future and the Meaning of Development. The chapter builds on the
analysis in Chapter Three, which described the emergence of a relatively cohesive Indian
economic nationalism organized around imperial resistance and economic drain theory in
the late 19th century. This first wave of nationalist frustrations with colonial rule exploded
in the swadeshi movement and boycotts of British manufactured goods around the turn of
the century. Chapter Four revealed how these nationalist agitations led to the beginning
of formal interactions between the Indian National Congress and colonial authorities as
the latter sought to address nationalist grievances, particularly around indigenous
industrialization. While political contestation in the period leading up to the First World
War was firmly the nationalist-imperialist mold, this chapter analyzes the fractures that
emerged amongst nationalist elites during the inter-war period in what had been a
relatively consensual understanding of Indian economic nationalism. This contestation
over the content of Indian economic nationalism was informed by competing cognitive
and cultural schemas, and is crucial for understanding the politics and foreign investment
policy direction of the soon-to-be independent India.
The chapter thus identifies critical historical antecedents of post-independence
policymaking in late colonial development debates as two new sets of nationalist schemas
emerged to challenge the imperial development orthodoxy. These schemas were based on
Mohandas Gandhi's moral philosophy and Jawaharlal Nehru's scientific socialism,
constituted the principal tools with which twentieth century Indian nationalists contested
colonial power as they approached independence in 1947. This contestation was a deeply
social process, with competing schemas designed to fit with particular constructions of
historical memory (cf. Abdelal, 2001). These schemas provided particular meanings to
the process of industrialization and development first to challenge imperial system of
thought based on classical political economy, and then increasingly turning to internal
contestation as the Indian National Congress moved closer to gaining state control.
Finally, both schemas assumed radically different roles for foreign and domestic capital.
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Gandhian development was based on small-scale village-based industry employing
'traditional' production technologies, but nevertheless retained a legitimating role for
large Indian capitalists as 'trustees of the nation's wealth'. Nehru's scientific socialism,
by contrast, relied on the state as the legitimate economic actor that would control the
economy from the 'commanding heights' as a means of driving modem industrial growth
through large-scale capital and technology-intensive industry. Private Indian capital was
relegated to a subordinate role in consumer-oriented industries and would be tightly
controlled by an elaborate industry licensing system. Crucially, the rationalized causal
logic and social meaning of these conflicting schemas prescribed radically different roles
for foreign investment. Both Nehru and Gandhi saw foreign capital as the tool of British
imperialism. However, foreign capital and technology were a necessary evil under
Nehruvianism in order to acquire the technologies need to build 'modern' industry; the
problems of legitimacy they presented would be addressed by managing private capital
through statist control mechanisms. By contrast, foreign investment had no role to play in
Gandhianism given its reliance small-scale industry using indigenous technologies. This
shaped competing preferences towards foreign investments by adherents of Gandhianism
and Nehruvianism that persisted in the post-independence period.
Chapter Six
Chapter Six is entitled Constructing Economic Interests and Policy Preferences in Post-
War India and Brazil. The chapter places the wider argument of the dissertation in cross-
national comparative perspective by examining post World War II industrial development
efforts in India and Brazil. It explores the tension between rational-materialist and
cultural-constructivist theories of political economy by comparing foreign direct
investment policy preferences in India and Brazil. It shows how, despite occupying
similar structural positions in the global political economy, having similar development
goals of transforming their countries from primary commodity producers into modern
industrial powers, and facing similar financial, technological and other material
constraints in promoting manufacturing industry, India and Brazil adopted radically
different approaches to regulating foreign capital. These differences were not limited to
government policy; Indian and Brazilian business actors also pursued different strategies
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in engaging with foreign firms despite their similar size and organizational capabilities
and facing the same global economic environment characterized by the aggressive post-
war expansion of US multinational firms.
The chapter then identifies the source of the radically different preferences towards
foreign direct investment. It describes how these differences emerged from historically
rooted variation in beliefs about the role of foreign versus domestic firms in the industrial
development and wider modernization project. These beliefs informed the development
of distinct cognitive schemas that provided actors with rationalized causal ideas linking
FDI with industrial development outcomes. These rationalized causal ideas were
underpinned by historically experiences that ascribed salient social meanings to the role
of foreign capital in the pursuit of industrial modernity. Brazilian business and
government actors welcomed multinational corporations as collaborative partners who
could play a central role in capital accumulation and industrialization, while their Indian
counterparts also recognized foreign firms were crucial sources of technology but viewed
them as neo-imperialist instruments, and hence were much more wary of engaging with
multinationals. Foreign capital was thus placed in contrasting categories of legitimacy in
both countries. The chapter provides further empirical support for the main argument of
the dissertation that economic actors' policy preferences cannot be deduced based on
assumptions of rational behavior and economic actor's position in the socioeconomic
structure. Preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas, rationalized causal
ideas imbued with historically salient social and political meaning. Economic interests
and policy preferences thus are not automatically given; preferences are formed through
historically embedded sociopolitical processes that shape the experiences and beliefs of
economic and political actors.
Chapter Seven
Chapter Seven is entitled Agency and Creativity in Schema Construction: Populist
Socialism and Aspirational Consumerism. Having shown how preferences emerge and
differ across similarly situation actors, Chapters Seven and Eight outline the socio-
political mechanisms through which foreign direct investment (FDI) policy preferences
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change over time. Chapter Seven does so by analyzing socio-political contestation at the
state level. Chapter Eight continues by shifting the level of analysis to consider how firms
and other societal actors engage in processes of contestation over FDI rules in the domain
of the state.
This dissertation has shown that preferences are neither fixed nor exogenously
determined but are shaped by socially constructed cognitive and cultural schemas.
However, this raises the following question: if actors see the world through the
interpretive frames of schemas -- widely held belief systems that posit rationalized causal
ideas imbued with deep social and historical meaning -- how do schemas and hence
preferences change? If preferences are not unambiguously given, but are developed
through a social process in which actors utilize cognitive and cultural schemas to
interpret the world and their situation within it, what are the mechanisms through which
this process might unfold? Do preferences change through processes of social learning
where actors seek new economic ideas and information to update their preference
orderings via 'rational' processes of Bayesian learning (Bates et al, 1998; Weingast,
2005)? Or do preferences change through more 'constructivist' processes where actors
adopt new ideas that diffuse through epistemic networks and alter their belief systems
(Dobbin et al, 2007)? That is, does the process occur solely in the minds of individuals or
is there a social dimension where collective social meanings and widely held
understanding come in to play. Finally, is there a role for discourse, debate and political
contestation in the process of adopting new ideas (Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2008)? And are
these alternative 'sociological' and 'scientific' mechanisms of preference change
compatible, as the three-stage model in Hall's (1993) seminal article argues, or are they
inherently incommensurable, as Blyth's (2011) critique suggests?
This dissertation argues that while both rational Bayesian and social learning perspectives
rightly stresses the role of causal ideas, a crucial missing element is the social meaning
with which causal ideas must be imbued, the salient historical narratives in which they
must be embedded and the cultural symbols that must be utilized in conveying causal
ideas in order for them to be fully internalized. That is, ideas that are weakly embedded
26
or do not fit the historical narratives and collective social memory of a given society have
little chance of resonating with societal actors much less shaping preferences and
behavioral outcomes. Imbuing ideas with social meaning is thus crucial, but it does not
happen naturally; it requires significant agency and creativity on the part of strategic
political and economic actors. These actors, often prominent figures in business or the
state with access to valuable social, political and economic resources, utilize widely
understood cultural symbols to devise and deploy new schemas that posit different roles
for foreign and domestic capital in the nationalist development project (Douglas, 1986;
Swidler, 1986; Sewell, 1992). This dissertation thus contributes to the literature on
preferences, social learning and the politics of ideas by highlighting the socio-historical
and cultural embeddedness of ideas along with the role of agency in shaping political and
economic outcomes, which are often downplayed or ignored in rational choice, historical
institutional and even some sociological institutional formulations of the new institutional
literature."
This chapter will show how preferences change as established cognitive and cultural
schemas become delegitimized by economic and political developments that violate the
promise and expectations of the dominant view. These developments provide an
opportunity for strategic actors to construct novel schemas by imbuing new causal ideas
with salient social meaning. India's rich and dense social fabric, replete with generations-
old socio-economic, ethnic and religious tensions that are continually reproduced through
cultural tropes embedded in the social memory provides the perfect empirical setting to
elaborate this theoretical argument of the source of preferences in cognitive and cultural
schemas. The chapter builds on earlier arguments by highlighting the agency and
creativity demonstrated by Indira Gandhi as she developed and deployed new schemas:
first populist socialism when she first became Prime Minster during the tumult of the late
1960s, and then aspirational consumerism upon her return to power in 1980. While the
analysis of changing schemas and FDI preferences in this chapter remains largely at the
policy level, the next chapter highlights the political contestation that took place through
discourse and debate between state and firm actors and the implications for preference
" This is a central argument of the 'twin-tensions' framing in the introductory chapter.
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change. This discursive contestation occurred when the aspirational consumerist schema
that heralded the beginning of economic liberalization in the 1980s fractured in the 1990s
as an increasing number of state and business actors attempted to recast it ways that
would serve their perceived interests. Throughout both chapters the analysis is oriented
around FDI policy, beginning with state actors in this chapter before shifting to the
interaction between state and firm actors in Chapter Eight. The dissertation thus
concludes by highlighting the interaction between FDI policy and firm strategy,
particularly around Indian firms' joint venture strategies with multinational corporations.
Chapter Eight
Chapter Eight is the final empirical chapter. It is entitled Constructing Cultural
Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in the Liberalization Era (1991-2012). The chapter
begins by outlining the theoretical framework that reveals the role of culture and
cognition in category construction and deployment. It briefly recounts the long-run
empirical backdrop to the liberalization period that illustrates the emergence of the
cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern' in the late 1 9 th century and their and
persistence through the post-independence period. The narrative then turns to the
acceleration of the economic liberalization from 1991 onwards. It first presents the
rationalized causal ideas that underpinned both state and firm preferences towards foreign
direct investment in the initial years of the reforms, before analyzing the backlash against
FDI liberalization that emerged amongst leading Indian economic actors. It shows how
actors imbue rationalized causal ideas with salient social meaning as they develop and
deploy competing representations of domestic and foreign business practices in the
domain of policy contestation. This emerging conflict amongst business actors was not
restricted to the elite realm of business politics; it was deeply embedded in the wider
political dynamics of the mid-late 1990s. The chapter charts the rise of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), a new political party that challenged and ultimately displaced the
dominant Congress Party. This political conflict was conducted in part by political actors
deploying cultural resources as weapons in the raging FDI debates. The chapter then
turns to the imposition of a major policy rule known as Press Note 18 that dramatically
alters the institutional environment that shaped market interactions between domestic and
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foreign firms in joint venture relationships. It analyzes the causal ideas and social
meanings that underpin the creation of Press Note 18. It does so through a brief
comparative case study of two Honda joint ventures, and then considers the reaction to
the policy change by foreign and domestic firms. The chapter then describes how
competing actors developed and deployed new socially meaningful ideas in the 2000s in
response to state intervention and new market developments.
Conclusion
Chapter Nine provides the conclusion to the dissertation. It summarizes the overall
argument, provides a discussion of the theoretical contribution the dissertation makes to
the new institutional literature in political economy and sociology. It does so by
reiterating the role of social meaning and culture as an crucial component of actors
preferences that is often underplayed in the political science literature, as well as the
importance of agency and contestation in the preference formation process, an element
that should be accorded greater analytic attention in sociology.
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CHAPTER 2
Theorizing Preference Formation and Categorization
I. Introduction
Interests, preferences and institutions are the central analytic concepts used to explain
human behavior and economic outcomes in comparative and international political
economy. This is especially so in the 'new' institutionalisms, whether the rational choice,
historical institutional or sociological variants that simultaneously re-emerged as distinct
paradigms in the 1980s and 1990s (Hall and Taylor, 1996). This renewed interest in the
study of institutions has produced an increasingly fruitful inter-disciplinary exchange in
the social sciences, particularly as scholars realized that the debate about institutions over
the past three decades was due less to paradigmatic wars than to each approach
responding to the behaviorism of the 1960s (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998).1
This recognition revealed commonalities among the competing paradigmatic approaches
to institutions that in turn has led to growing theoretical dialogue (Immergut, 1998;
Thelen, 1999; Campbell and Pederson, 2001; North, 2005; Katznelson and Weingast,
2005; Scott, 2008; Hall, 2010) and is becoming increasingly apparent in empirical work
(Mahoney, 2000; Greif, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Mahoney and Thelen,
2010).2
The literature sees preferences, interests and institutions playing an important role in
shaping human action, but competing paradigms disagree on the constitution of actors,
interests and institutions, and the nature and direction of the causal relationship between
1 The behaviorist approach sought to apply 'scientific' methods to human behavior through a focus on the
individual at the expense of institutions, as well as an emphasis on deductive rather than interpretive
approaches.
2 In addition to theoretical arbitrage, this has also been reflected in methodological innovation, where the
analytic methods that have traditionally been associated with particularly approaches - statistical analysis
and game theory in rational choice, archival research and macro-historical narrative in historical
institutionalism and ethnographic and other interpretive methods in sociological institutionalism are now
being employed to a greater degree across approaches, as evinced in the trend towards multi-method
research.
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them. This reveals the twin tensions at the 'theoretical core' of the new institutionalisms.
There is a tension between materialist and constructivist sources of preferences and
interests, and a tension between structure and agency. The location of different
institutional approaches on each of these intersecting dimensions provides distinct
theoretical predictions of the sources of interests and preferences that shape economic
agents' political behavior and produces policy and economic outcomes.
This dissertation explores these twin tensions by focusing on the evolution of the formal
and informal institutions governing foreign direct investment (FDI) policy and the
participation of foreign firms in the Indian economy from the late colonial period through
the present (1870-2012).3 Institutions are conceptualized as more than just 'rules of the
game' (North, 1991): they are more comprehensively defined as "sets of regularized
practices with a rule-like quality, [that] structure the behavior of political and economic
actors" Hall (2010:1). Institutions play an important role in shaping actors preferences by
ascribing legitimate roles to foreign and domestic firms in the Indian economy, but
institutions themselves are created through dynamic and contested sociopolitical
processes as actors struggle to shape the rules, beliefs and norms that govern economic
life. Actors and institutions are thus mutually constituted.
The dissertation addresses the following question: where do economic interests and
policy preferences come from? The dissertation challenges dominant theories by
analyzing how the foreign direct investment policy preferences of domestic firms and the
government evolved over time, from resisting openness to FDI that would maintain a
protected market to promoting liberalization of FDI policy and greater entry of
multinational firms. It shows that political economy theories predicting economic and
political actors' policy preferences are naturally endowed, are determined by socio-
economic structural position or are produced by rational calculation are misleading.
3 Formal institutions include policies, laws and other government regulations that specify the conditions
under which foreign-owned firms can participate in the Indian economy. Informal institutions refer to the
social norms that shape the ways in which in which foreign firms have been considered by Indian business,
government and the wider public. Most importantly, "institutions above all else [are conceived of] as
distributional instruments laden with power implications" (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010:9). These
institutions shape the pattern of distribution between foreign and domestic firms.
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Economic agents' policy preferences towards FDI are neither fixed nor structurally
determined; they are malleable and are constructed through processes of social
construction and political contestation. These sociopolitical processes emerge as
economic and political actors seek to establish themselves or their favored group as the
legitimate actors through whom the development ambitions of the nation should be
pursued. [Institutions play a crucial role] by providing the interpretative frames that allow
actors to distinguish between competing cognitive and cultural categories of 'legitimate'
and 'illegitimate' foreign and domestic economic actors. This contestation is always
fierce, particularly under the pervasive conditions of environmental complexity and
heightened uncertainty that characterize periods of crisis, institutional change and
economic reform. These moments of indeterminacy highlight ongoing agency as socially
embedded actors struggle to shape the institutional domain to their advantage by
legitimizing themselves as the agents through which national goals articulated by the
state can be realized while simultaneously delegitimizing their competitors in the
institutional domain. Analytic attention to long run sociopolitical dynamics reveals
continuous processes of socio-political contestation that are sometimes lost in punctuated
equilibrium models predicated on long periods of statis and short sharp periods of
change. The dissertation argues that order to understand the process of preference
formation we must understand the ways in which socially embedded agents continuously
interact with their institutional environment. The policy arena and the market are zones of
political contestation where economic and political agents seek to establish legitimacy
and entrench dominant positions.
Foreign direct investment policy in India provides an excellent domain within which to
analyze this process. This dissertation shows how actors seek to present themselves as
legitimate instruments through which the development ambitions of the state can be
realized. It shows how actors seek to legitimate themselves and delegitimize others by
developing and deploying cognitive and cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern'
business practices. These categories then serve as devices through which the legitimate
role of foreign and domestic firms in the project of national development is understood.
Institutions are the key devices through which actors are legitimatized, but institutions
33
themselves are created through active socio-political processes of human agency. The
dissertation thus contributes to a growing literature on institutionalism in the field of
comparative and international political economy. It promotes new understandings of the
mutual constitution of preferences, actors and institutions that can provide richer
explanations of political behavior and economic outcomes.
The dissertation draws insights from comparative political economy and economic
sociology to develop a rich inter-disciplinary theory of preference formation. This theory
then provides the analytic framework for the empirical analysis in the wider dissertation.
This rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The concepts of economic interests and
policy preferences are frequently invoked in the field of political economy and are central
to social scientific understandings of behavior, but they are often conflated and poorly
defined. Section II specifies a definition of economic interests and policy preferences. It
argues that preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas -- rationalized
causal ideas imbued with historically salient social meaning -- then describes how this
definition of preferences is operationalized in the analysis of FDI policy in India. Having
laid this foundation, section III presents a critique of dominant approaches of deducing
policy preferences from economic actors' structural position. Section IV then moves
beyond static sources of preferences to assess shortcomings in models of dynamic of
preference change via Bayesian learning. It provides an alternative view of preference
formation as a social and political process that takes place through the development and
deployment of cognitive and cultural schemas. Section V then briefly outlines an analytic
role for power in the process of preference formation. Section VI and VII operationalize
the argument in two important ways. First, Section VI identifies the rationalized causal
ideas and social meaning embedded in cultural schemas as mutually reinforcing but
analytically separable components that constitute policy preferences, and shows how
economic agents deploy these as resources in trying to shape the institutional domain of
FDI policy. Socially meaningful causal ideas are embedded in salient narratives and
cultural symbols that are used to convey conceptions of technical artifacts such as
economic theory and industrial technology. Section VII then directs attention from the
theoretical foundations of preference formation to the role of cultural categories of
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capitalist legitimacy. This section theorizes the role of categories as cognitive and
cultural devices in the preference formation process. It shows how categories are
deployed to legitimize and delegitimize foreign and domestic economic actors in the
course of policy contestation and institutional reform. The chapter concludes with a very
brief summary in Section VIII.
II. Theorizing Preferences and Interests in Political Economy
Political science still asks all too rarely why an actor believed the means he adopted
would have the effects he anticipated and where those beliefs originated. When we say
that an actor, whether an individual or a government, took a particular set of actions to
further his interests, even if we know what his interests were, we need to know why he
had any reason to believe such actions would serve those interests well. 4
Economic interests and policy preferences are the fundamental conceptual building
blocks in political economic analysis of the policymaking process. Preferences are central
to accounts of purposive action but leading scholars nevertheless lament that "preferences
remain a relatively primitive category of analysis" (Katznelson and Weingast, 2005). The
challenges appear to be fundamental, as Frieden (1999:39) notes that "scholarly attention
to the sources of national or sub-national interests - or, as we call them, preferences - is
wrought with confusion." 5 Despite their centrality in the social and behavioral sciences
preferences and interests are poorly defined. As such, it is important that clear definitions
of interests and preferences as distinct though related concepts are established at the
outset of this analysis.6
4 Hall (2005:135).
5 It is worth noting that in making this important point even Frieden himself appears to conflate the terms,
reflecting the challenge in distinguishing these key analytic concepts. Frieden's (1999) broader argument
though is that there is a strong need for more theoretical work on preferences, and he is particularly keen
that scholars separate interests and preferences from actors' strategic setting, which he defines as including
uncertainty and institutions, amongst other environmental factors. These play an important role in my own
formulation. In later work, Frieden and Lake (2005:149) provide a more clear distinction in where interests
are defined as how individuals or groups are affected by particular policies, with preferences relating to
different policy options. This is closer to the definition that I provide below.
6 While this analysis focuses on narrowly economic policy preferences rather than fundamental interests, it
is important to clearly establish the relationship between them.
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In his rich intellectual history The Passions and the Interests, Albert Hirschman (1977)
defines interests as 'valued ends.' Interests reflect the ultimate outcomes or states of
being that economic actors want to achieve. Interests and preferences are intimately
related: preferences refer to economic actors' conceptions of available alternatives that
they believe will allow them to achieve their desired ends.7 Actors' rationalized beliefs
about causal means-ends relationships are thus central to the substantive content of policy
preferences. Further, the process through which they acquire those beliefs underpins the
always-contested socio-political dynamics of preference formation (Hall, 2005:155).
The substantive content of these rationalized causal ideas are most often provided by
economic theories that posit causal relationships between FDI and development
outcomes. However, as this chapter and the wider dissertation show, there are competing
theories and ideas at play in the scholarly and policy literature on the developmental role
of FDI. This creates space for political contestation between economic and political
actors wielding competing causal ideas as they battle to shape the policy and institutional
environment in their favor (Beland and Cox, 2011). The nature of these ideas and
contestation between actors is central to preference formation and thus is elaborated in
the ensuing sections of this paper.
Rationalized causal ideas are a crucial cognitive element of preferences that allows actors
to link means with ends. As the next two sections show, the importance of causal ideas
and ideas in shaping actors preferences is increasingly well-recognized in literature from
across rational choice, historical institutional and sociological strands of the new
institutionalisms, though they are operationalized through radically different
7 The corollary in the microfoundations of neoclassical economic theory would be utility, which is a
measure of satisfaction and is synonymous with interests. Preferences would reflect the bundle of goods
that an actor believes would maximize her utility i.e. allow her to achieve her interests. See also North's
(2005:23) discussion of the role of beliefs in determining choices, which in turn shape social structure.
Belief formation - and the cognitive processes of learning that underpin them - is central in his theory of
institutional change. Elster (2005:248) defines preferences as "a preference ordering over policy options".
Further, "An outcome-oriented motivation needs to be supplemented with causal beliefs to yield a policy
preference. More simply: to achieve an end you need to form a belief about means to that end. This is true
of the pursuit of common interest as well as of private interest."
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mechanisms.8 However, there is a second cultural dimension of preferences that is
largely ignored across the new institutionalisms. This cultural dimension complements
the individual level rationalized cognitive element by providing a role for historically
rooted and inter-subjectively understood social meanings, symbols and tropes in shaping
actors preferences.9
The relationship between the cognitive and cultural dimension of preferences requires
further elaboration. The growing consensus in the new institutionalisms on the role of
causal ideas, such as those provided by economic theory, is consistent with my argument
that preferences are comprised in part of rationalized causal ideas. However, a crucial
missing element in new institutional conceptions of preferences is the social meaning
with which causal ideas must be imbued, the salient historical narratives in which they
must be embedded and the cultural symbols that must be utilized by actors in conveying
causal ideas to others in order for them to be fully internalized. That is, ideas that are
weakly embedded or do not fit the historical narratives and collective social memory of a
given society have little chance of resonating with societal actors much less shaping
preferences and behavioral outcomes. Imbuing ideas with social meaning is thus crucial,
but it does not happen naturally; it requires significant agency and creativity on the part
of strategic political and economic actors. These actors, often prominent figures in
business or government with access to valuable social, political and economic resources,
utilize widely understood cultural symbols and historical narratives to devise and deploy
new schemas and categories that posit legitimate roles for foreign and domestic capital in
the national development project (Douglas, 1986; Swidler, 1986; Sewell, 1992). This
dissertation thus contributes to the new institutional literature on preferences, social
learning and the politics of ideas by highlighting the socio-historical and cultural
8 Goldstein and Keohane (1993) refer to "causal ideas" as the "means-ends schemas used to assess whether
a specific set of actions will produce the intended results... Such causal ideas are constitutive elements of
fundamental preferences, defining what game theorists sometimes term the pay-off matrix that precedes
judgments made about the likely behavior of others" (also cited in Hall 2005:135). A potential issue may
lie in the extent to which uncertainty is ignored in this formulation. The effects of uncertainty play a major
role in the discussion in this chapter and the rest of the dissertation.
9 This cognitive element operates primarily in the mind of the individual, as compared with inter-
subjectively held social meanings and cultural symbols that are shared across members of a group (cf.
DiMaggio, 1997; Rathbun, 2008).
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embeddedness of causal ideas along with the role of agency in shaping political and
economic outcomes. This crucial social and historical dimension of preferences is often
downplayed or completely ignored in rational choice (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993),
historical institutional (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 1997; Blyth, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Beland and
Cox, 2011) and even some sociological institutional formulations of the new institutional
literature that otherwise emphasize the role of causal ideas.
We can now take these definitions and apply them to the economic policy realm, where
interests might be assumed to be profits or simply survival for firms and economic
growth and 'development' for policymakers.10 Economic policies are courses of action
undertaken by the government in order to achieve particular desired economic
outcomes." These policies always have crucial distributional implications. FDI policies,
for example, determine the levels of equity ownership and managerial control that foreign
economic actors can hold in firms located in the Indian economy, and the rules and
conditions under which domestic and foreign firms both collaborate and compete in the
market. Economic policy preferences thus reflect the socially meaningful rationalized
causal ideas that actors believe will allow them to achieve their interests. This definition
10 These assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity in my theoretical model. For example, firms'
interests may be maximizing market share, which, as models of monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior
from the field of Industrial Organization suggest, may have little to do with maximizing profits, at least in
the short run; alternatively, we know from economic sociology that firm goals may be oriented around non-
material goals such as legitimacy, prestige or other social rewards. My assumption is relatively simple: they
want to survive and make money. Similarly, politicians interests may lie in re-election, or simply gaining
personal wealth, goals which also may or may not be related to wider national goals such as economic
growth or 'development', that latter which itself has multiple meanings. The multiple meanings of
'development' for state actors are the focus of analysis in the upcoming chapters. In the case of firms I opt
to focus on profits as straightforward and reasonably defensible assumption that is consistent with the
empirical observations of Indian and multinational firm behavior, but the theory of preference formation
proposed in this chapter and illustrated throughout the dissertation is robust and amenable to relaxing these
assumptions. The analysis in the dissertation shows that economic growth and structural transformation has
always been central to the legitimacy of colonial and post-colonial governments in India. However, the
means of achieving these end states, and the role of FDI in accomplishing it, is the source of massive
debate and contestation.
" These can include monetary policies to achieve a given level of savings, investment and perhaps
ultimately inflation (amongst other potential targets), tax policies to achieve a given level of revenue
collection, or foreign direct investment to achieve economic growth or a particular balance of domestic and
foreign ownership of firms in the national economy. Within a given economic policy domain - monetary,
fiscal, trade or foreign direct investment - there are a variety of policy alternatives drawn from a feasible
set that could be applied (c.f. Elster, 1985). Monetary policy can be conducted through different
combinations of interest rates and levels of money supply, or different levels of ownership that foreign
economic actors are allowed to hold in firms that are located in the domestic economy in the case of foreign
direct investment.
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emphasizes the crucial interpretive role of preferences that is, actors' interpretations of
available policy options. It captures actors' conceptions of the extent to which alternative
policies options will allow them to achieve their interests, as well as the perceived
distributional effects i.e. how economic actors believe policies will affect them relative to
others within their institutional field.
Preference formation is thus the process by which actors determine the most appropriate
means through which to achieve their desired ends. Beliefs and strategic considerations -
two key analytic concepts from alternative institutional paradigms - are thus always
central elements of policy preferences, and play an important role in the theory of
preference formation developed in this dissertation. This is especially so for firms in
oligopolistic industries such as automobiles and pharmaceuticals, given that their
performance is measured in relation to their competitors as they fight for market share,
profits and growth. Thus actors have preferences for different economic policies because
they have a set of beliefs about how each of these policies will allow them to achieve
their desired ends.
Given these definitions we can illustrate the relationship between interests, preferences
and outcomes that guides the analysis in this dissertation. We begin by assuming that
economic agents - policymakers or firm managers - have a set of economic interests,
which may be economic growth in the case of government or profits that will ensure firm
survival in the case of managers. Policy preferences then reflect the policy means (e.g.
the regulations) through which policymakers or firms believe they can achieve their
desired ends: that is, the types of FDI policies that may be good for economic growth or
domestic firm survival, respectively and crucially, the social meaning(s) they attach.
Actors' preferences then indicate the type of political behavior we might expect, such as
lobbying activities as economic actors seek to convince others of the efficacy of their
preferred policy approach and thus shape the policy and institutional environment.
Preference formation captures the process through which actors determine which FDI
policies might best achieve their perceived economic interests. Economic agents may
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have material goals, but their economic policy preferences, which is to say the courses of
government action they wish to see employed, cannot be deduced unproblematically from
their fundamental interests or their structural position. Preferences are shaped by
cognitive and cultural schemas - rationalized causal ideas imbued with salient social
meaning - that serve as interpretative frames through which actors make sense of their
environment, evaluate options and motivate action.
The construction of cognitive and cultural categories is a crucial mechanism through
which these socio-political processes occur. The classic works of Emile Durkheim and
Max Weber provided a social-psychological mechanism of cognition through which
actors make sense of the world. Durkheim (1915) argued that the human mind creates
categories in order to map the complexity of their environment. These frameworks are
not only situated in the individual consciousness, they are inter-subjectively shared across
individuals and groups through institutions and social interactions. The creation of
cognitive categories is thus itself a social activity (Dobbin, 2004). Durkheim (1915)
provided the social underpinnings of cognition by identifying the human inclination to
collectively make sense of world by classifying things and attaching meaning to them
(Dobbin, 2009). This approach has been central to research programs in behavioral
economics, cognitive psychology and other social scientific disciplines (DiMaggio, 1997;
Mullainathan et al, 2008; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Behavioral economists have
adopted ideas of 'coarse sorting' to show how actors group situations into categories to
which they apply standard inferential models. Economic sociologists have illustrated the
role of categories in directing financial flows and policy rents to market actors
(Zuckerman, 1999). However, categories like wider institutions don't just constrain
action; they also serve as enabling cultural resources for strategic action, as scholars from
across the disciplines have increasingly shown (Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio, 1997; Fligstein
2001; Mullainathan et al, 2008). This link between cognition and meaning-making is seen
through classifications of legitimate and illegitimate capitalists that came to the fore at
crucial moments of Indian economic history such as when the state attempts to impose
new institutions. Armed with this understanding of the relationship between economic
interests, policy preferences and processes of categorization, the next section undertakes
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a critical consideration of how FDI policy preferences have been theorized in the
literature on the politics of FDI policy.
III. Structural Weaknesses:
Deducing Policy Preferences from Structural Position
The conventional approach to determining policy preferences in comparative and
international political economy - whether its rational choice or historical institutional
variants - is to derive economic actors' policy preferences from their structural
position. The widely held proposition that domestic incumbent firm preferences will
lead them to lobby against FDI liberalization draws support from neoclassical economics.
Neoclassical theory predicts "supernormal" monopoly profits come from imperfectly
competitive industries (Tirole, 1988). This provides incumbent producers in profitable
concentrated industries with an incentive to prevent entry of competitors to protect their
monopoly profits (Stigler, 1971). Private interests are thus expected to organize and
lobby for the private non-welfare maximizing benefits of protection (Olson, 1965;
Stigler; 1971, Peltzman, 1976; Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
In this view, multinational corporations (MNCs) pose a serious competitive threat to
domestic incumbents, particularly those located in developing countries. MNCs exist as a
strategy of transnational capital seeking higher returns on firm-specific assets. While
international portfolio capital captures returns via factor price equalization, owners of
firm-specific capital are vulnerable to incomplete contracting problems and thus avoid
arms-length market transactions. Establishing a physical presence through FDI is the
solution to securing returns on firm-specific capital in foreign markets. MNCs tend to
operate in oligopolistic industries (Caves, 1996). Their deep pockets and superior access
12 While all of the new institutional approaches I introduced in the previous section provide clear
predictions about FDI in India, the rational-material approach in IPE has provided the dominant
explanations in the field, hence it is the focus of this critique. As the chapter progresses and I elaborate my
own theory of preference formation I broaden my critique to other new institutional traditions, and embed
my approach in the wider trajectory of institutionalist thought.
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to technology allow them to overcome foreign market entry barriers and the "liability of
foreignness" that arises from their unfamiliarity with the cultural, political and economic
features of the local environment (Zaheer, 1995). Once established, MNCs' firm-specific
resources and capabilities are translated into competitive advantages that threaten to
reduce domestic incumbents' income and market share, increase competition in labor and
product markets, and pressure domestic incumbents to exit (Barney, 1991; Caves,
1996).13
Analytic approaches for determining domestic firms' policy preferences rely on
deduction from theoretical expectations of changes in firm income and profits arising
from the implementation of alternative policy options. The main divide, broadly applied
in the politics of international economic relations, is between factor and sector-based
approaches. Factor-based approaches rely on the Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theory, which
suggests that when factors of production can move freely between sectors, policy shifts
from protection to liberalization will increase the income of owners of factors that are
relatively abundant in the economy (i.e. those in which the economy is well endowed)
and lower the income of owners of the relative scarce factors (i.e. those in which the
economy is poorly endowed). In developing country contexts like post-war India and
Brazil, which comprise the objects of comparison in Chapter Six due to their structural
similarities but divergent business and state preferences, owners and intensive users of
scarce factors (usually capital) will be expected to support protection while owners and
intensive users of abundant factors (usually labor) will support liberalization. Political
conflicts emerge from differences in preferences between broad class coalitions, which in
turn are based on a given country's factor endowments (cf. Rogowski, 1989; Scheve and
Slaughter, 1998).
By contrast, sector-based approaches rely on the Ricardo-Viner model. It assumes that at
least one factor is fixed such that factors associated with sectors facing foreign
13 There is an alternative argument in the economics and international business literatures that FDI may
benefit domestic firms through productivity improving technology spillovers but this is largely absent from
the international political economy literature on the politics of FDI (though see Pandya, 2007). However, it
plays an important part in the actual politics of FDI policy, as I show later in this chapter.
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competition lose from liberalization. Following this model, and to the extent they are
immobile, both capital and labor in import-substituting manufacturing sectors will be
expected to oppose liberalization. Thus capital and labor in the protected post-war Indian
or Brazilian automobile industries should both oppose FDI reforms. Political conflicts
occur across sectors with cross-class coalitions of capital, labor and landowners who
stand to benefit from liberalization on one side pitted against cross-class coalitions that
stand to lose on the other. The key is factor specificity, i.e. the extent to which factors are
closely tied to their sectors (cf. Milner, 1988). In summary, both of these theories predict
- albeit via different mechanisms - that industrial capital in developing countries such as
India will resist liberalization and lobby for protection. How then can we explain
similarly situated Indian and Brazilian government and firm actors' contrasting
preferences for FDI in the immediate post-war period, when Indian automobile firms
sought limitations of the participation of foreign capital in India while their Brazilian
counterparts were far more welcoming to multinationals? Not only does this structural
approach fail to explain this sort of cross-national variation, these static approaches face
challenges in explaining preference change, such as many Indian firms' growing
preferences for FDI reforms in the post-1991 liberalization era. Chapter Six of the
dissertation reveals the weaknesses of these structural approaches through cross-national
comparison of varying preferences between India and Brazil that demonstrates the utility
of recognizing preferences as socially and historically embedded cognitive and cultural
schemas, while Chapter Eight demonstrates the utility of an understanding of preferences
formation as dynamic and highly contested social and political process where preference
change cannot be explained by deduction from structural position.
Open-economy Politics
The exclusive focus on material sources of preferences in the literature merits further
attention. In many respects, Peter Gourevitch's (1986) claim that "what people want
depends on where they sit" might be seen as the early forerunner of material interest-
based approaches in comparative and international political economy (Blyth, 2009).
However, the analytic move to combine political analysis with economic theory as
described in the previous section aimed to provide parsimony and predictive power
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though at the cost of Gourevitch's richness (Ibid). David Lake argues that deducing
interests is the essential innovation of "open economy politics," which "begins with sets
of individuals - firms, sectors, factors of production - that can reasonably be assumed to
share (nearly) identical interests" and derives preferences over economic policy from
each actors structural location (Lake, 2009:50). Indian firms' FDI policy preferences
would thus be deduced from their structural position relative to multinational competitors
in the global economy. These assumptions are vigorously defended as the standard for
comparative and international political economy (Frieden & Martin, 2002; Lake, 2009).
The open economy politics (OEP) approach was developed in the 1970s to explain the
significant variation in protectionism that was observed across countries and industries,
and over time. It was rooted in dissatisfaction with earlier political economic analyses
that were seen as unsystematic and lacking rigor. Frieden and Lake (2005:143) illustrate
the point by citing Harry Johnson "who famously ascribed many countries' protectionism
to a 'taste for nationalism,' [and] a willingness to 'direct economic policy toward the
production of psychic income in the form of nationalistic satisfaction, at the expense of
material income."' By contrast the adoption of deductive economic approaches such as
those based on 'rigorous' Ricardo-Viner and Stolper-Samuelson theories produced
testable hypotheses and generalizable results thus underpinning a revolution in
approaches to determining economic interests, policy preferences and political economic
outcomes (cf. Alt and Gilligan, 1994). Concrete materialist interests displaced fuzzy
cultural and ideational goals.
While this analytic approach grew out of trade analyses such as Rogowski's (1989) well-
known study of the sources of cleavages in political coalitions, it is widely applied as the
standard approach to non-trade areas of international economic relations including
international financial and monetary policy (Frieden, 1991; 1994; 2005), product markets
(Keohane and Milner, 1996; Bates, 1998), labor markets (Rodrik, 1997; Iverson, 2005)
and foreign direct investment (Pinto, 2003). Theoretical and empirical developments in
OEP later led scholars to incorporate the impact of domestic and international political
institutions as mechanisms of preference aggregation and sites of bargaining amongst
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competing societal interests at the domestic and inter-state levels (Milner, 1999; Lake and
Powell, 1999; Frieden and Lake, 2005).14 OEP thus represents an important development
in the wider 'institutional turn'.
Much of this research was conducted by economists and was driven by a normative
question that puzzled many of its proponents who wondered 'Given that freer markets
and economic liberalization is clearly good for countries, "Why don't governments do
what is obviously best for their societies?"' (Rodrik, 2008). By contrast, political
scientists saw "protection as the norm" and sought to explain why countries would
liberalize at all: "Politically, protection seem[ed] eminently reasonable" (Milner, 1999).
In economics, this question became a topic of interest for the voluminous public choice
literature that applied neoclassical market analytic tools to non-market domains of social
and political life. The mood of the time is best summarized by Gary Becker's
pronouncement that "the [neoclassical] economic approach is comprehensive one that is
applicable to all human behavior" (Becker, 1976:8). Economic policies were the outcome
of the political influence of powerful rent-seeking interest groups rather than
idiosyncratic nationalism, as in the earlier Harry Johnson quote (Buchanan and Tullock,
1962; Stigler, 1971; Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock, 1980; Grossman and Helpman,
1994).15 Policy arenas characterized by diffuse costs and concentrated benefits such as
trade and FDI were seen as particularly vulnerable to the rent-seeking activities of well-
organized groups. Despite important criticisms, especially of the strict behavioral
assumptions upon which it rested, the literature served to orient theorists on the
distributional effects of economic policy and the implications for political action. We
now turn to consider these three issues - behavioral assumptions, distribution and action -
in greater detail.
14 Frieden and Lake (2005) see work on the mutual interaction between domestic and international political
economy that incorporates both levels of analysis without imposing artificial barriers between them as the
next step in the OEP research program.
15 These developments in the subfield of political economy reflected the growing dominance of
neoclassical theory in economics and influence on other social science disciplines. Research programs in
the political economy of development were significantly shaped by this public choice literature, particularly
Krueger's seminal (1974) paper on the 'political economy of the rent seeking society' as well as
Bhagwati's (1982) formulation of 'directly unproductive profit-seeking activities' (DUPs). See Maxfield
and Schneider (1997) for a critique and discussion of how business collective action in developing
countries can generate positive development outcomes.
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Preference Ambiguity
These structural deductive theories, either separately or in combination (e.g. Hiscox,
2002), have done much to advance scholarly understanding of the sources of economic
policy preferences in comparative and international political economy. Nevertheless,
they have important limitations. Deduced preferences do not explain what in reality are
far more ambiguous responses to liberalization. Economic actors reveal complex
preferences that are a priori difficult to ascertain, even within a particular social class
(e.g. manufacturing capital) or industry (e.g. automobiles). This has been demonstrated
by empirical studies across a variety of country contexts (Schneider, 2004). Kingstone
(1999) reveals how Brazilian industrialists did not resist external liberalization in the late
1980s and 1990s. Domestic capital changed positions and joined reformist politicians in a
powerful coalition for free trade despite decades of privileges under import substitution
policies. Similarly, in Mexico large domestic firms played a crucial role in supporting
Mexico's trade reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Thacker, 2000). In both cases,
entrenched domestic incumbents that had reaped significant gains from protection
appeared to act against their structurally determined preferences.
Preference ambiguity is not limited to developing country contexts. Woll (2008) shows
how major US and European telecommunications firms like AT&T, Deutsche Telekom
and France Telecom were unsure of their policy positions over liberalization of the global
telecommunications industry. Their preferences evolved over the course of the
negotiations from resistance to active support. The same findings hold when examining
firm preferences in other realms of business politics. Martin (1995; 2006) reveals the
striking indeterminacy of US firms' preferences for healthcare and labor market policies
in the 1990s and 2000s. She is joined by Swenson (1991) and Mares (2003) in a growing
critique of approaches that read business preferences off of structural capital-labor
cleavages, which shows how capital has in many cases pushed for pro-labor policies.
This dissertation builds on these scholars' findings on the malleability and complexity of
business preferences by highlighting empirical outcomes from foreign investment
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reforms in India. The archival and field research conducted over the past five years
similarly reveals that economic actors' preferences are far more ambiguous than
structural-deductive theories predict.
Chapter Six places the argument in cross-national comparative perspective by examining
post World War 1I industrial development efforts in India and Brazil. It shows how,
despite occupying similar structural positions in the global political economy, having
similar development goals of transforming their countries from primary commodity
producers into modern industrial powers, and facing similar financial, technological and
other material constraints in promoting manufacturing industry, India and Brazil adopted
radically different approaches to regulating foreign capital. These differences were not
limited to government policy; Indian and Brazilian business actors also pursued different
strategies in engaging with foreign firms despite their similar size and organizational
capabilities and facing the same global economic environment characterized by the
aggressive post-war expansion of US multinational firms.
The chapter shows how these radically different preferences emerged from historically
rooted variation in beliefs about the role of foreign versus domestic firms in the industrial
development and wider modernization project. These beliefs informed the development
of distinct cognitive schemas that provided actors with rationalized causal ideas linking
FDI with industrial development outcomes. These rationalized ideas were underpinned
by historically experiences that ascribed salient social meanings to the role of foreign
capital in the pursuit of industrial modernity. Brazilian business and government actors
welcomed multinational corporations as collaborative partners who could play a central
role in capital accumulation and industrialization, while their Indian counterparts also
recognized foreign firms were crucial sources of technology but viewed them as neo-
imperialist instruments, and hence were much more wary of engaging with
multinationals. Foreign capital was thus placed in contrasting categories of legitimacy in
both countries. The chapter provides further empirical support for the main argument of
the dissertation that economic actors' policy preferences cannot be deduced based on
assumptions of rational behavior and economic actor's position in the socioeconomic
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structure. Preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas, rationalized causal
ideas imbued with historically salient social and political meaning. Economic interests
and policy preferences thus are not automatically given; preferences are formed through
historically embedded sociopolitical processes that shape the experiences and beliefs of
economic and political actors.
Chapter Eight analyzes interviews and public statements of central government officials
and managers of leading firms in industries such as automobiles reveals that their
preferences over FDI policy emerge from a complex process of deliberation and
contestation that takes place under conditions of significant uncertainty about the
implications of FDI reforms for firm performance, industrial development and wider
economic growth. The focus on preference formation as endogenously determined
through a social and political process rather than preferences as an exogenous apolitical
outcome of an actor's position in the socioeconomic structure aims to improve our
theoretical understanding of the economic interests actors pursue and the ways in which
they engage in the policymaking process.
IV. Preference Formation as a Contested Social and Political Process
The previous section focused largely on what might be considered 'static' policy
preferences that can be deduced solely from economic actors' structural position. This
section turns to consider the dynamics of preference change, which requires analysis of
the interaction between competing actors in the political economy and interrogation of
the behavioral models assumptions underpinning competing approaches to human action.
The analytic focus on how economic actors - individuals, groups, firms, sectors or factors
of production - are differentially affected by competing economic policy alternatives
underpins predictions about policy preferences, political behavior and economic
outcomes.16 Deducing policy preferences from economic theory has significant scholarly
16 Similarly, Buchanan (2003:1) contends that "The hard core in public choice can be summarized in three
presuppositions: (1) methodological individualism, (2) rational choice, and (3) politics-as-exchange."
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appeal. However, the rational actor model upon which it relies has restrictive behavioral
assumptions that has been the focus of attention across the new institutionalisms. This
section addresses the cognitive dimension of preferences as cognitive and cultural
schemas that was elaborated in Section II. It does so through focus on the role of causal
ideas as well as the mechanisms of Bayesian learning in the dynamics of preference
formation and change. The level of analysis in this section is largely subjective, that is, it
focuses on the cognitive processes taking place 'in an actor's head'. The ensuing sections
of the chapter will turn to the cultural dimension of preferences and highlight the
complementary inter-subjectively held and widely shared social meanings in which
causal ideas must be embedded.
Cognitive Limitations:
Rationality and Behavior Under Complexity and Uncertainty
Prominent rational choice political scientist Margaret Levi (2009:118) suggests that the
comparative advantage of rational choice lies in the assumption that individual actors
with fixed and exogenously determined preferences make reasoned choices given the
likely choices of others, subject to contextual and institutional constraints. Levi argues
that the strategic interaction approach provides strong micro-foundations to macro-
processes in comparative and historical political economy analyses that often rely on
'descriptive' narratives that are presumed to lack rigor (Ibid: 127; see also Bates et al,
1998; Frieden, 1999). Levi (2009) notes that the weaknesses, however, arise from the
model's narrow behavioral assumptions. The rational actor model relies on the critical
assumption of complete information, which is rarely found in a world characterized by
information asymmetries and pervasive uncertainty. Uncertainty not only arises from lack
of information, but from the "complexity of causal relations in the social world which
leads to unintended consequences and prevents the [rational] anticipation of outcomes"
(Beckert, 1996:820). This has not only been a major area of analytic attention for macro-
institutional analysts, but also for organizational scholars focusing on environmental
complexity generated by multiple 'institutional logics' (Battilana and Dorado, 2010;
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012; Suddaby et al, 2010; Wry et al, 2013). This
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complexity makes it difficult for actors to determine the rationalized causal relationships
that provide the cognitive content of policy preferences.
New institutional economists have responded to these challenges by incorporating many
of the significant developments in subfields of economics including information
economics and signaling theory (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1974), bounded
rationality (Simon, 1976), transactions costs (Williamson, 1975, 1985; North, 1991),
coarse sorting (Mullainathan et al, 2007) as well as technical advancements to capture
multiple equilibria in general equilibrium theory and the use of game theory in deeply
historical institutional analysis (Greif, 2005). Given these and related theoretical
innovations, many new institutional theorists in the rational choice tradition would accept
the claim that economic agents may lack the cognitive capacity to determine their
interests under conditions of uncertainty, and would instead suggest that boundedly
rational actors undergo a process of learning through Bayesian updating.1 7 As
information is generated in the environment and received, economic actors update their
priors and adjust their behavior, eventually bringing their actions in line with the
predictions of deductive theory, if only with a time lag. Learning through Bayesian
updating thus offers an important alternative explanation for preference change, and it
has been increasingly incorporated in comparative and international political economy.
Complex situations are conceptualized in terms of risk, and political and economic
behavior is viewed as an outcome of a cost-benefit calculus where optimizing decisions
are based on probabilistically weighted outcomes (Beckert, 1996; Woll, 2008). The
rational actor model is deemed saved.
It is important to recognize that ideas, typically associated with historical institutional
challenges to rational choice institutionalism, are in fact central to this process. The
Bayesian updating process has an important place in the social learning literature
(Weingast, 2005; Bates et al, 1998). However, it is the mechanism through which ideas
shape preferences that distinguishes rational Bayesian learning from alternative
17 North's (2005) view of institutional change as a rational adaptive process provides a good example of the
macro-level implications of this approach. It is particularly relevant to this research given North's view of
institutions as a human response to problems of Knightian uncertainty.
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sociological and historical institutional approaches. As Weingast (2005:162, 162) argues,
"people's preferences over actions change as a result of changing ideas.. .rational
individuals change their minds in the face of evidence, and in so doing often change the
political ends they pursue and the policies they prefer."' 8 The process is akin to actors
refining their beliefs through processes of information search to support continuous
hypothesis testing, akin to conducting a cost-benefit analysis. In this theoretical
framework, empirical 'evidence' is objectively and unambiguously assessed by actors,
unfiltered by a socially embedded subjective or interpretive frame, as this dissertation
suggests is the case. In the rationalist framework causal logics and ideas are detached
from social meaning; actors are assumed to be able to judge different policy options
objectively and chose their preferred policy approach accordingly.19 The findings of this
dissertation suggest that this is at best a limited approach, as it ignores the social meaning
that actors attach to causal relationships. This cultural dimension not only aids
interpretation by helping actors to make sense of complexity through use of cultural
symbols, narratives and tropes, by providing social meaning it also motivates action.
Nevertheless, learning through rational processes of Bayesian updating serves as the
dominant explanation for preference change in comparative and international political
economy (Bates et al, 1998; Lake and Powell, 1999; Frieden and Martin, 2001). 20
18 Goldstein and Keohane (1993) further refer to "causal ideas" as the "means-ends schemas used to assess
whether a specific set of actions will produce the intended results.. .Such causal ideas are constitutive
elements of fundamental preferences, defining what game theorists sometimes term the pay-off matrix that
precedes judgments made about the likely behavior of others" (cited in Hall 2005:135). Ideas serve as
roadmaps in the authors' rationalist formulation.
19 Thus an interpretive-subjective 'cultural' construct is absent in this largely positivist-objectivist model.
20 An alternative approach employed in sociological institutional analysis also sees preferences emerging
from ideas, but actors' adoption of new ideas is not an outcome of rational processes of Bayesian updating;
rather, actors learn new ideas through epistemic communities. As new policy ideas are developed they are
transmitted through global networks of policy and management experts. Actors adopt ideas deemed to be
legitimate by their peers and appropriate to the local circumstance(s) they face, and their common
education and training experiences facilitates the acceptance of the rationalized causal ideas embedded in
these new policies. That is, they 'fit' with what they have been taught and their acceptance further confers
legitimacy to these actors who, despite their location in peripheral economies and societies, solidify their
membership in the international community of experts. A, third approach associated with historical
institutionalism, most notably Hall (1993), attempts to bridge the gap between the calculative mechanisms
of rational choice Bayesian learning and 'sociological' approaches through which new ideas enter society
through epistemic communities. This social learning approach emphasizes power and persuasion via
authority contests through which new ideas gain legitimacy. These authority contests rely on discourse and
debate as actors armed with competing causal ideas underpinned by contrasting meaning systems, contest
in the political domain. This approach is most compatible to the view advanced in this dissertation.
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Constructivism has emerged as a more fundamental challenge to the rational actor model.
Many in this tradition agree that actors behave purposively and attempt to maximize, but
question the process through which they determine their utility valuations and whether
under conditions of uncertainty they have the necessary information and the cognitive
capacity to optimize based on clear preference orderings (Beckert, 1996; Whitford,
2002).2 The issue is not whether actors behave 'irrationally' by acting against their self-
interest, but rather how 'intentionally rational' actors make sense of their economic
interests in complex situations and the implications for purposive behavior.
An example from data collected during my fieldwork illustrates the point and casts doubt
as to whether preferences arise as a result of Bayesian learning processes. In a revealing
interview with senior management representatives of a leading Indian automobile
assembler we discussed whether changing views towards FDI emerged from a rational
process where the management team constantly analyzed productivity, output, sales and
similar data - as the Bayesian learning model would suggest - and used this information
to revise their views towards FDI policy and the presence of multinational firms. Our
discussion focused on a crucial period of the reforms of the firm's own history. They
were ending a long-standing partnership with a major multinational corporation and
simultaneously developing a make-or-break new model. This is precisely the type of
moment when firms might be expected to be particularly sensitive to the FDI policy
environment. The response was that: "[We] never have all the numbers. And even if [we]
did [have] the numbers, they mean different things to different people."2 2 The ways in
which economic actors interpret limited information is the central determining factor.
21 Economic sociologists reliance on purposive behavior counters the critique of an view of actors as
'cultural dopes' which is sees actors' behavior as over-determined as its 'rational fool' utilitarian
counterpart (c.f. Kabeer 2000; Dobbin 2004). This longstanding disciplinary divide is reflected in
Duesenberry's (1960, p. 233) oft-quoted line caricaturing the difference between sociology and economics:
"Economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology is all about why they don't have any choices
to make." Also, following Sewell (1992) does not privilege material structure in providing the cultural
schemas that drive actors i.e. many sociologists see structures as material and culture as the causal outcome
of these material structures (Beisel and Kay, 2004:503).
22 Interview C23, April 2011. Emphasis added.
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The reality is that even if actors had the cognitive capacity to engage in this rational
calculus there is rarely sufficient information with which to update probability matrices
and formulate and order their preference. Under these circumstances, the process through
which Indian firm managers determine what FDI policies would best ensure their survival
becomes an open question: actors may be unable to determine the means that will best
allow them to realize their interests in survival and profitability. Deducing interests from
structural position based on assumptions of rational behavior may be seriously
23
misleading.
Preference Formation Under Complexity and Uncertainty
The existence of pervasive uncertainty raises serious questions about the ways in which
economic agents formulate their preferences in complex environments. Consider the
situation facing policymakers and firms in post-1991 India: domestic economic reforms
were being instituted after more than thirty years of the highly restrictive import
substituting regime pejoratively known as the 'license-quota-permit raj', and against the
backdrop of the increasingly disconcerting phenomenon of globalization. This was a
period of rapid institutional transformation when actors' understandings of their social
and economic worlds were thrown into flux. A rational-material view suggests that
Indian policymakers and firms faced these environmental changes as situations of risk,
where information is available for the calculation and assignment of weighted
probabilities to alternative policy outcomes, thus facilitating a cost-benefit calculus and
maximizing behavior. This view is not borne out by actual experience in India. By
contrast, constructivists see a world of Knightian uncertainty where situations of
economic change are characterized by an absence of information from which to formulate
probabilities and order policy preferences (Beckert, 1996; Abdelal et al, 2005). More
fundamentally, uncertainty is conceptualized as a lack of knowledge about causal mean-
ends relationships (Beckert, 1996; Whitford, 2002; Blyth, 2007; Woll, 2008). These
23 Instead, interviewees from this firm described a process through which they opted to partner with a firm
with which it had previously had an agreement with during the import substitution era, even though thirty
years had passed since that arrangement had been terminated because of a 'sense of relationship'. In fact,
many large Indian manufacturing-sector firms appear to follow firm-level routines wherein they opt to
reinvigorate old partnerships. By contrast, Okada (1999) found that the decisions of many medium-sized
auto firms was based on mimetic isomorphism and 'follow the leader' strategies (cf. DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Haveman, 1993).
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causal ideas provide the substantive rationalized content of actors' policy preferences an.
This alternative view signifies that preferences are not unconsciously adopted, as
sociological institutional formulations relying on the smooth flow of ideas through
epistemic networks suggest. It raises the question of how economic actors make sense of
these complex situations under conditions of uncertainty, particularly since in
competitive environments they cannot afford to be paralyzed by uncertainty: they must
act.
Purposive and intentionally rational behavior arises from social interactions that serve to
facilitate the sharing of competing causal ideas claiming to be 'optimal' FDI policy
solutions to achieve the fundamental interests of Indian business and state actors: firm
profits and economic growth. This alternative approach to behavior under uncertainty
recognizes actors' cognitive limitations and the complexity of their environment.
Economic policy preferences are not generated exogenously from actors' structural
position, but rather arise endogenously through social interactions where economic
agents get together to "decide what they want and what to pursue" (Hall 2005:129).
Preference formation is a dynamic discursive social process of intensive engagement
between key economic actors from foreign and domestic firms and the state.
This view of endogenously determined interests and preferences has a rich intellectual
history. Karl Marx recognized the complex process through which individual actors and
groups developed conceptions of their interests, and how experience shifts a group's
understanding of its situation. Antonio Gramsci (1971) developed this notion further by
showing how discourse and narrative can be used to shape actors' perceptions of their
interests, thus comprising important tools in the exercise of political power. Endogenous
preferences also played a central role in the early institutionalism of Thorstein Veblen
(1899), who saw institutions as 'shared habits of thought' that created the social context
within which preferences were formed (Hodgson, 2004; Kingston and Caballero, 2009).
Preferences and institutions are mutually constitutive, a view that is growing with the
increasing dialogue between the 'new institutionalisms' as was noted in the introductory
section of this chapter.
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This raises important theoretical and analytic challenges. If the complexity of causal
economic relationships creates uncertainty that precludes actors from determining their
preferences "because the actual effects of actions cannot be fully anticipated," analysts
must turn to the cognitive and cultural mechanisms "that agents rely upon when
determining their actions without knowing what to do in order to maximize their
outcome" (Beckert, 1996:814). A view of preference formation as an active social
process where agents engage in joint efforts to interpret information, make sense of their
environment and formulate responses that they believe will best allow them to achieve
their desired ends provides powerful insights into political dynamics and institutional
development. This process is documented throughout this dissertation, from early
economic nationalist interactions between nationalist leaders like Dadabhai Naoroji and
R.C. Dutt in Chapter Three, or business leaders like G.D. Birla and J.R.D. Tata and top
policymakers such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Morarji Desai and T.T. Krishnamachari in the
late colonial and early independence period (-1940-1955) analyzed in Chapters Four,
Five and Six. As Chapters Seven and Eight show, these business-state interactions
became even more contentious between senior politicians and bureaucrats in the Ministry
of Finance and Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Confederation of Indian
Industry in the early reform period of the 1980s and 1990s (Kochanek, 1995; Kantha and
Ray, 2005; Sinha, 2005). This process of firms discussing problems and beliefs about
appropriate solutions amongst themselves and with the government gives rise to
significant opportunities for agency through processes of persuasion (Blyth, 2003;
Abdelal et al, 2005). Actors' preferences are shaped and re-shaped over time through this
active social and political engagement. Critically, the content of preferences driving
economic actors intentionally rational behavior must be populated by explanatory factors
that go beyond rationalized causal ideas to include factors that arise from their social and
historical context (Beckert, 1996; Whitford, 2002; Hall, 2005. This cannot be
accomplished through imputation; it requires empirical study of social relations to
understand how firms define and redefine their interests and preferences in a priori
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unpredictable ways (Woll, 2008). Variation in policy preferences at the firm, industry
and country levels will arise from social, political and cultural factors rather than simply
material interests, structural location or rational learning.
V. The Role of Power in Preference Formation
The process through which preferences are shaped provides a clear role for power, which
is a controversial concept in the new institutionalisms. We have argued that preference
formation is a process where actors determine which means are most likely to advance
their ends. This involves "the development and deployment of causal ideas and efforts to
persuade others of their validity. These processes entail the formation of 'technologies of
control', through which causal relationships within the relevant parts of the social or
natural word are posited" (Hall, 2005:135). It is an active process where economic agents
engage in significant contestation based on competing causal ideas. Causal ideas become
"weapons in distributional struggles" by defining both the causes of a perceived problem
as well as the solutions for solving it (Blyth, 2001). Efforts at persuasion through social
interaction are central to the process of preference formation (Blyth, 2007; Schmidt,
2008).
Power has always been a central analytic concept in the social sciences. Marx saw power
as much more than coercion; power reflected the ability of actors to shape how others
saw the world and made sense of their own interests. Weber saw power as operating
through legitimation, where actors comply because they believed it is in their interest.
However, despite its importance in early social theory and political economy, power has
been unevenly incorporated across competing strands of new institutional analysis, a
point that is revealed by exploring the intersecting dimensions of the twin tensions
discussed in the introductory section. Structural-material theories such as those in the
24 Woll (2007:12) suggests that under conditions of Knightian uncertainty "firms will rely on social
devices to reduce uncertainty, such as traditions, networks, institutions and the use of power. These devices
will become an important selection mechanism between several competing pathways to maximize self-
interest."
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historical institutionalism paradigm have long accorded an important role to power (cf
Skocpol, 1979; Steinmo and Thelen, 1992), a likely reflection of its genealogical roots in
Marxist analysis. Power in this tradition operates through sanctions on agents for non-
compliance, often through control of material resources or outright violence (Mahoney
and Thelen, 2010b). By contrast, more agency oriented materialist traditions such as early
rational choice theories saw institutions as devices of voluntary cooperation that resolved
collective action problems to the benefit of all (cf Shepsle, 1989). This benign view
tended to ignore power (though with important exceptions cf. Knight, 1992; Moe, 2005;
Levi, 2009).
Constructivist analysis falls into two camps with respect to the inclusion of power that cut
across the structure-agency divide. Structural-cultural approaches that rely on the
institutionalization of taken for granted assumptions provided by cultural norms, such as
Dobbin's (1994) exemplary account of how state actors embedded in different national
cultures shaped variation in cross-national industrial policy outcomes, tended to
downplay the distribution of power and resources amongst relevant actors in their
explanations of the way the state organizes the economy (Campbell, 1998).25 Similarly,
the agency-oriented pragmatist approach has gained much attention for their view of the
creativity of agents that allows them to forge new institutional arrangements largely
unhindered by the fetters of social structure. Pragmatists criticize institutional approaches
that confine agents within the bounds of national institutional arrangements, with Hall
and Soskice's (2001) 'varieties of capitalism' framework often serving as their principal
foil.26 Agents have the ability to creatively recompose their institutional context of even
break away from it entirely (Herrigel and Wittke, 2004:334). Pragmatists promote a
"reflexive character of action in a social economy" where, for example, suppliers in
25 Antecedents to this sociological institutional perspective can be found in Meyer and Rowan (1977) and
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Both of these see institutions and legitimacy as a constraint on actors, though
note DiMaggio (1988) on agency and Fligstein (1997) on social skill (see also Beckert 1999).
26 The focus on VOC is particularly interesting, not only because of its immense influence on the field of
comparative political economy in the 2000s, but more so because of its intellectual roots and trajectory.
Hall and Soskice (2001) is the collaborative product of a historical institutionalist who on one hand fits well
in the Marxist-inspired structural-material mold but is also credited with bringing the ideational turn to
comparative political economy that influenced a new generation (cf. Hall 1986, 1989, 1993; Blyth, 2002,
2011) and a rational choice economist.
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declining industrial districts can reformulate their relationships with assemblers and other
key players in the face of new competitive pressures, such as those arising from
globalization (Ibid; see also Sabel and Zeitlin, 1997; Sabel, 2006; Herrigel, 2008;
Herrigel and Zeitlin, 2010; Herrigel, 2010; Whitford, 2005; 2011). However, while
pragmatist agency-oriented approaches accord well with institutional concepts like
Fligstein's 1997 'social skill', pragmatists have been severely criticized for underplaying
the role of power that is central in Fligstein's power-cultural approach in inter-firm
relationships, where suppliers are typically seen as being in subordinate positions relative
to assemblers, based on their size and structural location in the global economy (cf.
Farrell, 2011).27
More recently, power has been incorporated explicitly across the divides of new
institutional analysis. Rational choice-based accounts such as Farrell's (2005) analysis of
inter-firm cooperation contrasts sharply with Herrigel's (2008) pragmatist account; 28
while Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) sweeping historical treatment of the emergence
of capitalism and democracy as driven by actors exercising social, political and economic
power brings contemporary rational choice institutionalism into dialogue with the classic
analyses of Barrington Moore (1966) and Theda Skocpol (1979).29 Similarly, power
relations have played an increasingly central role in sociological institutional work, as
political and economic sociologists have extended the classic view of power and
preferences through empirical studies that highlight inter-related mechanisms of power
and social construction (Dobbin, 2004:6). Fligstein (1990) showed how shifts in
conceptions of management over the course of the twentieth century were not based on
changing rationales of efficiency as economic historians (Chandler, 1977) and
27 This tradition that spans much of the Global Value Chain literature (as well as work in economic
geography) going back to at least Gary Gereffi's early work, which it should be noted emerged from the
power-infused 'neo-Marxist' dependency tradition.
See Farrell and Herrigel's revealing exchange based on Farrell's (2011) review of Herrigel (2010) and
Herrigel's (2011) response where they explicitly discuss the role of power in the competing theoretical
paradigms of new institutionalism and pragmatism, and the implications as seen in their own empirical
work.
29 Interestingly economists seem to be ahead of political scientists in this shift. Acemoglu and Robinson's
most recent book affords power an even greater analytic and causal role. Greif (2006) also discusses the
role of hierarchical power, albeit briefly. Moe (2005) also notes that public choice theorists also afforded a
role to structural power through rent-seeking interest groups. Levi (2009) joins him in calling for further
work on power by political scientists.
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institutional economists (Williamson, 1985) have argued, but rather were due to struggles
over corporate control by competing management groups. Roy (1997) showed how the
rise of the large American conglomerates at the turn of the twentieth century resulted
from a powerful group of bankers led by JP Morgan promoting the view that oligopoly
was efficient and thus gaining policy support for massive consolidation in early American
manufacturing industry, epitomized by firms such as US Steel. Perrow (2002) argued that
large-scale capitalism did not emerge in the US because it was more efficient than small-
scale production, as some economic historians have claimed, but was an outcome of a
small group of wealthy industrialists efforts to control the economy. Dobbin and Zorn
(2005) extend this "power-cultural" approach by showing how external groups designed
new corporate strategies and used their market power to impose them on firms. 0 In both
cases economic agents imposed their preferences for particular managerial models on
others, then used new theories of managerial efficiency to rationalize and legitimize their
actions ex post: operations, marketing and finance theories in turn in Fligstein's case and
theories of "core competence" in Dobbin and Zorn's.3 1 The empirical chapters of the
dissertation similarly show how powerful actors attempt to influence the preferences of
others through their engagement in the policymaking process at numerous points in
Indian economic history. These actors deploy causal ideas that suggest optimal
approaches to regulating FDI that will not only serve their own interests, but will be in
the interests of all. This is most evident in debates over MNC entry in Chapter Eight
where leading Indian industrialists frame their argument for restrictions on MNCs in
terms of ultimate technological benefits for the Indian economy writ large.
30 In the 1980s hostile takeover firms created the strategy of leveraged buyouts to acquire diversified
conglomerates and break them up, earning huge profits by selling the individual parts for more than the
whole. Promoters convinced shareholders and investors that they would reap benefits from higher share
prices and the wider economy would gain from a more efficient market for corporate control as part of the
quasi-populist "shareholder value movement". Two mechanisms were key, and both highlight the
interaction between material and constructivist factors in understanding preference change: first, the
promotion of stock option-based executive compensation, which aligned CEO's incentives with their own
and second, the role of securities analysts who "low-balled" diversified conglomerates, driving down their
share price and making them more vulnerable to hostile takeovers.
31 In later work, Fligstein (2008) has referred to the ability of "institutional entrepreneurs" to induce
cooperation in others as a critical "social skill" that allows actors to influence the direction of institutional
change. This is part of the push towards a more actor-centered view in economic sociology (cf. Campbell,
1998). See also Battilana (2006) who builds on DiMaggio (1988) to develop similarly agency-centric
institutional arguments in organizational studies (see also Beckert, 1999).
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These cases also illustrate how actors' relative resource endowments matter in dynamic
political economies characterized by contesting ideas and battles over distributional
outcomes. Given the asymmetric distribution of financial, organizational and political
resources all actors do not have the capacity to engage equally: everyone doesn't have the
same voice. This is not to suggest over-determinacy where causal ideas simply reflect the
material interests of the powerful, as Campbell (1998) stresses, but rather the importance
of considering the interaction between material interests and causal ideas. This provides a
realistic picture of purposive and competing agents striving to make sense of their
preferences and construct institutions that they believe will allow them to achieve their
fundamental interests. Power and agency are accommodated in accounts that retain
structure, providing excellent examples of the mutual constitution of actors, preferences
and institutions.
VI. The Substantive Content of Preferences:
Cognitive and Cultural Schemas as Rationalized Causal Ideas Imbued with
Historically-Salient Social Meaning
Evidence from my field research in India reveals that economic actors' efforts at
persuasion and deployment of persuasive discourse to influence preferences and attain
cooperation in shaping the institutions of FDI policy can be analyzed around three key
areas: rationalized causal ideas, socially meaningful symbols narratives and conceptions
of technology. These play a powerful role as mutually reinforcing but analytically
separable components of the means-ends relationships that constitute FDI policy
preferences. The section below provides greater insight into the roles of rationalized
ideas, symbolic narratives and technology in the process of FDI preference formation.
Rationalized Causal Ideas
Section II argued that rationalized causal ideas drawn from economic theory are an
essential constitutive element of policy preferences. By positing causal relationships
among economic variables, these rationalized ideas provide the substantive content of the
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cognitive link that economic agents make between government policies and economic
outcomes. Economic theory provides the causal connection between a given policy and
its economic outcomes and distributional effects. Hall (2005:141) argues that these
theories are "indispensable in the economic sphere since we do not see the economy with
the naked eye but live in the imagined economies constructed by economic theory."
Preferences thus turn heavily on the cause-effect relationships posited in prevailing
theories (Ibid). This is reflected in the twentieth century historical movement between
theoretical paradigms of Keynesianism and Monetarism in the advanced industrialized
countries, as well as from import substituting industrialization to economic liberalization
in the developing world. These epochal movements between techno-economic
institutional arrangements reflected shifts in distinct belief-systems based on competing
economic technologies. The rise and fall of Keynesianism in the US and Western Europe
was the outcome of changing policy preferences (Blyth, 2002), as was European
governments' decisions to enter into monetary union (Hall, 2005) as well as many
developing countries adoption of trade and investment policy packages associated with
neoliberal globalization and the Washington Consensus. Further, governments are not
alone in being susceptible to the ideas that drive these macro-institutional shifts; they also
occur at the firm level as the studies by Fligstein (1990) and Dobbin and Zorn (2005)
showed, and to which the findings of this dissertation also attest.
These theories are not simply technical artifacts, but rather function as mechanisms of
distribution, power and control. Just as the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism is
seen as having momentous distributional effects between capital and labor, not least as a
result of the impact on the viability of the welfare state, so too have the predictions from
economic theory about the effects of FDI policy provided the rationale for economic
agents' belief that a liberal FDI policy regime will be either good or bad for a given
sector, industry or firm. These theories and the policies they imply directly determine
distributional outcomes between foreign and domestic firms in India. Preference
formation is an inherently contentious and political process: it is a high stakes game.
However, the central role of economic theory in preference formation introduces an
element of indeterminacy as economic theory itself often provides ambiguous policy
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direction to economic agents, particularly under conditions of uncertainty. This provides
opportunities for economic agents to persuade others to pursue the courses of action that
they believe will best allow them to achieve their interests.
The indeterminacy of economic theory is well recognized in empirical studies of
policymaking. Hall (2005) showed how after 15 years of debate British officials were
unsure of whether joining the European Monetary Union would advance the nation's
interests. Even after inception the effects remained unclear. Certainly in the context of
FDI theory the relationship between FDI liberalization and economic outcomes for
domestic firms has long been ambiguous. FDI liberalization may either lead to
displacement of local companies as more efficient MNCs enter the market, or it may lead
to increases in domestic firm productivity and hence competiveness through
technological spillovers. These are the competing theories that shape FDI policy
preferences and contestation between actors in the policy arena.
As shown in section IV, the arguments against FDI liberalization rest on the expected
distributional effects of FDI liberalization, where efficient MNCs threaten to outcompete
and ultimately displace their domestic counterparts. By contrast, the main argument in
favor of liberalizing FDI in a developing country context sees MNCs' superior
technology as a potential advantage, suggesting that FDI facilitates productivity
spillovers that domestic firms can capture. A brief review of the literature serves to
highlight the issue. In early scholarship on FDI, Caves (1971) used sector-specific data to
find positive productivity spillovers from MNCs to local firms. FDI was held to provide
benefits through three distinct mechanisms: allocative efficiency through pro-competitive
effects, technical efficiency through demonstration effects and technology transfer
through access to know-how on favorable terms (Caves, 1974). These and similar results
were heavily promoted by powerful global actors such as the IMF and World Bank as
they pushed developing countries to adopt neoliberal economic reforms including
deregulated foreign direct investment regimes from the 1980s until today.
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These policies were promoted despite increasingly ambiguous evidence of the beneficial
effects of FDI, including the most widely cited article, which was co-authored by an IMF
economist. Aitken and Harrison (1999) critique studies using sectoral data by pointing to
identification problem: studies focus on industries where domestic TFP already high.
They use Venezuelan plant-level panel data and a fixed effects model to show that FDI
does not generate significant intra-industry productivity spillovers.32 Other studies have
increasingly found negative effects across factor and product markets. Aitken, Harrison
and Lipsey (1996) found that domestic total factor productivity was negatively impacted
as foreign competitors bid up wages and hired away talent workers. Markussen and
Venables (1999) found that local firm sales were hurt by MNC entry leading to
productivity decreases from the effects of adjustment costs on input usage or the ability to
capture scale economies. More recent studies have only increased the ambiguity by
identifying contingent effects: Javorcik (2004) found vertical spillovers arising from
backward linkages from MNC customers to their local suppliers, but no intra-industry
effects through horizontal spillovers or forward linkages. Buckley et al (2007) illustrated
a potential temporal effect through an inverted U-shaped relationship, with total factor
productivity rising with small levels of MNC entry and then falling as more MNCs enter
the market.
This theoretical and empirical ambiguity in the scholarly literature hardly deters
economic agents from drawing on these arguments in their efforts to convince others of
their preferred FDI strategy. On the contrary, these opposing economic arguments
32 Some find it somewhat ironic that the seminal paper in the field was co-authored by an IMF economist,
given that the IMF and World Bank have been unwavering in their claims that FDI promotes positive
sillovers for domestic firms.
3 Joint ventures have historically been posited as a solution to this distributional conflict, by encouraging
technology transfer from foreign to domestic firms, and as this dissertation will show, joint ventures have
been a central part of Indian FDI policy through its independent history. However, rather than reducing
political contestation over policies and preferences these hybrid organizational forms serve to bring the
tension between cooperation and competition amongst foreign and domestic firms from the policy arena
into the boardroom. This process is detailed in different historical periods in Chapters 3 and 5.
34 From a political economy standpoint it is important to note that most of these studies focus on the
sectoral or industry level and say little about distribution amongst domestic firms. That is, even if there are
positive spillover effects in a given industry such autos or pharmaceuticals which domestic firms might
actually capture them? This ambiguity brings us back to the original critique of rational-material behavioral
predictions arising from dominant political economy theories. It highlights the importance of uncertainty as
well as heterogeneity in beliefs between actors in providing a role for politics and persuasion.
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constitute valuable resources that are used by competing actors in their efforts to shape
FDI rules to their liking. Ambiguity creates a space for politics that would likely be
foreclosed if causal economic relationships were unquestioned. This policy contest to
influence preferences and outcomes takes place in a variety of public and private spaces.
The domain of public discourse through the media has been an especially brutal
battleground alongside closed-door discussions between individual firms, industry
associations, lobbyists and different representatives of the government. Domestic firms
that believe they can benefit from technology transfer from MNCs push for rules that
mandate local-foreign firm partnerships through joint ventures or the use of domestic
suppliers while others that are more skeptical of MNCs utilize theoretical arguments of
market stealing effects to make their case. Foreign firms are also important players in this
arena. They deploy theories that purport FDI providing broad efficiency gains at the
industry level and implications for employment and economic growth that shape key
actors preferences and wider public opinion.35 In the absence of a scholarly and policy
consensus the legitimacy of these competing theoretical arguments relies on factors that
are beyond the merits of the causal ideas themselves, including the social, economic and
political resources - which is to say the power - of economic agents striving to shape the
FDI field (Fligstein, 2008).36 It also heavily relies the extent to which competing actors
are able to imbue these causal ideas with historically salient social meaning, as is further
described below. These discursive dynamics are analyzed in greater detail in throughout
the dissertation using an array of historical and contemporary evidence from business and
government archives in India, the United States and the United Kingdom, interviews with
business and government representatives, policy documents, policy position papers from
industry associations and firms as well as policy statements and debates between key
protagonists that are carried out in the media and other areas of the public domain.
This argument, which is supported by evidence drawn from policy submissions by business actors and
statements in the media that illustrate opposing sides of these arguments, is detailed in the empirical
chapters of the dissertation, particularly Chapter Eight on the current liberalization period (1991-2012).
36 Social resources include legitimacy, economic resources capture the financial power that actors have to
promote their preferred view while political resources include personal relationships and connections with
politicians, bureaucrats and other key decision-makers.
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The Historically Salient Social Meaning in Cognitive and Cultural Schemas
Salient and social meaningful symbols and narratives play a key role in shaping
economic actors' policy preferences. Narratives are socially embedded cultural devices
that allow economic actors to make sense of the economic world by providing inter-
subjectively held interpretations of important events that shape actors' interpretations of
the rationalized causal relationships in the material world. Economic development and
modernization can be viewed as a series of "societal projects" (Dobbin, 2004) that are
based on a specific set of ideas - economic growth, industrialization, democracy - which
are operationalized in the policy realm by following the prescriptions of prevailing social
and economic theories that spell out the means to achieve them. In this respect "policy is
only partly driven by material forces.. .Its route also depends on sequence of events a
nation faces and grand narratives devised to explain what it should do in the face of such
events" (Hall, 2005:137). History and the interpretation and social meaning of past events
is thus central in understanding the policy preferences that actors hold.
Cultural symbols and economic theory have played mutually reinforcing roles in the
Indian FDI policymaking process. Actors try to comprehend otherwise technical and
ethereal economic policies by linking them to a larger sense of nation and history. How
else to make sense of the murky modalities of technological learning and the confusing
prescriptions of contradictory economic theories than to connect it with stories of travail
and triumph of entrepreneurial domestic firms? Tata Steel's late nineteenth century
struggle to establish a domestic steel industry against strident foreign opposition before
eventually prevailing against both the colonial government and British competitors and
rescuing India's nascent railroad construction projects during the steel shortages of World
War I provides an excellent example. Similarly, popular conceptions of the 'new
economy' I.T. giant Infosys have redefined how India is viewed in the global economy
and, more importantly, how Indian firms are viewed at home. The Infosys story has been
heavily employed to project a view of Indian firms as no longer the producers of shoddy
and outdated manufactured goods epitomized by the indefatigable Hindustan Motors
Ambassador with its 1950s design and engineering, an important narrative in itself that
needed to be replaced to make the unevenly distributed pain of neoliberal adjustment
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politically acceptable. It promotes FDI liberalization by shouting 'we can compete.'
'India Inc.' now symbolizes trailblazers of a rising India in the digital age of
globalization, churning out dozens of new billionaires each year amidst widespread
poverty and depravation and providing the inspiration for Thomas Freidman's (2005)
emblematic though certainly misleading The World is Flat.37
Analyzing narratives and the ways in which they are interpreted and reinterpreted over
time provides insights to the contested nature of history. It allows for "discerning how
one account comes to be accepted as 'what really happened' while other plausible stories
are rejected", and provides a perspective from the worldview of actors of why, in a given
context, certain actions are taken while others are either rejected or not considered at all
(Ross, 2009:149). Narratives are infused with symbols and metaphors that capture the
imagination, galvanize potentially fractious groups and motivate action; they imbue
actors with "social purpose" (Abdelal, 2001). Chapter Three shows how the nationalist
concept of 'swadeshi' encapsulated a powerful narrative that promoted domestic
ownership of industrial capital. Swadeshi symbolized the ethos of the 'Be Indian, Buy
Indian' anti-colonial rallying cry and was synonymous with the nationalist independence
movement. Swadeshi provided a powerful cognitive and cultural frame with which to
motivate and unite rising Indian political and economic actors as they struggled against
the British Imperial system that intertwined colonial governance with British commercial
and industrial capital. Crucially, it had important distributional implications between
Indian and foreign firms, as rising Indian capitalists fought to establish themselves in
nascent manufacturing activities such as jute and textiles that were dominated by British
managing agencies in early industrializing India.38 It dates back to the first Swadeshi
37 The title of the book arises from the term he coined after a heady day of golf on the courses of the
ironically quite exclusive Karnataka Golf Association (KGA) in Bangalore was capped by an interview
Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani. In describing the rise of Infosys, and by extension India's global IT
industry, Nilekani left him with the following phrase that "rang in [his] ear....'Tom, the playing field is
being leveled'." The term the 'level playing field' has itself become a powerful metaphor in the politics of
FDI policy and played a central role in the construction of policy preferences in the 1990s. As such it is not
by chance that Nilekani used it, nor that it resounded so deeply with Friedman. The role the metaphor of the
'level playing field' has played in battles between foreign and domestic firms over policies governing joint
ventures is discussed in Section VII of this paper and detailed in Chapter Eight of the dissertation.
38 It also had important implications for distributional struggles between large and small firms, as the
enduring image of Mahatma Gandhi sitting and spinning his own cotton on a handloom on the earthen floor
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Movement (1905-8) that called for a boycott of foreign goods (Encarnation, 1989) and
helped to launch India's independence struggle. 39 This nationalist narrative co-evolved
amongst key figures in business and the state, including India's leading two industrialists
JRD Tata and GD Birla, as well as its political leaders, Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal
Nehru. And as chapter 4 shows through comparison with Brazil, the view played an
important role in shaping the regulation of foreign investment in the early ISI period as
the Nehruvian goal of 'self-reliance', which represented a particular conception of
foreign versus domestic technology in promoting manufacturing industry, came to the
fore.
Just as economic theories are not mere technical artifacts, symbols and narratives are not
just stories. They are resources to be utilized by economic agents seeking to convey a
particular understanding of the world and courses of actions that should be pursued.
Symbols, like interpretations of economic theory, provide key opportunities for agency.
The empirical chapters of the dissertation reveal key moments in India's modern
economic history when well-positioned actors deployed socially meaningful symbols that
shaped the direction of policy change. These "norm"' or "institutional entrepreneurs"
possessed "social skills" that allow them to play central roles in constructing feasible
possibilities, particularly in the context of crises or institutional flux (DiMaggio, 1988;
Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Fligstein, 2008). We see this in Chapter Five's analysis of
late colonial era with the rise of Gandhi as the symbol of the independence movement, as
well as in the early post-independence period with the success of Nehru's powerful
'scientific socialist' vision for India's industrial development. Much was accomplished in
terms of promoting 'self-reliance' and controlling the 'commanding heights.' However, it
is important to note that this process was not deterministic. Despite Nehru's strong
of a village hut as a powerful symbol of 'traditional' cottage industry contrasted strongly with Jawaharlal
Nehru's 'modernist' view of large-scale industrialization 'from the commanding heights'. Just as Gandhi's
village industry metaphor reflected a development strategy based on small rural enterprise, nowhere is
Nehru's belief in the emancipatory power of big industry and science and technology better captured than
in his advocacy of India's space program. This internal struggle between large and small firms was central
to Indian industrial policy throughout the import substitution period and persists to this day.
39 The threat of swadeshi industrial policies along with political pressure from the Mahatma Gandhi-led
'Quit India' movement played an important part in precipitating the departure of British capital and
resulting massive transfer of productive assets to nascent Indian capital at the time of independence
(Kidron, 1965; Encarnation, 1989).
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position as the Prime Minister who led India into independence in 1947 as head of the
dominant Congress Party, there were important competing views that emerged from key
actors within his cabinet as well as from major industrialists who sought to undermine
key elements of Nehru's dream. Chibber (2003) provides a compelling account of
Nehru's inability to vest sufficient power in the Indian Planning Commission such that,
unlike the prototypical Korean development state, it could not fully implement
efficacious state-led economic planning. Similarly, Tyabji (2010) shows how Nehru's
curiously caved in to private domestic and foreign pressure against his desire to establish
state-owned firms as the primary producers of the key drug penicillin, which would have
placed an Indian public sector company at the pinnacle of the nascent pharmaceutical
industry. The causal power of conceptions of modernity and progress crucially depend on
how they are deployed. This point is important to show that a conceptualization of
economic life based on a constructivist theory of power and agency is not to suggest that
some actors are 'all-knowing heroes', rather it aims to highlight the ongoing contestation
between economic agents jockeying to shape the rules that govern inter-firm competition
that would allow them to achieve their perceived economic interests.
Conceptions of Technology in Industrial Development
A discussion of competing conceptions of technology in India's FDI debates provides an
excellent example of the how cultural schemas comprised of mutually reinforcing but
analytically separable rationalized causal ideas imbued with historically salient social
meaning constitute FDI policy preferences. Much of the rationalized logic drawn from
economic theory as well as the socially meaningful historical narratives that are deployed
in FDI debates are oriented around particular inter-subjective 'conceptions of technology'
held by business and state economic actors. These conceptions endow abstract causal
relationships with social meaning by specifying the role that technology plays in the
process of industrialization and the wider national development project. These
conceptions of technology are central to Indian business and government agents'
understandings of the implications of foreign direct investment and for domestic firms.
Technology is the central concept around which both promotion of and resistance to
liberal foreign investment policies and multinational firms has long been organized and is
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central in current FDI debates, particularly around joint ventures: MNCs will either
support or destroy the aspirations of developing domestic firm capabilities depending on
whether they share efficient foreign technologies allowing Indian firms to increase their
competitiveness, or use their technological advantage to put them out of business. This
view of the role of technology in shaping actors' FDI policy preferences is robust over
time. For Indian business and government agents, industrial technology was deemed
necessary for India to move towards modernity in the late colonial and early post-
independence period and is similarly viewed as the critical element required for an
ambitious India to establish itself as a global player in the current moment of economic
liberalization and hyper competitive globalized world market. As such the politics of FDI
policy have consistently turned on the competing views of technology that actors
projected as they battled in the policy arena.
Conceptions of technology are products of the 'sociotechnical imaginaries' of key actors
in India's economic history. Sociotechnical imaginaries refer to "imagined forms of
social life and social order that center on the development and fulfillment of innovative
scientific and/or technological projects" (Jasanoff et al, 2007:1). This analytic device is
drawn from the field of science and technology studies and allows for a deeper
consideration of the meaning technology holds for key actors and the role technology is
expected to play in industrialization and development. It provides insights into the social
construction of late development where technology has played the central role in
economic agents' understandings of the path to international competitiveness and
economic growth.40 Technology is a resource for economic growth, development and
modernization to fulfill national aspirations. It is laced with imperative within a wider
context where success in attracting and absorbing 'world class' technology is the
difference between catching up and falling further behind.
40 Imaginaries are a "crucial, constitutive element in social and political life." They are an enabling cultural
resource that "helps produce collective systems of meaning that enables the interpretation of social reality."
Imaginaries provide "a shared sense of belonging and attachment to a political community." These
imaginaries are imbued with an implicit understanding of the social world and the public good and are
"closely intertwined with nation-building projects." Critically for our purposes, they "encode visions" of
the future that are "projected" onto state and society, "shap[ing] the trajectory of' technology policy and
the pattern of industrial development with its accompanying distributional implications (Jasanoff et al,
2007:5).
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Visions of technology are deeply embedded in salient and socially meaningful nationalist
narratives. President John F. Kennedy's 'race to the moon speech' projected a
galvanizing vision of what technology could accomplish that was deeply intertwined with
American exceptionalism and the cold war. More recently, President Obama has cited
technology as the source of the America's historical economic dominance and the key to
restoring America's lost economic power. The vision of technology that he was
promoting centered on revitalizing the American auto industry in Detroit, at once the
most powerful cultural symbol of the early twentieth century boom in American industry
as well as its twenty-first century decline. The power lies in actors' perceptions of what
technology is and what it can accomplish. This underscores the constitutive element in
actors' policy preferences.
The key point is that technology itself is socially constructed: it is a black box waiting to
be filled with socially meaningful symbols and representations. The ambiguity inherent in
the idea of 'science' and 'technology' creates a critical space for politics. Actors use
notions of technology and "the dazzling range of meanings and functions it represented"
(Prakash, 1999:7) to advocate for their preferred policies. 'Technology' provides
opportunities for economic actors to project their own conception of what it is and what it
can be. As such, much of the politics of FDI in India arises from clashes between
competing sociotechnical imaginaries held by dueling actors. Despite the near-universal
importance of technology for fulfilling societal aspirations, it is rarely captured by a
single accepted vision. As with other forms of social and political life it is highly
contested. This politics of contrasting visions of technology was revealed in the
outwardly projected technological visions of India's two 'founding fathers' Mohandas
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The narratives they constructed to convince others buy
into their political goals diverged dramatically with tremendously different distributional
implications for India's development path. In many respects, nothing could be more
different than Gandhi's conception of simple, 'traditional' indigenous, village-based
production based on the handloom. It was an explicit rejection of industrial policies that
were aimed at supporting British-owned industry and served as a symbol of colonial
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resistance. By contrast, Nehru's dream of large-scale 'industrialization from above'
entailed such 'modern' industries as automobiles, chemicals and steel. His deeply-held
belief in the emancipatory power of modern technology underpinned his advocacy of
heavy investments in science and technology and was crowned by his support for an
Indian space program.41 In many respects these visions embody the oft-cited
contradictions that characterize today's India: 'India shining' amidst pervasive poverty
marked by social depravation and political strife. This political tensions stretch across
multiple cultural and analytic categories: urban-rural, large firm-small firm, 'traditional'-
'modern', and critically for our purposes, foreign-domestic.
VIII. Conclusion
This chapter provided the theoretical framing for the wider empirical analysis conducted
in this dissertation. It proposed a theory of the sources of policy preferences as cognitive
and cultural schemas, rationalized causal ideas imbued with historically salient social
meaning. It challenged dominant theoretical conceptions of preferences by analyzing how
FDI policy preferences of business and government actors evolved over time. The
chapter argued that political economy theories predicting economic and political actors'
policy preferences are naturally endowed, are determined by socio-economic structural
position or are produced by rational calculation are misleading. Instead, it offered a view
of economic agents' policy preferences as constructed through processes of sociopolitical
contestation as economic actors seek to establish themselves as the legitimate actors
through whom the state's development ambitions should be pursued. The analysis
conducted in the next six chapter of the dissertation demonstrate how analytic attention to
long run sociopolitical dynamics reveals continuous processes of socio-political
contestation. In order to understand the sources of economic policy preferences and make
sense of policy contestation we must understand the ways in which socially embedded
41 India's technological ambitions at this time are clear as it formally launched its space program in 1962,
shortly after the Sputnik landing and the same year that J.F. Kennedy made his famous moon landing
speech.
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agents continuously interact with their institutional environment by seek to establish their
legitimacy and entrench dominant positions through continuous political contestation.
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CHAPTER 3
Institutional Origins: The Rise of Indian Economic Nationalism (1870-1905)
I: Introduction
This chapter identifies the institutional origins of Indian economic nationalism in the late
19 th century. It explains how Indian nationalists emerged, how these actors' preferences
towards foreign capital were shaped and, along with the next two chapters, how these
preferences evolved through the late colonial period up to independence in 1947.
Together these three chapters establish the material and cultural foundations of the
institutional environment of industrial policymaking. This environment was structured by
competing causal ideas and social meanings that served as resources in political
contestation between rival actors in the late colonial, post-independence import
substituting industrialization and economic liberalization periods. Empirically, the
chapter proceeds by focusing on the discourse and debates around competing
representations of domestic and foreign economic actors' legitimacy in the Indian
economy. It shows how these debates shaped the emergence of a unique Indian economic
nationalism, and highlights the implications for economic policy, industrial development
and market outcomes in the late colonial period.
The chapter begins to operationalize the overarching theoretical framework of the 'twin
tensions' in the new institutionalisms introduced in the Chapter One. It focuses on two
areas in particular. First, it analyzes institutional origins by showing how institutions
were mutually shaped by subjective-cultural and objective-material factors. The approach
captures the crucial link between the concrete material processes of British imperial
hegemony and the uneven development it created, and the cultural categories of meaning
and practice -- including those of imperial domination as well as nationalist resistance --
that co-evolved in the late 19 th century global political economy. Rather than assessing
these material and cultural factors as separate or competing explanations, as do strands of
the political economy literature from rational choice to pragmatic constructivism (cf.
Lake and Powell, 1999; Levi, 2009; Herrigel, 2008, 2010), this dissertation argues that
they are in fact but "two translations of the same sentence" (Bourdieu and Wacquant,
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1992) that should be placed in the same analytic framework (cf. Bourdieu, 1977;
Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992; Fligstein, 2008). Second, the analysis places actors and
agency at its core. The chapter shows how Indian nationalist actors creatively combined
indigenous and foreign ideational and cultural resources to construct novel cognitive and
cultural schemas suited to their own political-economic context. These schemas provided
new causal ideas and social meanings to interpret concepts of economy, technology and
nationalism. Schemas not only helped actors make sense of the complexity of their
institutional environment, they also served as powerful weapons to challenge British
imperial hegemony by legitimizing and delegitimizing the behaviors and practices of
emerging Indian and dominant foreign economic actors. This agency-oriented creativity
resonates with the emphasis of pragmatists like Herrigel (2008; 2010), but the analysis
shows how creative capacity is contingent on actors' resource availability. Power is
crucial, a factor that agency-oriented materialist and constructivist traditions -- rational
choice and pragmatism -- have too often downplayed (cf. Farrell, 2011). The chapter thus
begins to demonstrate the utility of the theoretical framework developed in the previous
chapter for providing richer explanations of political economic outcomes.
To do so, this chapter employs Sewell's (1992) conception of social structure as "dually"
comprised of structural-material as well as cultural-constructivist resources. Agents play
a central role in this framework through their capacity to "reinterpret and mobilize an
array of resources in terms of cultural schemas" and to "transpose and extend [those]
schemas to new contexts" (Sewell, 1992:19; see also Goswami 2002:784).1 This agency-
centric view contrasts with alternative cultural approaches such as the 'world society'
theories of Meyer et al (1997) that analyze the diffusion of ideas but see the adoption by
actors as passive imitation (Go, 2012). Sewell's theoretical antecedents lie in Gidden's
(1979; 1984) notion of duality of structure and dynamic processes of structuration and
Bourdieu's (1977) ideas of habitus. These allow his framework to avoid both material
and ideal determinism; however, Sewell identifies important limitations with their
Cultural schemas comprise systems of thought and meaning through which actors make sense of their
social and economic worlds. It provides actors with insights in how society and economy should and
actually does operate; that is, it has both normative and positive connotations (cf. Sewell, 1992; Wedeen,
2002; Dobbin, 2004; Adelal et al, 2005,2010).
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conceptions of power, agency and the capacity of actors to alter the social structures in
which they are embedded. He argues that to reconcile a theory of change with a theory of
structure, one needs a 'fractured' rather than rigid conception of social structure that
provides entry points for agents to challenge dominant structures.
This cultural sociological approach accords well with political economists' focus on
conflict and contestation. The utility of the framework is revealed in this chapter through
the contradictions of the British colonial project and the entry points it provided for
nationalist agents who had knowledge of imperial cultural 'schemas', that is, the system
of intellectual control that the British wielded through rationalized causal ideas of science
and economics. This knowledge empowered well-positioned actors to devise creative
critiques that became the nationalist position. Thus actors' location in social structure
matters, but is not deterministic as structural-functional theories suggest. Structural
position in socially defined categories of class, race, nationality, wealth, education,
occupation and social prestige are important because they provide "knowledge of
different schemas and access to different kinds and amounts of resources and hence
different possibilities for transformative action" (Sewell, 1992:21).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a definition of
economic nationalism and situates late colonial India in the wider 19 th century global
political economy. It shows how colonial administration of India shifted from the British
East India Company to direct control of the British Crown. It highlights the role of the
Colonial Government in consolidating the territory and economy of the subcontinent, and
the implications of this extensive institutional reorganization for the emergence of a new
Indian nationalist consciousness. Section III then describes the role of colonial economics
and science in shaping the physical and institutional environment of the colony, while
Section IV shows how emerging nationalist actors formulated creative critiques of British
economic governance. Section V illustrates the emerging debates and contestation
between colonial and nationalist elites around the effects of trade policy on nascent
Indian industry, as well as the mass agitations that ultimately resulted. It reveals the
tensions around the relative roles of foreign and indigenous capital in India's industrial
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development that would define much of the first half of the 20t century leading up to
independence. Section VI concludes with a brief summary of the arguments and their
relation to the material in the next chapter.
II. Economic Nationalism and the Idea of the Indian 'Nation'
The term 'economic nationalism' is frequently used but rarely well defined. In one of the
most sophisticated recent treatments, Abdelal (2001:1) defined economic nationalism as
"the attempt to link the idea of a nation to specific [economic] goals." 2 Nationalism is a
"proposal of the content of national identity" (Ibid) that reflects society's collective
interpretations of the meaning of the nation, the path it should follow and the policies that
societal actors believe will achieve those goals. Thus the mean-ends relationships
between policies and outcomes that the previous chapter advanced as a definition of
actors' preferences are deeply embedded in the essence of nationalism. Further, this
framework for understanding the relationship between preferences and nationalism
provides significant analytic room for agency and contestation. While the meaning of
nationalism is inter-subjectively held, the 'content' of every national 'proposal' is hotly
debated and contested. There are always competing nationalist projects with political
battles determining which will prevail.
Finally, nationalisms do not emerge within a vacuum; they arise in interaction with and
often in opposition to other nationalisms in the international state system and the global
political economy. Nationalisms are relational, and are often imagined to have an 'other'
both within and outside of the state. It is variation in this 'content' as promoted by
competing nationalist actors that gives rise to contestation within and between
nationalisms i.e. between competing national goals and identities in a given society and
2 Economic nationalism has long had an important role in explaining economic policy outcomes. However,
disciplinary divides in the social sciences have produced narrow definitions and have hindered our ability
to develop richer understandings of this crucially important phenomenon. Political scientists have tended to
equate economic nationalism with mercantilism or statism, while economists often see it as synonymous
with protectionism. However, outside of interest group analysis both conceptions have fairly shallow
linkages to the underlying social forces that produce them. By contrast, anthropologist Benedict Anderson
(2006 [1983]) provided a deeply socially embedded theory of nations as 'imagined communities', but his
elaboration does not directly address the economic policy implications of these nationalist imaginaries.
Thus while individually these views may not be inaccurate, they nevertheless seem incomplete. This
section aims to provide a more comprehensive approach.
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across countries. This variation ultimately produces differences in economic policies and
market outcomes. As this chapter will show, the content of Indian nationalism in the late
19' century emerged from contestation between emerging Indian nationalists and
colonial authorities. This later evolved into growing internal contestation between
different strands of nationalism amongst Indian nationalists in the early 2 0 th century,
particularly those associated with the two most important historical figures in Indian
politics: Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. This contestation served to legitimize
and delegitimize different organizational forms of capital: foreign-domestic, large-small
and public-private. Agency and contestation are thus central to the nationalist analytic.
Consolidation and Institutionalization of the Indian Colony
Nationalism and the idea of a single nation of 'India' emerged shortly after the
consolidation of the South Asian colony under the British Crown in 1858. This
development established India as an integral part of the increasingly interconnected
economies of Britain's global empire. Up to this point, the colony was comprised of a
collection of distinct regions directly governed by the British East India Company
alongside a set of quasi-independent 'Princely' states. The latter were remnants of the
Mughal empire that were controlled by zamindars - local rulers such as the Hindu
Maharajas and Muslim Nawabs - who were typically in political and commercial
alliances with the Company.
The British Colonial Office took direct control of the South Asian subcontinent following
the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, ending a century of administration by the East India Company.
One of the immediate outcomes was the dramatic expansion of the institutional apparatus
of the colonial state, including the imposition of a centralized monetary system, internal
commercial and land taxes, and external trade tariffs. The installation of the British 'Raj'
[reign], as the colonial administration became known, also included the construction of a
transportation network and communications infrastructure, as well as a built environment
that established the physical presence of the colonial state through imposing buildings
and formal urban planning.
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The British created multiple levels of administrative units to manage the vast colonial
space. These included agencies to map the human and physical geography of the colonial
territory through censuses as well as a multitude of reports on finance, industry and social
welfare that culminated in the annual Moral and Material Progress reports. These reports
served ideological as well as administrative purposes. They promoted a benevolent
conception of British colonial rule, which was crucial as the assumption of control of
India by the Colonial Office and the Crown from the East India Company was posited to
be about civilizing the natives and raising them out of poverty and squalor. The reports
were thus essential for maintaining the legitimacy of British rule in the colonies as well
as at home in the UK.
These colonial-level developments re-ordered the entire array of institutional structures
that shaped social and economic life under the East India Company. They created new
cultural and legal institutions to govern the internal market, including laws of property
and contract, while simultaneously restructuring the nature of colonial South Asia's
participation in a global economy dominated by private British merchant capital and the
British state. The British placed India in a particular structural and cultural position:
India was transformed into a producer and exporter of primary products, mainly cotton,
jute, tea and opium, and a captive market for British manufactured goods, especially
cotton textiles. This process proceeded rapidly over the latter half of the nineteenth
century such that the colony went from absorbing 31% of British cotton goods in 1860 to
85% by the close of the century (Misra, 1999). This transformation had major
implications for the prospects industrialization under indigenous capital.
This period also saw the formation of the spatial, institutional and cultural dimensions of
the global political economy of the 'first' globalization. This particular institutional form
of the global political economy was 'dually' facilitated by 'objective' material gains from
technological developments that dramatically increased productivity while lowering
transportation and communication costs as well as the 'subjective' cultural norms and
laissez faire ideas of classical political economy that rationalized and legitimized the
system (cf. Sewell, 1992). While these worked together to expand and deepen the
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globalizing world economy and held the imperial project together, it produced uneven
development between center and periphery that provided fodder for emergent
'nationalist' resistance in colonial South Asia as in other parts of Asia, Europe, Latin
America and Africa. Imperialism and nationalism evolved as inextricably linked cultural
and structural processes.
Constructing the Idea of 'India' as a Nation-state
It is somewhat ironic that consolidation of the heterogeneous peoples, societies and
polities of South Asia under the British Raj created the unified nationalist reaction that
eventually challenged and overthrew it. The institutions and coordinated state structures
of the Raj established new linkages between people in disparate geographies and
economies of the colonial South Asian territory. This enabled the emergence of
nationalist conceptions of a unified nation. Institutional reordering under British colonial
authorities not only transformed the formal institutions of the economy, it also fueled the
creation of new cognitive and cultural categories of identity and conceptions of economy
and geography that were consistent with a 'modern' capitalist nation-state. The new
technologies, institutions and governance capacities of the colonial state facilitated the
transformation of objective and subjective structures by providing new cultural resources,
meanings and practices with which nationalist political actors created novel ideas,
identities and movements (Goswami, 1998:614). This restructuring provided the material
and cultural context within which nationalist actors formulated anti-imperial theories and
strategies of action aimed at transforming the structures of the colonial space. Ideas of
economy, territory and culture co-evolved.
As argued earlier, nationalisms are relational and arise in opposition to other nationalist
forces in the domestic and global political economy. Indian nationalism was no different.
Nascent Indian nationalists identified their 'other' in British imperialists in India and in
the Colonial Office in London, and crafted their nationalist critiques and programmatic
strategies in opposition to the policies of the Raj. However, though this nationalist
consciousness and the particular form it took were direct outcomes of the takeover by the
Raj and the broad-based institutional restructuring and consolidation of the Indian colony
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it imposed, it nevertheless met with multilayered opposition from the Colonial
authorities.
First, the idea of 'India' as a unified nation was immediately challenged by the colonial
view of the 'impossibility of India' (Goswami, 1998:622). For example, in 1888
Financial Secretary John Strachey asserted:
This is the first and most essential thing to learn about India - that there is no, and
never was an India, or even any country of India, possessing, according to European
ideas, any sort of unity, physical, social or religious....That men of the Punjab, Bengal,
the United Provinces, and Madras, should ever feel they belong to one great nation, is
impossible.3
This view was quickly countered by Pherozshah Mehta, a Bombay lawyer and one of the
founding members of the Indian National Congress (INC), the organization that became
synonymous with the nationalist movement and has dominated Indian politics since
independence:
Indeed, so far as the historical argument is concerned, we (the INC) have been successful
in turning the tables upon our adversaries. We have shown that it is they who defy the
lessons of history and modernity when they talk of waiting to make a beginning till the
masses of people are fully equipped with all the virtues and all the qualifications which
adorn the citizens of Utopia, in fact till a millennium has set in, when we should hardly
require such institutions at all.4
M.V. Bhide continued the riposte in an 1895 address to the INC:
I know there are among our critics.. .who proclaim with an air of superior wisdom that
India is but a geographic expression and that there is no Indian nation as such, but only
a congeries of races and creeds, who have no cohesion in them...here in this gathering
we have representatives from the most distant provinces, Bengal, Assam, Punjab, North
Western Provinces, Rajputana... but the watchword of these congressmen in India,
Indians first, Hindus, Muhammadans, Parsees, Christian, Punjabees... afterwards.. .the
aggregate of those that are residents of one territory...urged by like impulses to secure
like rights and to be relieved of like burdens.5
This cultural construction of the nation is consistent with Anderson's (2006 [1983])
theory of nations as 'imagined communities,' while the discursive contestation reflects
3 [Strachey, 1888: 5-7, cited in Goswami 1998:622]
4 [INC Papers Vol. 1, 1890, 109, NAI cited in Goswami, 1998:622]
5 [INC Papers Vol 1, 1895, 173, NAI cited in Goswami, 1998:623]
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the mechanisms through which new institutional fields are created.6 This mode of conflict
defined much of the relationship between Indian nationalists and colonial authorities.
Modularity and the Global Rise of Nationalisms
There is a tension between the unique cultural construct of the nation that nationalist
actors must create to successfully oppose the imperialist 'other', and the homogenizing
forces of the global political economy. Indian nationalists were not alone in their efforts
to imagine a unified nation of India. After all, this was the period of the first globalization
as well as the time when the Westphalian system of nation-states was coming into being.
The global political environment was characterized by nationalist struggles to consolidate
territories, peoples and economy in Europe, Asia and Latin America. This was also the
moment when 'late-developing' states such as the USA and Germany sought to establish
domestic industrial capacity within the wider institutional context of globally dominant
British manufacturing and a free trade regime enforced by the combined might of British
capital, the British navy and British theories of classical political economy.
These efforts by late developing states provided institutional templates for the colonies
that Anderson (2006 [1983]) has referred to as 'modular': providing valuable content for
the construction of nationalist proposals. Anderson showed that nationalist imaginations
can not be analyzed in isolation; they are part of wider socio-historic dynamics in both
their material and cultural dimensions. Nationalisms are products of global economic and
technological processes as well as the cultural meanings and practices that accompanied
them. Anderson identified the new discourse of nationalism and the mechanisms through
which it was transplanted across space and time, allowing nascent conceptions of
nationalism to spread through Latin America, Europe and Asia in the mid-late 19 th
century. India was no exception: the processes occurring within India in late 19th century
cannot be divorced from the political developments in other regions of the world.
Nevertheless, despite the availability of nationalist ideas in the global environment, the
6 This analytic approach can also be used to challenge existing theories of institutional origins from both
rational choice, historical institutional and ideational political economy perspectives e.g. Boix, 1999; North
and Weingast, 1989; Rosendorf and Milner, 2001; Koremenos et al, 2001; Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 2004,
Blyth, 2007. This will be one of the avenues that will be pursued with the material from this chapter post-
dissertation.
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construction of Indian nationalism required strategic efforts by emergent nationalist
actors to reformulate 'modular' ideas for the Indian context. This is the very definition of
agency -- "the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts" -- that Sewell
(1992:19) argues is required to facilitate structural transformation.
Despite its attractiveness, Goswami (2002:780) suggests that modular diffusion may be
conceptually delinked from the material context of new socio-economic relations of late
19th century global capitalist production. While Anderson's (2006 [1983]) modular
nationalism and view of nations as imagined communities provide rich insights, they do
so at the cost of privileging 'subjective' cultural accounts over 'objective' material
explanations, raising the tension between culture and materiality that is central to the
'twin tensions' in the new institutionalisms identified in Chapter 1. Anderson's (2006
[1983]) emphasis on the subjective is strategic -- aiming to correct what he perceived as
overly positivistic understandings of the nation through a discursive approach that
revealed the subjectivity of nationalism - but his modular approach may nevertheless
universalize mimetic processes. This risks sacrificing the context-specificity arising from
"[material] socio-historical processes and institutional constraints that attend the
production and circulation of meaning" (Goswami 2002:780). The material and cultural
dimensions of socio-historical processes require equal analytic weight.
While structural-material assumptions underpin the dominant conceptions of economic
interests and policy preferences that this dissertation challenges, the framework avoids
privileging culture over materiality by recognizing the duality of subjective-cultural and
objective-material determinants of preferences in shaping the institutional foundations of
nationalism in late colonial India. Sewell's (1992) theory of duality facilitates a
conception of structure as simultaneously material and cultural. It also stresses the
importance of agency in understanding how Indian actors both interpreted nationalist
ideas that they were exposed to in their reading or travels to Europe and East Asia
through their own socio-historical lens, and reformulated these models to the Indian
political-economic context. This agency-oriented approach to nationalism not only
challenges Anderson's modularity, but also the world polity approach of Meyer et al
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(1997). The world polity argument suggests that ideas diffuse via mimetic processes
through elite networks and are adopted wholesale. The Indian case provides a direct
challenge to this view. The following sections of this chapter build on this argument by
showing how this duality of material and cultural factors mutually shaped the preferences
of nationalist actors and the emerging field of industrial development. Both economic
theory and science and technology were key components of the content of emerging
Indian nationalism, as nationalist actors propagated the idea that India had long traditions
in science and manufacturing that predated Europe as well as an economic critique of
British de-industrialization and exploitation of India.
III. Constructing Modernity:
Colonial Science and Economics tame Mother Nature and the Indian Market
The arenas of debate in late colonial India were structured by British imperial power,
with the discipline of economics providing the legitimating mode of discourse for
emerging Indian nationalist demands. Understandings of economic theory, science and
technology combined to provide the interpretive lenses through which competing
conceptions of modernity and development were perceived and articulated. These
interpretive frames had major implications for industrial policy and patterns of industrial
development amongst different organizational forms of capital, in particular foreign and
domestic firms. Competing economic theories provided rationalized causal ideas that
served as "technologies of control" (Hall, 2005:135); these theories were "weapons"
wielded by dueling actors that ultimately shaped regulatory and market outcomes (Blyth,
2001).7 On one hand, economics was seen as a dispassionate 'science' in late colonial
India, but actors on each side of the debate heavily infused these theories with what new
institutionalists in economics and political science term "normative elements" (North,
2005; Blyth, 2001).8 These 'normative elements' reflect socially and historically
7 Blyth (2001:4) advanced "the notion of [economic] ideas as weapons in distributional struggles" by
showing how "the development and deployment of economic ideas is a prerequisite of fundamental
institutional change" and demonstrated this through his comparative analysis of policy debates during the
1930s Great Depression and 1970s Oil Crisis in Sweden and the US. These are precisely the dynamics that
ensued in India, as this section will show.
8 This was clear in both colonial documents, as in the Moral and Material Progress Reports, as well as in
nationalist critiques. Indeed, North (2005:2) suggests that "The 'reality [of a political-economic system is
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embedded cultural symbols, meanings, narratives and tropes. These cultural elements are
deeply embedded in the rationalized causal ideas that structure the institutional
environment, imbuing ideas with salient social meanings that motivate action. However,
while recognized by a few new institutional economists and political scientists, they
remain deeply undertheorized. They deserve much greater analytic attention than
accorded in the new institutional literature.
British theories of classical political economy and developments in science and
technology had crucial implications for the emergence of the field of industrial
development in late colonial India. Two factors were crucial during this time: the
growing acceptance of causal ideas of science and technology as a means of harnessing
the forces of Mother Nature for industrial production, and of economics as a means of
controlling the forces of supply and demand that constituted the 'free' market. Together
these rationalized causal ideas comprised powerful cognitive schemas that were
channeled towards the regulation of exchange of industrial output and the realization of
post-Enlightenment conceptions of intellectual progress, material prosperity and
modernity and that constituted 'development'.9 However, 'development' was not an
objective concept, it was imbued with salient social meaning reflecting British economic,
political and cultural superiority. The cognitive dimension of scientific and economic
ideas was thus imbued with salient social and cultural meaning.
never known to anyone, but humans do construct elaborate beliefs about the nature of that 'reality' - beliefs
that are both a positive model of the way the system works and a normative model of how it should work."
Blyth (2001:4) also noted the duality of normative and scientific discursive tools, arguing that "In
deploying economic ideas as weapons, agents can restructure existing institutional arrangements by
defining not only the causes of a perceived economic problem but also the solutions for dealing with it. By
offering both a scientific and normative critique of existing institutions, economic ideas allow agents to
challenge existing institutional arrangements and the patterns of distribution they enshrine." This belief
system may be highly contested or widely held. North (2005:2) adds that "The dominant beliefs - those of
the political and economic entrepreneurs in a position to make policies - over time result in the accretion of
an elaborate structure of institutions that determine economic and political performance" (Ibid) and
distributive outcomes. "The resulting institutional matrix imposes severe constraints on the choice set of
entrepreneurs when they seek to innovate or modify institutions in order to improve their economic or
political positions" (Ibid). We will see the effects of the complex institutional matrix that the British created
in India, and the implications for the struggles of rising Indian nationalists.
9 The Enlightenment provided the cultural and intellectual framework for the application of scientific
knowledge to generate material benefits and the creation of the positivist 'scientific' disciplines of socio-
economic analysis to organize, rationalize and control the social environment.
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Science and economics were thus established as rationalized and socially meaningful
means of achieving wealth and power. However, these 'modern' -- often viewed as
synonymous with Western -- ideas existed in a complex relationship with the emergent
Indian nationalism of the late 19* century. On one hand, European ideas of science and
economics -- the latter reflecting a particular laissez faire, free trade, limited government
brand of economics from Adam Smith and David Ricardo -- were seen as imposed by
British colonizers, first through the East India Company and later through the Raj. At the
same time, rationalized causal ideas of science and economics provided the tools of
resistance against Imperial intellectual, cultural and material subjugation and
exploitation. This underpins the tight relationship between science, economics and
nationalism in the construction of cognitive and cultural schemas. Indian nationalists
displayed significant agency in reinterpreting and mobilizing these cognitive and cultural
schemas as powerful resources in the anti-imperial struggle. Much like culture is
underplayed by new institutional economists and political scientists, agency is
underplayed by many sociologists that otherwise highlight the importance of social
meaning. As Sewell (1992:19) argues, "Not only can a given array of resources be
claimed by different actors embedded in different structural complexes (or differentially
claimed by the same actor embedded in different structural complexes), but schemas can
be borrowed or appropriated from one structural complex and applied to another." Ideas
of science and economics constituted valuable cognitive and cultural schemas that Indian
nationalists appropriated as powerful resources in their struggle. 10 Their knowledge of
these schemas provided the capacity to transpose them, the very definition of agency that
Sewell (1992) provides.
In India, the socially constructed technological imaginaries and theoretical
representations of the economy developed hand in hand. By the late 19 th century the
symbolic and material power of colonial science and technology was clear: railroads that
conquered the vast distance of the subcontinent and 'tamed the colonial territory', and
bridges stretched across the mighty and mystical Ganges. Technological advances such as
10 Sewell (1991:19) continues, "Not only do workers and factory owners struggle for control of the factor,
but Marx appropriates political economy for the advancement of socialism," providing a nice parallel with
Indian nationalist appropriation of colonial science and economics.
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the steam driven power loom in the cotton textile industry also served to harness nature
towards industrial production, rationalizing and legitimizing economic ideas of Ricardian
comparative advantage that predicted Indian handloom weavers would be unable to
compete against the power looms of the more 'efficient' Lancashire cotton mills. This
reflected emerging conceptions of competitiveness and 'efficiency', itself a crucial social
construct of modem capitalism that serves to mask relations of power and control (cf.
Fligstein, 1990; Dobbin, 1994; Roy, 1997; Hall, 2005).11 Crucially these causal ideas
were used to rationalize and legitimized imperial regulatory institutions such as 'free
trade' that then reinforced these predictions.
Artifacts of technological progress such as the railroad, telegraph and power loom not
only shaped conceptions of technological possibilities, they reinforced a 'modern' market
consciousness. Mid-century railway construction took off with direct colonial rule, and
further expansion in the 1880s provided greater physical reach for traders and producers
while expanding the conception of 'the market' as a quasi-abstract space filled with
possibilities. Of course, this is not to suggest that actors had no notion of markets before
the railroads, but rather that the way 'the market' was conceptualized shifted dramatically
with the new possibilities that technological advances such as the railroad provided. This
was supported by the introduction of the telegraph, another major European technological
innovation of the time that greatly enhanced the circulation of commercial information
amongst colonial officials, British merchant firms and indigenous traders, complementing
the increased circulation of physical goods that the railroads provided.
Technological innovations introduced to the colony thus served to reconstitute 'the
market' as a "newly imagined abstraction generated through a greater rationalizing of the
material world and speed of exchange" by expanding commercialization and monetizing
exchange (Birla, 1999:150). Ludden (1992:258) argues that the growth of transactions
demarcated in the newly standardized rupee "and the scope of commercial exchange
pushed only in one direction: it steadily increased the capacity of bureaucrats, policy-
" Chandler (1977) provides the classic opposing view of efficiency as a natural outcome of the historical
advance of technology and human knowledge.
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makers, politicians, reformers and experts to capture and manipulate the central cognitive
invention of capitalism, 'the economy'. An Indian national economy thus emerged in the
nineteenth century as a bounded and coherent entity within a global capitalist system
dominated by the British Empire." This conception of the free market reflected "a model
of Nature itself as a system of balance and order," that fit perfectly with rising 'rational'
scientific knowledge of the mystical forces of Mother Nature, expressed as natural flows
of supply and demand (Birla, 1999:150). 12
The purportedly scientific discipline of economics was synonymous with the dominant
liberal economic theories of Smith and Ricardo that were heavily promoted by the
imperial state. It offered powerful intellectual tools underpinned by modern capitalist
cultural practices of freedom of contract, security of property rights and private
incorporation that the British imposed through formal legal institutions such as the Indian
Contract Act of 1872 and the Indian Companies Act of 1882.13 This formal and informal
institutional architecture simultaneously naturalized and harnessed the power of the free
market, much as Kipling's engineers had harnessed the power of the Ganges by placing
'Mother Gunga in chains' (Prakash, 1999).14 All these were made possible by the
developments in transportation and communication technologies and theories of economy
and market exchange that colonial knowledge provided.
The British deployed their favored causal ideas of science and economics as tools to
reconfigure the Indian landscape and economy by imposing a mutually reinforcing
physical, legal and intellectual infrastructure. This served the dual imperial goals of
12 In addition to Ludden's (1992) India's Development Regime, Birla also cites Prakash's Another Reason,
Manu Goswami's Producing India and C.A. Bayly's Colonial Rule and the Informational Order in South
Asia.
13 The legal fictions that were created by these pieces of legislation establishing the nationality of a
corporation and the ownership and contractual relationships between foreign and domestic corporate
entities are central for the dissertation and play a crucial role in the analysis in later chapters.
14 Prakash cites Kipling's short story 'The Bridge Builders' - science as a means of establishing control
over nature and "domination over people who see nature in mythical terms" In the story the "heroic"
British engineers successfully build a railway bridge over the Ganges "against all odds", allowing Kipling
to represent the meaning of the feat as "'Mother Gunga - in irons,' symbolizing the triumph of British
engineers over Indians and their culture." (Prakash 1999:5,168) It is worth noting that the imaginaries
attached to foreign technology persisted, shaping the post-Independence Nehruvian period and more
recently current debates about the role of foreign technology in the liberalization of FDI policy.
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political control and profit maximization, which was achieved primarily through British
managing agencies, albeit with Indian merchant-traders acting as important middlemen.
However, the tools of colonial modernity came at a price: the freedom of thought
embedded in post-Enlightenment scientific knowledge provided Western-educated Indian
elites with tools to formulate multipronged critiques of imperialism.
Herein lay the paradox of colonialism. Science and economics were powerful tools of
imperialism that were nevertheless vulnerable to co-optation. But the emerging cultural
category of 'nationalist' did not automatically produce coherent behavioral scripts that
actors unreflectively followed as some constructivist arguments that minimize agency
and contestation might suggest;15 newly emerging nationalist actors displayed significant
agency in developing critiques of British imperialism and creating the foundations for a
new Indian nationalism. Indian elites faced the dilemma of "trafficking between the alien
and the indigenous, forcing negotiations between modernity and tradition, and
rearranging power relations between the colonizer and the colonized" (Prakash,
1999:6).16 This is precisely what the Western-educated indigenous elite attempted as they
sought to appropriate the cultural and intellectual resources of their colonial rulers.
"Enchanted by science, they saw reason as a syntax for reform, a map for the
rearrangement of culture, a vision for producing Indians as a people with scientific
traditions of their own" (Prakash, 1999:6). These actors' attempts to reconfigure the
binaries of colonizer-colonized and science-superstition were key to indigenizing science
and establishing Western-educated elites who were employed in the colonial
administration and modern professions at the junction between 'modern' Western science
15 Wedeen (2002) provides an excellent critique of that ways in which the concept of cultural schemas have
been imported into political science as reified, coherent and consensual rather than ambiguous and
contested, as this chapter has argued. This critique is further discussed in the next chapter in the context of
cultural theories in rational choice institutionalism.
16 The irony of the emergence of nationalist elites as 'traffickers' between West and East is made all the
more stark by Macaulay's (in)famous Minute on Western Education (1835) revealing early British attempts
to create an indigenous elite: "In one point I fully agree with the gentlemen to whose general views I am
opposed. I feel with them that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body
of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and
the millions whom we govern, -- a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes,
in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of
the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to
render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population."
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt minute education 1835.html
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and 'traditional' Indian knowledge, allowing them to 'embody and reformulate culture'
"in their reach for hegemony" (Prakash, 1999:8). They epitomize Sewell's (1992:19)
definition of agents who have "the capacity to transpose and extend [cultural] schemas to
new contexts." Finally, by virtue of their own western education, nationalist actors were
themselves trafficking between the alien and indigenous. The Indian elite thus embodied
the modernization project. These late 1 9 th century critiques that are discussed in greater
detail below resulted in the formulation of hybrid conceptions of modernity, and set the
stage for the intensified development debates of the post-World War I period that are the
subject of the next chapter.
IV. Indigenizing the Rationalized Causal Ideas of Imperial Economic Theory:
The Theory of 'Economic Drain'
The enactment of liberal economic policies of the late 19th century Raj was preceded by a
range of conceptions of the economy imposed by the East India Company, from late
eighteenth century physiocratic models of value derived from agricultural development
and land,' 7 to bazaar [market] regulation based on Smith's theories of exchange, to the
promotion of "free trade ideology" and "the theoretical fiction of the equilibrium of
supply and demand." These interpretive frames were deployed by the Company to wrest
control of economic activity from the zamindars - the aristocratic landlords of the
Mughal Era -- and legitimize regulation of production and exchange around the turn of
the 19th century (Birla, 1999:22).
The Smith-Ricardo vision of classic British political economy came under attack by an
increasingly vocal segment of the educated Indian middle class from as early as the mid
19th century.18 Emerging nationalists like Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), a noted
professor, cotton merchant and founding member and second president of the Indian
National Congress, led the charge in arguing that the 'so-called natural laws of economy'
were not operative in South Asia. Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901), a
17 Birla (1999) also cites Ranajit Guha's A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of the
Permanent Settlement. Durham: Duke University Press, 1996.
18 Indigenous scientific critiques played a larger role in preference formation and policy debates during the
inter-war period, as discussed in the next chapter.
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magistrate in the Bombay High Court and founding member of the Indian National
Congress, concurred. Ranade did not deny the validity of economics, but rather argued
that it should be inductive - closely linked to historical experience - rather than deduced
from abstract theory. He criticized English economists' view of free trade as being
constricted 'solely from the economical point of view' without consideration of 'the
political and social elements which enter into the question (* cited in Chandra,
1966:711). Ranade placed the critique firmly within the structural realities facing the
Indian colony while addressing dominant Ricardian theories of static comparative
advantage:
'The orthodox economists assign to the backward and torrid regions of Asia the duty of
producing raw materials and claim, for the advanced European temperate zone countries,
the work of transport and manufactures, as a division of labor in production, which is
fraught with the highest advantage to all and is, we are told, a providential dispensation
against which it would be foolish to rebel.'1 9
These emerging nationalists bolstered their arguments with case examples from
elsewhere in the world, much as suggested by Anderson's (2006 [1983]) modular
nationalism but with the agency of Sewell's (1992) transposition of schemas. Ganapathy
Subramania Iyer, founder of the major newspaper The Hindu pointed to protectionist
policies of Germany and the USA in critiquing English pushing free trade. He used the
example of these successful late developers to argue that economic policies should be
determined by national need not economic theory (* Chandra, 1966:713).20 Like Ranade,
he held that 'the truths of economic science are not universally applicable, irrespective of
the particular stages of national growth and of peculiar environments and conditions.' (*
Chandra, 966:713-4) He further insisted that 'The given conditions of society and the
prevailing conceptions regarding its future and contemporary interest, determined the
economic ideas that received the approbation of thinkers and the acceptance of
statesmen.' "It was therefore clear to him that the principles of orthodox economics had
to be modified when applied to India since 'the economic interests of India and the
conditions under which they have to be safeguarded' were different from those of Europe
'9 (* Cited in Goswami, 1998:615)
20 This is consistent with Anderson's concept of 'modular nationalism'. These arguments also draw on
Friedrich List. More broadly, it shows the extent to which developments in the emerging 'institutional
field' of Indian industrial development interacts with other fields, reflecting the utility of the institutional
field analytic for theorizing institutional origins.
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and America" (* Chandra, 966:714). Nationalist newspapers such as The Mahratta
similarly called for 'the application of a different set of principles', declaring that 'India
is not to be sold for the fads of economic doctrinaires'. These actors called on the GOI to
'proclaim once for all that it is not going to borrow its economics from England' and
pleaded for 'the formation of a national economics' (* Chandra, 1966:715).
The Theory of Economic Drain
These gripes and agitations began to coalesce into an articulate critique of free market
operations as the systematic exploitation of Indian wealth that captured both internal
conditions of poverty and the subordinated structural position of the Indian colony in the
global economic order. The crucial theoretical innovation was the development of the
comprehensive 'economic drain' thesis, based on an innovative indigenously developed
rationalized causal idea that problematized the extractive economic relationship between
Britain and India. The idea of the drain dates back to the mid-i 800s, but began to be
clearly formulated by Dadabhai Naoroji, in his landmark Poverty and Un-British Rule in
India first presented in 1871. Building on the nationalist critique of classical political
economy, Naoroji argued that colonial policies of free trade drained India of its wealth,
such that "India exemplified the 'pitiless perversion of [the so-called natural] economic
laws by the bleeding to which it was subjected' " (* Goswami, 1998:615).
Naoroji's writing strategically inverted the Colonial government's claims of progress
made in its flagship Moral and Material Progress reports by generating national per
capita income estimates that highlighted the depth and scope of impoverishment of
people in the newly bounded national territory and economy (Goswami 2005:212).
Naoroji pointed to the grave poverty that plagued the territory, characterized by the rise
in rural indebtedness and the explosion of famines. There was ample empirical evidence
to bring to bear in support of the drain thesis. Fifteen million Indian colonial subjects died
between the time the Crown assumed control of the colony from the East India Company
in 1857 and the publication of Naoroji's work in 1871. This severely undermined
Colonial Office claims that the colony was taken over from the East India Company to
better the lives of the Indian people. The drain thesis further argued that the British
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extracted millions of pounds annually from the colony through debt on infrastructure
projects, manufacturing goods purchases through trade with Britain, remitted official
salaries and military costs, all of which comprised the perniciously termed 'home
charges'. This was facilitated by the massive institutional, physical and technological
infrastructure that the Raj created post-1857.
English capitalists do not merely lend, but with their capital they themselves invade
the country. The produce of the capital is mostly eaten up by their own countrymen, and,
after that, they carry away the rest in the shape of profits and dividends. The people
of India do not derive the same benefit...The guaranteed railways not only ate up
everything in this manner, but compelled India to make up the guaranteed interest
also from her produce. (Naoroji 1871[1962] 2001-2 cited in Goswami 1998:621)
The global context was crucial for understanding the nationalist drain thesis: while the
UK ran large trade deficits with its major trading partners in the latter quarter of the 19th
century -- 45m pounds-sterling with Europe and 50m pounds-sterling the United States --
it maintained a 60m pounds-sterling surplus with colonial India (Goswami, 1998:620).
The Indian colony not only was a crucial market for private British manufacturing firms,
it was also essential for the health of the fiscal balances of the British Exchequer. Thus
nationalist actors' interpretation of the international division of labour and unequal
development all were used to challenge "axiomatic presuppositions of classical political
economy" and the economic policies of the British in India (* Goswami 2005:212). Thus
material and cultural factors interact in the formation of nationalist preferences towards
the economic policies of the Raj.
Naoroji was not alone in his castigation of the British. He was joined by other nationalist
leaders such as Justice Govind Ranade and Bholonath Chandra who elaborated the
implications of the drain for India's industrial development in separate 1872 and 1873
lectures. Govind Ranade asserted that "[Indian had been converted to a] plantation,
growing raw produce to be shipped by British Agents on British ships, to be worked into
Fabrics by British skill and capital, and to be re-exported to the Dependency by British
merchants to their corresponding British firms" (* Goswami, 1998:615). G.V. Joshi
spoke directly to this relationship between the drain and the need to foster domestic
industrial development, arguing that 'No nation can stand such a drain and yet hold its
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own in the industrial field.' The drain was posited to be related both to British removing
capital from India, as well as crushing domestic industry by 'depriv[ing] them of their
life-blood' (* Chandra, 1966:664), demonstrating the crucial link that nationalists made
between the drain and industrial development.
These nationalist actors found justification for their claims in data on economic relations
between Britain and its colony. For example, after 1870 profit remittances from India
exceeded fresh investments from Britain, making the latter a net importer of capital from
India through the last quarter of the 19 th century. This had important effects in shaping
emerging nationalist perspectives towards foreign capital. Naoroji argued that,
perversely, since poverty-stricken and underdeveloped India was a net exporter of capital,
the country was "in the unenviable position of being exploited by its own capital" (*
Chandra, 1966:102). Naoroji elaborated this lament in 1887, noting that 'First of all,
British India's own wealth is carried away out of it.. .and then that wealth is brought back
in the shape of loans, and for these loans British India must find so much more for
interest; the whole thing moving in a most vicious and provoking circle' (* Chandra,
103).
The 'drain' thesis not only became dominant in India, it also gained prominence in
European discourse on colonialism. Indian drain theorists drew intellectual support from
across the ideological spectrum, from Adam Smith's reference to the British under the
East India Company as the 'plunderers of India' in The Wealth of Nations to Karl Marx's
argument that British civil servant pensions 'add to the annual drain on India' in an 1857
New York Daily Tribune editorial. Marx later added that:
'What the English take from them annually in the form of rents, dividends for railways
useless to the Hindus, pensions for military and civil servicemen.. .without any equivalent
return and quite apart from what they appropriate to themselves annually within India -
speaking only of the value of commodities the Indians have gratuitously and annually
send over to England - [it] amount[s] to more than the total sum of income of the 60
millions of agricultural and industrial labourers of India. This is a bleeding process with
a vengeance!' 2 1
21 Personal correspondence (1881), cited in Chandra (1966:669); also referenced by Goswami (1998:621).
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While drain theory resonated with intellectuals in Europe, colonial officials viewed it
with significant irritation and concern, if not alarm. They saw the drain thesis as
dangerous and responded in no uncertain terms in official documents as well as private
correspondence.
... that lessons drawn from the history of the West are misapplied to the present
circumstances of India; the broad generalizations of European writers on political
science are stated without mention of their important reservations; and natives, left
without proper guidance, are led to believe that what is appropriate in the case of
Switzerland and Italy must necessarily be good for India. In the region of economics,
the most mischievous doctrine is that which is based on the theory that India is
drained of her wealth by her connexion with Great Britain. This belief is honestly
held by growing numbers.. .The Governor General in Council believes that the
prevalence of this idea has done incalculable mischief, and it behooves every officer of
Government, and in particular those connected with education, to study the
arguments put forward in support of it and to seize upon every opportunity of
exposing their fallacy.
The bolded sections of the quote above speak to the importance of the competing
rationalized causal ideas of economic theory in shaping the institutional environment, and
the seriousness with which British colonial authorities took challenges to the dominant
imperial system of thought. It highlights the underlying conflict and contestation between
Indian nationalists and colonial authorities over the legitimacy of British imperial rule,
and would shape the formation of preferences towards the relative roles that indigenous
and foreign capital should play in India's industrialization.
The Drain thesis, Foreign Capital and Indian Industrial development
Nationalist actors not only developed coherent arguments that the British drained India's
resources, but also that British colonial free trade policy destroyed India's centuries-old
indigenous handicraft industry. In fact, these ideas were causally linked. G.V. Joshi
argued that by destroying the urban handicrafts industry, the British created a huge class
of unemployed from the class of skilled artisans, such that "foreign capital could
penetrate the country and set up manufacturing enterprises where were near 'completing
the ruin of our manufacturing industries even in the remotest part of the country"' (*
Chandra, 1966:154). Unemployed skilled labor was thus turned from manufacturing to
the British imperial goal of expanding primary commodity production and converting
22 Home Proceedings, March 1908, p4 4 (cited in Goswami 1998:621, emphasis added).
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India into raw materials producer and valuable captive market for British finished goods.
The rationalized causal idea of drain theory allowed Naoroji and his contemporaries to
conclude that ending the drain of wealth would require the participation of native
capitalists for industrial development they were to fulfill their nationalist ambitions:
If civilization is to mark us for her own, we must have an Indian commerce to be carried
on with indigenous capital, managed by native talent and, if possible, carried in
steamers owned by Indians, flying the British flag. It may be a dream, nay, even a day
dream, but nothing less than this will advance the Indians as a nation.23
However, a conundrum was that even though British investment in industry was low, it
nevertheless dominated the emerging industrial landscape. Indian indigenous
manufacturing was in its infancy. All the major areas of industrial activity including jute,
sugar, paper mills, as well as leather factories, iron foundries, etc. were controlled by the
British managing agencies. Even though much of the share capital was Indian, the legal
institutions that facilitated the managing agency mode of corporate governance ensured
that British retained managerial control of these entities (Misra, 1999). India was indeed
"in the "unenviable position of being exploited by its own capital" as Naoroji had
lamented (* Chandra, 1966:102). This interpretation of the role of institutions and
regulation on corporate governance underpins contemporary angst about family-
controlled pyramidal business groups that persists in India and has been captured in the
finance literature on business groups and 'tunneling' (cf. Bertrand et al, 2002; Khanna
and Yafeh, 2007).
The cotton textile industry that was emerging in the 1860s-70s, concurrent with Indian
nationalism, was the only place where Indians had large ownership share from the outset
"But even here, a part of the capital was foreign, the management was mostly foreign,
and the technical cadre had perforce to be for the most part imported" (* Chandra,
1966:93). Nevertheless, cotton textiles would become the principal site of nationalist
agitation around indigenous industrialization.
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23 (* Chandra, 1966).
Nationalist interest in promoting nascent indigenous capital drove nationalist actors to
complement the 'negative' drain theory critique with a 'positive' set of socially
meaningful ideas that focused on steps to be taken towards industrial development and
indigenous control of the economy. Though nationalist actors sought to develop
alternative theories of the Indian economy that were attentive to historical particularities,
they remained influenced by developments outside of the South Asian subcontinent as
Anderson's (2006 [1983]) modular nationalism suggests. Friedrich List's 1841 The
National System of Political Economy was of particular value in informing the ideas of
M.G. Ranade, G.V. Gokhale and G.V. Joshi.2 List's work was motivated by the
challenge of British domination of the global political economy and his own vision of a
unified German nation. It "constituted the positive content of the economic critique of
colonialism and the normative basis for institutional nationalism" that became associated
with the Indian National Congress (Goswami 2005:211).25
Listian solutions were aimed at aspiring nation-states with their own imperial ambitions,
such as Germany and the United States, that were "suffering under the dual yoke of
classical political economy and Britain's global hegemony". List's theoretical framework
overlaid spatial boundaries on economic activity in ways that classical economics with its
laissez-faire commitments and focus on the individual as the unit of analysis obscured. 26
His dynamic theory of nationalist economic development rejected free trade and
proposed high tariff barriers behind which infant industries could grow and eventually
challenge British industries, much as Alexander Hamilton had proposed protectionism
24 Again, the importance of Listian ideas speaks to relevance of Anderson's modularity analytic as well as
the importance of 'print capitalism' (the spread of ideas through the newly commercialized printing
presses) in the development and diffusion of nationalist thought. However, as has been stressed in this
chapter, Indian economic nationalists demonstrated significant agency in reformulating external ideas to fit
their own social context and political needs. This agency-centered view goes beyond the view that
Anderson (2006 [1983]) and the world society literature (Meyer et al, 1997) promotes.
25 Once again we see the importance of normative and positive critiques, as first outlined in Section III (cf.
Blyth, 2001; North, 2005).
26 List distinguished the actors in his nationalist theory from economic actors in Smith's liberal theory as
'merely producers and consumers' and 'decadent and selfish', with no concern for future generations;
atomistic, lacking collective goals. In the Listian world, shared national identities increase societies'
willingness to bear economic costs in pursuit of nationalist goals; it engenders sacrifice & lengthens time
horizons. This was explicitly formulated by nationalist leaders of the South Korean and Japanese
developmental states during their rapid development phases in the 20*' century (cf. Jasanoff and Kim, 2007;
2009).
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and industrialization as a solution for the United States to deal with late 18 th century
British economic hegemony. Both Hamilton and List saw manufacturing industry as the
basis of national power, a view that the emerging Indian nationalists also shared. These
neo-mercantilist strategies were enacted by a variety of emerging nation-states including
the US, Germany, Italy, Russia and Meiji Japan (Abdelal, 2001) and provided the
inspiration for emerging nationalist struggles in colonized territories such as India.
Indian nationalists did more than extend List's categories to account for colonized
countries. They demonstrated significant agency in reworking the problem with direct
reference to colonial unevenness in the Indian context (Goswami 2005:216). As this
chapter has stressed, Western ideas were not unconsciously imitated and adopted through
mechanisms of diffusion as the "world society" literature sparked by Meyer et al (1997)
suggests (Go, 2012). Nationalist actors displayed significant agency in reformulating
Western ideas and deploying them as tools in contestation with imperial forces. Their
knowledge of imperial as well as successful late developing economies served as
resources that allowed them to creatively reformulate available schemas to develop new
theories of the Indian economy. This is similar to the creativity that lies at the heart of
pragmatist theories of political economy (cf. Sabel, 2006; Herrigel, 2008, 2010; Herrigel
and Zeitlin, 2010; Whitford, 2005; 2011) but is bolstered by an emphasis on the
importance of power that these actors' derived from their education and elite social
standing, even as colonial subjects. List's theory was a valuable resource that nationalist
actors adapted to Indian particularities and deployed to achieve their political and
economic ambitions. It provided valuable content for Indian nationalist agitations and
industrial policy recommendations. There is no better place to examine the salience of
these issues and the emerging conflict between nationalist actors and colonial authorities
than in the context of trade tariffs and the emerging Indian cotton textile industry. It
provides an apt depiction of how colonial policies provoked nationalist reactions, and the
effects on a foundational industry dominated by Indian capitalists.
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V. The Politics of Free Trade and the Swadeshi Response
Cotton-textiles is widely acknowledged as a foundational industry in the history of
modern capitalism. It has been central for establishing production infrastructure,
manufacturing experience and technical expertise, especially by indigenous economic
actors in late developing countries (Amsden, 2001). This was the case with the Industrial
Revolution in late 18th century England as well as the late developing states of Germany,
the United States and Japan as they transitioned to industrial capitalism a century later.
The cotton-textile industry played a similarly important role in the political economy of
industrialization India, all the more so because it was the only major industry in the late
1 9 th century that was primarily owned and controlled by nascent Indian capitalists.
Further, textiles were a core consumer good, even for the poorest rural villager, thus
everyone in India had a stake in the industry as producer, trader or consumer. This placed
the industry -- and the actors within it -- at the very center of the debate over trade and
industrial policy. Crucially for this dissertation it provided the first major area of conflict
and contestation over the relative roles of foreign and domestic capital in India.
Early indigenous industry in India was concentrated around cotton, with the growth of
commercial agriculture, primarily cotton but also sugar and tea, supporting the
27beginnings of large-scale textile industry. Two external factors contributed heavily to
the early development of the industry: the 1860s cotton boom stemming from production
disruptions due to the American Civil War and the opening of the Suez Canal. The
combination of high global prices from unmet demand with significantly reduced
transportation costs created the opportunity for developing new areas of cotton
production. These were complemented by post-1857 British commercial policies that
revealed the potential of the Indian market.28 Thus India simultaneously developed raw
cotton production capabilities as well as a vibrant domestic market for textiles.
27 Jute however was the most important industry, particularly as India had a global monopoly, but it was
almost completely dominated by British capital and located in Calcutta, the seat of British colonial power.
Indian industrialists were unable to establish themselves in jute until well into the 20th century.
28 Aspiring Indian capitalists benefitted from the fact that British Imperial powers initially perceived little
competitive threat to England's textile production center, Lancashire.
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Material and cultural elements combined to facilitate the emergence of the nascent
cotton-textile industry. Material opportunities for new sources of profit complemented by
the inflow of market and technical knowledge as well as capitalist worldviews that served
to reorient some Indian economic actors from commerce and speculation to fixed long-
term investment in manufacturing industry.29 The beginnings of an Indian-owned
industry could be seen in Bombay and Ahmedabad in the West from around 1850,
spreading to Cawnpore in the North and Coimbatore in the South of India by the 1870s.
This resulted in a rapid increase in trade, which was dominated by European trading
houses but also included growing participation by Indian merchants. In fact, most nascent
Indian industrialists emerged from merchant-trading communities such as the Parsis,
Gujaratis and Marwaris rather than skilled artisanal or professional backgrounds.:
Tariff Wars
Colonial tariff policies not only played a major role in shaping the structure of the cotton-
textile industry but crucially the content and meaning of Indian economic nationalism
(Abdelal, 2001). The return of the colony to Crown rule saw the imposition of 10%
import tariffs on all manufactured goods, which combined with the factors noted above
helped the nascent Indian industry get off its feet. However, these were imposed for
revenue purposes to address the fiscal effects of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, rather than as
infant industry protection. Regardless, strong reactions from British textile producers and
traders led to a tariff reduction on cotton goods in 1861/2 to 5% and then to 3.5%.
Despite these relatively low tariff levels -- especially relative to other manufactured
goods -- British textile interests represented by bodies such as the Manchester Chamber
29 The material and cultural dimensions of this transition are analyzed at greater length in the next chapter,
where the imperial and nationalist schemas presented in this chapter and employed to problematize the
emergence of Indian capitalists.
30 Much of this was due to the Indian merchant-traders access to capital and markets through their
commercial networks and relationships with British merchant firms in India and the UK. It was also
facilitated by these actors' travels and studies abroad. For example, the Parsi merchant-trader Jamsetji Tata,
founder of the Tata business group, learned about cotton-textile production while studying in England in
the mid- 18th century and launched one of the first cotton mills upon returning to India. Kohli (2004) notes
that Parsis were able to take advantage of their market knowledge as they were already textile traders,
while Marwaris had extensive knowledge and understanding of India's internal markets. Gujarati merchant-
traders had also participated in trade with the Middle East for centuries. The emergence and constitution of
the Indian capitalists class, and crucially variation in perceptions of indigenous economic actors from
different merchant-trading communities, will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter.
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of Commerce continued to agitate against these duties, arguing that tariffs did a
disservice to both Manchester and India. In 1874 the Manchester Chamber held that
tariffs were:
1. Opposed to principle of Free Trade;
2. Harmed British producers by restricting exports; and
3. Were against Indian [consumer] interests because make goods more expensive.
British capitalists were not alone in professing their belief in liberal economics. Kidron
(1965:12) argues that by this time, "laissez-faire had been elevated into the 'secular
religion of the British middle class"' that comprised the bureaucracy staffing the Colonial
Office in London and the manning government posts in India. This is aptly demonstrated
in colonial recruitment policies and practice, even at the most senior levels, as Lord
Hardinge (Viceroy of India, 1910-16) recalls:
Lord Morley [Secretary of State for India, 1905-10; 1911] came up to us, and taking me
aside asked if I would like to succeed Lord Minto as Viceroy of India.. .What struck me
as curious at the time was that the only question he put to me was whether I was a free
trader, and I was honestly able to say that I was then and always had been a free-trader.
He told me that I might regard the matter as settled.32
The persistence with which free trade arguments were pursued ultimately proved
successful as in 1876 the Viceroy of India Lord Salisbury eliminated tariffs not only on
cotton textiles but on almost all British imports, while claiming this was in the best
interest of India. Unsurprisingly, this coincided with the period when nationalist positions
around the drain were beginning to coalesce.
The tariff holiday persisted for almost twenty years despite increasingly bitter battles with
nationalist actors. Once again, however, revenue needs rather than demands for trade
protection and support for indigenous industrialization led to the Tariff Act of 1894 and
31 This move by the Manchester Chamber of Commerce reflects the strategy that Marx identified where
powerful actors present what they want as not only being good for them, but in the best interests of all (cf.
Dobbin, 2004).
32 Kidron (1965:12). The depth of colonial actors laissez faire beliefs became one of the legendary aspects
of the British Empire. "It [free trade] was an exacting religion: if a grain ship bound for Calcutta foundered
off the coast of famine-stricken Orissa, the natural laws of political economy, reinforced by instructions
from the Lieutenant Governor, decreed that it continue on its way. If natural decay rendered it useless
before transshipment could be effected, so be it. 'By the time relief came', wrote Phillip Woodruff in his
celebrated work The Men Who Ruled India, 'a quarter of the population were dead"' (Ibid).
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the imposition of a 5% import duty. However, the duty initially exempted cotton fabrics,
yarn and thread. This generated a nationalist outcry that this exemption clearly revealed
the extent to which Government of India was beholden to the 'Lancashire caucus', and
that it was a 'policy of Industrial development suited alone to foreign manufacturers' (*
Chandra, 1996:235). An article in The Bangabasi summed up the nationalist sentiment:
'Be that as it may, as regards this question of the cotton duties, the mask has now fallen
off the foreign English administration of India. The highest officials of the country,
nay the entire official body and the leading newspapers in England, have had to make the
humiliating confession - 'The boast in which we have been so long indulging, the
boast that we govern India in the interest and for the welfare of the Indians, is
perfectly unfounded; India is held and governed in the interests of the English
merchants. 33
The new policy lasted only a few months, as yet again fiscal imperatives led to a
corresponding 5% duty being imposed on cotton fabrics and yarns. However, for the first
time a countervailing duty was also imposed on Indian produced cotton goods of 20
count and higher. This policy exposed the colonial authorities' ideological position and
provoked an unprecedented storm of reaction from nationalist actors. In fact, even some
British officials spoke out against countervailing duties, both on the basis of their
impracticability as well as the likely impact on emerging Indian industry. Finance
Member James Westland argued in a dispatch to the Secretary of State that 'of the
manufactures of India, quite 94 per cent is absolutely outside of the range of any
competition with Manchester being the coarser quality of goods (24s. and above) which
Manchester cannot pretend to supply so cheaply as India' (* cited in Chandra, 1966:236-
7). Despite this broad-based reaction eventually yarn above 20 count - capturing 20% of
Indian production - was placed under the countervailing duty. Westland later
"apologetically conceded that the Government of India did not recommend the measure
on its own merits but rather on account of the direction received from the Secretary of
State" based in the Colonial Office in London (Chandra, 1966:237). 3
33 The Bangasi, 31 March 1894. Cited in Chandra, (235) emphasis added.
34 An important point to note is that this tariff debate revealed tensions between the government in India
and the Colonial Office in London, which were to come to return during WWI with the massive shortages,
and beginnings of support to Indian industry. This is further explored in the next chapter.
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Even with these massive concessions, British manufacturers continued to pressure the
GOI resulting in further reductions in the import duty on British goods to 3.5% in 1896,
and crucially, the placement of all woven goods from Indian mills under a corresponding
3.5% countervailing duty. Once again this resulted in a huge outcry from Indian
nationalists. Industrialist and Indian National Congress member D.E. Wacha declared
that the Congress would 'agitate and agitate for the repeal of this iniquitous duty' (*
Chandra, 1966:239). Indian nationalists were not only concerned that the duty would
harm India's current production but also that "the excise duty would impede the Indian
textile industry from turning to the spinning of finer counts of yard which was the main
direction in which further expansion of this industry could take place.' (* Chandra,
1966:241) This was a crucial rationalized causal idea that linked trade policy with
industrial development. That is, the duty would preclude the dynamic productivity gains
that are essential elements of fostering industrial upgrading from low value-added coarse
cotton pieces to more technically sophisticated and high value-added fine counts.
Upgrading was of course central to the dynamic outcomes of List's infant industry model,
and both Indian actors and colonial authorities were well aware of what Japan as well as
the US and Germany had accomplished through providing protection to domestic
industry. Pherozeshah Mehta, a Bombay lawyer and founding member and President of
the INC in 1890, argued 'That principle and that policy are that the infant industries of
India should be strangled in their birth if there is the remotest suspicion of their
competing with English manufactures' (cited in * Chandra, 1966:245). Even the
moderate N.G. Chandavarkar added 'under the present policy no Indian industry will be
allowed to outgrow European competition' in his 1900 INC Presidential address (cited in
* Chandra, 1966:245). Nationalist actors were convinced that India was being run for the
British despite the claims of beneficent stewardship that were central to justifying and
legitimizing British colonial rule. Ex-INC President P. Ananda Churlu summed it up well
in a speech on the 1896 Cotton Duties Bill in the Legislative Council when he declared
that 'While India is safeguarded against foreign inroads by the strong arm of British
Power, she is defenceless in matters where the English and Indian interests clash and
where (as a Tamil saying puts it) the very fence begins to feed on the crop' (* Chandra,
1966:247).
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The Swadeshi Response
The heightening tariff disputes combined with the increasingly well-articulated drain
thesis led to the first occasion where the Indian National Congress did more than simply
agitate. The Congress took more concrete action through the creation of the 'swadeshi' or
'self-reliance' movement, which called for the boycott of foreign manufactured goods
and the promotion of domestic production. Many in the nationalist leadership saw this as
the only way to help indigenous industry as it had become clear that 'British
benevolence' could not be relied upon.
The rationalized causal ideas and social meanings underpinning swadeshi can be traced to
as early as 1840s, but these began to gain credence and popularity with an 1870 article in
the indigenous paper Native Opinion and a series of lectures by Justice Mahadev Govind
Ranade in Poona in 1872. Swadeshi thus emerged alongside the drain thesis. They are
inter-related: drain theory provided the rationalized causal ideas for Swadeshi: proponents
suggested that 'they are draining us, we need own industry'. The idea of swadeshi grew
vigorously from 1880-1895 -- fueled by the growing market tensions between Indian
cotton textiles and those from Lancashire -- and eventually exploded into acts of
widespread social, political and economic resistance.
Initially, the realm of action was relatively small, situated mainly in Bombay Presidency,
which was not only was the commercial and manufacturing center of Western India, but
also the stronghold of indigenous Indian industry. Further, though popular dimensions
had emerged as early as the 1870s, the swadeshi movement was the first attempt to
broaden what had largely been elite nationalist agitations to the masses. 5 The movement
exploded in 1896 with the imposition of the countervailing duty on Indian cloth
generating huge boycotts, especially in Bombay. The sentiment was that since the GOI
was doing little to support domestic industry, the people should.36
35 Of course, this is not to say that there weren't acts of resistance amongst non-elites, as the wealth of
literature on subaltern studies has demonstrated.
36 Social pressures were also applied against those who failed to follow the strictures of swadeshi and
bought British products. Were also many salient material representations of swadeshi including coins that
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This popular dimension is seen most clearly in the growth of popular songs supporting
indigenous manufactures as well as agitations against traders who stocked foreign goods.
Songs were a major tool used to promote swadeshi and the boycott of British goods in
favor of Indian substitutes. They reflect the power of songs as cultural resources
embodying salient social meaning and practice, as well as the processes through which
nationalist actors deployed cultural schemas as valuable resources in representational
politics. This expanded the realm of contestation beyond the domain of elites to
encompass the masses, all with major effects on market outcomes.
An analysis of two of these songs reveals the affective content and social meaning of
growing Indian economic nationalism that the songs harnessed and directed towards the
goal of indigenous industrialization. The first laments the plight of India's traditional
artisanal class - the weaver and the blacksmith - and the extent to which they have been
displaced by British imports of textiles and metal goods (threads and needles). This
artisanal class was the group that held the industrial skills that would have propelled
Indian industrialization if it were not for British colonial policies. The song invokes drain
theory with the vivid metaphor of locusts ravaging the land and provides a clear
rationalized causal relationship between colonial trade policy and industrial development.
The weaver and the blacksmith are crying day and night
They cannot find their food by plying their trade
Even threads and needles come from distant shores
Even match-sticks are not produced in the country
Whether in dressing themselves or producing their domestic utensils or even in lighting their oil
lamps...
In nothing are the people independent of the foreign master...
Swarms of locusts from a distant island coming to these shores have eaten up all its solid grain
leaving only the chaff for the starving children of the soil
A second song evokes similar emotive power, calling for Indian artisans and consumers
to defend themselves against the 'looting' of the foreigners, promoting consumer demand
for Indian milled grains and spun textiles. Most importantly, the framing empowers
action by calling for Indians to not stand idly by, but to contribute to preventing the drain.
were circulated and used as legal tender in swadeshi shops during the period when the British were
imposing a uniform monetary system.
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We may be poor we may be small,
But we are a nation of seven crores [seventy million]...
Defend your homes, protect your shops,
Don't let the grain from our barns be looted abroad.
We will eat our own coarse grain and wear the rough, home-spun cloth,
What do we care for lavender and imported trinkets?
Foreigners drain away our mother's milk [Bharat Mata's or Mother India's]
Will we simply stand and watch.
Colonial authorities dismissed proposals for protection of indigenous capital within the
colonial space, but this did not deter nationalist objectives. Surendath Banerjee, President
of the INC in 1895 and 1902, argued that 'If protection by legislative enactment is
impossible, may we not, by fiat of the national will, afford industries such protection as
may lie in our powers?' 37 Bipin Chandra Pal similarly argued that:
Protection, with a view to controlling foreign markets, is absolutely impossible under
present circumstances. But we can, by regulating consumption, have some sort of
protection for our indigenous arts of industries; and the regulation of consumption is the
economic principle that underlies the national boycott movement.38
Thus in the absence of legislative power, Indian nationalists sought to draw on the 'will
of the people'. Naoroji added that, while it may seem simple and futile, the use of songs
as tools of nationalist agitation could prove powerful: 'We may laugh at this attempt
[singing of songs to preach the discarding of foreign goods] as a futile attempt to shut out
English machine made, cheaper goods against handmade dearer ones. But little do we
think what this movement is likely to grow into, and what new phases it may take in
time" (Naoroji 1871[1962]:207) cited in Goswami 1998:624). Indians also took note of
"the successful Chinese boycott of American goods" (* Chandra, 1966:136), in yet
another example of Anderson's (2006 [1983]) modular nationalism. The colonial
government took these songs seriously and banned popular swadeshi texts. However, by
the time they had done so many had already been widely distributed in written and oral
form, and were being performed regularly in towns and villages all across India.
Ultimately, these efforts amounted to contested attempts by nationalist actors to regulate
industrial dynamics in an increasingly institutionalized national economic domain. This
3 [Surendath Banerjee, INC, Papers, Vol. 11 1902].
38 Bipin Chandra Pal (1907); *see Goswami (1998:628).
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domain was controlled by the Raj and structurally located in a globalized world economy
that in turn was dominated by the material and cultural power of British capital and free
trade ideology. Nationalist strategies had to match the duality of the structures they
challenged. The swadeshi movement was not only successful in raising consciousness
within India about the promotion of indigenous industry, but also contributed to the
successful establishment of indigenous enterprises such as the Tata Iron and Steel
Company (TISCO) and a number of banks.
By the turn of the century the INC was openly calling for state support in the promotion
of indigenous industry and taking an increasingly oppositional stance towards the Raj.
The role of the state in the Meiji revolution in Japan was seen a model that could be
emulated by the GOI. "One of the most commonly invoked examples of an organic
national society and economy within swadeshi discourse was Japan. Within the
geopolitical imaginary of swadeshi, Japan occupied, especially after its victory over
Russia in 1905, a central normative significance" (Goswami, 2005:219). Japanese victory
demonstrated convincingly that an Asian country could challenge and defeat a European
power both militarily, which was taken as a proxy for industrial and economic power.39
The swadeshi movement had contributed to galvanizing the nationalist effort as the two
became increasingly intertwined. "The industrial movement is flowing deep, fraught with
national ideals... Our industries need protection. But this government will not grant them
protection.. .the time has come when the scattered national impulses must be focused into
an organic and organized whole for the promotion of our industries." (*Chandra, 1966)
The response of the Raj was predictable, rooted as it was in the material and cultural
imperatives of British hegemony. The claim was that the 'Government was ill-qualified
to further industrial development by direct action, and that all such matters should be left
to private enterprise'. The INC was undeterred, and put forward various resolutions that
called for 'practical steps in the shape of State encouragement be taken for the revival
and development of indigenous art and manufactures and for the introduction of new
39 Indian nationalists admiration of the rise would shift as Japanese goods began to compete with Indian
products. The complexities of the perceived economic relationship between Japan and India is discussed
further in the next chapter.
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industries' (* Chandra, 1966:113). Nationalists identified specific policy measures
through which assistance could be provided, such as reorganizing the credit system and
transforming trading and moneylending capital into industrial capital.
Unsurprisingly there was significant skepticism amongst the general membership of the
Congress and in the nationalist press about the likelihood of a positive response from the
colonial authorities:
'It is in the interest of the English Nation to keep down the native industries as
much as possible to encourage directly their development. The greatest benefit the
English rulers look to and actually realize from their Indian dependency is the unlimited
market that India supplies their industrial products. Under such a state of things it is
impossible to expect Government to do anything like what the Poona writer [G.V. Joshi]
suggests. 40
The Bangabasi went further:
There can be no denying that the help of Government is absolutely necessary in reviving
and improving the indigenous industries of the country... But can any encouragement of
Indian industry be expected from a Government, which is not only a Government of
foreigners and of aliens in religion, but also the Government of a people who are
themselves a manufacturing and a commercial people... The fact is the English
manufacturer cannot bear the sight of an Indian using even the most trifling articles
of indigenous manufacture, and he will know no rest until he has swept the Indian
market clean of all articles of Indian making... And these English manufacturers are
the English nation, whose interest, before that of all others, it is the subject of English
statesmanship to look after and secure.4'
This was the widely understood and rationalized idea under which the colonial
government refused to provide assistance to nascent Indian capital.
The Role of Foreign Capital in Indian Industrial Development
Though it was implicit in much of the early discourse, Indian nationalists began to
directly address the role of foreign capital in India's industrial development towards the
end of the 1 9 th century. Chandra (1966) suggests that the nationalist leadership was for a
long time "confused, divided, and hesitant" in its approach to the role of foreign capital in
India. This reflects the uncertainty stemming from competing causal ideas surrounding
the issue of foreign-domestic actors that is analyzed in detail in the ensuing chapters. This
40 The Hindu, 3 February 1890. Cited in Chandra, (1966:121).
41 The Bangabasi, 31 May 1890, cited in Chandra (1966:121).
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uncertainty underpins the dynamic and contested dimensions of the preference formation
process as economic sociologists and political scientists have noted (Beckert, 1996;
Blyth, 2002). Nationalists initially had little say during the initial construction of
railways, canals and other 'modern' infrastructure that was negative towards foreign
capital. "However, as Indian-owned industries slowly developed and the Indians became
aware of the effects of its dominance, criticism of foreign capital began to appear and to
grow" (Chandra, 1966). Dadabhai Naoroji epitomized this preference change. In the
1880s, after his initial views on the drain were published, he cited John Stuart Mill in
suggesting that foreign capital could set an example and act as stimulant to domestic
industrial efforts. Justice M.G. Ranade similarly suggested that foreign capitalists could
act as teachers to Indian entrepreneurs: 42
This is the practical work which Providence has set down for us to learn under the best of
teachers... We have to improve our Raw Materials, or Import them when our Soil is
unsuited to their production. We have to organize Labour and Capital by co-operation,
and Import freely Foreign Skill and Machinery, till we learn our lessons properly
and need no help. We have rusticated too long; we have now to turn our apt hands to
new work, and bend our muscles to sturdier and honester labour. This is the Civic
Virtue we have to learn, and according as we learn it or spurn it we shall win or lose
in the contest.. .I feel sure it will soon become the creed of the whole Nation, and ensure
the permanent triumph of the modern spirit in this Ancient Land.43
This was a crucial early articulation of causal ideas of FDI as a positive contributor to
indigenous industrial development though the mechanism of knowledge and technology
transfer. These ideas would become essential in the politics of FDI in the immediate post-
independence import substitution and later economic liberalization eras. However, by the
1890s there were few supporters of foreign capital to be found amongst Indian nationalist
elites. These actors now questioned the circumstances surrounding what had previously
been considered progressive industrial development by foreign capital as the distribution
of benefits were now seen as skewed. Naoroji suggested that rather than encouraging
42 This thinking sought to strike a balance between excluding foreigners and bringing in foreign capital to
facilitate technology transfer and learning amongst indigenous firms. This is central to the construction of
industrialization in the post-independence import substituting industrialization and more recent economic
liberalization periods that are the focus of the last two chapters of the dissertation. It speaks perfectly to the
relationship between foreign capital, learning and industrialization in the politics of joint ventures, and the
continuity of institutions that emerged in the late 19t* century. This is a key part of the technological
imaginary, not only what is possible but how to acquire the capabilities, and crucially, the idea that this is
important in the context of global competition. One cannot overstress the extent to which these are the very
same ideas that animate debates on liberalization in the 1990s and 2000s.
43 [Justice Mahadev Govind Ranade Ranade, Essays, 1893/1990:277-8..., cited in Chandra p6 6 ]
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domestic efforts, foreign capital turned the Indian people into 'hewers of wood and
drawers of water to the British and foreign capitalist' (* Chandra, 1966) while G.S. Iyer
argued that foreign capital reduced 'the Indian people to the lot of a race of coolies under
white masters' (* Chandra, 1966).
Nationalists views are well-reflected in Dadabhai Naoroji's testimony to the 1895 Welby
Commission in response to questioning as to why Indians didn't start new industries: 44
Naoroji: What is the reason they were able to take up these industries, such as tea or any
of these industries, or any of these enterprises which the foreigners came and took
possession of; is it not because our capital is carried away from the country?
Gokhale: Yes, this is so.
Naoroji: Is not that at the root of the whole thing?
Gokhale: Yes, it is the root of the whole thing.4 5
Bipin Chandra Pal further argued that:
"The introduction of foreign, and mostly British, capital for working out the natural
resources of the country, instead of begin a help, is, in fact, the greatest of hindrances to
all real improvements in the economic condition of the people. This exploitation of
the land by foreign capitalist threatens to involve both Government and the people in a
common ruin.. .It is as much a political, as it is an economic danger. And the future of
New India absolutely depends upon an early and radical remedy of this two edged
evil."
Ultimately, "the opponents of foreign capital came to believe that genuine economic
development and improvement of the country was possible only if Indian capitalists
themselves initiated and developed the process of industrialization, and that foreign
capitalists were incapable of fulfilling this task." (Chandra, 1966). G.S. Iyer of The Hindu
was certainly of that view, declaring in 1901 that:
'I am not aware of any instance of a country, either in modern or ancient times... where a
number of foreign capitalists, with all the political and social advantages of their being of
the ruling race, have helped in bringing abut the industrial prosperity of the people
ruled.. .I do not hesitate to say that only in this way, that is, by educating and training
our own people so as to enable them to take into their own hands the manufacture of
our raw materials that non-agricultural wealth can be created.'46
4" The Welby Commission was appointed to examine the apportionment of civilian and military
expenditures (the controversial 'home charges') between the Government of Great Britain and the
Government of India.
45 Naoroji's position is in stark contrast to earlier views about the need for foreign capital given the inability
to mobilize indigenous capital.
46 GS Iyer, 1901. Cited in * Chandra, 1966).
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Foreign capital was seen as blocking Indian capital in a variety of fields including those
where little foreign technology was required such as banking. After destroying
handicrafts, the view was that foreign capital would occupy all of the potential areas
where indigenous capital might be ready to enter in the future, even if not at present, thus
limiting the capacity for dynamic industrial upgrading. Finally, there was recognition of
the close links between economic domination by foreign capitalists and political control
by the British. As early as September 23 1889, an editorial in The Hindu noted that "if
during the period of reforms 'the influence of foreign capitalists in the land is allowed to
increase, then adieu to all chances of success of the Indian National Congress, whose
voice will be drowned in the tremendous uproar of "the empire in danger" that will surely
be raised by the foreign capitalists' " (* Chandra, 1966). Such statements by nationalist
actors underscored the importance of ensuring there was a viable Indian capitalist class
that could perform the role of industrial development that foreign capital was deemed
politically unsuitable for and in any case unwilling to perform. The perceived challenges
of identifying a indigenous economic actors possessing the 'right orientation' to pursue
industrialization would become a major issue for modernizing nationalist political actors
in the early twentieth century as this next chapter will show.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter elaborated the analytic framework introduced in the previous chapter by
identifying the institutional origins of Indian economic nationalism in the late 19 th
century. It employed Sewell's (1992) 'duality' to recognize agency, build the possibility
and mechanisms of institutional change into structure and overcome the cultural-material
divide that limits much analysis in the new institutionalisms. It lay the foundation for
understanding how nationalist preferences towards foreign capital were emerged, setting
the stage for the next chapter which shows how these preferences evolved from the onset
of World War I up to independence in 1947.
As the 1 9 th century came to a close, developments in trade policy and the emergence of
the swadeshi movement helped nationalists to make their economic critique stronger,
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more articulate and more comprehensive. Romesh Chunder Dutt, a former member of the
Indian Civil Service, built on the work of Naoroji and other early nationalists to provide
an elegant elaboration of the emergent nationalist argument in his masterful two-volume
The Economic History of India published in 1901 and 1903. The series was a capstone for
the previous thirty years of nationalist thought and activism. It provided a powerful
master narrative of Indian economic history beginning with the effective launch of East
India Company rule following the Battle of Plassey in 1757 and explained India's
subsequent poverty under the British in terms of drain theory. Following his predecessors
Dutt argued that liberal British economic policy had deindustrialized India in favor of
British industrial capital by destroying the vibrant handicraft industry through the
promotion of 'free trade' (Dutt, 1901). From the beginning of Volume 1, Dutt stressed the
view that for centuries before the rise of Europe as an industrial and imperial force,
India's vibrant handicrafts industry produced a wide variety manufactures, including
jewelry and iron works that were well known for their quality around the world. Dutt's
Economic History of India was critical in providing an "artful fabrication of a constitutive
link between the existence of India as a nation and its ability to exert control over its
resources" (Prakash, 1999:186-7).
This theoretical framework had crucial implications for emerging preferences towards
foreign capital amongst nationalists political actors as well as emerging Indian capitalists.
Though Dutt was not the first to promote this viewpoint, "he fashioned it most
systematically. After him, the [20th century] nationalists routinely invoked concepts of
village communities, deindustrialization, and economic drain to formulate and press the
claims of the nation" (Prakash, 1999:187). Dutt's two-volume series spoke directly to the
development of indigenous industry, and the growing tension between foreign and
indigenous capital that is further explored in the next chapter.
Swadeshi agitations and frustration with the stymieing response by the British eventually
led to calls for swaraj or 'self rule' by Dadabhai Naoraoji in a 1904 speech to the
International Socialist Congress and a 1905 speech to the Benares session of the Indian
National Congress. He attributed India's poverty to the lack of industry, which in turn
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was attributed to the drain that could only be halted by self-government. The first Indian
Industrial Conference was also held in Benares alongside the INC meeting with Dutt as
the chair. The Conference called for the expansion of commercial and industrial
education, and the compilation of information on indigenous methods of trade, finance,
and organization.
The swadeshi movement "combined economic grievances with nationalist imperatives"
(Prakash, 1999:187) by demanding that the British end their exploitation of Indian
resources and calling for the state intervention to facilitate the development of indigenous
industry. The vision of developmentalism embedded in swadeshi self-reliance ideology
required a developmental state, thus providing the crucial link between the late 1 9 th
century swadeshi movement and the early 20th century agitations for swaraj that became
closely associated with Mohandas Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National
Congress. Gandhi referred to the swadeshi strategy as the 'soul' of swaraj, and argued
that 'swaraj without swadeshi is a lifeless corpse'. 47 The combination of swadeshi and
swaraj underpinned a particular conception of a developmental state that was fueled by
developments in Japan and other late developing states. It pervaded the debates of the
1930s between Gandhians and Nehruvian 'scientific socialists' that is the focus of the
Chapter Five, and the policy approach of the post 1947 independent Indian state that is
described in Chapter Six in comparative perspective with Brazil.
Finally, though this chapter focused heavily on causal ideas drawn from economic theory,
indigenous elite critiques were not limited to the economic sphere. Nationalist actors also
developed and deployed rationalized scientific ideas, epitomized by Prafulla Chandra
Ray's A History of Hindu Chemistry written in 1902. Much as with the construction of
the drain theory, the nationalist scientific elite sought to appropriate the past by
highlighting Vedic scientific advances, steeped in particular interpretations of Hinduism
4 Gandhi further linked swadeshi and swaraj with cottage industries, village production and 'traditional'
homespun khadi cloth. It contrasts sharply with Nehru's vision of India's economic future as driven by
large-scale, technology intensive, 'modern' industry. These differences in the content of Gandhian and
Nehruvian nationalist proposals lay at the core of their disputes about the path of India's industrial future in
the 1930s.
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that predated European scientific knowledge. 4 8 The book reflected Ray's own frustrations
with the limitations he faced in professional advancement. Chandra Ray was the son of "a
prosperous zamindar and a man of wide culture" who had a doctorate in inorganic
chemistry from the University of Edinburgh. Despite strong recommendations, his
application to the India Office in London for entry to the Indian Educational Services was
denied, as the service remained closed to Indians. 49 His social background, like that of
other nationalist actors, provided him with the material and cultural resources and
capacity to creatively combine Indian and European cultural schemas laced with meaning
of tradition and modernity in the production of his powerful nationalist scientific ideas.
The underlying view of past Indian scientific knowledge complemented the economic
arguments around past Indian industrial skills, both of which had been destroyed by
British colonialism which drained material resources and knowledge, such that they could
not contribute to emerging industrialization as in other late developing states. Much as
nationalist actors combined 'negative' drain theory critique with the 'positive' critique
from List's infant industry ideas, Chandra Ray's 'Hindu Chemistry' provided crucial
content to Indian nationalist proposals at the dawn of the 2 0 th century, not least by linking
technology and economics to generate new rationalized ideas of the industrialization
process. This causal link would lie at the center of competing ideas that legitimized and
delegitimized foreign investment and business practices of multinational firms in the
post-independence period. The ideas and social meaning also motivated many nascent
Indian industrialists: Chandra Ray himself was the founder of several industrial concerns
including India's first pharmaceutical company, Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals.
The Chapter Five elaborates the technological imaginaries generated by Chandra Ray and
by the new generation of nationalists -- Gandhi and Nehru in particular -- in the first few
decades of the 2 0 th century. The combined political salience of nationalist economic
critique and visions of technology underscores the argument in the previous chapter about
the mutual constitution of economic theory, technology and nationalism. These views on
48 This inversion of the Western-Eastern modernization dialectic retains political virility as well as religious
overtones in the discourse on globalization in India in the post-1991 liberalization era. This is voiced most
clearly by the Hindu nationalist fundamentalist sectarian elements of the RSS/BJP (cf. Kaushik Sunder
Rajan (2006:fn 14).
49 "Sir Prafulla Chandra Ray" in Science and Culture, Volume II, No. 2, August 1936.
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science and economics provided the means-ends relationships through which nationalist
ambitions could be realized, thus constituting the process of preference formation.
Finally, the elaboration of these views served as a powerful means of political
mobilization: British colonial power had destroyed India, and the only way to fix it was
to enlist political representation from Indians who were members of the 'educated
middle-class': elites like Dutt, Chandra Ray, and the leadership of the Indian National
Congress. 50
50 There is of course a crucial critique of this elite narrative in subaltern studies.
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CHAPTER 4
Capitalist Emergence:
Constructing the Cultural Category of 'Indian Economic Man'
I. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the emergence of Indian economic actors in the politically
contested industrial policy domain. It builds on the analysis of imperialist-nationalist
discourse in Chapter Three by examining the construction of the cognitive and cultural
category of 'Indian Economic Man'. The chapter has both theoretical and empirical goals.
It continues to elaborate a constructivist political economy by offering an agency-centric
theoretical approach to culture while providing the empirical analysis of the emergence of
indigenous capitalists as political actors during the first three decades of the 20'h century.
The analysis considers the relationship between four sets of actors that occupy the
institutional domain of industrial policy: British colonial authorities, British managing
agencies, Indian nationalist political actors and indigenous Indian capitalists. It begins by
identifying a common problem that colonial and nationalist political actors faced: the
'traditional' economic conventions of 'Indian economic man' were considered
incommensurate with the norms and institutions of modem capitalism that the British
sought to impose on the Indian colony as well as the developmental ambitions of Indian
economic nationalists. It shows how otherwise competing British colonial and Indian
nationalist actors arrived at a similar binary traditional-modern culturalist conception of
the 'orientation', strategies and practices of Indian business actors. They shared elements
of this interpretative frame despite their otherwise radically divergent political objectives.
It does so by presenting the conflicting preferences and objectives of colonial and
nationalist actors before identifying how the dichotomous cultural categories of
'traditional' and 'modern' ascribed to Indian economic actors and increasingly to British
managing agencies nevertheless served both of their modernizing purposes. These
cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern' served to legitimize and delegitimize
particular business practices and strategies of Indian economic actors and crucially,
would become ascribed to specific Indian capitalists, caste-based community groups and
business houses. Finally, categories of capitalist legitimacy were not limited to Indian
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economic actors. They were also increasingly ascribed to British economic actors as
colonial demands shifted from those which required the 'buccaneering' norms of the
traditional managing agencies to the norms that came to define the emerging 'modern'
organizational form of the multinational corporation.
The rationalized causal logics that underpinned the legitimizing and delegitimizing
cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy can be described as follows. Colonial political
authorities were informed by the liberal tenets of classical political economy. This logic
naturalized British intellectual, technological and economic dominance and prescribed
free trade policies as the optimal approach to organizing economic activities within the
colony and between the colony and the global economy. This logic underpinned imperial
objectives of retaining political control of the Indian colony for the British Crown, which
was achieved though maintaining economic control of the Indian economy for British
firms. ' Indian business had an important albeit subordinate role in facilitating these
colonial goals as junior partners to their British counterparts. By contrast, nationalist
political figures understood India's position through the interpretive lens of the drain
theory critique of liberal political economy. This cognitive and cultural schema had both
logical and socially meaningful components, which held that the British brutally
extracted India's resources, destroyed its native industry and hindered the rise of a new
class of indigenous capitalists. Nationalist actors resented the dominance of the economy
by British firms - as foreign economic control was considered tantamount to foreign
political control. Foreign capital was interpreted as a 'neo-imperialist instrument' and
nationalist political actors were intent on promoting Indian business. However, this
rationalized logic did not automatically legitimate all indigenous economic actors on the
basis of being Indian. Nationalist actors distinguished between Indian economic actors
who pursued 'traditional' business practices of trade and speculation as well as
1 One of the main arguments of the dissertation is that economic actors' policy preferences cannot be
deduced based on assumptions of rational behavior and economic actor's position in the socioeconomic
structure. Preferences are shaped by cultural schemas - systems of meaning and thought that embody
rationalized causal means-ends relationships and logics imbued with historically salient social and political
meaning that shapes action. Economic interests and policy preferences thus are neither natural nor
automatically given; preferences are formed through historically embedded sociopolitical processes that
shape the experiences of economic actors. The theoretical underpinnings of this argument were elaborated
in Chapters One and Two, and is a central theme throughout the rest of the dissertation.
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comprador activities of banians, Indian brokers and middlemen that facilitated the
commercial dominance of private British capital. As such, though both colonial and
nationalist actors were interested in economic development, the former wished to
maintain India as a colonial satellite and growing market for British goods while the latter
wanted India to establish its own footing on the world stage. Nevertheless emerging
Indian capitalists were important instruments in the achievement of both colonial and
nationalist objectives.
Finally, the chapter assesses the response of indigenous capitalists and highlights their
attempts to navigate this politically contentious and dynamic institutional environment.
While colonial and nationalist actors provided conflicting cultural representations of
emerging Indian capitalists, it shows that these Indian economic actors were neither
political tools nor cultural dopes; they displayed significant agency in resisting the
attempts of modernizing imperial and nationalist actors to categorize them as backward.
They challenged this cultural categorization by organizing and projecting an image of
themselves as 'modern' economic actors, thereby asserting a role as expert managers of
the Indian economy and a viable alternative to foreign capital in the nationalist pursuit of
industrial development.2 The content of these categories is outlined in the table below.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1900-1930)
TRADITIONAL MODERN
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Modem
Colonial and nationalist conceptions of traditional Nationalist conceptions of Indian economic actors
'Indian Economic Man' or comprador actors. as emerging 'captains of industry'.
TRADITIONAL MODERN
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: Modem
Nationalist conceptions of foreign capital as 'neo- Colonialist perceptions of MNCs as modem.
imperial instruments'. Colonialist increasing Nationalist perceptions of MNCs as potential
perception of Managing agencies as outdated technology providers.
2 [However, the dissertation remains attentive to crucial variation amongst Indian capitalists.]
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the emerging
interactions between colonial and nationalists actors and the dichotomous traditional-
modern categories and discourse around 'Indian economic man'. Section III discusses the
effects of developments in colonial regulatory and surveillance capacity through the rise
of the Japanese commercial threat to nascent indigenous Indian industry, while section IV
continues the discussion with the first steps towards colonial industrial policy. Section V
considers formal collective action amongst indigenous capitalists as they sought to
project a modern conception of themselves and challenge the hegemony of foreign capital,
and section VI concludes with a brief summary and introduction to Chapters Five.
II. Capitalist Emergence:
Constructing Indigenous Economic Agents and Modernizing Indian Economic Man
Indian nationalist actors took proactive steps to promote nascent indigenous industry
following the late 19th century agitations detailed in the previous chapter. These steps
included organizing an industrial exhibit at the Indian National Congress' annual meeting
in Calcutta in 1901 to showcase the products of Indian indigenous industry. Following
the exhibit's success, the event was repeated at the annual meetings in Ahmedabad in
1902, Madras in 1903 and Bombay in 1904, culminating in the first Indian Industrial
Conference, held in Benares in 1905 (Kochanek, 1974:157). The event was held
alongside the Congress annual meeting convened under the Presidency of Romesh
Chandra Dutt, who had just published an extensive critique of colonial rule in his two-
volume Economic History of India that established him as the contemporary leader in
nationalist economic thought. Conference participants produced a range of resolutions to
lobby the colonial government to support the development of Indian manufacturing
industry. The conference also led to the formation of committees in major cities across
the colony to study local industry with the aim of promoting nascent domestic firms and
indigenous industrialists.
British colonial officials also began to participate in the Indian Industrial Conferences as
they grew over the next few years. The conferences thus became an important venue of
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interaction between nationalist and colonial figures - competing sets of modernizing
actors seeking to map India's economic future. 3 These discussions covered a range of
general policy issues relating to the economic wellbeing of India's population, from the
poverty and periodic famines that had wracked India for the past few decades to the
promotion of indigenous industrial development. However, in addition to core issues
such as tariffs and new developments such as the growing threat of Japanese competition,
they increasingly turned their focus to the general 'state' of Indian economic actors.
Despite their many differences on policy issues, nationalist and colonial actors shared
common concerns with the 'traditional' cultural norms that they perceived as governing
the economic behavior of Indian business communities. 4 Indigenous merchant-traders of
the 1 9 th century -- India's emerging capitalists of the 2 0 th century -- were crucial
economic actors who facilitated colonial extraction and the functioning of the Indian
economy since the days of the East India Company. However, as the British colonial
authorities transformed the economy in the late 1 9 th century through the implementation
of formal institutions of modern capitalism (as opposed to the governance mechanisms
that facilitated the mercantilist objectives of the East Indian Company) and nationalist
actors deployed Swadeshi logics promoting indigenous industrialization, both groups
feared that Indian economic actors lacked the appropriate 'orientation' to undertake
modern economic activities. Modernizing colonial and nationalist political actors
believed Indian merchant-traders were trapped in the 'traditional' cultural conventions of
kinship, clan and caste - norms that were out of line with the operation of a modern
economy and the pursuit of industrial development. This created significant angst:
At the government-sponsored Indian Industrial Conference of 1912, for example,
colonial administrators and nationalist intelligentsia contemplated the state of
'Indian Economic Man', articulating an ongoing interest in reforming the ways of
3 These interactions were the beginning of a dialogue that increased throughout the late colonial period. The
emergence of these types of interactions between colonial and national political actors complicates the
nationalist-colonial relationship and the extent to which these actors worked together or at odds with one
another.
4 Marwari merchant-traders epitomized these traditional cultural norms even relative to their Parsi and
Gujarati counterparts, and the stereotypes about Marwaris persist in Indian business and economic
discourse to this day. These inter-community distinctions became particularly important with respect to
foreign capital in the post-independence period.
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indigenous merchant-capitalists, who operated through ties of kinship, clan and caste.
These vernacular [indigenous] practitioners of capitalism were universally recognized as
key actors in the colonial economy, for their extensive credit networks had fueled
commodity production, exchange, and consumption since the early days of the East India
Company. But according to early twentieth century modernizers, Indian Economic
Man required a radical makeover. Donned in 'ragged dress', he was burdened by
family and caught in tangled customary webs regulating partnerships and the 'division of
parental property'. The assessment was dire: Indian Economic Man evinced 'no
economic ambition, only longing for nirvana'. Policymakers, both colonial and
nationalist, who sought to promote economic development, especially swadeshi or home
industry, argued that the 'indigenous system of banking and other business' posed a
challenge for India's progress, for 'men trained under it are generally incapable of
taking broad views of things or rising above their traditions'."
These 'anti-modern' behavioral norms and cultural practices of 'Indian economic man'
were considered incommensurate with both colonial and nationalist ambitions and
objectives. They were misaligned with the newly reformed institutional environment that
the Raj had installed to facilitate further colonial extraction, and ill-equipped for the
process of industrialization through indigenous firms that Swadeshi Indian economic
6
nationalists sought to promote. Despite their many differences, both modernizing
projects required economic actors that fit the cultural categories of modern industrial
capitalism prescribed by the logics of classical political economy and epitomized by
Adam Smith's homo economicus: rational self interest, recognition of market incentives
and relentless pursuit of profit-making opportunities. 7 Indeed, the description of raggedly
dressed 'Indian economic man' in the official conference report was preceded by a
representation of 'Western Economic Man' and his transformation from narrow
individualistic profit maximization to benevolent contributor to societal advancement:
The conception of an 'economic man' in western economies has been very limited. He
was at one time depicted as a man bent on making profits, ...as a man stern and
5 Birla (2009:2), emphasis added.
6 This institutional environment was constituted of both informal norms and belief structures, such as those
that underpin economic interests and policy preferences, as well as formal policies and legal rules.
7 As argued in the previous chapter, classical political economy arose with the Enlightenment as a means of
rationalizing and providing the mechanisms of control for the rapidly evolving European societies. The
Enlightenment provided the cultural and intellectual framework for the application of scientific knowledge
to generate material benefits and the creation of the positivist 'scientific' disciplines of socio-economic
analysis to organize, rationalize and control the social environment. Key amongst these was the notion that
increased material output was broadly beneficial for all - this was central in Adam Smith's moral
philosophy and underpins later conceptions Walrasian welfare economics, the framework that remains a
central organizing principle in modern microeconomics (and as we will see in Chapter 7 on economic
liberalization, provides the rationalizing frame for much of argument in favor of India adopting a liberal
FDI regime).
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determined, with hardly any heart and feelings. Ideas have now changed and the
modern 'economic man' of the West is depicted with a kindly face indicating
benevolent intentions. Now let us picture an Oriental and especially an Indian
'economic' man: His ragged dress.. .his wife and children.. .cares of dissolution of
partnership.. .division of family property.. .and lastly no economic ambition.. .[only]
longing for nirvana.8
Western economic man was re-conceptualized from harsh selfish individualism to kindly
benevolence. This is precisely the transformation that Andrew Carnegie sought to portray
in his 1889 essay 'Gospel of Wealth', which justified laissez-faire capitalism and the
philanthropic responsibilities of wealth as he and his American 'monopoly capitalist'
peers sought to transform their image from rapacious 'robber-barons' to legitimate
'captains of industry':
This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of wealth: To set an example of modest,
unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for the
legitimate wants of those dependent upon him; and, after doing so, to consider all
surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to
administer, and strictly bound as a matter of duty to administer in the manner which, in
his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the
community - the man of wealth thus becoming the mere trustee and agent for his poorer
brethren, bringing to their service his superior wisdom, experience, and ability to
administer, doing for them better than they would or could do for them selves... Thus is
the problem of rich and poor to be solved. The laws of accumulation will be left free,
the laws of distribution free. Individualism will continue, but the millionaire will be
but a trustee for the poor, intrusted for a season with a great part of the increased wealth
of the community, but administering it for the community far better than it could or
would have done for itself.9
In stark contrast to 'Western economic man', modernizing colonial and nationalist figures
believed indigenous economic actors "were driven by the narrow-minded and age-old
gemeinschaft [community] requirements of kinship and clan, rather than a commitment to
improving the wealth and material conditions of the [wider] colonial public" (Birla,
2010:84). These beliefs were consistent with the cognitive and cultural schemas that
shaped their worldviews, informed by the logics of liberal political economy and
8 Indian Industrial Conference 'Summary of Proposals', in Report of the Indian Industrial Conference, pp.
lix-lx. Cited in Birla (1999:240).
9 Andrew Carnegie (1889) 'Gospel of Wealth', North American Review.
http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/l11carn.html accessed August 28, 2012. This concept of
capitalists as 'trustees' of the nation's wealth was adopted by Gandhi and formed a major point of conflict
between his system of thought and Nehru's scientific socialism. Gandhian trusteeship played an important
role in legitimizing large Indian capital in the Gandhianism. By contrast, Nehru was far more skeptical of
these large indigenous private actors and as such they had less of a role to play in the Nehruvian system
that he developed. These are discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
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nationalist drain theory. For both sets of modernizing actors, Indian economic man failed
to display the gesellschaft [individual] norms of relentless self-interest prescribed by
classical political economy as the means through which societal gains were maximized.
Modernizing actors believed these 'Western' behavioral norms were necessary to
facilitate the functioning of the formal institutions of contract, exchange and formation of
joint stock companies that the British Raj had imposed in the late 19t century. A similar
set of beliefs was also crucial for nationalist preferences towards foreign and domestic
firms. The nationalist project required economic actors from traditional merchant
communities that would shift from speculative trading and moneylending activities that
had long been seen as rapacious and abusive of the poor, especially in rural areas. It also
sought to curtail participation in local 'share bazaars' and the formal stock market in
ways that appeared tantamount to gambling and direct these actors towards long-term
capitalist investment in manufacturing industry, as indigenous ownership of industry
would free India of foreign economic domination by British firms -- and hence political
control by the British government. It would also support the development of an economy
based on modern industry that would provide manufacturing employment, reduce poverty
and raise India in the global pecking order of modern capitalist nation-states. 10 Modern
behavioral norms would thus generate economic benefits that were distributed outside of
the narrow kinship-based communities in which Indian merchant-traders were embedded.
Colonial Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1900-1914)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Colonial and nationalist conceptions of Modem: 'Captains of Industry'
Indian economic actors as 'bazaar traders and
speculators'. Trapped in ties of caste and kin. No
economic ambition, only longing for Nirvana
Illegitimate foreign economic actors "----1 Legitimate foreign economic actors
'Traditional' Western Economic Man stern and 'Modem' Western Economic Man of the West
determined, with hardly any heart and feelings; bent depicted with a 'kindly face indicating benevolent
on making profits intentions. Akin to Andrew Carnegies 'Trustees'.
10 The challenge facing nationalists was that if indigenous economic actors were held to be incapable of
generating modem industrial activity, nationalist actors had no where to turn. This would remain the
conundrum until state ownership emerged as a viable alternative with the rise of Nehru's scientific
socialism in the 1930s, as described in the next chapter.
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The imposition of these legitimating and delegitimating cultural categories in conjunction
with the formal institutions of property, contract and commercial law supported by the
technologies of economic monitoring described in the previous chapter served as
governance mechanisms with which modernizing colonial and national actors could
channel the behavior of Indian economic man towards 'modem' economic activities. By
enforcing these cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern', colonial authorities
sought to bring Indian economic actors into their regulatory purview, ensuring that they
conducted the economic activities required by the colonial state. These were no longer
limited to mercantilist resource extraction as pursued under pre-1857 East India
Company rule; they now rested on sophisticated capitalist investment with its long time
horizons, acquisition of leading technologies, efficient management of hundreds of
employees and participation in politically sensitive labor negotiations. Crucially, by
characterizing Indian merchant-traders as existing outside of capitalist cultural norms,
modernizing nationalist-colonial actors reinforced a binary between traditional and
modern capitalist conventions that had major implications for the distribution of resource
flows through industrial policy support. These policies provided crucial rents through
trade protection, government procurement and access to technologies, which in turn
shaped the competitiveness of emerging Indian industry and the ability of Indian
economic actors to compete with their foreign (largely British but increasingly Japanese,
German and American) counterparts. Thus cultural categories created during this period
of indigenous capitalist emergence could also be deployed as instruments of state
patronage and control and, as Chapter 8 shows, these categories have retained political
salience and continue to serve as resources for strategic actors engaged in policy
contestation to shape regulatory and market outcomes during the current period of
globalization and economic liberalization.
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III. Colonial State Meets Native Capital:
Governance Technologies and Institutions for Regulating Indian Market Actors
The previous chapter described how Indian economic actors entered manufacturing
industry through textile production during the cotton boom stemming from the US Civil
War. However, emergent Indian merchant-capitalists began to seek new investment
avenues following a slowdown in agricultural production in the 1890s along with clashes
with colonial authorities over textile tariffs. This generally took two forms: financing
commodity production overseas and increasingly, investment in diversifying industrial
production from cotton and textile mills to other activities, such as steel, where the Tata
Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) launched in 1907 is by far the best example." This
dynamic was later accelerated by the limited supply of a wide array of imported
consumer goods during the First World War, which created the demand for import
substitution and significantly boosted early diversification efforts.
As these market developments unfolded, late 1 9th and early 2 0 th century advances in the
commercial data collection capacity of the Raj provided the public with new conceptions
of trade and industry. The Department of Commerce and Industry was created in 1905 to
replace the Finance and Commerce Department in the colonial government, and a
Commercial Exhibitions Branch was founded in 1906, a year after the first Indian
Industrial Conference that itself emerged from Congress-sponsored industrial exhibitions
that aimed to showcase the products of indigenous Indian firms. These developments not
only increased the capacity of the government to monitor economic activity, they also
brought the activities of indigenous merchant-industrialists and their contribution to the
economy more clearly into view. The new data highlighted the scale of indigenous
commercial activity, challenging pre-conceived notions of commercial dominance of the
Indian economy by British firms.
The colonial state continued to increase its economic surveillance and governance
capacity over the next ten years, culminating in the establishment of a Commercial
11 Overseas commodity trade primarily occurred in other British colonies such as Burma, Malaya and
Uganda and was typically conducted by members of the South Indian Chettiar merchant-trading
community.
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Intelligence Department in 1917 with the principal goal of identifying and taxing
indigenous capitalists' booming war-time profits. However, rather than resisting these
regulatory intrusions of the colonial state, many emergent merchant-capitalist
"themselves attempted such information-collecting efforts to assert the leverage of Indian
industry in imperial trade" (Birla, 2009:106-7). These colonial developments were
welcomed as they allowed Indian economic actors to demonstrate that their economic
activities had wider benefits for the country and thus served both colonial and nationalist
purposes. For example, the major Bombay-based Gujarati textile firm Laximichand
Dossabhai & Bros. wrote to the Commercial Intelligence Department suggesting the
creation of a 'Commercial Museum and Intelligence Bureau' which would " 'undertake
to furnish every possible information about the Indian and British manufactured goods
and raw materials and give all facilities to promote.. .the increased Indo-British trade
relation' " (Birla, 2009:106-7). 12 It represented an avenue of strategic action on the part
of Indian capitalists as they sought to negotiate the cultural categories of legitimate
economic behavior. Merchant-traders simultaneously sought to re-constitute themselves
from scruffy, distrusted bazaar traders, moneylenders and speculators to legitimate
capitalist-industrialists through whom the modernizing dreams of the colonial and
nationalist imagination could be realized.1 3
Competing Interpretations of the Japanese Commercial Threat
Structural developments in the global economy provide an excellent illustration of the
distributional implications of these traditional-modern capitalist cultural categories
through economic policy rents. British colonial agents not only sought to delegitimize
'traditional' Indian economic actors relative to British but also relative to other foreign
12 This reveals both the "new public presence of vernacular merchant-capitalists" as well as "their
entrepreneurial ambitions" (Birla, 1999:106-7).It also reflected Indian capitalists' growing civic
engagement, evidenced in their financial support of charitable endeavors, including health facilities and
critically, scientific and commercial education institutions (Ibid). These institutions were to provide modern
knowledge by which to harness nature and the market.
13 It is worth briefly reiterating the areas of overlap and divergence between colonial and nationalist groups
here. Colonial actors primarily sought increased trade with UK-based firms while tolerating some low-end
manufacturing in India, particularly as British firms vacated these areas and moved up the value-added
chain. Nationalists wanted to see entry into technology intensive manufacturing to raise India out of
poverty, improve India's in world standing, and ensure the creation of indigenous owned industry such that
moves towards independence will not be constrained by economic domination by foreign firms.
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economic actors. As noted in the previous chapter, Japan engaged in a major
modernization and industrialization effort in the late 19t century to catch up to the West.
The Meiji Restoration was a huge success, not only increasing Japan's manufacturing
capacities but also its military capabilities, as convincingly demonstrated by Japan's
victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Having built an industrial base through
heavy state intervention and infant industry policies based on the economic ideas of
Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, Japan became a formidable competitor in global
export markets, and India - the jewel in the crown of the British Empire and the most
important market for British manufactured exports - was squarely in the sights of Japan's
aggressive new firms.
The rapid increase in Japanese imports threatened both Lancashire textile and other
British manufacturing interests that exported goods to India and nascent Indian
industrialists seeking to produce for their home market. This raised tensions between
colonial authorities bent on retaining control of the Indian economy and nationalist actors
committed to the development of indigenous industry. It also heightened the imperative
facing nascent Indian capitalists to increase their participation in the public policy domain.
This would allow them to state their case for policy support as legitimate capitalist-
industrialists whose activities generated widely distributed social benefits and who could
compete with foreign firms invading the Indian market. The level of concern is clear
from a letter from the Department of Commerce and Industry in Delhi, to the Secretary of
State in the Colonial Office in London, where colonial authorities noted that Japanese
trade has been causing "uneasiness among educated Indians generally and in commercial
circles in particular":
For the present we would observe that although the five years' statistics apparently
indicate trade development which may well gave been advantageous to India and Japan,
the figures conceal a serious rivalry from which Indian industries, as distinct from
Indian trade, have suffered. Japan has set before herself, as is well known, the ideal of
becoming one of the leading industrial nations of the world. Her Banks provide cheap
loans to her manufacturers for this object; her tariff is so framed as to encourage the
introduction of raw materials and to debar the import of manufactured goods while her
system of shipping subsidies enables her to assist her overseas trade with rates of freight
with which unsubsidized shipping cannot compete, and to flood the Far East and India
with Japanese articles at exceptionally low prices. As a result of this policy India is now
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inundated with cheap Japanese manufactures, competition which depresses the
prospects of her nascent industries.14
First, it is crucial to note the crucial distinction that colonial actors drew between Indian
economic actors located in trade versus those in industry. This distinction between traders
and industrialists is central to the legitimacy that is accorded to competing categories of
Indian economic actors, as will be demonstrated throughout this dissertation. Further, and
tellingly, the exchange between colonial authorities reveals the contradictions in the
liberal logic in their cultural construction of the Japanese capitalist whose cheap goods
threatened to dominate the Indian market:
We fully recognize that in many, if not in most, respects the industrial success of Japan is
based on the enterprise and business acumen of her capitalists and on the skill of her
artisans. But there are other points in which we may claim that the Japanese are unfair
competitors. We have already alluded to the assistance which Japanese merchants derive
from shipping subsidies and from the cheap use of Government funds through the Banks.
We are further informed that in practice, if not in theory, the government regulations for
the control of work in factories are far more lax and far les humane that those in force in
this country. Such handicaps as these may not unreasonably be termed unfair to
Indian manufactures of competing articles. 5
The contrasting portrayal of the Japanese capitalists relative to their Indian counterparts
in official colonial discourse merits brief discussion. Colonial authorities describe the
figure of the Japanese industrialist as successful due to "enterprise and business acumen,"
as well as "the skill of her artisans", characterizations that are in clear opposition to the
'ragged Indian bazaar merchant' attempting the transition to capitalist manufacturing.
This is posited as the reason for the efficient production of Japanese manufactured goods,
even while detailing the Japanese state supported mechanisms through which Japanese
manufacturers are in fact "unfair competitors," adding lax labor standards to the already-
noted "shipping subsidies" and "cheap use of Government funds". Nevertheless, Japanese
economic man, like Western economic man, is placed in an opposing binary cultural
category from Indian economic man.'6 This cultural categorization legitimized foreign
14 Secret letter, #6 of 1916, from GOI, Dept of Com & Ind, to Rt Hon Austen Chamberlain, Sect of State
for Indian, Delhi 31 March 1916. Records from the British Colonial Office housed in the British Library,
London, emphasis added.
15 Ibid, paragraph #6.
16 This contradiction in the cultural categorization of Japanese capitalists is all the more stark given that
these firms were primarily zaibatsu, large family owned merchant-trading-banking-industry groups that
were embedded in tight kinship-based networks, just like the colonial caricature of Indian economic man.
Further, the 'big four' of these groups - Sumitomo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Yasuda - had been heavily
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economic actors and delegitimized Indians and with important implications for the
provision of policy support. If Indian capitalists are being out-competed by Japanese due
to their purported natural superiority in business, any suggestions for policy intervention
to aid Indian industry is quickly deemed illegitimate and ultimately futile, precisely the
position that colonial authorities expressed in the 1930s (as discussed in Chapter Five).
The logic of industrial policy support is thus closely tied to the construction of economic
actors' legitimacy. These categories are briefly summarized in the table below, with the
arrow indicating competing conceptions of the legitimacy of Japanese economic actors.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Japanese Capitalist Legitimacy (1914-18)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Colonial interpretation of enterprise, acumen and Nascent Indian industrialists struggling against
skill of Japanese competitors implies Indian unfair Japanese competition
economic actors lack these 'modem' attributes.
Illegitimate foreign economic actors - .. Legitimate foreign economic actors
Nationalist actors views of Japanese industry as Colonial actors' interpretation of Japanese
"unfair competitors" due to "the assistance which industrial success as "based on the enterprise and
Japanese merchants derive from shipping subsidies business acumen of her capitalists and on the skill
and from the cheap use of Government funds of her artisans."
through the Banks [and] government regulations for
the control of work in factories are far more lax and
far les humane that those in force in this country.
Such handicaps as these may not unreasonably be
termed unfair to Indian manufactures of competing
articles".
The competition facing Indian industry as well as the contradiction in the colonial logic
that sought to legitimize Japanese industry despite acknowledgement of the subsidies and
weak labor regulations it enjoyed whilst simultaneously delegitimizing nascent Indian
capital by implying it lacked the modern capitalist attributes of 'enterprise, acumen and
skill of Japanese competitors' created an immediate nationalist backlash:
"The increasing importance of Japanese competition, the efficiency of its methods and
the popular idea that it is heavily subsidized by the Japanese government, has had a
marked effect on Indian public opinion. Indian newspapers freely criticize the apparent
inaction of the government. They draw unfavourable comparisons between our attitude
and that of the Japanese towards the promotion of industries, and charge us, in
comparison, with indifference to the industrial future of India and to her commercial
promoted as national champions under the Meiji leadership, and as a result were the leaders of the resulting
Japanese exporting charge.
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prosperity. As an instance of criticism of this character, we reproduce below a paragraph
from the 'Indian Patriot' of the 27* of September 1915:-
'Public opinion has persistently and unequivocally expressed itself in favour of a
vigorous and forward policy. We see around us the sign of a great change. Germany and
Austria have ceased to export. Japan is straining every nerve to capture our market. We
are aware of it all. We are conscious that in the race for progress and power, on which
we are set, wealth alone with conquer. We are anxious to be wealthy, and, therefore,
anxious to be an industrial country. But we can, it seems, only talk and the Government
can only watch. Why should we not do what it has been possible for Japan to do? That
question is on the lips of all. We refuse to take the answer that we are unfit and
unprepared. We are fit for any work, and if Great Britain cannot prepare use for any
work within the smallest time, we confess we must have misjudged the resources of Great
Britain. The will alone is wanting - not in the people, but in the Government."7
The editorial in the aptly named Indian Patriot expresses the objectives and ambitions of
Indian nationalists, as well as the causal logic that provided the means-ends relationship
between industrialization and national wealth. Further, it reveals the crux of the debate
between colonial and nationalist actors on the legitimacy of foreign and Indian capital:
the 'fitness' of Indian economic actors and their 'natural capacity' to industrialize and
compete in global markets. Finally, the editorial shows the political leverage that
nationalist actors could exert over colonial authorities based on their own anxieties about
retaining control of their most valuable imperial possession. In this sense nationalist
agitators were empowered by Britain's weakening position on the top of the global
hierarchy of imperial powers, particularly with Britain in the midst World War I.
There was growing recognition that the British Empire was in its twilight. The exchange
between colonial officials notes the effects of Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese
War on the Indian view of Japan, initially as a protector of Asia from Europe, though
Indian nationalists were becoming gradually becoming disenchanted with Japan's
imperial activities in China and Korea.' 8 Tellingly, GOI officials then express their own
concerns with the prospect of Japan's strengthening position in the country and its
political motivations and 'machinations':
The Government of India cannot look forward to the probable future development of the
situation without uneasiness. [Apart] from the purely industrial issues we cannot
17 Secret letter, #6 of 1916, from GOI, Dept of Com & Ind, to Rt Hon Austen Chamberlain, Sect of State
for Indian, Delhi 31 March 1916.
18 It shows colonial fears of a perceived solidarity between Asian countries in a Western imperial global
political economy.
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regard it as other than undesirable that the Japanese should establish themselves on
any large scale in this country. In fact, to the political aspect of the question we
attach the most importance. The prestige of Japan is great and her ambitions
unbounded. A systematic commercial penetration may well be the precursor of wider
schemes the execution of which may not be imminent, but against which it is well to be
forewarned. Her national design is to dominate the East, and whatever be the
sentiments of Indians towards her at the moment [referring to disillusionment noted
above], the [role of] champion of the East against the West is sure to evoke a response
in an Oriental country.19
While cognizant of Japan's "ulterior political aims", the colonial authorities' immediate
concern remained Japan's commercial policies.20 These concerns coupled with nationalist
agitations led the Raj to provide some limited industrial policy support.
We trust that the more vigorous industrial policy which, as indicated in our dispatch of 26
November 1915, we hope shortly to initiate, may assist Indian enterprises in some
measure to meet competition from Japan; but in the meantime we cannot fail to
recognise that our apparent inaction may, from the Indian point of view, be attributed
either to fear of Japan or to the inefficiency of our methods. Our present attitude of
careful abstention, for obvious reasons, from any discussion of Japanese competition in
public documents or trade reports tends to confirm this view.
IV. Indian Capital and Colonial Industrial Policy
The colonial state attitude towards emergent Indian capital, which had hovered between
indifference and hostility in the pre-war period, began to shift with the internal dynamics
of nationalist agitation and the external commercial threat from rising powers such as
Japan, Germany and the US. These attitudinal changes gained momentum with the
structural developments that accompanied the onset of World War I.22 The colonial
government faced sharp fiscal deficits as British financial resources were directed
towards the war effort, necessitating increased revenue collection in India. Further, there
was a sharp decline in manufactured imports due to the sudden redirection of British
factory output from consumer goods to military armaments as well as shipping
disruptions from naval conflict and the German U-boat threat. Finally, there was
19 Ibid, emphasis added.
20 The letter concludes by noting that as an Asian country it would be easier for Japan to pursue its imperial
ambitions in India unnoticed than a European country such that the "commercial footing" it was
establishing would ultimately generate "political influence" (Ibid).
21 Ibid.
22 Though WWI was clearly an important moment that wrought important structural effects, it accelerated
an ongoing process rather than constituted a break, as punctuated equilibrium models might suggest.
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recognition of the direct contribution of Indian manufacturing industry to the war effort,
particularly the railway lines produced by the Tata Iron and Steel Company which
produced 1,500 miles of steel railway lines that was crucial to Allied victory in
Mesopotamia (Markovits, 1985).
The Indian Industrial Commission
The Colonial Government set up the Indian Industrial Commission in recognition that
"the time has come when the question of the expansion and development of Indian
manufactures and industries should be taken up in a more comprehensive manner than
has hitherto been apprehended" (Prakash, 1999:175). The commission began its work in
1916 with 10 members, of whom 4 were Indian, and issued its report in 1918.
The report highlighted two critical points: first, the state - and not solely the market - was
responsible for industrialization in India and second, advancing industrialization required
extensive application of technology (Prakash, 1999:176). The report embodies the
emerging modernizing discourse. The "dispassionate" analysis began from the historical
position that India, much as in Romesh Chunder Dutt's The Economic History of India,
was in fact ahead of Europe up until the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. The report
begins with the following statement: 'At a time when the west of Europe, the birthplace
of the modern industrial system was inhabited by uncivilized tribes, India was famous for
the wealth of her rulers and for the high skill of her craftsmen.' 23 However, consistent
with European conceptions of the Enlightenment, the report cited a deviation in the
economic and technological trajectories of Europe and India that occurred with the
Industrial Revolution as the explanation of European advancement and Indian stagnation.
The committee agreed that industrial progress depended on state intervention to provide
the technical knowledge and expertise required for successful industrialization. It held
that the colonial state could make up for the absence of the historical conditions that
produced industrial advances elsewhere through the rigorous application of scientific
knowledge. The report thus provided an important elaboration of a legitimate role for
23 Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, 1916-1918, emphasis added. Also cited in Prakash
(1999:176) and Chatterjee (1993). These views are also highly compatible with modernization theory.
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state intervention in the economy to support domestic producers that preceded Jawaharlal
Nehru's call for state-led industrialization in the 1930s that is the subject of the next
chapter." However, the source and rationale for the deviation was an immediate point of
contention as it spoke directly to the issue of the suitability and capacities of Indian
economic actors relative to their counterparts in Britain and elsewhere, most notably
Japan as indicated in the previous section.
Committee member and prominent Congress Party nationalist Madan Mohan Malaviya
prepared a dissenting note that accompanied the report. In his statement, Malaviya
strongly disagreed with the historical explanation given by the majority of committee
members of the divergent paths of Europe and India with the Industrial Revolution, as it
suggested that Indians had less 'natural' capacity for industrial enterprise than Europeans.
This position not only had crucial implications for the possibility of industrialization in
India but also for the role of Indian economic actors as it signaled the efficacy of
pursuing industrial development through foreign rather than domestic firms. This was a
crucial point that nationalists fought against.
In my opinion this does not give a correct view of the matter.. .and is calculated to
support erroneous ideas about the natural capacity of Indians and Europeans for
industrial enterprise, and to stand in the way of the right conclusions being reached as
to the possibility of industrial development in India with the co-operation of the
Government and the people.
Malaviya's statement is another example of Indian actors taking a proactive role in their
own cultural construction and legitimation. Malaviya strongly contested the imperial
logic that naturalized European technological superiority. He offered a competing
rationalized nationalist logic that India in fact was technologically superior since
3,OOOBCE. Malaviya substantiated his claims by citing historical texts and archaeological
discoveries -reported by European scholars and hence deemed legitimate -- that Indian
muslins dominated ancient Greek and Roman markets and were used to wrap Egyptian
mummies, and that Marco Polo and Alexander the Great praised the excellent quality of
However, there was disagreement on the particular organizational forms that state intervention should
take, setting the stage for deepened colonialist-nationalist debates around the details of industrial policy and
lanning.
5 Report of the Indian Industrial Commission, emphasis added. Also cited in Prakash (1999:188-9).
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Indian iron goods. Malaviya argued 'Though conquests after the 1 1th century hampered
the state of 'Indian industrialists' for a brief period, the foundation of the Mughal Empire
and 'the safety and security of the reign of Akbar seemed to have fully revived Indian
industries and handicrafts.' 26 The truly disastrous moment for Indian industry was the
conquest of India by the East India Company "as British weavers expressed their deep
jealousy of Indian weaver's skill and moved the Company to use its newly-acquired
power against indigenous industry." The industrial revolution did not mark a mark a
divergence; rather imperialism meant Britain deindustrialized India, destroying the
livelihoods of its artisans and precipitating lost technical skills by converting it into a
producer of agricultural resources to finance its own industrialization.27 "This [logic],
according to Malaviya, was the true explanation for the disparity in industrial
development between Europe and India" (Ibid). This narrative- of British de-
industrialization was the very essence of nationalist economic drain theory that was the
subject of the previous chapter. Contrary to colonial claims that the divergence was based
on the Enlightenment, proving Europe's natural superiority (how else to explain its
occurrence in Europe and not elsewhere?) nationalists contended that there was in fact no
divergence based on natural causes internal to Europe; instead Europe disrupted India's
own natural path to industrial development through the exploitative institutions of
imperialism.
Much like the official report, the rationalized causal logic that Malaviya deployed
prescribed a clear role for the state. The logic reflected the tight link between historically
salient nationalist narratives and socially meaningful 'technological imaginaries' in the
construction of development and modernity. The state would be necessary to allow
26 Ibid, emphasis added to highlight the focus not just on Indian industry in the abstract, but on Indian
economic actors, particularly emerging industrialists. This argument closely matches Mohandas Gandhi's
position on Indian handicraft industries, as is described in detail in the next chapter, albeit Gandhi focused
on small-scale cottage industry while Malaviya's interest was in the potential for Indian industrialists in
large-scale more technology-intensive and sophisticated areas of production. The distinction between these
two would become the main source of conflict between Nehru and Gandhi, and is the main subject of the
next Chapter. It is also an interesting invocation of positive outcomes from Muslim rule under the Moghul
leader Akbar on India's pre-British Raj development in light of the Hindu-Muslim communal conflict that
soon arose in the Indian subcontinent.
27 This resonates very well with later arguments that were made in India and other developing countries
within the broad frame of unequal exchange and dependency theory.
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Indians to finally realize the potential of their natural inclinations towards technology and
28industry that had been disrupted by the British and create a modern industrial nation.
This was the path to economic growth, industrial employment and increased standards of
living. Malaviya cited the role of the state as a technical institution in promoting
technological catch-up and late development in Germany and Japan as evidence
supporting the causal logic of state intervention, simultaneously paralleling the 'modular
nationalism' (Anderson, 2006) that the first generation of Indian economic nationalists
introduced in the 1870s and foreshadowing the scientific socialism that Jawaharlal Nehru
would successfully deploy in the independence struggle of the 1930s.29 These nationalist
narratives and technological imaginaries were projected into elite policy debates and the
wider public discourse, shaping the preferences of Indian colonial subjects towards the
role of domestic and foreign capital in the societal modernization project.30
Despite growing arguments for state support of indigenous industry, the colonial
government felt compelled to strike a delicate balance between providing concessions to
Indian capital without threatening dominant British commercial and industrial interests.
On one hand, the state formally ignored the results of the report, but on the other, these
arguments resulted in the provision of small degree of tariff protection for new industries,
reflecting "the more vigorous industrial policy" that colonial authorities indicated in a
1915 dispatch to the Secretary of State in London "may assist Indian enterprises in some
measure to meet competition from Japan".31 While the specific tariff levels that were
applied fell short of the levels requested by Indian businessmen, they were nevertheless
beneficial to nascent Indian capitalists. For example, the imposition of this tariff
protection was partly responsible for saving the most symbolically powerful indigenous
28 This also foreshadows the debate on the role of the state in nationalist contestation between Nehru and
Gandhi that is the focus of the next chapter.
29 This "nationalist imagination" functioned "as a form of reinscription.. .Its ambition was to rewrite India
and Indian interests.." (Prakash, 1999:179). Finally, "The conception of the state as the embodiment of the
technological imperative earmarked a prominent role for science and scientists" (Prakash, 1999:191), a
development that would become highly apparent in the 1930s as nationalist socialist-scientists entered the
discourse.
30 See Dobbin's (2004:2) argument that economic modernization can be seen as a series of "societal
projects".
1 Secret letter, #6 of 1916, from GOI, Dept of Corn & Ind, to Rt Hon Austen Chamberlain, Sect of State
for Indian, Delhi 31 March 1916.
134
firm Tata Iron and Steel (TISCO) from bankruptcy in 1924 (Markovits, 1985:12).
Further, while the cotton-textile industry, particularly in Bombay, continued to face
increased competition from Japanese imports in the 1920s, Indian capital began to make
inroads into other areas including jute, which had long been dominated by British capital
in Calcutta, as well as new industries such as chemicals and food processing.32
V. Indigenous Capitalist Collective Action
At the same time that colonial authorities and nationalist political actors were developing
their positions towards indigenous capitalists, nascent Indian capitalist-industrialists were
determining how to position themselves vis-a-vis the competing goals of imperialism and
nationalism. 3 Indigenous capitalist collective action reflected these efforts of 'Indian
economic man' to present himself as a legitimate economic actor and an instrument of the
modernizing development project. British firms were the first to organize at the
national level through the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India (ASSOCHAM) in
1920, an organization that retained its foreign orientation well past independence.3 5
Indian capitalists responded by forming indigenous business organizations through which
they sought to establish their legitimacy as contributors to wider societal welfare and to
32 There were also important tensions that were rising between nationalist political actors and emerging
Indian capitalists. While World War I provided indigenous industrialists with major growth opportunities,
they were subjected to 'comprador' accusations of war-time profiteering and collaboration with the colonial
regime. However, this view amongst many swadeshi nationalist actors existed alongside a recognition of
the need for an indigenous capitalist class as a counterweight to British business, as was made clear from
the 1912 Conference. Chapter 6 returns to this issue when discussing the relationship between nationalist
political actors and Indian capitalists.
3 Capitalist collection action itself influenced how Indian capitalists preferences were shaped through
debates and information exchange. This process highlights elements of capitalist collective action that
differ from public choice perspectives on business organization as the pooling of common material interests
in order to seek rents (cf. Krueger, 1974; Olson 1981; Bhagwati, 1982) would suggest.
34 The Calcutta Chamber of Commerce (later named the Bengal Chamber of Commerce) was the first
organization of British capital and was formed in 1833 after the East India Company withdrew from
commercial activity. The Bombay and Madras Chambers of Commerce were founded in 1836, and the
three merged to form ASSOCHAM in 1920.
35 British industrialists generally had close links to the colonial state facilitated by racial similarities and
institutionalized through mingling in various members-only social clubs that were generally closed to
Indians. Further, ASSOCHAM was based in Calcutta where the colonial government resided, while many
of the most dynamic Indian businesses were located in the West in Bombay. Indian businessmen thus found
themselves with relatively limited channels of access to influence bureaucrats in the colonial government.
There were also important industry-level divides: for example, jute and tea production were dominated by
British capital and concentrated in the East, while cotton and textile mills was largely Indian owned and
located in the West.
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press the Government of India for policy demands against the organized influence of
foreign firms.
The first modern Indian indigenous organization was the Bombay Piecegoods Merchants'
Association, with several other local and regional level organizations being formed in the
decades that followed. Representatives of Indian business participated in the first Indian
Industrial Conferences from 1905 onwards, and there were formal calls for cooperation
between existing associations at the 1913 Conference. These efforts resulted in formation
of the first national level association, the Indian Chamber of Commerce, which was later
renamed the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and is today one
of India's leading representatives of Indian capital.
Indian business leaders made the objective of the national-level business organization
clear from the outset. In his 1926 Presidential Address at the Inaugural Meeting of the
Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta, Anandji Haridas told his fellow capitalists:
"We need to organize ourselves... [to assert] the contribution which the business classes
are making to the civil and economic development of the country. To assert our rightful
place in the public affairs... we must organize ourselves to a man."36 These efforts at
capitalist organization were not simply defensive moves; rising Indian capitalists were
proactive about the need to create and project a particular conception of the role of
'native' capital in Indian economic life into public discourse. Crucially, they sought to
contest dominant liberal economic theories and their implications for the balance of
market power between foreign and domestic firms:
The idyllic school of economists.. .declare that modern methods of large-scale
commerce and large-scale industry are foreign to the Indian genus and culture.
Against the cumulative opposition from the various sources, the Indian businessman must
36 Presidential Address, Inaugural Meeting, Indian Chamber of Commerce, 1926, ICC Annual Report, 1926
(NMML). This need to organize was not only driven by counterbalancing British capital; Haridas and his
colleagues were also wary of the growing militancy of Indian labor. "The gentlemen from the labourite
group ...are.. .accentuating the cleavage between Indian capital and labor." Chapter 6 will briefly discuss
the role of Indian labor in these emerging state-capital relations. NB: G.D. Birla (of the Marwari group
Birla Bros. Ltd) was the inaugural president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, not Anandji Haridas (of
Anandji Hardidas & Co.), who was Senior Vice President. Thus even though it was Haridas who delivered
the Pres address on 30 Jan 1926, Birla it seems was away quite a bit with the report noting it missed his
guidance for a good part of the year.
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make their way. How else are they to achieve their success except by perfect
organization of their forces and resources?37
This inaugural meeting of the ICC "announced the emergence of 'native commerce' as a
class", as capital "personified with a consciousness and a will" (Birla, 2009:199). It
marked an important shift in the social world of Indian capital, from 'traditional'
organizational forms of the extended family and caste council, to 'modern' civic
associations and corporate bodies incorporated under the legitimacy of formal legal
institutions (Ibid:200). These organizations consolidated sets of emergent Indian
capitalists that profited tremendously from cotton as well as jute, coal, cement and steel
during the war.38 However, despite their material success emergent capitalists were
riddled with anxieties stemming from their 'traditional' image and tenuous relationships
with British capital, the colonial state, national politicians and increasingly militant labor.
They bore the cultural legacy of the speculative bazaar merchant embedded in closed
kinship networks, which they sought to challenge by reinventing themselves as modern
economic actors and representatives of elite Indian civil society. 39 They also appeared as
comprador economic actors who had benefitted from wartime shortages through
rapacious business practices and economic behaviors that generated massive profits at the
expense of the poor and of the nationalist struggle.
37 Ibid. G.D. Birla's journal, the Eastern Economist would later refer to the "spurious claims [of] British
financiers and pseudo academic economic theorists.. .that the influx of British capital into India.. .(led to)
her material progress". Eastern Economist August 20, 1943, p. 973, cited in Mukherjee, 2002:342, fn10.
38 The ICC was the forerunner to FICCI, which was founded in 1927 and became the leading representative
of Indian business interests. FICCI held protection of the indigenous cotton textile industry and export-
friendly low exchange rate regime as its major platform, positions that would become the basis of
Congress' economic policy. However, I do not wish to overstate the power of FICCI in these relatively
early days. Markovits (1985) and others argue that in its early days FICCI was a weak grouping of largely
regional associations such as the Indian Merchants Association and the Ahmedabad and Bombay Mill
owners Associations, which individually were more successful at engaging with the colonial state. Further,
there were divisions within FICCI along a number of key lines including trade versus industry, with the
former concerned about rural indebtedness, as well as a lack of consensus on the entry of foreign capital.
Thus at this stage of Indian industrial development state-capital relations were primarily limited to
exchanges between the British colonial state (which did not always follow the dictates of the Imperial
government in London) and British capital, with colonial industrial policy reflecting the interests of these
two groups, and generally excluding Indian capital and nationalist interests. Nevertheless this capitalist
organization would rise in stature as India moved towards independence in the late 1930s and 1940s.
39 This legacy would persist for decades, shaping how the new independent Indian state approached
indigenous business during the import substituting industrialization period of the 1950s and 1960s, as well
as how Indian capitalists engaged in contemporary debates on economic liberalization in the 1990s and
2000s as they continued to negotiate these historically rooted cultural categories.
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In response to colonial and nationalist attempts to categorize and de-legitimize emerging
Indian economic actors, Indian capitalists engaged in their own 'culturalist-capitalist'
discourse. They sought to present themselves as spokesmen for 'Indian genus and culture,'
and representatives of modernity, rationality and technical skill in market management
and industrial development. Indian economic actors demonstrated significant agency in
recognizing the nature of the discursive terrain in which they would have to engage and
resisting the anti-modern cultural categories in which colonial actors sought to place them.
Indian economic actors did so by providing information and expertise on trade and
monetary policy through indigenous chambers of commerce, civic organizations and
official bodies and by participating in state-sanctioned activities. Their aim was to
challenge and reconfigure both the cultural categories of Indian economic man as well as
the 'scientific' economic theories and logics that confined their socio-economic
ambitions. Emerging capitalists rejected the notions that they were naturally unsuited to
large-scale and industry due to their Indian cultural and intellectual attributes. This
required the development and deployment of alternative economic logics and conceptions
of technology that rationalized and legitimized their role as the key economic agents
upon whom India's industrial future depended, strategies that were increasingly
employed as India moved towards independence as discussed in Chapter 6.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy (1914-1947)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Modem:
Colonial and nationalist conceptions of Indian Emerging Indian capitalists seek to legitimize
economic actors as 'bazaar traders', 'speculators' themselves as modern spokesmen of Indian genus
and comprador actors. and culture who are representatives of modernity,
Mode of capitalist organization is the 'traditional' rationality and technical skill in market
extended family and caste council. management and industrial development.
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Indian Business Actors' Preferences towards Foreign Capital
Indian business actors began making demands to restrict foreign capital from this early
stage. As Indian business increased its formal engagement in the policy domain, they
contested the colonial logic that India needed foreign capital because of the alleged
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scarcity and 'shyness' of indigenous capital. Colonial actors maintained that Indian
capital preferred to remain in their 'traditional' accustomed areas of trade and stock
market 'share bazaar' speculation rather than risk entry into 'modern' industrial
development activities. This reluctance rationalized and legitimized the participation of
foreign firms in Indian industrialization. This was not solely the position of colonial
actors; Indian nationalist actors would make similar claims once they assumed state
power after Independence.
In a dissenting note to the 1921-22 Government of India Fiscal Commission Report, a
group of Indian business actors including G.D. Birla instead argued for supportive
industrial policy claiming that their willingness to invest was 'proved by the industrial
activity which resulted from the indirect protection afforded by the war conditions'. At
best, foreign capital was necessary 'merely to supplement' indigenous capital and hasten
the pace of industrial development. 40 The group continued by arguing that free entry of
foreign capital would lead to higher consumer prices and financial drain through profit
repatriation, a logic that had salience in Indian nationalist Economic Drain Theory. They
proposed the imposition of regulations on profit retention to channel foreign firm
earnings to domestic reinvestment, mandates on the inclusion of Indians as board
directorates and preferences towards Indian shareholders including the extension of share
subscription periods to 30 days to help ensure that Indian subscribers could acquire up to
50% share ownership of newly floated joint stock companies. They also demanded the
reservation of key industries for Indian business, including natural resource extraction,
shipping and banking. 41 This list expanded in the 1930s to include established areas such
as railways and new fields such as automobiles and civil aviation.
Emergent Indian capitalists also sought to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the
nationalist movement. In his 1928 FICCI Presidential speech, Purshotamdas Thakurdas
40 Indian Fiscal Commission Report, 1921-22, Minute of Dissent, para. 50 cited in Mukherjee, 2002:365.
41 For example, Indian business proposed restricting internal trade financing -- estimated to be 15 times
greater than foreign trade finance -- to Indian banks. Similarly, 75% of share capital was to be reserved for
Indians in the field of civil aviation. Indians at this point were well established in areas such as cement,
cotton, heavy chemicals, iron and steel. Indian Fiscal Commission Report, 1921-22, Minute of Dissent,
paragraphs, 48, 52, 53; cited in Mukerjee (2002).
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proclaimed: 'Indian commerce and industry are intimately associated with and are,
indeed, an integral part of the national movement, growing with its growth and
strengthening with its strength... [they cannot therefore] make terms with one or the other
(foreign government or foreign commercial interests) at the expense of national
interests.' 42 These legitimating efforts by formal bodies of organized Indian capitalists
signaled their full arrival in the contested Indian policy domain. In same speech
Thakurdas also asserted nationalist claims to the Indian economy, arguing that 'Indian
commercial interests have a right to the predominant share of commerce and industry in
India just as the British do in Britain.' In 1929, as policy discussions towards greater
political autonomy progressed, the FICCI Executive Committee continued to press the
issues, arguing that 'there could be no self-government in India if she was to be denied
the power to devise and follow a national economic policy including the right, if her
interests required it, of making economic discrimination against non-national interests'.43
These claims on behalf of the Indian business class were complemented by the efforts of
individual members of India's rising industrialist class. Walchand Hirachand, Chairman
of the Scindia Steam Navigation Company and the leader of efforts to re-establish Indian
shipping in the 2th century called for greater support for Indian shipping, which at the
time only controlled 15% of coastal trade and 2% of overseas trade. Hirachand's
demands generated a strong response from the shipping magnate James Mackay, Earl of
Inchcape and Chairman of the British shipping monopoly P&O Steam Navigation
Company, who complained to the Indian Secretary of State Lord Birkindhead of the
'monstrous' and 'outrageous' attempts of Indian capital to 'expropriate' them.44 These
sentiments prompted the 1927 Simon Commission to propose constitutional safeguards to
protect British capital, which were later formalized in the 1935 Government of India Act.
A few years later, Hirachand -- who would later launch one of India's first automobile
companies Premier Automobiles -- declared in a bout of confidence 'that India would not
require foreign capital if the administration was placed in the hands of the best of her
42 Presidential Speech, FICCI Annual Report, 1928, p.4; See also FICCI Annual Report, 1942, p. 161-2.
Cited in Mukherjee (2002)
43 FICCI Proceedings of the Executive Committee, 1929, p.7; FICCI Annual Report, 1930, p150.
44 Letter from the Earl of Inchcape to the Indian Secretary of State Lord Birkindhead, September 16 1928,
cited in Mukherjee (2002).
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nationals.' Given India's resources, if the country 'allowed to develop on right national
lines... [India would] present a picture of industrialization unknown in the annals of
industrial development of the world and that too with the help of purely Indian capital.'4 5
Thus by the early 1930s there are increasingly confident assertions of the role of the
emerging Indian capitalist class in the policy discourse.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy (1914-1947)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors 4 - Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Modem:
Colonial and nationalist conceptions of Indian Emerging Indian capitalists seek to legitimize
economic actors as 'bazaar traders' and themselves as modem 'Captains of Industry' and
'speculators'. Emerging Indian capital as champions and instruments of India's development
'comprador' ambitions.
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
'Traditional'
Foreign capital as neo-imperial.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter described the emergence of Indian capitalists and the cultural construction of
Indian Economic Man in the early 20th century. The analysis considered the relationship
between colonial, nationalist and indigenous capitalist actors through the binary cultural
categories of 'traditional' and 'modern' that modernizing nationalist and imperial actors
created. It offered an alternative approach to understanding 'culture' in the field of
political economy - focusing on the construction of cultural categories and the regulatory
and distributive implications for nascent Indian capitalists -- while providing insight to
the emergence of indigenous capitalist political actors in the field of industrial
development. Indian capital was haunted by the specter of the ragged bazaar merchant
and sought to project an image as modern 'captains of industry' who represented the
development aspirations of an ambitious soon-to-be independent nation-state. They
demonstrated significant agency by refusing to submit to the marginalizing cultural
categories that colonial and nationalist actors created by engaging in attempts to
strategically navigate the cultural discursive environment and establish their legitimacy.
45 FICCI Proceedings of the Executive Committee, 1932, cited in Mukerjee 2002:365.
141
The importance of the cultural reconstruction of the Indian capitalist class as a means of
achieving their political-economic objectives cannot be overstated. Their efforts had an
intimate yet complex relationship with rising nationalism. On one hand they were
strengthened by nationalist agitations against the Raj, particularly through causal logics
such as Malaviya's that critiqued colonial positions by highlighting Indians' 'natural'
tendencies to industry. However, there were deep-lying tensions between nationalists and
capitalists over the alignment of their objectives: whether capitalists' successes were
broadly shared. Mukherjee (2002: 71-2) argues that capitalists "were aware that
bourgeois ideological hegemony in the anti-imperialist struggle was to be maintained not
by simply buying up, manipulating or pressurizing the nationalist leaders, but by trying to
successfully project its own class needs or interests as representing the societal interest or
the interest of the nation," a view that has its roots in Marx.46 Indian capitalists were
careful not to be thought of as advancing their "own narrow class interest" or placing
those considerations "before nation." Rather, they wished to be "seen as speaking in the
interest of the Indian nation" (Ibid; see also Dobbin 2004). 47 This is central to how many
economic sociologists, following Marx, understand power: "Karl Marx defined power not
merely as coercion, but as the ability to shape how others view the world and their own
interests. From the dawn of capitalism, successful entrepreneurs and managers have
defined economic conventions by prosletyzing, telling the world that the best way to run
a business [or the economy] is their way. Success itself gives these people the authority
[and legitimacy] to define what rational behavior is" (Dobbin, 2004:2). Thus we can
understand the efforts of nascent Indian capitalists much like William Roy (1997)
presented their American industrialist counterparts at the turn of the century -- almost the
46 In The German Ideology, Marx claimed 'For each new class which puts itself in the places of one ruling
before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interests as the common
interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of
universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution
appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class, but as the representative
of the whole of society, it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.' The
German Ideology, Moscow, 1964, pp. 61-2.
47 He goes on to suggest that "this projecting of a class interest as the national interest was not achieved
through manipulation, but by establishing a genuine coalescence of the two" by identifying areas where
there was "genuine unity of interests between the national bourgeoisie and the rest of society", as in
oppression by imperialism and feudalism.
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same moment in time if not quite the same stage of capitalist industrial development.
Indian capitalists also wished to convince others that Indian firms were at least as capable
- if not more so - than their British counterparts to be the vehicle through which the
soon-to-be-independent nation would achieve its development aspirations.
The next chapter analyzes the fractures that developed in what to this point had been a
relatively consensual understanding of Indian economic nationalism, as two new sets of
nationalist cultural schemas emerged to challenge the imperial development orthodoxy
and compete with each other over the economic direction that the soon-to-be independent
India state would take. It analyzes the construction of the nationalist cultural schemas of
'Gandhian' moral philosophy and Nehruvian 'scientific socialism' and the internal
debates that ensued amongst competing nationalist actors in the 1920s and 1930s. This
nationalist contestation centered on competing economic theories and conceptions of
technology that provided the principal tools with which twentieth century Indian
nationalists contested colonial power as they approached independence in 1947, while
establishing the critical historical antecedents of post-independence policymaking.
Indigenous capitalists also took advantage of fractures that arose in Indian nationalism
between Gandhian and Nehruvian socialist-scientific systems of thought described in the
next chapter to develop and project alternative conceptions of themselves and their role in
Indian industrialization into the public sphere. These are described in Chapter Six by
showing how Indian industrialists co-opted meaningful tropes that played on nationalist
anxieties, particularly abut foreign firm dominance and the idea that Indian industry
would be a subordinate 'junior partner' to British firms.
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CHAPTER 5
Contesting Modernity Amidst Global Uncertainty:
Competing Visions of India's Future and the Social Meaning of Development
I. Introduction
This chapter builds on the analysis in Chapter Three, which described the emergence of a
relatively cohesive Indian economic nationalism organized around imperial resistance
and economic drain theory in the late 19 th century. This first wave of nationalist
frustrations with colonial rule exploded in the swadeshi movement and boycotts of
British manufactured goods around the turn of the century. Chapter Four revealed how
these nationalist agitations precipitated formal interactions between the Indian National
Congress and colonial authorities as the latter sought to address nationalist grievances,
particularly around indigenous industrialization. In particular, it revealed the emerging
categories of capitalist legitimacy focused on the construction of 'Indian Economic Man'.
While political contestation in the period leading up to the First World War occurred
firmly across a nationalist-imperialist divide, this chapter analyzes the fractures that
emerged amongst nationalist elites during the inter-war period in what had been a
relatively consensual understanding of Indian economic nationalism. This contestation
over the content of Indian economic nationalism was informed by competing economic
theories and conceptions of technology, and is crucial for understanding the policy
direction of the soon-to-be independent India. The chapter thus identifies critical
historical antecedents of post-independence policymaking in late colonial development
debates as two new sets of nationalist cognitive and cultural schemas emerged to
challenge the imperial development orthodoxy.' These schemas, broadly associated with
'In this chapter the Nehruvian and Gandhian systems of meaning and thought operate at a high level, akin
to the concept of 'policy paradigms' in the political science and sociology literatures (Hall, 1993;
Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002). However, as argued in the previous chapters it emphasizes both
cognitive and cultural dimensions, seeing these systems as comprising rationalized causal ideas imbued
with historically salient social meaning. These are systems of meaning and thought through which actors
make sense of their social and economic worlds. They provide actors with insights in how society and
economy should and actually does operate; that is, it has both normative and positive connotations (cf.
Sewell, 1992; Wedeen, 2002; Dobbin, 2004; Adelal et al, 2005,2010). Cognitive and cultural schemas
allow actors to understand causal relationships in the world and ascribe meaning to them, which in turn
motivates action. Schemas are thus akin to 'scripts' (cf. Dobbin 2004) but without the lack of agency that
the concept of cultural scripts implies in both the 'old' sociological institutionalism and more recently the
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Mohandas Gandhi's moral philosophy and Jawaharlal Nehru's scientific socialism,
constituted the principal tools with which twentieth century Indian nationalists contested
colonial power as they approached independence in 1947. This contestation was a deeply
social and cultural process, with competing schemas designed to fit with particular
constructions of the Indian historical memory (cf. Abdelal, 2001). These schemas imbued
the concepts of industrialization and development with specific albeit competing social
meanings, first to challenge imperial system of thought based on classical political
economy, and then increasingly turning to internal contestation as the Indian National
Congress moved closer to gaining state control.2 These schemas were different despite
the fact that similarly situated nationalist elite actors responsible observed the same
material conditions, demonstrating the variation in interpretative frames through which
actors make sense of their material environment. This highlights the crucial importance
of culture and social meaning in the battle of ideas, a dimension that is often downplayed
or ignored in the literature on the role of ideas from across different strands of the new
institutionalisms in political science and economics (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993;
North, 2005; Hall, 1993; Blyth, 1997; Blyth, 2002; Beland and Cox, 2011; but see
Dobbin, 1993 and Campbell, 1988).
The rest of the chapter analyzes the construction of the nationalist cultural categories of
'Gandhian' and 'scientific-socialist' and the internal debates that ensued amongst
competing nationalist actors. The chapter is organized as follows. The next section
describes the fracturing of the previously cohesive content of Indian economic
nationalism through the rise of its two most important figures, Mohandas Gandhi and
Jawaharlal Nehru. It analyzes the influences and motivations behind the development of
new institutional economics (North, 2005; Greif, 2006). They allow enable significant agency as actors
strategically deploy causal ideas (Blyth, 2001) along with cultural symbols, narratives and tropes (Swidler,
1986) in the realm of political and market contestation.
2 Crucially, the cultural meaning systems and discursive frameworks that emerged from this period of
contestation lasted through the import substituting industrialization period of the 1950s and 1960s, and still
resonate during the more recent economic liberalization of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Further, the
protagonists who debated the normative and positive (ethical and technical) elements of development
became the policymakers of the 1950s, and the language they deployed retained political salience for
policymakers of the 1990s and 2000s. Similarly, the many of the leading indigenous capitalists of this
period were also the managers of the 1950s. Thus these debates shaped both government policy and firm
strategy of the post-independence period.
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their competing systems of meaning and thought during the 1920s. Section III assesses
the effects of the massive uncertainty generated by structural disruptions in the global
political economy in the early 1930s - the Great Depression and collapse of the imperial
economy that rested on the liberal tenets of classical political economy -- on nationalist
debates on the meaning of development and modernity. Section IV narrows the focus to
contestation between Gandhian and Nehruvian systems, highlighting the agency and
creativity that these actors deployed in constructing politically salient systems of meaning
as they dueled for control of the political domain. Section V analyzes the discourse in the
Indian National Congress' National Planning Committee, the first step towards national
economic policymaking. Section VI concludes with a brief summary and introduction of
the next chapter, which turns to emerging state-capital relations and deepening
consideration of the role of foreign capital in India's industrial development in the post-
independence period.
II. Gandhi and Nehru: Fathers of the Modern Indian Nation
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi are the fathers of the modem Indian nation.
Together they exemplified the efforts of Indian strategic actors to create new content of
twentieth century Indian nationalism and imbue it with cultural meaning and social
purpose (cf. Abdelal, 2001). Nehru and Gandhi recast modernity according to their own
visions of India's future and created cultural schemas that galvanized the emerging state.
However, they represented contrasting conceptions of nationalism: Gandhian nationalism
was rooted in his moral authority, mobilizing appeal, and romanticized conception of the
purity of 'traditional' village life while Nehruvian nationalism comprised a 'modernist'
vision of state control of technology-intensive large-scale industry that harnessed science
in the pursuit of cultural progress and material prosperity. The rest of this section
describes the origins, influences and evolution of Gandhi's moral philosophy and Nehru's
'scientific-socialism', which provided the competing content in Indian nationalist thought
as India moved towards independence.
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Mohandas Gandhi
The name Mohandas Gandhi is synonymous with Indian nationalism. Gandhi was the
preeminent moral and political leader of the Indian nationalist movement and became an
inspirational figure for independence struggles and civil rights movements elsewhere in
the developing and industrialized world. Gandhi was born in 1869 and was raised in a
Gujarati bania (merchant-trading) community. His father was a colonial bureaucrat in the
period immediately following the 1858 takeover of the colony by the British Crown from
the East India Company, and Gandhi himself was educated in England, receiving a law
degree from the University College London. After a short career in law in India he took a
position with an Indian firm in South Africa where he remained for 21 years from 1893-
1914. Gandhi's political beliefs were forged during his tenure in South Africa. Gandhi
had few prior political inclinations, but his philosophical beliefs and political activism
were sparked by the discrimination that he and other Indians living in the country faced at
the hands of Europeans under British colonial rule.
Gandhi returned to India from South Africa on January 9, 1915 and immediately
undertook a two-year tour of the country. He was deeply affected by the poverty and
squalor that he encountered. India had been wracked by multiple famines that killed
millions over the decades since the British took over direct administration of the colony
from the East India Company in 1858, and the depravation -- particularly in the villages
of rural India -- was apparent. He was appalled by the effects of British imperialism on
Indian agriculture and was deeply disturbed by the collapse of India's traditional
handicrafts industry. Gandhi saw the process of artisans being forced into agriculture as
reflecting the transformation of India as a land of balance between industry and
agriculture to an "agricultural colony", much like Chapter 3 showed early nationalists
like Romesh Chunder Dutt elaborated in The Economic History of India. Like the
generation of nationalists before him, Gandhi attributed this degradation to the "satanic
system" of British imperialism and the imposition of free trade, albeit a manifestation of
'free trade' that promoted commodity exports from India, imposed heavy tariffs on
Indian manufactures in the UK, extracted trade secrets from Indian artisans and conferred
special privileges to British capital in India. This reflected a shift from a sympathetic
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view that Gandhi held towards benevolent British colonial rule even as he fought for
Indian rights in South Africa -- a view of colonial munificence that the British themselves
had long sought to portray in England and overseas -- to the strident anti-imperialism that
would dominate his speeches and writings.
Gandhi's system of thought was predicated on establishing a uniquely Indian philosophy.
It developed in three distinct phases: up to 1919, 1919-1934 and 1934-1948. The first was
captured by his famous publication Hind Swaraj (Indian Home Rule) in 1909, which
developed a wholesale critique and rejection of Western materialism, machinery and
modes of production and advocated non-violent resistance to imperialism. The second
was the period when Gandhi went from individual activist to leader of the Indian
National Congress. This was the period when Gandhian thought enjoyed relatively
uncontested dominance in the nationalist political domain. The third entailed a 'practical'
program of economic and productive decentralization through village-based
organizations during the period of heightened contestation with Nehruvian scientific-
socialism and Gandhi's gradual withdrawal from formal Congress politics (Misra,
1995:4).
Gandhi's claim to an authentic 'Indianness' rested on his argument that India had long
been intellectually, morally, culturally and technologically superior to the West and so
had little to gain from 'Western modernity'. Gandhi's philosophy was based on the purity
of a pre-colonial utopia characterized by harmonious relations of pre-industrial
production. This normative conception of a non-industrial society underpinned his
positive economic program of village-based cottage industry. His invocation of the 'true'
India was laced with historical meaning and was a central strategic element of his
political appeal. However, much like his nationalist predecessors Dadabhai Naoroji and
Justice Govind Randade developed a 'modular nationalism' by strategically borrowing
from Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List to create a system of thought in opposition
to the West, Gandhi was also influenced by 19 th century Western thinkers such as John
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Ruskin (1819-1900), David Thoreau (1817-1862) and Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910).3 Gandhi
exhibited significant agency in creatively combining cultural schemas from foreign and
indigenous sources (cf. Sewell, 1992, Wedeen, 2002; Fligstein, 2008).
Gandhi's capacity for agency and 'social skill' 4 was facilitated by the resources he could
access given the social positioning from his traditional Gujarati bania upbringing,
Western education in London and experience in South Africa as an advocate for
oppressed Indian migrants. These social, cultural, material and intellectual resources
allowed him to successfully empathize and communicate with groups as diverse as Indian
capitalists, colonial actors and poor rural villagers.5 Indeed, a strength of Gandhianism
were the malleable meanings embedded in his system of though that were amenable to
multiple interpretations for different audiences, whether "the Gorakhpur peasantry,
Marwari businessmen, or militant Chitpavan Brahmins" (Zachariah, 2005:161). Gandhi
could switch from a "religious idiom" to a "secular humanist" idiom to an idiom of
"scientific expertise" depending on the need. He "...was prone to asking advice on the
3 Gandhi describes how the impact of Tolstoy's ideas of 'bodily/bread labor' and 'intellectual food' in
"creating the moral and social atmosphere for the realization of the fullness of man" influenced his
philosophical position while revealing that "Thoreau furnished me through his essay on the 'Duty of Civil
Disobedience' with a scientific confirmation of what I was doing in South Africa." Thoreau was influential
in the development of his core principles of morally justified non-cooperation -- the hallmark of Gandhian
political resistance -- and decentralization of political and economic power, which shaped his economic
program of action. Gandhi further invoked Western thinkers to address criticisms of the consistency of his
positions and their evolution over time. Citing Tolstoy and Emerson, Gandhi claimed "Much has often been
sough to be made of the so-called inconsistencies of Tolstoy's life but there were more apparent than real.
Constant development is the law of life and a man who always tries to maintain his dogma in order to
appear consistent drives himself into false position. That is why Emerson said that foolish consistency was
the hobgoblin of little minds. Tolstoy's so-called inconsistencies were a sign of his development and his
passionate regard for the truth. He often seemed inconsistent because he was consistently outgrowing his
own doctrines" (Misra, 1995:11, citing Gandhi in All Men are Brothers).
4 Fligstein (2008) invokes this concept to critique new institutional theories and explain the role of agency
and institutional change in his theory of fields, defining it as the ability to induce cooperation in others.
"social skill, [is] defined as the ability of actors to induce cooperation in other actors in order to produce,
contest, or reproduce a given set of rules (Fligstein, 1997; Fligstein and McAdam, 1994, 2011; Joas, 1996).
The skill required to induce cooperation is to imaginatively identify with the mental states of others in order
to find collective meanings that motivate other actors. Social skill entails utilizing a set of methods to
induce cooperation from one's own group and other groups (Fligstein, 1997). Skilled social actors interpret
the actions of others in the field, and on the basis of the position of their group, use their perception of
current opportunities or constraints, to attain cooperation." Fligstein (1998:11). This is also akin to
Schmidt's (2008) 'background ideational abilities' and 'foreground discursive abilities' in the elaboration
of discursive institutionalism.
5 As argued in Chapter Two and illustrated in Chapter Three, social positioning is important as it provides
actors with access to material and cultural resources, though it is not determinate as suggested in overly
structural theories.
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technical aspects of economic problems from businessmen before writing articles in
which they would appear transformed into his characteristic style of presenting ethical
dilemmas" (Ibid). Gandhi's capacity to strategically deploy these resources underpinned
his broad appeal and the establishment of his system of meaning and thought as the
dominant strand of nationalism in India. Gandhi's ability to connect with a broad range of
actors with diverse interests coupled with his capacity to strategically appropriate
arguments of his opponents was central to his attempts to construct and project his own
view of modernity. His actions illustrate the analytic importance of agency in
understanding the construction of the cognitive and cultural schemas that shaped policy
and political action in late colonial India.6
Gandhi and the Indian National Congress
Gandhi joined the Indian National Congress, then under the leadership of the moderate
Gopal Krishna Gokhale who advocated carrying out the Congress' nationalist agitations
within the colonial system. Gandhi transformed the Indian National Congress from an
exclusive group of the narrow urban educated elite to a mass political party. He brought a
new militancy and organizational capacity from his experience in South Africa to
energize Congress political activism and challenge the colonial authorities. Gandhi began
organizing mass acts of civil disobedience at the end of his two-year tour in 1917 over a
variety of social and economic injustices suffered by Indian colonial subjects. The
response was tremendous and the resistance spread rapidly across the colonial territory.
This represented a new tactic that differed from earlier Congress approach based on elite
engagement with colonial authorities and the Raj reacted with alarm. Tensions increased
as more demonstrations were held and ultimately exploded with the April 1919
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre where British troops fired on protesters killing hundreds of
unarmed civilians. This marked an important moment in Gandhi's political development.
The incident shocked him, transforming his long-held view of Britain as a benevolent
colonial ruler with whom nationalists could work, and leading him to tell the 1920 special
session of Congress "The British Government was the Satan with whom no cooperation
was possible" (cited in Misra, 1995:9).
6 See also Schmidt (2008) for a complementary argument on discursive institutionalism.
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The 1920 Congress annual meeting marked the beginning of the Gandhian period of
Congress politics as Gandhi became president of the organization. It saw an
'Indianization' of the Congress that entailed greater participation by lower middle class
members in the leadership organization structure and direct engagement with the masses.
These changes were signified by the replacement of English with Hindi and other
regional languages at Congress meetings and the adoption of Indian rather than Western
clothing made of the signature home spun 'khadi' cotton. Khadi became an exceptionally
potent cultural symbol of the Ghandian technological imaginary of traditional village-
based technical expertise that was counterposed against mill-based production, whether
from factories in Lancashire or Bombay. In fact, kadhi cloth retains its political
significance as a style of dress today. Most importantly, these changes saw heightened
political agitations against the Raj as Gandhi organized the famous Non-cooperation
Movement, a major act of civil disobedience based on non-violence and swadeshi
boycotts of British manufactured goods.7
Gandhi's philosophical teachings and political activism proceeded hand-in-hand.
Gandhian economic thought had "precedents in the [turn of the century] swadeshi
movement" and became a "political weapon against the economic domination of
Lancashire" just as his civil disobedience was a strike against colonial rule (Zachariah,
2005:157). He created a cohesive system of meaning and thought with political,
economic and moral dimensions. It was based on a decentralized village-based economic
order, self-sufficiency through small-scale agriculture and cottage industries employing
traditional technologies, knowledge forms and production techniques that India's skilled
artisans had successfully employed for generations before the onset of British rule.
Gandhi's village experiment centered on attempts at reviving village craft industries
thought to be 'lost' or 'destroyed' by the liberal economic and trade policies of British
colonial rule as well as promoting agro-processing activities to link peasant food
7 The non-cooperation movement began in September 1920 and continued until February 1922. It was
opposed by many senior members of the INC but was supported by younger members including Nehru. It
was ultimately suspended by Gandhi due to the outbreak of violence in the Chauri-Chaura incident. Despite
his curtailment of the non-cooperation movement Gandhi was imprisoned by the British in 1922 on the
charge of publishing seditious materials.
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production with industrial development. Gandhianism dominated nationalist politics
through the 1920s, but it came under challenge towards the end of the decade by a
younger generation of 'scientific socialist' 8 political actors within the nationalist elite, of
which Jawaharlal Nehru was the most prominent and important representative.
Jawaharlal Nehru
Nehru was born and raised in an extremely prominent and politically well-connected
family. His great-grandfather Lakshmi Narayan was an established lawyer in the Mughal
Court in Delhi in the early 1800s and his father, Motilal Nehru, trained as an attorney at
the University of Cambridge and was twice President of the Indian National Congress in
1919 and 1928.9 As a small child, Nehru was privy to family conversations in which
commonplace acts of discrimination and violence suffered at the hands of the British
were angrily recounted. Nehru recalls being "filled with resentment against the alien
rulers of my country who misbehaved in this manner, and whenever an Indian hit back I
was glad." However, he also added "Much as I began to resent the presence and
behaviour of the alien rulers, I had no feeling whatever, so far as I can remember, against
individual Englishmen. I had had English governesses and occasionally I saw English
friends of my father's visiting him. In my heart I rather admired the English" (Nehru,
1941:20-1). The complexities and contradictions of these childhood experiences are
evident in the balance that Nehru - who would become the consummate internationalist -
- would later seek to strike between India and the West as he developed his own system
of meaning and thought.
Like his father, Nehru went to England and studied natural sciences and law at
Cambridge. His professional and political career began with his return to India in 1912,
8 The term 'scientific socialist' was coined by Friedrich Engels, and refers to empirical application of
Marxian theory, especially linking philosophy, economics and science in pursuit of development.
9 The political importance of this family cannot be overemphasized, as the Nehru-Gandhi family continues
to dominate Indian politics after almost a century. Jawaharlal Nehru was the first Prime Minister of India,
his daughter Indira married Feroze Gandhi and after her father's death became India's third Prime Minister.
Indira's son Rajiv became the sixth Prime Minister after his mother was killed and after his assignation his
Italian-born wife Sonia Gandhi was convinced by Congress leadership to assume the Presidency of the
Indian National Congress Party, which she has retained for over a decade as her eldest son Rahul Gandhi is
groomed for certain Congress leadership.
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three years before Gandhi's return from South Africa. He began practicing law, joined
the High Court and attended the annual meeting of Indian National Congress. This was
the period of increasing formal interactions, exchanges and cooperation between
Congress elites and colonial representatives. This was the same session that ran parallel
to the 1912 Indian Industrial Conference analyzed in the previous chapter where
nationalist and colonial actors contemplated the state of 'Indian Economic Man',
constructing the cultural categories that prescribed the appropriate role of indigenous
capital in Indian industrial development and regulated the behavior of emerging Indian
industrialists (as depicted in the table below).
Colonial Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (-1912)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Colonial and nationalist conceptions of Modern: potential 'Captains of Industry'
Indian economic actors as 'bazaar traders and
speculators'. Trapped in ties of caste and kin. No
economic ambition, only longing for Nirvana
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
'Traditional' Western Economic Man stern and 'Modern' Western Economic Man of the West
determined, with hardly any heart and feelings; bent depicted with a 'kindly face indicating benevolent
on making profits intentions. Akin to Andrew Carnegies 'Trustees'.
Despite his own elite education and self-described "bourgeois background", Nehru was
unimpressed with the Congress, later reflecting "It was very much an English-knowing
upper class affair where morning coats and well-pressed trousers were greatly in
evidence. Essentially it was a social gathering with no political excitement or tension"
(Nehru 1962:27).10 Nehru had little patience for this pleasant fraternization. He was
deeply disturbed by India's material poverty and cultural and intellectual decline,
particularly given Europe's post-Enlightenment advancement in these areas and like
Gandhi he held the British responsible. Nehru had no confidence in the leadership of the
national movement to effect a reversal of India's material and cultural collapse,
10 Nehru's disappointment with the Congress elite recalls British attempts to create Indian westernized elite
infamously captured in Macaulay's Minute on Western Education that aimed "to form a class who may be
interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour
but English in taste, in morals, in opinion and in intellect." Nehru clearly was not impressed by what might
be seen as the successful outcome of Macaulay's Minute.
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particularly given their complete disconnection from the people of India. He bitterly
lamented that "All these people lived a world apart, cut off from the masses and even the
lower middle class. Politics was confined to this upper strata" (Ibid). He saw the political
discourse as centered on the concerns of the powerful -- zamindari landlords, native
Princes, capitalists and the Raj -- and his "continual criticism of the politics of talk
and...insistent demand for action" had little effect on the Congress leadership (Nehru
1962:29,34). Thus when Gandhi arrived in India and radically transformed the Congress
through engagement with the masses, Nehru was immediately drawn to him, even though
the roots of future differences in their positions were evident from the outset.
Gandhi's moral authority and capacity for political mobilization was an inspiration.
Nehru was one of Gandhi's strongest supporters when he launched the non-cooperation
movement in 1920 over the objections of more moderate figures in the Congress. This
anti-imperialist action predicated on mass participation had massive appeal to Nehru. He
was electrified by Gandhi's activism, but less taken with his economic position that
idealized pre-colonial village life and called for a return to India's 'traditional' pre-
industrial roots. However, Nehru was still quite young, and his own economic and
political philosophies had yet to be developed during his early Congress years. Nehru's
views generally fit with prevailing elite nationalist thought rooted in 19 th century theories
of Naoroji and Dutt, albeit somewhat uneasily given his dissatisfactions with the current
Congress leadership. Nehru recalled that "It was all nationalism and patriotism and I was
a pure nationalist, my vague socialist ideas of college days having sunk into the
background" (Nehru 1962:35). However, he was inspired by anti-British action in
Ireland, later reflecting that "fresh reading was again stirring the embers of socialist
ideas" but "They were vague ideas, more humanitarian and utopian [a likely reflection of
his liberal humanist training from childhood] than scientific" (Nehru 1962:35). His
primary influence was the humanitarian socialism and anti-imperialism of Bertrand
Russell, but "he had made no study of economic and land problems, and had no
economic ideology to share" (Mishra, 1988:36). Nehru's time during this Gandhian
period was spent working 'on the ground' and seeing firsthand the degradation of poverty
and village life, while rising in the ranks of Congress leadership, becoming General
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Secretary in 1923 and again in 1927. Nevertheless his dissatisfaction with the prevailing
liberal imperial as well as 'traditional' Gandhian systems of thought left him in continual
search of an alternate intellectual avenues through which to make sense of the Indian
situation and to chart new paths of economic thought and political action.
All of this changed when Nehru made his first return to England in 1926. Nehru found an
entirely different situation with the rise of socialism and anti-imperialism amidst clear
signs of British imperial decline. This was a period of heightened engagement between
nationalist agitators from the colonies and European metropoles. In contrast to the period
of 1870-1900 when the first generations of Indian nationalists took inspiration from
European nationalism by reading newspapers, journals and books, the 1920s saw face-to-
face meetings and discussions between European leftists and nationalist actors from the
colonized territories. These interactions present a different view of the circulation of
ideas than the unidirectional assumptions of the 'world society' literature (Meyer et al,
1997). Nehru represented the Indian National Congress at the Congress of Oppressed
Nationalities in Brussels and met many European socialists and communists as well as
nationalists from Asia and Africa, including Indian political actors based outside of the
country. He then travelled to Russia, where he was deeply impressed by the radical socio-
economic changes that had been wrought by the October 1917 Revolution and
subsequent socialist economic planning.
Nehru returned to India invigorated with new ideas and purpose. His experience provided
a new interpretive lens for understanding India's situation, equipping with him fresh
causal ideas, explanations and solutions to the problems he had been grappling with for
the past 15 years. His interpretation of Russia's socialist experiment provided the content
for a new Indian nationalism. Indeed, his very first article, published in The Hindu on
April 3, 1928, was aptly entitled 'Fascination of Russia'. The article revealed the first
formulations of Nehru's emerging conviction that the Russian Revolution would help
India find solutions to its own problems given their similar conditions. Nehru's future
path is easily discerned. He began with a critique of nationalist positions rooted in the
past - a direct reference to Gandhian philosophy that romanticized pre-industrial
156
elements of India's economic history - and then continued by expounding the wondrous
effects of Russia's industrial accomplishments on education and poverty of the masses.
... the past is dead and gone and our immortal civilization does not help us greatly in
solving the problems of today. If we desire to solve these problems, we shall have to
venture forth along new avenues of thought and search for new methods. The world
changes and the truths of yesterday and the day before may be singularly inapplicable
today... Russia thus interests us because it may help us to find some new solution for
the great problems which face the world today. It interests us specially because
conditions there have bot been, and not even now, very dissimilar to conditions in
India. Both are vast agricultural countries with only the beginnings of industrialization,
and both have to face poverty and illiteracy. If Russia finds a satisfactory solution for
these, our won in India is made easier (Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Fascination of Russia', in
The Hindu, April 3, 1928 cited in Mishra, 1988:40).
"Nehru's conversation to scientific socialism was complete" (Mishra, 1988:40). He was
re-energized and began to formulate a coherent system of thought and meaning that
critiqued both classical political economic economy that the British used to justify the
suffocation of Indian industry and entrepreneurship as well as Gandhian philosophy that
rejected industrialization by projecting a vision of India's future based on the idealized
purity and simplicity of an imagined pre-colonial village life. Nehru constructed an
alternative nationalism based on the application of 'modern' science in industry,
education and cultural life that would underpin the development of large-scale
technology-intensive industry providing widespread manufacturing sector employment.
This would both rescue India's poverty-stricken peasants from the drudgery and
'backwardness' of village life while restoring India's position in the global hierarchy of
nation-states. Nehru's scientific socialism was tailored for India and had explicit
implications for political action. Contrary to the British who were bent on retaining
control of the 'Jewel in the Crown of British Empire' even as the rest of the empire
crumbled amidst the economic malaise and political tensions of the inter-war period, as
well as Gandhians advocating for the partial autonomy of Dominion status," Nehru
proposed full Indian control of economic policies as the only acceptable political
solution. On the role of foreign capital, Nehru stated: "'Political domination is patent
enough, but a far more dangerous and insidious thing is economic domination' " this
"1 Dominion status comprised political autonomy, but with the confines of the British Empire. This was the
political status that the European settler colonies of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa held
since the late 1 9 h century.
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view was to become clear in his approach to the pharmaceutical industry and patents in
the 1950s (Tyabji, 2004, 2010). He tabled a resolution at the December 1927 annual
meeting of the Congress in Madras stating that "the Congress declares the goal of the
Indian people to be complete national independence." It was overwhelmingly passed.
Emerging Conflict and Contestation between Gandhi and Nehru
Much like Gandhi reoriented the nationalist elite Congress towards mass engagement and
'Indianized' its form and function a decade before, the resolution signaled a new
direction for the Congress, albeit one that conflicted with Gandhi's approach. It marked
the beginning of contestation between Gandhi and Nehru's diverging nationalisms.
Indeed, Gandhi wrote Nehru a letter on January 4 1928 criticizing his socio-economic
vision and independence resolution that ran against Gandhi's own more moderate calls
for Dominion Status as "hastily conceived and thoughtlessly passed". Gandhi chastised
Nehru saying: "You are going too fast. You should have taken time to think and become
acclimatised." Nehru's curt reply reflected the sharp divide that had emerged in their
positions:
You have stated somewhere that India has nothing to learn from the West and that she
has reached a pinnacle of wisdom in the past. I entirely disagree with this viewpoint
and I neither think that the so-called Ram Raj was very good in the past, nor do I
want it back. I think the Western or rather industrial civilization is bound to conquer
India, may be with changes and adaptations, bit none the less in the main based on
industrialism. You have criticised strongly the many obvious defects of industrialism
and hardly paid any attention to its merits. Everybody knows these defects and all the
Utopias and social theories are meant to remove them. It is the opinion of most thinkers
in the West that these defects are not due to industrialism as such but to the capitalist
system which is based on the exploitation of others. I believe you have stated that in your
opinion there is no necessary conflict between Capital and Labour. I think that under
the capitalist system this conflict is inevitable.'2
Gandhi's Ram Raj, a religiously-inspired utopic golden age of harmonious co-existence
in the non-industrial society that underpinned his economic program of village-based
industry epitomized by home-spun 'khadi' cloth, was firmly rejected for a conception of
modernity and progress modeled on Western experience.' 3 This was a major divide
12 Letter from Nehru to Gandhi, in S. Gopal (ed) Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, cited in Mishra,
1988:44.
13 Further, there was a place for zamindari landlords and Indian princes in Gandhi's utopia, figures for
whom Nehru had significant contempt as long-standing economic and political oppressors of the masses.
158
between two powerful cultural meaning-systems (cf. Wedeen, 2002). Nehru believed that
Gandhi's village self-help was a glorification of poverty and backwardness. Instead, his
strategic conflation of "Western or rather industrial civilization" represented an attempt at
(re)appropriating the meaning of 'modern' industrial society. Although modern industry
was associated with the West, Nehru argued that there is nothing intrinsically Western
about 'industrialism' given the glories of India's own industrial past, much as had been
elaborated in great detail by the nationalist theories of the 19 th century. Further, he argued
that the 'well-known' defects of industrial society are not intrinsic to the technological
aspects of industrialism, but rather were due to the capitalist system in which they are
embedded, in particular its exploitation of labor by capital. This provided important
insight into Nehru's views of capitalists as exploitative economic actors that would
underpin his preferences for state-owned industry once he became Prime Minister. These
views are contrasted with colonial and Gandhian conceptions later in the chapter.
Finally, while Gandhi's philosophy was exclusively rooted in a depiction of the moral
purity of India's past and his anti-imperial activism was aimed at Indians under colonial
oppression at home and in the South African, Fijian and other diasporas, Nehru
embedded his nationalist approach in a broader anti-imperialist framework. He imbued it
with purpose and meaning (Abdelal, 2001) by identifying the "commonality of interests
among 'the peoples of Asia and Africa struggling for freedom' and 'the worker of the
West'. Nehru argued that 'Imperialism was the common enemy to be fought ceaselessly
and rooted out before a better order could be established"'. 14 This critique accorded with
Lenin's famous 1917 statement in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism.
Nehru conducted extensive 'educational tours' around the country throughout 1928 in
order to share his nationalist vision of swadeshi (self-reliance), swaraj (self rule) and
socialism with peasants, students and industrial workers. However, while Nehru gathered
new followers amongst the masses of colonial subjects, the political implications of his
system of thought generated internal conflict within the Congress. A section of the
leadership -- interestingly backed by the two paternal influences in Nehru's life, Gandhi
14 Nehru's foreword to PJ Schmidt's The Imperialist Danger, cited in Mishra (1988:44).
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as well as his father Motilal Nehru who at the time was serving as Congress President --
sought to soften the independence resolution and return to demands for Dominion status
within two years, though retaining full independence as the ultimate goal. Nehru strongly
criticized this move and refused to attend the final sitting of the session. Though the
Congress adopted the weakened Dominion resolution, albeit with a one-year time frame,
the year 1929 saw Nehru grow significantly in stature within the Congress and across the
country. Although he had already suffered the first of several periods of incarceration at
the hands of colonial authorities, he returned to their attention, though outside of
Gandhi's shadow. The Raj now saw Nehru and other members of the younger generation
such as Babu Subhas Chandra Bose as 'an extreme nationalist who is at the same time
genuinely attracted by some of the Communist doctrines' and tried to label Nehru as an
agent of Moscow.' 5
The Complexities of the Nehru-Gandhi Relationship
Finally, it is important to recognize that although Gandhi and Nehru began what would
be a long period of vigorous contestation between their competing nationalist visions of
India's future, the two men retained a close if complex relationship akin to that of father
and son. Indeed, in the midst of the otherwise curt exchange of letters cited overleaf,
Nehru affectionately asked Gandhi 'Am I not your child in politics, though perhaps a
truant and errant child?' 16 Thus in spite of his conflicts with Congress senior leadership,
Nehru was chosen to preside over the December 1929 annual meeting in Lahore with the
backing of Gandhi. Though he had the support of only 3 of 18 Provincial Congress
Committee members (10 of the 18 supported Gandhi) Gandhi's backing and "statement
that 'Jawaharlal's being in the Congress presidential chair was as good as his being in
that position'" was influential (Mishra, 1988:52). The year 1929 saw preparations for
new agitations as the one-year window for Dominion status expired with no positive
signals from the British. Even moderate supporters of the Dominion proposal were
resigned to increased pressure on the British through Nehru's approach. The dawn of the
15 Nehru, like Gandhi, frequently ran afoul of the colonial authorities and spent much of this period in jail.
He was first arrested in 1921, and was incarcerated again in 1930 and several more times up to 1945.
16 January, 24 1928 letter from Nehru to Gandhi, cited in Perry Anderson's 'Why Partition?' London
Review of Books, Vol 34, No. 12, 19 July 2012. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n14/perry-anderson/why-
partition last accessed August 20, 2012.
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new decade was thus set for renewed conflicts between colonial forces and an new mode
of nationalism, as the Congress penned a declaration against the British in January 1930
citing drain of the economy through taxation, destruction of village handicraft industries,
currency manipulation and tariffs biased towards British manufactures. The independence
battle was on.
III. The Great Depression:
Uncertainty and the Social Meaning of 'Development'
The rise of the new Indian nationalisms in the 1920s coincided with a period of increased
structural fragility in the global political economy and the liberal intellectual paradigm
that supported it, though these were not entirely separate as Nehru's European travels
most clearly show. WWI provided the initial disruption to the old imperial equilibrium,
and orthodox economic theories came under massive pressure in the 1920s before
exploding with the Great Depression and subsequent collapse of the international
financial system. The global political economy of the 'first globalization' was based on
the application of post-Enlightenment scientific discoveries to industry, the boom in
manufacturing production stemming from the Industrial Revolution in England that
subsequently spread to the rest of Europe and North America, coupled with the interstate
system of economic exchange rationalized by the cognitive and cultural schema of free
trade. The financial system was based on an international monetary framework of credit
and currency exchange anchored by the Gold Standard. This was embedded within an
imperial state system that relied on a complex and tenuous balance of power maintained
by post-1870 treaties between European imperial powers. Together these facilitated
international trade and maintained political peace, but the system had been under pressure
for decades. In this respect the onset of the Great War was merely the 'cataclysmic'
outcome of political-economic tensions that had been building throughout the 'long 19 th
century'.
Post-war attempts to reestablish the liberal economic system ultimately failed with the
stock market crash of 1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression. These structural
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developments had a major impact on the causal ideas of liberal economic thought that
rationalized the entire system. "As the economic and regulatory institutions of liberal
capitalist states became unstable" in the 1920s and the Great Depression set in, "the
majority of such states rejected the ideas of classical liberalism as the cornerstone of
economic management" and the bottom completely "fell out of the free market orthodoxy
when Britain went off the gold standard" in September 1931 (Blyth, 2001:4-5, 108).17
These developments in the global political economy "created a new context for
arguments which challenged accepted economic orthodoxies" as the precepts of classical
economics that underpinned pre-WW1 stability gave way to an increasingly open debate
(Zachariah, 2005:29). "A variety of reflationary and redistributive economic ideas,
ranging from Keynesianism to fascism, were developed and deployed by different states"
to address the uncertainty amidst the global economic collapse of the 1930s (Blyth
2001:4-5).'8 As the boundaries and assumptions of "acceptable economics" shifted in
global discourse, they became "extremely permeable" in India providing openings and
opportunities for new nationalist critiques designed for the reality of the time (Zachariah,
2005:291). These fractures in the institutional structure of the global political economy
that rested on the precepts of classical political economy coincided with the emerging
conflict and contestation amongst Indian nationalists in the Gandhian and Nehruvian
'socialist-scientific' camps.
For the first time in the nationalist movement, major fractures had developed in the
causal ideas and social meaning of what for decades had been a relatively coherent and
1 Polanyi provides the most apt description of the times in his famous text The Great Transformation: The
"abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain; the Five-Year plans in Russia; the launching of the
New Deal; the Nationalist Socialist Revolution in Germany; the collapse of the League [of Nations] in
favor of autarchist empires. While at the end of the Great War nineteenth century ideals were paramount,
and their influence dominated the following decade, by 1940 every vestige of the international system had
disappeared and, apart from a few enclaves, the nations were living in an entirely new international setting"
(Polanyi, [1944] 2001:24). When the US went off the gold standard in 1933 "the last vestige of the
traditional world economy vanished" (Ibid:27). This was the tumultuous reality of the 1930s.
18 "These economic ideas postulated that governments could, and should, seek to control the national
economy by active market manipulation since the private economy as a whole was perceived as inherently
unstable and incapable of socially optimal outcomes" (Blyth 2001:4-5). These new ideas supported active
market management by the state, which had a duty to ensure investment, generate employment and
promote economic growth.
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consensual Indian nationalism oriented towards opposing imperialism. However, though
these fractures opened new opportunities and spaces for fresh ideas, this did not signal a
clean break with nationalist thought of the past. In India, "old debates [on economic
drain, famines, free trade and the role of indigenous industry] became part of the
historical memory which was to be drawn upon as a political resource-base by
nationalists" (Zachariah, 2005:29; cf. Sewell, 1992). Nevertheless, these were not simply
cultural scripts that actors passively internalized through uncontested processes of
socialization. Contemporary nationalists displayed significant agency and creativity in
constructing new cognitive and cultural schemas. These powerful and salient systems of
meaning and thought were devised by strategically dismissing some imperial arguments
and appropriating others in order to contest imperial power in the political and policy
domain.
Uncertainty and the Causal Ideas and Social Meaning(s) Ascribed to 'Development':
Economic Theory and Science and Technology
It is critical to stress the ambiguities, uncertainties and multiple possibilities that
economic actors in India and indeed worldwide faced in the 1930s (Polanyi, 1944; Blyth,
2002; Zachariah, 2005).19 Two dynamics were clear: there was enormous worry as to the
direction of the global political economy, particularly given the twin political and
economic threats of stagnation and fascism (Polanyi, 1944), and yet the vulnerability of
the dominant explanatory framework of liberal economics represented an exciting array
of possibilities for colonies agitating for independence. The weaknesses of the liberal
economic model made apparent by the breakdown of the global economic system
provided ammunition to the Indian nationalist critique that had been long been leveled
against the imperial liberal order -- much like it fuelled the ideas of John Maynard
Keynes, who incidentally began his government career in the India office in London.0
Development remained the stated goal of both imperialism and nationalism, but during
this tumultuous and uncertain period the concept of 'development' itself encompassed a
19 See discussion on uncertainty in Blyth (2002) and Rathbun (2007) as well as in Chapter 2.
20 Abdelal et al (2005:20-25) provide an extensive discussion about Keynes' constructivist thought in
making sense of the economy amidst the uncertainty of the Great Depression that accords with this
argument].
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wide variety of causal ideas and social meanings. Policy "debates surrounding the word
evoked a wide and exciting range of possibilities, not yet limited by the later impositions
of 'development economics', and relatively unconstrained by the demands of practical
politics" as nationalist actors had the freedom of critique without the responsibility and
practical challenges of policy implementation (Zachariah, 2005:1). This reflected a
fracturing of the social meaning ascribed to development in the late 1 9 th century, when
both imperialist and nationalist actors shared a fairly unitary conception of the
phenomenon that was largely modeled on post-Enlightenment Western modernity:
material and intellectual progress predicated on science, reason and rationality in the
public sphere. This became open to debate in the 1930s with new Gandhian and
Nehruvian conceptions of development and modernity battling liberal imperial thought
for supremacy in the political realm.
Though the liberal global economy was crumbling and the solution to the intellectual
crisis was up for grabs, the terms along which the debate would be conducted were clear.
The discursive arena remained structured by imperial power, just as it was in late 19 th
century, such that to be effective, nationalist interventions had to appeal to terms that had
gained academic and political legitimacy in the UK. Imperialism was more than a set of
structural-material political economic relationships; it also constituted the social and
intellectual environment that shaped the development debates in India. It provided the
'taken for granted setting' and the "discursive framework that writers and audiences
shared even as they resisted it". It remained "the reference point for attempts at
developing and deploying alternative discursive frameworks" (Zachariah, 2005:58; see
also Schmidt, 2008 on 'Discursive Institutionalism'). While the nationalist critique had to
be rooted in the 'scientific' language of economics and European ideas provided the
language for the nationalist critique, "The solution [for nationalist actors] was to seek to
move the boundaries of 'economics'; to widen the scope of existing fora as far as
possible to express the wider views' and to create new fora, drawing more people into
sharing the wider concerns" (Ibid). Keynesian and other critiques of classical political
economy weakened the orthodoxy and served as resources for strategic actors in their
efforts to shape the cultural, discursive and ultimately policy environment.
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Conventional economic theory prescribed particular assumptions about India,
naturalizing its backwardness while asserting European superiority. These are the same
cultural schemas that the nationalist arguments of the 19th century described in Chapter 3
were designed to counter, but Nehru and Gandhi moved beyond Naoroji and Dutt, albeit
in radically different ways. The meanings ascribed to development in the post WWI
period were malleable and shifted as nationalist actors strategically adapted them to the
contemporary Indian context, both to contest imperial power and to intervene in the
internal struggle between Gandhi's "turn-of-the-century anti-industrial romanticism"
(Zachariah, 2005:16) and Nehru's modernist vision predicated on large-scale industry,
state planning and Western technology (cf. Wedeen, 2002; Sewell, 1992; Schmidt,
2008). A key part of nationalist grievances was the lack of support for indigenous
industry amidst protection and subsidization of British capital. This underpinned the
nationalist position towards foreign capital. Gandhian and socialist-scientific nationalists
held a shared understanding of British deindustrialization of India, but ascribed radically
different social meanings to the implications for India's subsequent development path.
Gandhian principles focused on the destruction of traditional handicrafts and promoted a
return to village-based cottage industries of the past, powerfully symbolized by the
political salient homespun 'khadi' cloth. By contrast, Nehruvian scientific socialists held
that British deindustrialization derailed India from following its own 'natural' path to
Industrial Revolution. The solution to India's stunted industrialization was heavy state
direction to compensate for colonial disruption and accelerate the development of
technology intensive industry. Both of these systems of thought had major implications
for private domestic capital, as hinted earlier and illustrated in the next section.
Finally, as argued in the previous chapters, science and technology had a central role in
the conceptions of modernity in competing Gandhian, Nehruvian and imperial systems of
thought. Just as theoretical principles and empirical realities that informed the field of
economics were in flux, so to was the flowering of science fueling the 'technological
imaginations' of nationalist actors, particularly as the inevitability of self-government and
independence became clear. There was a tightly inscribed link between nationhood,
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science, rationality and modernity. "To be a nation was to be endowed with science,
which had become the touchstone of rationality" (Prakash, 1999:7). Science was a
"metaphor" and a "grammar of modern power" that aspiring nationalist leaders sought to
deploy in fashioning an image of India's future (Ibid). These nationalist visions of
science and technology were about more than what scientists might actually do, or what
might actually take place in a lab; they were about "...what science stood for, the
dazzling range of meanings and functions it represented" (Ibid). This highlights the
analytic power of the concept of 'sociotechnical imaginaries' introduced in chapter two
(Jasanoff et al, 2007) and has direct bearing on the political possibilities that the concept
of 'science' provided to strategic nationalist actors.
The scientific imaginary enveloped broad aspects of Indian social, political and economic
life, providing the tools for competing nationalist and imperialist actors to organize
politics and the economy. "The rich and pervasive influence of science was rooted in its
ambiguity as a sign - its ability to spill beyond its definition as a body of methods,
practices, and experimental knowledge produced in the laboratory and confined only to
the understanding of nature" (Prakash, 1999:7). This ambiguity constituted a powerful
resource in the construction of cognitive and cultural schemas, allowing competing actors
to ascribe different causal relations, functions and possibilities to science and technology,
much as the crisis in liberal economic theory allowed them to do with economics. The
inherent ambiguity in science and economics created a space for politics, with the
technical details of competing economic theories and visions of technology mapping the
terrain of contestation. This is epitomized by the debates between Gandhians and
Nehruvian scientific-socialists who constructed their nationalist projects on differing
conceptions of technology: a return to traditionally superior technology of India's past or
a re-appropriation of modern Western technology that was built on stolen Indian
knowledge. The next section describes this strategic action by analyzing the discursive
terrain of development and modernity in the 1930s. It begins with the initial structure
provided by imperialism, and then assesses the interventions of Gandhi and Nehru's
competing brands of Indian nationalism and the way these shaped Indian National
Congress as it moved towards to independence and control of state power.
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IV. Contesting Development and Modernity
There was a complex coexistence of commonality and opposition between Gandhian
conceptions of development and modernity, and those of liberal colonial authorities on
one hand, and competing scientific socialist actors on the other. Scientific-socialists and
Gandhians were both staunchly anti-imperialist, but ascribed radically different meanings
to the cultural symbols of technology-intensive industry and material wealth that were
defining characteristics of Western modernity. Gandhi completely rejected these
trappings of the West on moral grounds, while scientific-socialists sought to universalize
these symbols from the exclusive domain of Europe. Similarly, imperialist actors shared
scientific socialists' views of progress as based on industrialization, but rejected the idea
that India could partake in this modernity and relegated India's future to low-technology
production, a conception that was not unlike Gandhi's 'traditional' village industry. This
section explores the complexities and contradictions of competing imperial, Gandhian
and scientific socialist systems of thought, highlighting the agency and creativity that its
proponents deployed to persuasively convey the meaning of their systems of thought in
the policy domain.
The Imperial Discursive Frame
As the previous section argued, the discursive framework in India remained structured by
imperial power, even with the economic crisis, great depression and imperial decline.
India was considered backward for a set of naturalized political, social, economic and
even racial reasons, all of which were backed by 'scientific' 19th century theories from
classical political economy, social theory and Darwinian evolutionary theory. This
backwardness assigned Britain the moral responsibility to 'develop' India, as illustrated
in the Colonial Office's official rhetoric and documents including the annual Moral and
Material Progress Report, correspondence between colonial officials, and popular
discourse epitomized by Rudyard Kipling's classic poem 'The White Man's Burden'. 2 1
21 The close relationship between moral and material elements of development was not just a part of
nationalist systems of thought. From 1858-1935 the Government of India Act required the colonial
government to present a statement on the 'Moral and Material Progress of India' each year in Parliament.
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These views had clear implications for industrialization in India. Modern technology was
only implementable in the West, and India simply lacked the 'natural' conditions and
capacities to support technologically sophisticated industry, though the colony was well
suited towards agriculture and mineral extraction. However, maintaining this imperial
system of thought required creative strategic action even for imperial powers just as it did
for nationalist challengers, particularly given the wider developments in the global
economy.
The collapse of the liberal economic system posed major challenges for colonial
authorities with respect to the question of Indian industrialization and the position of
indigenous versus British capital in the Indian economy. It became increasingly difficult
to justify a policy stance on the basis of free market principles with limited government
intervention (which of course favored British firms), particularly given the economic
success stemming from the increased role of the state in the advanced countries -
Keynesian at home in the UK as well as most of Western Europe and the New Deal US,
fascism in Germany, Italy and Japan, and communism in Russia -- and continued
agitations for state support for industrialization in the Indian colony.2 This provided an
opportunity for significant agency and creativity on the part of colonial actors; nationalist
actors were not alone in this respect.
Colonial actors adopted a dual strategy. First, they selectively appropriated aspects of the
nationalist economic argument and adapted to their own purposes.23 Many found
Gandhi's economic ideas (as distinct from his political philosophy) quite appealing:
"Gandhi's concern with villages was lauded as correct, as the 'real' India lived in its
villages; therefore, industrialization was undesirable, as it would damage this 'real'
India" (Zachariah, 2005:48-9). However, they also allowed that India might have some
This view "implied that moral progress would accompany the material, thereby allowing the imperium to
claim the high moral ground" (Zachariah 2005:45).
22 This of course was exacerbated by the success of Japanese exports in India (and other global markets)
which, as argued in the previous chapter, was widely recognized to be based on major state support for
Japanese industry.
23 Thus nationalists were not alone in selective appropriation of their opponents' arguments, even though
colonial actors were operating from a position of power.
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limited industrialization in technologically undemanding areas that fit India's 'natural'
conditions, which as it turned out overlapped with areas where Indians would not
compete with British producers. Sir George Schuster, a liberal Finance Member (1928-
1934) within the otherwise conservative colonial government thought that India could
have some industrialization, though mainly in lower end manufactures that British firms
were abandoning as they upgraded from textiles and steel to more complex manufactured
goods. However, he thought "there would continue to be 'a mass of manufactures which
India cannot possibly manufacture herself'"' (Zachariah, 2005:88-89). He believed that
"Planning India's economy was also a part of a wider process of reconciliation of British
and Indian business interests" and "hoped for a 'complementary plan' which would
involve cooperation of Indian and British interests" but nevertheless would maintain the
existing international division of labor (Ibid).
This somewhat conciliatory position that offered hope for some limited industrial policy
support to Indian capital was dashed when Shuster was replaced as Finance Member by
the orthodox Sir James Grigg, who held the position from 1934 until 1939 when he was
called back to London to be Under Secretary of War at the beginning of World War II.
Even amidst the incredible uncertainty of the time some colonial actors like Grigg
remained steadfast in their liberal economic beliefs. Grigg found Keynesian ideas "'either
silly or vicious'... Agriculture was, according to him, the real 'vocation' of India and he
did not hide his hostility to a policy of industrialization based on customs protection nor
his sympathies for Lancashire interests" (Markovits, 1985:48). His views were
unshaken by the uncertainty and complexity of the economic environment. On September
10, 1934 he wrote to Purshottomdas Thakurdas, an important voice amongst indigenous
business and co-founder of the leading Indian industry association FICCI, 'I wish I could
see my way though all this economic mess. My one clear ray of light - which you will
perhaps think a cloud of error - is that India mustn't industrialise herself too quickly'
(Markovits, 1985:48, emphasis added).
24 Colonial as well as Gandhian and Nehruvian approaches to the relationship between the state and foreign
and domestic capital will be analyzed in the next chapter.
25 Additionally, "He was very hostile to Indian businessmen, particularly to G.D. Birla [one of India's two
leading businessmen along with J.R.D. Tata] who was his 'bete noir' " (Markovits, 1985:48).
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India's position was thus defined relative to British interests and colonial assumptions
about Indian industrial potential and its natural position in the world economy. India was
to remain a market for British exports, and Indian capital at best junior partners to their
foreign counterparts.26 Noting the increase in imports of more sophisticated higher value-
added industrial goods from Britain such as chemicals, electrical machinery and
automobiles, even the conciliatory Schuster argued that " 'Most of these, especially
motor vehicles, are classes of imports which are capable of vast expansion without
interfering with India's own natural industrial development'". Automobiles is worth
highlighting as precisely the type of good that reflected Britain's 'natural' advantage in
technology intensive manufactured goods - a view with its roots in classical political
economy -- and thus autos is the main illustrative industry in the latter chapters of this
dissertation. Further, as we will see below and in Chapter Six, Schuster made this
statement at the same time that one of the leading scientific socialists was formulating
and promoting a comprehensive plan for automobile manufacturing in India based on
indigenous capital, having chosen automobiles precisely because of its technological
intensity and association with modernity.
Grigg's exchange with Thakurdas makes his views on India crystal clear, but it was in
private correspondence with his British colleagues though that Grigg revealed its full
force, providing the most apt depiction of the colonial position:
.. India is the most desperate poor and inefficient and backward country you can
imagine. The representative Indian is not to be found among the few tens of thousands of
noisy politicians, journalists, stock exchange gamblers and clerks; he is an almost
naked creature clad in a loin cloth and an umbrella who squats about among his
crops by day and breeds like a rabbit by night.. .As an antidote to the misfortunes of
the cultivator we have played up to the idea of a rapid industrialization of India.. .but the
effects haven't been too happy. The prices to the consumer have been grotesquely high
(and the consumer is the peasant plus the European), import trade had been cut down
enormously and.. .the ability of the agriculturalist [sic] to export still further reduced
while except in the case of steel the enterprise and uprightness of the industrialist have
been insufficient to enable the new industries to become established securely. Thus we
26 This reflected the colonial position on the prospects of Indian manufacturing, and crucially, is an early
articulation of the view of Indian firms as 'Junior Partners' to foreign firms that has major resonance in the
post-independence period and later liberalization periods, particularly with conflicts around joint ventures.
27 Zachariah, 2005:89 footnote 31, emphasis added.
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have pleased nobody not even the industrialist or the politician to whom we have been
playing up.28
Grigg was an unrepentant believer in liberal economics. Despite the collapse of the global
economy and the 'economic mess' that he tried to see through, he wrote to a colleague in
1935 "I am still a firm believed in individualism and my experience in India has
confirmed my view that there is no real hope for the world until it gets back much more
nearly to Free Trade" (Zachariah, 2005:93) while his views on the latter were even more
extreme:
Grigg's personal crusade was against the 'particularly virulent form of economic
nationalism' that existed in India; on the hopeful side, he reported 'faint glimmerings of a
recognition that economic nationalism is only a device for big employers to exploit
their workmen, the consumers and the taxpayer generally."' He detested businessmen
more than he detested the Congress. Nehru was 'an academic but fanatical
revolutionary" other in the Congress 'merely the jackals of big business and most
people think that Gandhi is really a prisoner of these'. Businessmen in India had a
'habit of posing as the people of India and getting higher protection as a result. Nehru's
current ascendancy, he noted, had frightened the 'jackals' to say to Zetland and
Linlithgow [Secretary of State for India 1937-40 and Viceroy of India 1937-43,
respectively] that 'they want to be reconciled to the British and that Gandhi is the only
possible instrument for effecting this reconciliation'. This was not only 'from the point of
view of checking communism'. These 'buccaneers of business' knew that the
'reappearance of Gandhi again in any active form would mean that the markets would
be hopping about like mad and so they would be able to make enormous speculative
profits'." 29
Constructing Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy:
Colonial and Nationalist Contestation
Grigg saw Congress as in the pocket of big business, an interpretation that emerged from
the classical political economy perspective of rational calculating self-interest and also
fits with contemporary public choice theories of business-government relations.30
28 Letter from Grigg to Chamberlain, 17 Aug 1934, cited in Zachariah (2005:94-5).
29 Letter cited in Zachariah (2005:94).
30 There may have been a significant gap between colonial perception and reality. Mukherjee (2002) argues
that Indian capital had relatively little influence on the Congress Party by virtue of its financial
wherewithal. He cites a March 1939 intelligence report on Congress finances from the Director of the
Intelligence Bureau: "Congress has also very important substitutes for regular finance. The mass 'appeal to
patriotism' saves as host of cash expenditures. Free traveling by railway or public motor transport, fees
levied on all transactions at markets, voluntary contributions collected a meetings, fairs, etc, by Congress
volunteers are examples." (Mukherjee, 2002:64) Additionally, in response to Viceroy Linlithgow's
question of "Whether Congress can for long continue an existence divorced from the Gandhian
moneybags" the report stated: "Both for normal Congress activities and for election purposes, the
moneybags are less important that the Gandhian superstition [i.e. nationalist ideology] and the powerful
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However, Gandhi offered a different view. In "grappl[ing] with the asymmetrical
relationship of indigenous capital and Indian nationalism" Gandhi, a lawyer by training,
"proposed the [legal] concept of trusteeship as the ethical ground for India's rapidly
expanding industrial bourgeoisie." Gandhi explained his trusteeship proposal in a 1935
interview in the Modem Review: "Those who own money now are asked to behave like
trustees, holding their riches on behalf of the poor. Your may say that trusteeship is a
legal fiction. But if the people mediate over it constantly and try to act up to it, then life
on earth would be governed far more by love than it is a present".3 1
The 'trust' was a "distinctly British legal concept" that reflected a proxy relationship
while providing a model of self-governance. The roots of the concept in the Indian
context can be traced back to the 1 9 th century English philosopher Frederic William
Maitland's description of the East India Company as an agent holding the Indian colony
in trust on behalf of the British Crown (Ibid).32 Gandhi's invocation of the concept, as
well as his explicit recognition of justification of the use of this 'legal fiction,' provided
another example of elite 'trafficking' between the indigenous and the Western, strategic
appropriation of ideas through the combination of schemas as well as the growing role of
the legal tools in constructing and legitimizing the institutions of the Indian political
economy. This is most clear from Gandhi's influence from Western philosophers. More
crucially, it reflects Gandhi's strategic efforts to construct a particular vision of Indian
development and was an early sign that despite his promotion of small-scale village
influence of Congress ministries in office. With these influences to support them, local Congress
organizations can command so much support from the public and also in more or less disguised form, from
the official machinery, that they are in a position to fight elections without needing much money."
(Mukherjee, 64) Finally, after the Quit India (civil disobedience) movement was launched in August 1942
the Viceroy ordered another investigation that found: "As to the relationship between big business and
Congress, the available evidence does not appear to justify any assumption that 'Big Business' has secretly
been using Congress as an unsuspecting instrument towards the achievement of its own ends, or vice-versa,
but rather that the two have been working together in a partnership of convenience with no illusions on
either side" (Mukherjee, 2002:64-5).
3" Cited in Birla (1999:103). Gandhi elaborated this theory through interviews and article in the 1920s and
1930s. See his piece: My Theory of Trusteeship.
32 Birla argues that the trust constitutes a "legal allegory" defining fiduciary relations between the
benevolent GOI and its subjects. "Gandhi's theory of trusteeship called upon benevolence to regulate
capitalisms concentration of wealth, evoking the disciplines of contract - that is, legal obligations o
beneficiaries - as the moral duty of capitalists. As public discourse, Gandhi's trusteeship reflected the
prominence of legal concepts in colonial modernity's social imaginary, where the charitable trust and the
joint-stock company institutionalized the public as alibi for the market." (104)
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enterprise Gandhi was hardly anti-capitalist, but had a much more nuanced and complex
conception of indigenous capitalist production, a point that becomes crucial in the
debates of the 1930s.
Finally, Gandhi's view had major implications for the emerging categories of capitalist
legitimacy. The concept of trusteeship reformulated 'Indian Economic Man' from Adam
Smith's self-interested profit maximizing capitalist to the "philanthropic trustee, a figure
both paternal and entrepreneurial, managing his wealth as the nation's wealth, in service
of beneficiaries, the nation, and the poor, the public and the population" (Birla,
2009:103). As we will see below, this was a cultural category that was radically different
from the rapacious moneylender or ragged bazaar-merchant and which Indian capitalists
seized upon in the mid-late 1920s and 1930s. The view of the trustee instead accorded
with notions of American industrialists such as Andrew Carnegie who were attempting to
shed the robber-baron image. This link between American and Indian conceptions of
capitalists is underpinned by the obituary that Science and Culture published following
Carnegie's death. Gandhian and wider notions of capitalists as trustees thus accorded
well with Indian economic actors own burgeoning efforts to project themselves in the
public sphere as economic experts committed to the pursuit of nation's interests.
Contesting Cultural Categories of Domestic Capitalist Legitimacy in 1930s India
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Modem: Gandhian view of 'trustees of the nations
Liberal imperial view of Indian business as wealth'
'speculators', 'jackals' and 'buccaneers' of
business that exploit consumers, the taxpayer and
their workers.
Nehruvian view of capitalists as exploiters of labor
The Scientific Socialist Critique
This imperial position -- as well as the Gandhian precepts it sought to appropriate -- was
vigorously contested by the emerging group of scientific socialist 'modernizers'.33
Besides Nehru, key figures included Meghnad Saha, physicist from Presidency College
33 [Alternatively: The emerging group of scientific socialist 'modernizers' vigorously contested this
imperial position and the Gandhian precepts it sought to appropriate.]
173
in Calcutta who founded the Indian Science News Association that launched the
influential monthly journal Science and Culture, which was modeled on Nature (UK) and
Science (US) 3 4 ; P.C. Mahalanobis, physicist-mathematician-statistician also from
Presidency College, founder of the Indian Statistical Institute and a major contributor the
design of the input-output tables that would form the core of India's post-independence
economic planning; and Sir M. Visvesvaraya, a civil engineer and civil servant who was
an influential voice in elite discussions around the development of Indian industry,
particularly autos. These men were connected through their participation in a series of
political efforts to project a view of 'modern' technology and its role in Indian
development.35 This technological focus also meant that beliefs about foreign capital
were a central part of the modernizing discourse.
Visvesvaraya's background epitomizes the modernizing scientific-socialist belief in state-
directed application of science and technology to the problems of development.
Visvesvaraya visited Japan in 1898 and witnessed the rapid industrialization that the state
had achieved during the Meiji Revolution. This was widely understood as the reason
behind Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and its rise as a world power,
and was reinforced by the steady increase in Japanese manufactured goods in the Indian
market after 1910. It is further worth noting that this production was organized through
private firms albeit with heavy state support. Visvesvaraya's experience provided the
belief that industrialization was the means to material wealth and global power, which he
articulated by advancing the link between science, technology and industry. Science was
the means to industrialization, which in turn was the path to modernity. This belief was
the driving force behind Visvesvaraya's proposal for launching automobile production in
India, which he developed in 1935-6 after conducting study tours in the US and Europe.
36 The plan included many of India's leading industrialists such as Walchand Hirachand,
34 Science and Culture released its first issue in 1935. The journal played a key role in propagating and
disseminating these scientific imaginaries. The journal provided a platform from which these men could
share and promote their visions, to other elites - both colonial-imperial and domestic capitalists - as well as
to the wider English speaking civil society that was itself gaining greater political consciousness.
35 Prafulla Chandra Ray, author of A Hindu Chemistry and also a Bengali academic at Presidency College,
was an early forerunner of this group.
36 Visvesvaraya also attacked colonial government for obstructionism through his All-Indian Manufacturer
Organization and the pamphlet entitled Indian Automobile Factory Scheme: Government of India's
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J.R.D. Tata and G.D. Birla amongst others and resulted in the creation of a joint-stock
company named Indian Motors Ltd. The proposal aimed to have minority foreign capital
participation to ensure technical support but preclude managerial control, the model that
was to dominate Indian engagement with foreign capital in the post-independence
period.37
Meghnad Saha was an active participant in politics as a 'nation-builder' and was one of
the most visible commentators on Indian development. He played an important role in
building key scientific institutions in India such as the National Institute of Science and
'scoffed' at politicians -- namely Gandhi and his followers -- who failed to see the role of
science and technology in India's destiny and who blamed India's challenge on science.
By contrast, in the introductory issue of Science and Culture he argued that only intense
use of science could allow India to address its "bewildering economic, social and even
political problems" (Science and Culture, June 1935, Vol. 1, No. 1). These actors sought
to 'mysticize' the development challenge and then offer science as a map to chart India's
path. Science was the core of industry, planning was the means to harness science for
development, and scientists were the key interlocutors. This understanding was not
limited to professional scientists; it was shared by leading scientific-socialists in the
political realm such as nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose, who welcomed the turn
to modern science while distinguishing this new generation of nationalists from their
older predecessors including Gandhi:
The appearance of Science and Culture is to be warmly welcomed not only by those who
are interested in the abstract sciences but also by those who are interested in nation-
building in practice. Whatever might have been the view of our older "Nation-
Builders", we younger folks approach the task of nation building in a thoroughly
scientific spirit and we desire to be armed with all the knowledge which modern
science and culture can afford us. It is not possible, however, for political workers with
their unending preoccupations to glean that knowledge for themselves; it is therefore for
scientists and scientific investigators to come to their rescue.38
Obstructive Attitude, which cited the benefits that auto manufacturing would have for the development of
Indian industry as well as for the war effort (Zachariah, 2005:255).
3 Visvesvaraya's plan is assessed in greater detail in the next chapter.
38 "Some Problems of Nation-Building" Subhas Chandra Bose, Science and Culture, October, 1935.
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These actors saw science and technology as central for transforming backward nations to
industrial giants. It served as metric for 'backwardness', particularly through specific
industries that epitomized development and modernity, of which autos was the most
important as a 1938 editorial in Science and Culture based on data from Visvesvaraya's
auto plan makes clear: "...if we take the motor car industry as an index of civilized
existence, the USA stands easily first, with over 30 million cars in use; about one man in
5 possesses a car, i.e. every family possesses a car...in India, there is one car for every
2,300 persons. This figure gives an appalling picture of the low index of civilized life in
India". 39 This provides a clear reflection of the social meaning ascribed to the automobile
industry as a symbol of development and modernity in India, much as it was in peer
developing countries aspiring to industrialization, as discussed in the next chapter
through comparison with Brazil.
This tension is revealed in discussions of the development of an auto industry in India.
Saha saw himself as both a socialist and a scientist, believing that the true emancipatory
power of science was only possible through socialism. However, in practice the solutions
he recommended were articulated within colonial or indigenous capitalism.
Visvesvaraya, on the other hand, was unconcerned with the question of socialism or
capitalism; for him industrialization was a must. He was a huge proponent of auto
industry, and he championed a detailed proposal for the development of an auto
manufacturing facility through Saha's Science and Culture. In this endeavor
Visvesvaraya was operating through the Indian shipping magnate Walchand Hirachand.
Saha disliked businessmen but defended the Visvesvaraya-Hirachand project on grounds
that it was necessary to improve India's technological level (Zachariah, 2005:255).
These differences in views of Indian capitalists reflected fissures within the Indian
nationalist science-technology-economics matrix. Many on the nationalist left resented
businessmen as collaborators with British during the war, who subordinated national
goals to their own short term profits. In response, Indian business argued that they were
furthering national interest through the development of national enterprise, while
39 Science and Culture, 1938, Vol. 4., No. 5 also cited in Zachariah, 2005:238
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complaining that British retarded the development of new industry. This precise view
would be famously restated in 1993 by the so-called 'Bombay Club' during India's
economic reforms.
Birla as well as Hirachand saw the war as good opportunity to launch an Indian auto
industry. Birla was initially a director in the Visvesvaraya-Hirachand project, but later
pulled out citing delays from government interference. Birla wrote to Hirchand with
complaints about the delays and proposed location in Mysore, before adding "Besides , as
I told you, I am going to go ahead with my own project, quietly and without any fuss or
propaganda. I cannot therefore conscientiously participate in your project" (Mukherjee,
2002). Birla then entered into negotiations with Lord Nuffield of the Morris Auto
Company in the UK. This generated immediate backlash in the nationalist media, as seen
in the Hindustan Standard editorial below:
"If the economic future of the country is to be safeguarded public indignation must be
roused against the sinister deal with foreign capital. Have the Birlas entered into an
entente with foreign capital just when the National Planning Committee has expressed
itself against such a course? It is deplorable that Birlas who are so closely associated
with the Congress High Command should be involved in such as sinister and shady
deal."40
These representations of foreign and domestic capital can be summarized as follows, with
the arrows representing tensions in conflicting categorizations:
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Le itimacy in Inter-war India (1914-1947)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: nationalist and scientific socialist view Modem: scientific socialist view of Indian capital
of Indian capital as comprador collaborators as potential captains of industry
(e.g. Saha; Hindustan Times editorial) (e.g. Visvesvaraya)
illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modem: potential 'technology providers'
(e.g. Hindustan Times editorial) (e.g. Visvesvaraya automobile plan)
The editorial highlights the complex points of congruence and tension between and
within otherwise competing systems of thought. First, there were tensions between the
imperial, Gandhian and scientific socialist views of emerging Indian capitalists.
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40 Cited in Zachariah, 2005:259.
Additionally, scientific socialists were internally divided on the issue of domestic private
capital: were they comprador collaborators or potential captains of industry? This internal
division would become a major point of contention after India won independence and
scientific socialists under Nehru took control of the state industrial policy apparatus.
There were broader points of conflict as well. Both scientific socialists as well as imperial
actors shared similar understanding of what constitutes 'civilized life' in India that
sharply contrasted with Gandhi's glorification of the simplicity and purity of low
technology systems of production. However, imperial and scientific socialist modernizers
ascribed radically different causes to India's 'backwardness' -- deindustrialized by the
British as argued in drain theory versus natural state as in classical political economy --
and hence different solutions: intensive application of science and technology aimed at
catching up versus a focus on areas of natural - low tech - comparative advantage.
Another Science and Culture editorial continues by expanding beyond the specifics of the
single industry of automobiles to weigh in on the role of 'traditional culture' in another
attack on Gandhian thought: "if this is ever to enter the path of progress, her younger
generations must be cut adrift from many medieval ideas and traditions which are
installed into their minds in the name of religion, philosophy, custom, tradition or history.
Only a good dose of scientific education can undo the evil influences to which young
minds are subjected."4 The editorial shows how the cultural categories created by British
imperialism shaped the cultural schemas that modernizing socialist-scientific actors
deployed to both counter imperialism and attack Gandhian thought.
The Complexity of Modernity and Anti-modernity in Gandhian Thought
Gandhi, like the colonial authorities, rejected the notion of 'modern' large-scale
industrialization in India. However, contrary to the arguments of his critics, Gandhian
thought "did not operate through claims to being anti-modern" Zachariah, 2005:158). The
reality was that during this period it was impossible "to base an argument... on a rejection
41 'The Next Twenty-five Years of Science in India, in Science and Culture, 1938, Vol. 4., No. 1 also cited
in Zachariah, 2005:238.
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of 'modernity' given that the conception of 'modernity' was "extremely empowering,
and carried with it extremely positive connotations for a people called 'primitive' and
'backward"' (Zachariah, 2005:159). These terms were well recognized to political
audiences of the time and "their emotive significance had already been well
established... A legitimate position, therefore, had to be based on something which was
'modern', but not 'Western"' (Ibid). This called for creative interpretation of the meaning
of modernity. Contrary to charges that his vision was not conducive to modern life,
Gandhi "... claimed...to offer solutions which were more modern than industrialization-
based models of society, and to challenge the criteria of modernity which they saw as
somewhat uncritically borrowed from the West" (Zachariah, 2005:158). Western systems
were viewed as too materialist with insufficient attention to the moral and ethical
elements of society that characterized the purity of India's past. Gandhi created a
conceptual system that was strategically located between capitalism and socialism, which
he viewed as equally Western, a powerful charge against both imperialism and nationalist
scientific socialism. 42
Gandhi constructed a conception of 'traditional' Indian society, which required "creative
borrowing from and re-interpretation of 'Hindu' traditions as being 'modern' before the
West was 'modern'." This is the creative agency in Sewell's (1992) framework as well as
in pragmatist strands of the new institutionalism (cf. Herrigel, 2008; 2010). Gandhi's
'creative borrowing' paralleled the nationalist scientist-industrialist Prafulla Chandra
Ray's efforts in producing the two volume A History of Hindu Chemistry from the
Earliest Times to the Middle of Sixteenth Century in 1901 and 1908. Tradition and
technology were intertwined at the core of the systems of meaning and thought in
Gandhi's Hind Swaraj and Ray's A Hindu Chemistry. Ray combined material from both
ancient Sanskrit texts and European writing to argue that science was far ahead of Europe
in the pre-Enlightenment era, citing novel discoveries and the development of innovation
42 Nehru also selectively appropriated specific elements when constructing his own system of thought. He
admired Russian Revolution and subsequent Soviet planning, but did not want to adopt the system
wholesale. Instead he borrowed the elements he found most appealing - the central role of the state, norms
of socio-economic equality of socialism, scientific rationality of planning, technological imaginary of
large-scale industry - while rejecting others, most clearly totalitarian forms of political control in favor of
Western democracy.
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chemical preparations that preceded and informed not only early European but also Arab
and Asian societies. The technological basis of Gandhi's village industry was similarly
not anti-modern, since it was based on production expertise that was superior to Europe
during the period when Indian artisanal products were extremely sought after on world
markets, attracting traders from Europe and the Middle and Far East. However, these
techniques had been lost through the destructive violence of British colonialism. The
technological imaginary that fuelled-Gandhi's village society provided the means of
getting it back. 
Gandhi's system was further complicated given that he was not against machines per se,
but opposed "the 'craze' for labor saving devices" amidst India's high rural
unemployment. For example, he thought the Singer Sewing machine was 'one of the few
useful things ever invented' precisely because it empowered small-scale home-based
production (Zachariah, 2005:157).44 Instead, Gandhi was concerned about the type of
human subject that Western modern technology produced. "Technology did not signify
[physical] machines alone, but signified as well as complex web of social, economic,
cultural, and political practices aimed at accumulating capital and fabricating possessive
individuals" (Prakash, 1999:214), as Gandhi made clear in comments on Dutt's
Economic History of India:
When I read Mr. Dutt's Economic History of India, I wept; and as I think of it again
my heart sickens. It is machinery that has impoverished India. It is difficult to measure
the harm that Manchester has done to us. It is due to Manchester that Indian
handicraft has all but disappeared.. .Machinery has begun to desolate Europe.
Ruination is now knocking at the English gates. Machinery is the chief symbol of
modern civilization; it represents great sin.
46The Western path to modernity had dire moral implications for Gandhi. Nehru saw
India's future lying in industrialization, but Nehru's path to development did not follow
4 These technological imaginaries are " 'imagined forms of social life and of social order that center on the
development and fulfillment of innovative scientific and/or technological projects'... Sociotechnical
imaginaries are at once descriptive of attainable futures, and prescriptive of the futures that ought to be
attained" (Jasanoff et al, 2007). That is, they are comprised of both normative and positive elements.
44 Science and technology is open and amenable to multiple political positions, as stressed in Chapter Two.
45 Hind Swaraj, pp. 93-4, cited in Prakash (1999:216).
46 "This assumption that moral and material progress were crucially related permeated both imperialist and
nationalist thinking.. .One of Gandhi's stronger arguments was that, unlike other socio-economic systems,
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the teleological trajectory offered by modernization theories based on England's
industrial revolution with its brutal class warfare and exploitation. Nehru envisioned an
alternative path to industrial development rooted in India's own history and
manufacturing experience and organized under Fabian socialist principles of state-owned
heavy industry and crucially for this dissertation, close regulation of private domestic and
foreign capital participation.
Finally, one of the most powerful charges by scientific socialists was that contrary to
Gandhi's claims, his ideas were not in fact truly indigenous. This however was a
defensive tactic, as one of Gandhi's strongest claims had long been that socialist-
scientists positions were not in keeping with Indian tradition and were in fact Western,
which had powerful meaning given the broad anti-imperialist stance as a rejection of the
West. The latter was a powerful weapon against the 'modernizers', as Gandhi very
effectively "drew on old anxieties regarding cultural disruption or what constitute[s]
legitimate borrowings from the 'West' (Zachariah, 2005 165). Chapter Eight shows how
these anxieties persisted over time and would be exploited to great effect by the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which emerged as the Congress Party's main
political challenger in the 1990s.
This strategic use of historical anxieties to construct and contest cultural schemas was a
common discursive tactic. The scientific-socialist defense rested on the universal validity
of science, particularly when put to work towards material and intellectual progress. This
was directly aimed at countering Gandhian charges of an imbalanced focus on material
versus ethical and spiritual conceptions of progress in socialist-scientific thought. This
was coupled with an offensive against the 'backwardness' of the village and the inability
of cottage industries to move the nation forward: reliance on "the philosophy of the
the society he envisaged would not delink the moral and material aspects of human progress, and that the
moral would lead the material. His strongest opponents in the nationalist movement were equally
convinced of the interrelatedness of the two; but for them, most often, the material would have to lead the
way to the moral." This relationship between the moral and material should not be surprising, as it is worth
noting that modern economics is laced with normative imperative, as see in clearly with the role of
efficiency considerations in welfare economics. To summarize the causal relationships between moral and
material progress in the three competing systems of thought: Gandhian system: moral 4 material;
Nehruvian scientific socialism: material -4 moral; Imperial system moral and material co-evolve.
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spinning wheel and bullock cart" ignored the "techniques of modern civilization" which
was inexcusable "if India is to grow into a powerful world-entity like the USA, Soviet
Russia, and the countries of Western Europe.. .A nation, however great its moral and
spiritual qualities may be, can not hope to win battles with bows and arrows against tanks
and artillery. In this world of strife and competition, if a nation wants to survive, it must
develop the latest techniques of civilized existence". 47 Scientific socialists that European
civilization in fact borrowed from the East, so seeking Western science was simply a way
of restoring the order and "reclaiming the fruits of past achievements" (Zachariah,
2005:240). The colonial project and much of the resistance was about an attempt to
impose Western views on Indian society. Western science needed to be simultaneously
opposed and appropriated in order to launch a national industrialization project. This
strategic appropriation of history epitomizes the nationalist contradiction and the
complexity of cultural discourse.
V. The National Planning Committee
By 1937 the Indian National Congress was forming provincial governments with full
independence and state control appearing increasing inevitable. The Congress Working
Party Committee met in August and resolved to appoint a Committee of Experts to
address the issues of social development, reconstruction and planning and crucially, to
draw up an "all-India industrial plan". Subhas Chandra Bose was elected Congress
President and declared in his February 1938 presidential speech that the national
government would "adopt 'a comprehensive scheme for gradually socializing our entire
agricultural and industrial system in the sphere of both production and appropriation... on
the advice of a National Planning Commission' " (Chatterjee, 1993:200). Bose convened
an October meeting of Industry Ministers from the Congress' provincial governments,
which was followed by the announcement of a National Planning Committee with fifteen
members drawn from different areas of expertise. It included five scientists4 8 , four
47 Science and Culture Vol. 4, No 10.
48 The NPC scientist-members included: Meghnad Saha, A.K. Saha, Nazir Ahmed, V.S. Dubey and J.C.
Ghosh.
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leading merchant-industrialists4 9 , two economists5 0 and three nationalist politicians5'
including Jawaharlal Nehru.
Despite the ferocious criticism of Gandhi by the younger generation of modernizers,
Gandhian ideas remained resilient in the wider policy domain and much of the debates on
industrialization within the NPC continued to reflect the conflict and contestation
between the two groups. Leadership of the Committee would thus prove important in
deciding the policy direction of the NPC and by extension the soon-to-independent India.
The scientific-socialist Meghnad Saha was enamored by the close Soviet-style
relationship between scientist and politician and sought the ear of nationalist politicians
whom "he found frustratingly naive about industrialization" (Prakash, 1999:194). Saha
was worried that the Indian National Congress Working Committee's "support for a
mixed economy and cottage industry" meant that they had become "dangerously captive
to Gandhian ideas." This apparent support stemmed from the Congress' strategic rhetoric
of nationalist mobilization, but as Chatterjee (1993:201) argues, the Congress leadership
as well as wider Indian elites had long accepted the central role of industrialization for
modern development. However, the Congress party's political strategy of mass
movement against imperial rule necessitated the use of Gandhian ideas of "machinery,
commercialization, and centralized state power as the curses of modern civilization,
thrust upon the Indian people by European colonialism. It was industrialism itself,
Gandhi had argued, rather than the inability to industrialize that was the root cause of
Indian poverty." This had long been a staple of Congress mobilization. "But now that the
new nationalist state was ready to be conceptualized in concrete terms, this archaic
ideological baggage had to be jettisoned" (Ibid).
Saha's angst was relieved by finding "sympathetic ears" in Subhas Chandra Bose and
Jawaharlal Nehru (Prakash, 1999:194). Saha invited Bose to give a speech to the Indian
49 The merchant-industrialist members included: Purushottamdas Thakurdas (one of the main forces in the
formation of FICCI along with GD Birla), A.D. Shroff (banker and director of the Tata Group), Ambalal
Sarabhai (Ahmedabad-based, Gandhi supporter) and Walchand Hirachand (founder of India's first
shipping, aircraft and automobile production).
50 The economist members of the NPC included: K.T. Shah, Radhakamal Mukherjee and M. Visvesvaraya.
5 These included J.C. Kumarappa, Gandhi's economic interlocutor, the labor leader N.M. Joshi and
Jawaharlal Nehru.
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Science News Association in which the latter trumpeted the importance of large-scale
industrialization for India's future and crucially, confirmed that "what was needed was a
'far reaching co-operation between Science and Politics"' (Prakash, 1999:195).
We want, first and foremost, the aid of science in this task [of industrialization and
national reconstruction]... And national reconstruction will be possible only with the
aid of science and our scientists.. .Though I do not rule out cottage industries and
though I hold that every attempt should be made to preserve and also revive cottage
industries wherever possible, I maintain that economic planning for India should mean
planning largely for the industrialization of India. Industrialization, as you will all
agree, does not mean the promotion of industries or manufacturing umbrella-
handles and bell-metal plates, as Sir John Anderson would have us believe. I
gratefully recognize the fact that your magazine Science and Culture has helped to direct
intelligent thoughts in this country towards the problems of industrialization. The articles
published periodically on electric power supply, flood-control, river-physics, need of
establishing a National Research Council, etc., have been highly illuminating and
instructive. I would now like to make a few observations on the principles of national
planning: (1) Though from the industrial point of view the world is one unit, we should
nevertheless aim at national autonomy, especially in the field of our principal needs and
requirements. E E (2) We should adopt a policy aiming at the growth and development
of the mother industries, viz., power supply, metal production, machine and tools
manufacture, manufacture of essential chemicals, transport and communication of
essential chemicals, transport and communication industries, etc.s2
Bose later returned the favor by inviting Saha to attend a meeting of the National
Planning Committee, where Saha met Sir M. Visvesvaraya, who for twenty years had
championed the need for India to use science to develop agriculture and industry to
propel itself into the modern world, and believed that the state had a central role to play
through economic planning. Though Visvesaraya was clearly a good choice to lead the
Planning Committee Saha convinced Bose to choose a nationalist with political weight.
"Saha wrote to Nehru, asking him to head the planning committee instead. 'On behalf of
the Indian scientists, I would appeal to you to accept the chairmanship and guide the
deliberations of the committee"' (Zachariah, 2005:195).
This was a crucial moment in the emerging link between modernizing nationalist
politicians and scientific elites. "Nehru was an apt choice. He was not only the most
important nationalist leader after Gandhi, but also the most uncompromisingly modern of
all the Congress leaders. He needed no convincing of the central importance of
industrialization, science, and planning for the nation" (Prakash, 1999:195-6). Nehru's
52 Speech to the Indian Science News Association, 21 August 1938, Calcutta.
http://nextfuture.sriaurobindosociety.org.in/aprO 9/nfaprO9 insp%20thought.htm (Accessed April 9, 2012)
184
belief in the power of modem science was complete, as this excerpt from his address to
the Indian Science Congress makes clear:
... science is the spirit of the age and the dominating factor of the modern world.
Even more than the present, the future belongs to science and to those who make friends
with science and seek its help for the advancement of humanity.. .Though I have long
been a slave driven in the chariot of Indian politics, with little leisure for other thoughts,
my mind has often wandered to the days when as a student I haunted the laboratory of
that home of science, Cambridge. And though circumstances made me part company with
science, my thoughts turned to it with longing. In later days, through devious processes, I
arrived again at science, when I realized that science was not only a pleasant diversion
and abstraction, but was of the very texture of life, without which our modern world
would vanish away. Politics led me to economics and this led me inevitably to science
and the scientific approach to all our problems and to life itself. It was science alone that
could solve these problems of hunger and poverty, of insanitation and illiteracy, of
superstition and deadening custom and tradition, of vast resources running to waste, of a
rich country inhabited by starving people.
Nehru's speech highlights his "meaningful reappraisal of science as a nationalist." This
was a "Much more expansive view of science than its conception as theoretical
discoveries.. .Nehru's view projected science as a method that could be used to order
politics and economics as to understand nature" (Prakash, 1999:195-6). His
understanding epitomized the socio-technical imaginary fueling his system of thought.
The mandate prepared to guide subcommittee work similarly reflected the rise of
'rational' planning as the means through which the new Indian state would address its
development challenges:
Planning under a democratic system may be defined as the technical co-ordination by
disinterested experts of consumption, production, investment, trade, and income
distribution in accordance with social objectives set by bodies representative of the
nation. Such planning is not only to be considered from the point of view of economics
and the raising of the standard of living, but must include cultural and spiritual values
and the human side of life.54
The statement not only reflects the dominance of the socialist-scientific approach to
planning but the strategic blending of positive and normative elements that revealed the
complexities of the scientific socialist cultural schema. Nehru later wrote of his
experience on the NPC: "'We had avoided a theoretical approach, and as each particular
53 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, "The Indian Science Congress", Science and Culture, Vol. 3, No. 7, January
1938.
54 Cited in Prakash 1999:197-8; Zachariah, 2005:224.
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problem was viewed in its larger context, it led us inevitably in a particular direction. To
me the spirit of cooperation of the members of the Planning Committee was particularly
soothing and gratifying, for I found it a pleasant contrast to the squabbles and conflicts of
politics' " (Chatterjee, 1993:201).
The committee proceeded to push large-scale industrialization against Gandhian ideals of
cottage industry, and the resulting conflicts were clear in exchanges between Nehru and
J.C. Kumarappa, effectively the representative of Gandhian economics - if not the
Mahatma himself -- on the NPC. Kumarappa challenged the authority of the NPC to
engage in industrial planning, since as he claimed, the Congress' priority "was to restrict
and eliminate modern industrialism" (Chatterjee, 1993:201). Nehru countered by
asserting that most NPC members believed in the promotion of large-scale industry,
assuming it would not 'come into conflict with the cottage industries'. Nehru went on to
charge that "Now that the Congress is, to some extent, identifying itself with the State [as
opposed to against the colonial state as had been the nationalist position for the past
seventy years] it cannot ignore the question of establishing and encouraging large-scale
industries... [and] it is not only within the scope of the Committee to consider large-scale
industries, but it is incumbent upon it to consider them" (Ibid:202).
Gandhi himself was also unhappy with the work of the NPC, and wrote to Nehru
questioning whether the NPC was working within the mandate of Congress, telling Nehru
in no uncertain terms " 'It has appeared to me that much money and labour are being
wasted on an effort which will bring forth little or no fruit.' Nehru in turn did not conceal
his impatience with such 'visionary' and 'unscientific' talk and grounded his own
position quite firmly on the universal principles of historical progress that underpinned
the scientific socialist system of thought: 'We are trying to catch up, as far as we can,
with the Industrial Revolution that occurred long ago in Western countries"' (Ibid).
While the debate in the committee subsided, it persisted in the public domain where
much of the political contestation took place. Gandhi later revealed his dissatisfaction
with Kumarappa's challenge to the scientific socialists in the latter's article "Public Costs
of Centralized Production" published in the August 1941 edition of Gram Udyog Patrika,
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the monthly journal of the All-India Village Association that Gandhi founded in 1934
upon leaving the Congress. Gandhi's criticism of Kumarappa in a letter written on
August 12 1941 provides crucial insight to the strategic construction of nationalist
systems of thought, as well as the link they entailed between economics, technology and
nationalism:
'My Dear KU[marappa],
Your article on industrialization I consider weak. You have flogged a dead horse. What
we have to combat is the socialization of industrialism. They instance the Soviet exploits
in proof of their proposition. You have to show, if you can, by working out figures that
handicrafts are better than power driven machinery products. You have almost allowed
in the concluding paragraphs the validity of that claim.
Your's,
BAPU
VI. Conclusion
This chapter presented an analysis of the fractures that emerged in Indian economic
nationalism during the inter-war period. It showed that even with the massive disruptions
brought about by World War I and the collapse of the liberal economic regime
constructed by British hegemony during the Great Depression, the British continued to
dictate the terms of the Indian development debate with discursive rules that worked in
the favor of British economic actors and British firms in colonial India. In order to gain
legitimacy, protagonists' arguments had to be framed in the 'rational', 'scientific'
language of economics. Gandhi effectively constructed a utopic cultural category heavily
imbued with religiously inspired historical meaning. His valorization of 'traditional'
village life had deep resonance with the masses and the implications for industrialization
appealed to some colonial authorities' beliefs in India's natural inferiority, but left him
open to strong criticism from elite 'scientific-socialist' nationalists who saw 'modern'
technology and the solution to India's perceived backwardness.
* It is essential to point out that these were strategically constructed systems of economic thought. They
had to be coherent and rooted in legitimate terms, but nevertheless these were fabricated to serve specific
political purposes. Gandhi wanted to advance a system "of non-violent, non-exploitative, humanistic and
egalitarian economy opposed to Adam Smith's system of free economy, Karl Marx's system of violent
socialist economy and Keynes' (sic) system of regulated economy." Nehru similarly sought to construct a
system that incorporated the material and intellectual advantages of socialist planning without the
totalitarian repression of the Soviet state.
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Ultimately, the pinnacle of the debate was directly between Gandhi and Nehru. Despite
the differences in their nationalist perspectives, Gandhi and Nehru were united by their
critique of the West. Gandhi opposed the effect of Western science and technology, and
the labor saving machines it produced, on Indian society and economy. However, the
spectrum of their positions was more complex than simple dichotomies of modern-
antimodern, centralized state-decentralized community, or elite-subaltern might suggest.
On one hand it is reasonable to focus on the oft-posited gulf in conceptions of technology
and modernity in Nehruvian and Gandhian thought. However, as Prakash (1999:203)
argues, it is imperative to assess their differences within the broader ambit of anticolonial
nationalism, which provided the cultural context within which both leaders formulated
and advanced their ideas. Both Nehruvian and Gandhian critiques of Western modernity
were articulated in the historical context of anticolonial nationalism. This nationalism -
both Gandhian and Nehruvian versions - positioned itself in opposition to Western
modernity, though not to the idea of modernity itself. These actors had to construct a
uniquely 'Indian' modernity. This was an essential task for state building. "To be a nation
in the international system of states meant that the nationalists had to both constitute a
modern nation and claim that it was irreducibly Indian" (Prakash, 1999:225). This
highlights the crucial importance of culture and social meaning in the battle of ideas, a
dimension that is often downplayed or ignored in the literature on the role of ideas from
across different strands of the new institutionalisms (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993;
North, 2005; Hall, 1993; Blyth, 1997; Blyth, 2002; Beland and Cox, 2011; Dobbin,
1993).
Nevertheless there were strong points of difference. Nehru expressed contempt for the
idealized view of the village that Gandhi expressed to Nehru in a letter in 1945 when
India was on the verge of gaining Independence. Nehru thought that by this point Gandhi
may have outgrown the anti-industrialism of his 1909 publication Hind Swaraj, only to
find that in Gandhi's mind 'the old picture still remains intact' (Ghose, 370). Nehru's
reaction was strong. He wrote back to Gandhi 'A village is backward intellectually and
culturally and no progress can be made form such an environment.' He further told
Gandhi that found Hind Swaraj to be "completely unreal" even from when he first read it
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20 years earlier.56 The future lay in cities and industry was inevitable if poverty is to be
removed and progress achieved. Prakash (1999) suggests that ultimately victory in this
battle had less to do with political skill than with cultural and ideational resources, and
in this sense Gandhi was under-equipped, an outcome that was reflected in the firmly
scientific socialist direction that the Congress followed in the National Planning
Committee and upon independence.
Once again the cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy that Gandhi and Nehru's
systems of meaning and thought prescribed can be summarized as follows below.
Nehruvian and Gandhian Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy (-1930-1947)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Modem:
Nehru's view of village industry as 'backward' and Gandhi's view of village industry as supporting a
private Indian capital as exploitative. 'true' Indian modernity
Gandhi's view of 'the socialization of industrialism' Nehru's view of state-ownership and control of
and state-led industrialization as detrimental for heavy industry as developmental, following the
Indian development (moral and material). Soviet model.
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modem: potential 'technology providers'
Nehru and Gandhi shared concerns about foreign
capital as neo-imperial.
Thus far the dissertation has demonstrated the crucial link between economics,
technology and nationalism, and how these are laced with purpose and meaning by
strategic nationalist actors. The next chapter illustrates how these three elements became
mutually constitutive of state and capitalist preferences towards foreign capital and
industrialization as India attained independence and began pursuing import substituting
industrialization policies. It does so by analyzing the role of Indian capitalists in the
planning and policymaking process, and illustrates the value of this approach through
analysis of cross-national variation in meanings of development and modernity and the
56 Prakash (1999) notes that this response was a blow to Gandhi, given the closeness of their personal
relationship.
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implications for preferences towards foreign direct investment in India and Brazil. The
chapters to come show how these debates on the meaning of modernity continue to shape
preferences and influence contemporary policy debates on the appropriate role of foreign
investment in Indian development.
190
CHAPTER 6
The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment:
Constructing Economic Interests and Policy Preferences in Post-war India and
Brazil
"...the [Indian] business community is not prepared to go to the same lengths as its counterpart in Latin
American countries in attracting foreign investment. The average Indian business prefers foreign
investment which does not entail foreign overall control." -- Embassy cable from US Consular Officials to
the Secretary of State, 1958.
"...it is not possible for India, unfortunately, to offer the same facilities and concessions to foreign
investors as is done by some of the Latin American countries." -- R.D. Birla of the Birla business house
(India's largest business group) in conversation with US Consular Officials, 1958.
I. Introduction
This chapter of the dissertation explores the tension between rational-materialist and
cultural-constructivist theories of political economy by comparing the process of foreign
direct investment policy preference formation in India and Brazil. It identifies the sources
of the radically different preferences towards foreign direct investment indicated by the
two quotes above in the contrasting social experiences of Brazilian and Indian economic
and political actors. The chapter provides further empirical support for one of the main
arguments of the dissertation that economic actors' policy preferences cannot be deduced
from economic actor's socioeconomic structural position.' Preferences are shaped by
cognitive and cultural schemas, which are defined in the dissertation as rationalized
causal ideas imbued with historically salient social and political meaning. Economic
interests and policy preferences thus are not automatically given; they are formed through
historically embedded sociopolitical processes that shape the experiences, interpretive
frames and worldviews of economic and political actors.
1 Chapter Two argued that the conventional theoretical approach to determining policy preferences in
comparative and international political economy is to derive economic actors' policy preferences from their
structural position. These theories typically predict that domestic incumbent firms will resist liberal FDI
policies and oppose multinational entry, particularly in imperfectly competitive industries that generate
"supernormal" monopoly profits such as automobiles (cf. Tirole, 1988). The rationale lies with the
expected competitive advantage arising from MNCs' firm-specific resources and capabilities that threaten
to reduce the income and market share of their domestic competitors (Barney, 1991; Caves, 1996).
Deriving preferences over economic policy from actors' structural location is a key innovation of "open
economy politics" and is vigorously defended as the standard for comparative and international political
economy (Frieden & Martin, 2002; Lake, 2009).
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As this chapter will show, Indian and Brazilian business and government actors occupied
similar structural positions but had radically different preferences towards the entry of
multinational firms. This was so even when firms from both countries had similar
financial capacities and organizational capabilities and similar opportunities to enter new
sectors as well as to expand as suppliers to multinational firms. How can this variation be
explained?
The chapter places this question and the wider argument of the dissertation in cross-
national comparative perspective by examining post World War I industrial development
efforts in India and Brazil. By employing the method that George and Bennett (2005)
have referred to as "structured, focused comparison" it shows how, despite occupying
similar structural positions in the global political economy, having similar development
goals of transforming their countries from primary commodity producers into modem
industrial powers, and facing similar financial, technological and other material
constraints in promoting manufacturing industry, India and Brazil adopted different
approaches to regulating foreign capital. The institutions governing FDI were different
even as both countries adopted the same broad economic policy paradigm of import
substituting industrialization that prevailed across most of the post-war developing
world.2 Further, these differences were not limited to government policy; Indian and
Brazilian business actors had different interpretations of the role of FDI, which led them
to pursue different strategies in engaging with foreign firms. This variation in firm
strategy emerged despite their similar size, organizational capabilities, industrial and
sectoral location, and the fact that they faced the same global economic environment
characterized by the aggressive post-war expansion of US multinational firms. These
contrasting business and government preferences cannot be explained by conventional
rational-material approaches that assume that economic interests and policy preferences
are structurally given.
2 The definition of institutions moves beyond formal 'rules of the game' (North, 1991) to include informal
norms and "sets of regularized practices with a rule-like quality, [that] structure the behavior of political
and economic actors" (Hall, 2010:1). The formal and informal dimensions of institutions are increasingly
becoming the focus of much work in institutional theorists across economics, political science and
sociology (cf. North and Denzau, 1994; North, 2005; Greif, 2006).
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The chapter describes how these differences emerged from historically rooted variation in
beliefs about the role of foreign versus domestic firms in the industrial development and
wider modernization project. These beliefs informed the development of distinct
cognitive and cultural schemas that imbued causal ideas linking FDI with industrial
development outcomes that were shared by Indian and Brazilian actors and indeed,
prevailed in the post-war period, with contrasting socio-cultural meanings. These
rationalized causal ideas were underpinned by historical experiences that ascribed
different social meanings to the role of foreign capital in the pursuit of industrial
modernity. Brazilian business and government actors generally welcomed multinational
corporations as collaborative partners who could play a central role in capital
accumulation and industrialization. Their Indian counterparts also recognized and
accepted the rationale of foreign firms as crucial sources of technology but viewed them
as neo-imperial instruments, and hence were much more wary of engaging with
multinationals (Evans, 1979; Sikkink, 1991; Shapiro, 1994; Kidron; 1965; Adler, 1987;
Encarnation, 1989).
The chapter draws on material from US and Indian government and business archives to
reveal variation in the content and salience of nationalist narratives, and in the social
meanings that key actors ascribe to the causal ideas that prescribe developmental roles to
FDI. 4 Together these constitute the elements of preference formation that were
elaborated in Chapter Two of the dissertation. This chapter shows how they shaped
Indian and Brazilian business and government actors' conceptions of their national
industrialization projects and their preferences towards foreign investment. The
implications of this variation are reflected in contrasting FDI policies and ensuing
patterns of ownership and control in the automobile industries that were heavily
3 Consistent with the argument in other parts of this dissertation, particularly Chapter Five on debates
around the meaning of 'development' and 'modernity' in India, there were important fractures in these
otherwise dominant cultural schemas that shaped Brazilian and Indian actors preferences for foreign
investment. These fractures and the political contestation that they generated will be further elaborated as
this research is developed beyond the dissertation.
4 Much of the archival material used in this chapter draws on the US State Department materials from the
National Archives (Record Group 59) in College Park, MD. It primarily consists of cables, letters and other
forms of correspondence sent back and forth between the US Embassies and Consulates in India and Brazil
and the State Department in Washington DC.
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promoted in both countries as part of the foundation of post-war industrialization. This
pattern of variation did not just shape the way these industries emerged, it had crucial
long-run effects on market share between foreign and domestic firms across the
manufacturing sector in both countries. For example, the Indian automobile and
pharmaceutical industries emerged from the post-war period largely controlled by
domestic private capital while multinational firms dominated in Brazil, a pattern that has
largely persisted through the more recent period of economic liberalization and
globalization. The chapter thus builds on the arguments made in the previous chapters on
the social, political and historical origins of FDI policy preferences and demonstrates the
role of these preferences and the business politics they generate in shaping policy and
market outcomes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II addresses case selection and
methodology by identifying the structural similarities between India and Brazil that
underpin the puzzle of their contrasting foreign investment preferences. Section III
elaborates Indian business and government preferences towards foreign firms, building
on the historical analysis that has been conducted in the previous chapters of this
dissertation. Section IV then describes early industrialization in Brazil, identifying the
historical sources of Brazilian economic actors' relatively congenial views towards
foreign investment. Section V turns to the automobile case by showing how Indian and
Brazilian policy preferences manifested in the development of the crucial automobile
sector. Section VI provides a summary of the argument and introduces the forthcoming
discussion on the period of economic liberalization in Chapters 7 and 8.
II: Structural Similarities, Socio-Historical Differences:
India and Brazil Compared
India and Brazil serve as excellent comparative cases to challenge ahistorical structural-
deductive approaches to identifying the sources of FDI policy preferences. First, both
countries entered the post-war period intent on pursuing policies that departed from the
liberal free trade consensus of the pre-Depression era. Both economies had been oriented
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around primary commodity exports throughout the nineteenth century - cotton, jute and
tea in India, and coffee, sugar and rubber in Brazil - and both countries were embedded
in mercantilist trade relationships dominated by British merchant firms. Thus India and
Brazil occupied similar structural locations in the global economy in the period leading
up to the Second World War and the beginning of their post war industrialization drive.
This had implications for both domestic business and government actors in each country.
This chapter recognizes these groups as having distinct incentives and structural positions
by separately identifying the sources of business and government preferences amongst
each set of actors in each country.5
Second, both India and Brazil found themselves in similar macroeconomic positions at
the end of the Second World War as they struggled with fiscal constraints arising from
weak balance of payments positions. Policymakers in both countries viewed these
challenges through similar rationalized interpretive frames supplied by the economic
theories that blamed these macroeconomic imbalances on excessive reliance on imports
of manufactured consumer and capital goods, which they both attributed to their
underdeveloped industrial sectors. Thus the solution in both countries was boosting
domestic manufacturing efforts in industries where production output would substitute
for imported goods so as to reduce hard currency outflows. 6 This position was consistent
with the model of import substituting industrialization (ISI) that was spreading across the
developing world in the 1940s and 1950s. However, while this diffusion of ISI ideas may
seem to fit the 'world society' model (Meyer et al, 1997), as the previous chapters have
argued these ideas were interpreted, strategically reformulated and deployed in different
ways based on local socio-political and historical contexts. This is aptly demonstrated in
this chapter through the different ways in which FDI was regulated in India and Brazil
within an otherwise similar ISI policy paradigm.
5 At the same time the analysis throughout the dissertation recognizes that these preferences are shaped
through a variety of modes of interaction between business and state actors, such that processes through
which the preferences of each group are not independent. It further recognizes that there may be crucial
variation within each group, such as Brazilian domestic capital, as well as across groups.
6 Attempts to simultaneously increase foreign exchange inflows by exports entered the policy discourse
later as the ISI model was initially fairly silent on the export issue. This is the subject of much of the
voluminous literature comparing Latin American ISI with East Asian ELI (export-led industrialization).
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The dynamics through which these macroeconomic weaknesses arose were also similar.
By 1945 both countries had accumulated large war-related foreign exchange surpluses,
only to see their current account balances turn quickly and dangerously negative shortly
thereafter. Brazil accumulated US$600m of reserves through raw material export
receipts, import controls and shortages during the Second World War, which allowed the
government to adopt an open import regime. Brazilian consumers responded accordingly,
with motor vehicles and auto parts leading an explosion of import demand. However, by
the end of 1947 foreign exchange reserves accumulated during the war were exhausted,
creating fiscal imbalances as import demand exceeded foreign currency availability.
Crucially, balance of payments concerns arose not just from booming imports, but from
the fact that Brazil's trade surpluses and reserves were held in European currencies that
were not readily convertible in the aftermath of the war and the destruction of the major
European economies. Scarce US dollars were needed for most imports (Shapiro,
1994:30). This made a deep impression on Brazilian policymakers who interpreted this
dependency as an outcome of Brazil's political weakness and marginal position in the
hierarchy of nations and dependence on global powers. An overvalued cruzeiro
exacerbated the hard currency shortage and led to licensing and hard currency rationing
that favored capital goods and discriminated against 'non-essential' consumer durables
such as automobiles.7
India similarly emerged from the Second World War with strong current account
surpluses. Sterling balances held by the Reserve Bank peaked at 17.3 million rupees in
April 1946, and India held 1.7 billion pounds of Great Britain's external liabilities, more
than 50% of the UK's total foreign obligations. However, the British refused to honor
their fiscal obligations to India, thus negating a balance sheet with a strong surplus and
placing the country in a tight fiscal position right at the cusp of achieving independence.
As in Brazil, this highlighted India's weak geopolitical status and dependence on global
powers.
7 There was high consumer demand for automobiles, but auto imports placed a taxing toll on reserve
position. This underpinned part of the rationale for the focus on developing an automobile industry by
Brazilian policymakers.
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The compromised macroeconomic positions of India and Brazil had important
implications for the regulation of foreign capital as contemporary economic theories
provided compelling causal ideas promoting FDI as a means to simultaneously achieve
the goals of macroeconomic stability and industrial development. These theories
suggested that foreign firms could bring in desperately needed hard currency to set up
enterprises that produced manufactured goods for the domestic market thus
simultaneously reducing internal demand for hard currency imports. This of course was
the central rationale of import substituting industrialization as promoted by economists
such as Raul Prebisch at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA). However, addressing macroeconomic challenges and the desire to industrialize
through foreign capital had crucial implications for the ownership and control of industry,
which would lie at the center of contrasting preferences in India and Brazil.
Third, both countries faced similar challenges in dealing with the technological and
organizational capabilities and market dominance of multinational companies (MNCs) as
they attempted to establish and promote domestic industry in the inter-war period. Like
other countries in the new post-war 'periphery', India and Brazil sought to rapidly
industrialize at the precise historical moment when the phenomenon of foreign direct
investment in manufacturing industry took off (cf. Wilkins, 1970; 1974; 2009). This
period was characterized by aggressive outward expansion of MNCs, which in the wake
of the Second World War and the destruction of European and Japanese industry, was led
by American firms. The US government actively encouraged private American firms to
invest overseas and used its growing post-war status as global hegemon to pressure
foreign countries to create investment regulations that were amenable to US multinational
expansion.8 These government policies and firm strategies were further facilitated by the
rise of the liberal Bretton Woods international financial institutions. The IMF and World
Bank became major sources of development finance in the post-war period, and their loan
8 There is a clear parallel with British enforcement of free trade and open investment regimes during its
period of hegemony in the nineteenth century. This was a period when British capital dominated in both
India and Brazil began to wane around 1914.
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conditionalities typically demanded open investment environments. 9 As a result, US
private investment rose dramatically from $11.8 billion in 1950 to $29.7 billion in 1959.
As will be seen below, Latin American countries were especially receptive to US MNCs,
and US private investment in the region rose accordingly from $4.6 billion to $9 billion
during this period (Sikkink, 1991:46).
Historicizing Variation in Economic Nationalism in India and Brazil
Finally, nationalism played an important role in shaping FDI policy preferences in both
countries.10 However, to assert that India was less receptive to foreign capital because it
may have been more 'nationalistic' than Brazil would oversimplify the concept of
nationalism and ignore the way that nationalism developed and the role it played in both
countries and render the concept analytically unhelpful. In fact, in this respect using
Brazil as the comparator for India constitutes a 'crucial case' (George and Bennett, 2005)
given that during this period Brazil was considered to epitomize economic 'nationalistic'
post-war economic policies, especially relative to many of its Latin American peers. The
argument advanced in this dissertation is that nationalism cannot be considered as a uni-
dimensional variable or monolithic analytic category; analysts must consider variation in
the way nationalism itself is socially constructed. As argued in Chapter Three, economic
nationalism is "the attempt to link the idea of a nation to specific [economic] goals"
(Abdelal, 2001:1). Nationalism is a "proposal of the content of national identity" that
reflects society's collective interpretations of the meaning of the nation, the path it should
follow and the policies that societal actors believe will achieve the socio-economic goals
that define the national project (Ibid). Thus the rationalized and socially meaningful
causal mean-ends relationships between policies and outcomes that constitute actors'
9 While IMF and World Bank conditionalities were not as stringent nor strictly enforced in the post-war era
(1945-77) as in the post oil crisis period as the Washington Consensus began to take hold (1977 onwards),
the Bank and Fund still tended to push for open market policies. This is evidenced by India's 1966 World
Bank program (cf. Chaudry et al, 2004; Mukherji, 2012).
'0 The discussion thus far has focused on the similar structural and material conditions and constraints that
Brazilian and Indian actors faced in the early post-war period, albeit with an initial discussion of the causal
ideas that shaped these actors interpretations of the challenges they faced. This section on economic
nationalist addresses cross-national differences in the social meaning of foreign investment. It argues that
while the causal ideas and structural-material constraints were similar; the social meanings with which they
are imbued were different.
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preferences are deeply embedded in Brazilian and Indian nationalist cognitive and
cultural schemas. It is variation in the socio-historical evolution of these schemas that
shaped differences Indian and Brazilian actors' preferences for foreign investment. The
importance of these historical paths is lost in analyses that rely on conceptions of
nationalism as a binary variable where magnitude, i.e. 'more' or 'less' nationalism, rather
than content of nationalism is seen as determining regulatory and market outcomes.
Instead, this analysis will consider variation in social meanings though historical
narratives and cultural symbols.
The chapter reveals major differences in the content of the distinct nationalist cognitive
and cultural schemas - anti-imperialist Nehruvian 'scientific socialism' and
desenvolvimentismo or 'developmentalism' -- that became dominant in India and Brazil
in the post-war period." These schemas explain why economic actors in these countries
displayed such contrasting stances towards FDI in the immediate post-war period. The
preferences of both policymakers as well as industrialists in both India and Brazil were
shaped by 'nationalism,' but 'nationalism' manifested in different ways due to variation
in the social, political and historical experiences of actors in each country. 12
Colonial experience played a major role. As Chapters Three and Five of the dissertation
showed, Indian nationalism was strongly anti-imperial, having emerged as a counterpoint
to colonial rule in the mid to late nineteenth century after the British Crown took direct
control of the colony from the East India Company in 1857. The British 'Raj' functioned
by superimposing colonial authority on pre-existing structures of economic trade and
" Brazilian Desenvolvimentismo referred to state-led industrialization to promote economic development
and raise the national standard of living. It was associated both with the military and the Vargas and
Kubitschek regimes in the pre-and immediate post-war periods. These are discussed further later in the
chapter. The Nehruvian scientific socialist cultural schema rose to dominance through contestation with
Gandhianism as well as the colonial orthodoxy in the 1930s and shaped the thinking of Indian nationalists
as the country became independent in 1947. This is detailed in Chapter Five of the dissertation.
1 The identification of these distinctions between India and Brazil is not to imply that there were no
conflicts within each country between pro- and anti-FDI forces. In fact, the wider dissertation argues that it
is precisely through these conflicts that cultural schemas are developed and preferences are shaped.
Preference formation is thus a heavily contested social and political process. These conflicts are not
detailed in this chapter in the interest of space, but suffice to say that the reason pro-FDI preferences 'won'
in Brazil and anti-FDI preferences 'won' in India lies in the extent to which competing groups were able to
articulate pro- or anti-FDI positions that generated greater salience in each country. This is articulated at
greater length elsewhere in the dissertation.
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political governance that had existed for centuries under pre-European empires. Chapter
Three showed how strategic actors including Dadabhai Naoroji, M.G. Ranade and R.C.
Dutt developed and deployed nationalist cognitive and cultural schemas built on the
novel causal ideas of economic 'drain' theory in the late nineteenth century. Drain theory
identified the mechanisms through which the British extracted vast economic resources
from India and quantified both the abstract financial losses to the country as well as the
real squalor, poverty and famines that the Indian people suffered. The causal ideas that
comprised drain theory were explicitly oriented around promoting industrial
development, which these actors believed was the key to modernity. These rationalized
causal ideas were underpinned by salient and socially meaningful historical narratives of
India's glorious artisanal manufacturing tradition that pre-dated the British but was being
destroyed by the laissez-faire economic policies that were enforced under colonial rule
for the benefit of Lancashire producers. As such, advancing the interests of the Indian
nation was seen in terms of revitalizing Indian manufacturing through the powerful
cultural symbol of Swadeshi self-reliance and delinking from the imperial West, both the
old colonizer in London and rising neo-imperial hegemons such as Germany, Japan and
the United States. This view was strengthened by the negative experiences that Indian
business actors had with British managing agencies, which sought to exclude emerging
Indian capitalists from lucrative sectors of the economy, as described in Chapter Four.
Brazil, by contrast, had an entirely different colonial experience. Brazil was a slave-based
agricultural commodity producing settler colony with a vast interior that was weakly
governed by a colonial central government comprised of local elites. Crucially, these
elites did not view the Portuguese state as an alien imperial power; in fact, when the
Prince Regent Joao was forced to flee Portugal under British protection after Napoleon's
invasion in 1807, local landed and merchant elites welcomed his court and Brazil
eventually declared itself an independent monarchy in 1822 under Joao's heir Emperor
Dom Pedro I. Kohli (2004:133) suggests that the "swift" and "painless" manner in which
sovereignty was achieved left both nationalist sentiments and political organizations
fragmented and with a 'weak sense of national purpose'. However, independence did not
automatically lead to a strong centralized state and clear national identity. The emperor's
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administration in Rio de Janiero, which was very European and elite, was unable to
establish a cohesive national polity -- including control over local bosses in Brazil's outer
regions -- and eventually clashed with a growing military that had closer social
connections within the wider Brazilian society.
As in India, industrialization and the pursuit of modernity became the center of social and
political contestation. The emperor's reign coincided with an emerging conflict between
the old slave-based sugar and rubber economy in the North-East that the monarch
supported with mercantilist policies throughout the nineteenth century and the growing
coffee and gold based economy further south in Sao Paulo that was clamoring for free
trade to take advantage of Brazil's increasingly dominant position in global coffee
production. The Brazilian military, which had been formed to resolve various border
disputes with Brazil's neighbors, was instrumental in resolving this conflict, thus
beginning what would become a continuous role in politics over the course of the next
century. Brazilian military officers were inculcated with Comte's positivist ideas of
science and technology as the basis of progress and saw the new coffee industry and the
nascent manufacturing activities that were emerging along with it as more 'modem' than
the old planter elite associated with Brazil's North-east sugar-slave-rubber complex that
had been the mainstay of the economy since the sixteenth century (Kohli, 2004). The
military eventually shifted its allegiance and the monarch was ousted in a coup on
November 15, 1889 and forced to return to Portugal as Brazil declared itself a Republic.
The relative timing of these political developments in India and Brazil is worth briefly
noting, as just four years after the nascent nationalist movement in India had coalesced
with the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 Brazil had already achieved
independence and Republican status with little struggle against its former colonial rulers.
Brazil's transition from monarchy to republic began what would become a longstanding
and increasingly institutionalized relationship between the military and economic elites
that would shape the type of economic nationalism that would emerge, but as Kohli
(2004) argues, the absence of a significant conflict in the attainment of independence did
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little to cement a cohesive Brazilian national identity as a counterpoint to European
imperialism relative to India's long independence struggle against the British.
Contrasting Emerging Attitudes towards Foreign Capital in the 'Old' Brazilian
Republic with Late Colonial India (-1870-1914)
The launching of what would become known as the 'old' Republic led to a number of
immediate institutional developments that significantly boosted business and nascent
industry and had further implications for the type of nationalism that ultimately
emerged. Labor migration was particularly important for understanding the historical
roots of Brazilian industrial development and FDI preferences as it led to the influx of a
new labor and entrepreneurial class. The demand for labor led coffee growers to push for
new European immigration, which was strongly supported by the leaders of the new
Republic. This pro-immigration policy led to a boom in the population of the Sao Paulo
region as the population tripled to two million between 1870 and 1900, with a further
700,000 migrants arriving between 1900 and 1915 (Hanley, 2005:101). These migrants
were primarily drawn from Southern Europe, particularly Italy, and were essential drivers
of the late nineteenth century coffee boom. In addition to providing low cost labor to the
rapidly expanding coffee industry they also became the urban proletariat and consumer
class, and formed a significant proportion of the emerging entrepreneurial class.
The entry of these migrants to the Sao Paulo region in the late nineteenth century
facilitated the development of the coffee complex that economic historians identify as
lying at the heart of the Brazilian industrial development process.' 5 Immigrants brought
technical skills and new knowledge of industrial machine works and applied it to the
growing needs of coffee cultivation, including machinery and metalworking to produce
13 Radically new commercial legislation was passed by January 1890 leading to an explosion in the
formation of joint stock companies, especially in Sao Paulo. More joint stock firms were created in the first
few months of the year that had been launched since the introduction of the joint stock corporate from in
1849. This also led to the rise of the Sao Paulo stock and bond exchange known as the Bolsa (Hanley,
2005:84).
14 This preference for European labor persisted despite the existence of a labor surplus in the ex-slave sugar
and rubber region of the Brazilian Northeast.
15 Many Brazilian economic historians such as Lewis (1999) and Hanley (2005) identify the classic work as
Warren Dean's (1969) The Industrialization of Sao Paulo, 1880-1945.
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agricultural implements, chemical firms for synthetic insecticides, plants that roasted the
coffee for market and textile that wove rough sacks for coffee bean shipment (Hanley,
2005:4). This economic alliance was strengthened as entrepreneurial immigrants
(overwhelmingly men) married into planter families, further facilitating the investment of
proceeds from booming coffee boom into new areas of economic activity and cementing
the patter of co-evolution of agriculture and industry (Ibid). Further, many of these
migrants were embedded in business networks in Europe and thus their entrepreneurial
activities facilitated relationships between emerging business in Brazil and established
commercial and financial networks in Europe. Thus at the turn of the century the
Brazilian political economy - at least in dynamic industrializing Sao Paolo -- was
characterized by a nexus between established coffee planters, migrant manufacturing
sector entrepreneurs and European commercial firms and financiers. This was a feature of
settler colonial capitalism, as distinct from the form of colonialism where a foreign
authority conquers and rules over indigenous 'natives' as prevailed in India, that shaped
the social meaning of foreign capital and blurred the distinction between foreign and
domestic firms in Brazil.
The social background of early Brazilian industrialists also had important implications
for their preferences towards foreign capital relative to their Indian counterparts. While
Indian business elites understood themselves in the context of long standing 'indigenous'
identities, given that they emerged from centuries old ethno-linguistic merchant-trading
communities, many Brazilian business elites were either migrants or the children of
migrants and identified much more with their counterparts in Europe than the indigenous
and slave populations that they found upon arrival in Brazil. Rather than seeing Europe
and the US as the home of foreign imposters, they conceptualized these places as either
their native homes or "their recreational and cultural areas" (Kohli 2004:140). The latter
point was important for state as well as business elites. That is, Brazilian political elites
understood themselves as descendants of migrants with real or imagined links with
Europe while, as Chapter Five argued, Indian political elites such as Jawaharlal Nehru
emerged from families that were either local caste or community leaders or had been
engaged in politics in the courts of the Mughal Empire that pre-dated the British in India.
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Even Mohandas Gandhi came from a traditional Gujarati bania merchant community that
had been engaged in overseas trade in the Arab peninsula for centuries. These differences
in historical background and identity shaped the construction of radically different
nationalist cultural schemas and preferences for foreign investment amongst business
actors, as illustrated in Section IV.
These emerging preferences towards foreign investment had important effects on the type
of trade and industrial policies that the new Brazilian Republic sought to pursue. Topik
(1987) suggests that "Rather than viewing foreigners as threats to national
sovereignty... Brazil's dominant class and state administration....wanted to Europeanize
Brazil and believed reliance on world markets was the best way to achieve that."16 As
discussed above, the Brazilian Republic was formed through a close alliance with coffee
interests and in addition to supporting new business development around the coffee
industry, was also committed to the laissez-faire approach that coffee producers and
merchants favored. This led the new state to expand coffee production by opening new
lands, attracting European labor and building railroads to provide expand production and
trade deeper into the rich and fertile Sao Paulo hinterland.
Railroad expansion was especially crucial during this period, and the Brazilian state
looked abroad for capital and technology and guaranteed profits to foreign investors
prompting strong inflows of British as well as American capital and rapid growth of the
railroad network. The opening of the Santos-Jundai line in 1867 connected the western
hinterland of Sao Paulo to the sea provided a massive boost to agricultural production in
the vast and fertile interior (Hanley, 2005:3). Coffee production grew rapidly with the
number of coffee trees quintupling between 1880 and 1900, making Brazil the largest
producer of coffee in the world, accounting for more than 50% of global supply (Hanley,
2005:3). British capital was thus viewed favorably as facilitating development and trade
in the Sao Paulo region that would become the industrial center of twentieth century
Brazil. By contrast, private British capital also built the railroads in India beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century under the aegis of colonialism, but early Indian nationalists
16 Steven Topik (1987) Political Economy of the Brazilian State, p130, cited in Kohli (2004:144).
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viewed British colonial guarantee of profits as a major source of the national drain.17 The
railroads were seen as the instrument that facilitated colonial extraction by extending the
reach of British merchant trade deeper into the Indian heartland rather than facilitating
development by opening virgin hinterlands for production and trade as in Brazil. The
British financed railroads were thus a source of major nationalist agitation and resentment
in India, not as a harbinger of development and modernity as in Brazil.
Further, many economic historians of Brazil have pointed to the important role of foreign
capital in the old Republic 8 and just as in India private British capital was dominant.19
However, unlike India where British firms dominated jute, tea and sugar processing as
well as most engineering industries, often to the exclusion of indigenous economic actors
(as Chapters Three and Four showed), British capital in Brazil showed little inclination to
expand their dominance of railroads, shipping and merchant trade to enter agricultural
20processing or manufacturing industry. In fact, manufacturing accounted for just 2% of
total British investment in the wider Latin America region (Evans, 1979:60; Hanley,
2005; see table below). Emerging Brazilian firms thus didn't share Indian firms' negative
historical experience of competition with foreign companies in a discriminatory policy
environment controlled by an external imperial power, and so did not perceive foreign
firms as impediments to their growth in the same way as their Indian counterparts.
Foreign firms held an entirely different social meaning for capitalists in Brazil. This
17 Further, by the turn of the century the Brazilian state began to find the burden of guaranteeing a
minimum rate of return to foreign-owned railroads increasingly onerous and moved to nationalize the
railroad, but opted to do so by contracting large overseas loans to purchase the railroads outright from their
foreign owners rather than arbitrarily confiscating private property (Baer, 2001). The British colonial
government also took over the railways in the first few years of the twentieth century and they were fully
nationalized by the independent Indian state in 1951.
18 Dean (1969) and Topik (1987) are important proponents of this view. See Hanley (2005:109) for a partial
critique that distinguishes foreign debt financing from equity financing in the turn-of-the-century Sao Paolo
industrial sector, particularly those firms financed by the Bolsa (the nascent Brazilian stock market). There
is a long standing debate in Brazilian historiography around this area that future versions of this paper will
explore more deeply.
19 American and other foreign capital became increasingly important in the first few decades of the 20th
century, first in utilities then increasingly in areas like chemicals.
20 British ownership of the railroads and shipping firms did facilitate control of merchant trade and
Brazilian commodity exports were used to purchase manufactures from the UK.
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historical difference persisted even when Brazilian firms found themselves in the same
industry as multinationals during the post-World War II industrialization boom.21
Distribution of British Investment in Brazil, 1875-1913 (% by sector)
1875 1895 1905 191
Government Loans 66 56 68 4
Railways 21 36 20 2
Public Utilities 9 4 5 2
Financial -- -- 1 Z
Raw Materials 1 1 3 j
Industrial and Miscellaneous 3 3 3
Total (pounds-sterling) 30,928,000 92,988,000 122,903,000 254,812,00(
Source: Hanley, 2005 Table 4.9
In addition to the different social and cultural meanings ascribed to foreign firms, there
were fundamental differences in the collective understanding of the historical roles of
manufacturing industry in India and Brazil. In stark contrast to India, a prevailing belief
throughout the 1 9 th century was that "industry was 'entirely artificial in Brazil, surviving
only at the expense of excessive monetary devaluation and tariff protection"' (Evans,
1979:64). Much of the Brazilian political elite agreed with both Portuguese mercantilists
and British free trade advocates that "industry on the periphery is unnatural" (Ibid). This
was precisely the opposite view in India, despite the fact that both countries were perfect
examples of 'classic dependence' given their structural position in the mid-late nineteenth
century global political economy as subordinate trade partners exchanging primary
commodities for British manufactured goods.
The previous chapters have described in detail how India nationalist actors also faced
identical assertions by the British that industry in the colony was 'unnatural' as India, or
more precisely Indians, were unsuited for technology and skill intensive manufacturing
activities due to their 'inherent characteristics'. As Chapters Three and Four showed, race
21 By contrast, Chapters Three, Four and Five detailed how the Indian nationalist movement was galvanized
by opposition to British merchant trade. For example, the swadeshi (self-reliance) movement constituted
the first mass movement against colonialism organized by the elite Indian National Congress, and was
organized around supporting indigenous Indian textile products and shops against the imported textiles
from Lancashire. These views similarly resonated in the post-war period when India business and
government actors began to negotiation with multinational firms.
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based cultural tropes were deployed against Indians writ large. However, nationalists
along with many emerging capitalists shared deeply embedded nationalist cultural
schemas based in the tenets of drain theory and assertions of the pre-colonial superiority
of Indian manufacturing skill. They believed that any observed weaknesses in Indian
industry during the period of British colonialism was due to the destruction of traditional
Indian industry and the deindustrialization and impoverishment of India through imperial
policies of free trade, not innate differences in Indian capacity for industry. In fact, they
argued that Indian science was superior to Europe in the pre-industrial revolution era
(Prakash, 1999).2 In fact, Indian nationalist systems of thought were explicitly devised
by nationalist actors to challenge colonial cultural schemas built on the lessons of
classical political economy that naturalized European industrial and technological
superiority, by citing India's rich manufacturing history as proof of its capacity to pursue
industrial development.2 3 Thus while the view of Brazilian owned industry as naturally
weak would later shape industrial policy against private Brazilian capital from the 1930s
onwards, the rationale of Indian industrial policy was to support the growth and
24development of Indian private firms. The historical memories and cultural tropes were
thus radically different, and these would play an important role in shaping preferences
towards foreign investment as well as competitive market outcomes.
Finally, the Brazilian military was a crucial source of emerging Brazilian economic
nationalism as well as the cultural schema of developmentalism that would become
dominant from the 1930s onwards. The military's concerns at this time lay with
protecting Brazil's vast borders from its neighbors and developing industry that would
22 Prafulla Chandra Ray's 1903 work A History of Hindu Chemistry from the Earliest Times to the Middle
of the Sixteenth Century is the classic nationalist text in this vein. Chandra Ray's work on indigenous
Indian scientific achievements along with Romesh Chandra Dutt's two volume An Economic History of
India published in 1901 and 1903 which provided a rich elaboration of drain theory and offered a strong
empirical challenge to the classical political economy arguments about Indian backwardness are discussed
in greater length in Chapter Three of the dissertation.
23 In this respect, the origins of the capitalist classes in both countries may play an important role in the
different cultural schemas that emerged to shape industrial development in the 2 0 th century. Like India,
local Brazilian capital was dominated by large diversified business groups; but unlike Indian groups, no
distinction was made between the 40% of the largest 'Brazilian' groups were founded by recent European
migrants. In India, such groups would be dominated by British capital and be considered 'foreign', even if
they had been present in India for 100 years. That is, nationality itself is constructed.
24 Any weaknesses in Indian business actors were generally perceived as being due to (1) imperial
opposition and (2) intra-Indian capital variation by caste-based community.
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allow Brazil to become a major power than with political, economic or military threats
from Europe. As such, economic nationalism in Brazil became largely oriented around
national security concerns in resource extraction and the development of basic industries
while Indian economic nationalism was motivated by collective understandings of India's
past industrial prowess and artisanal manufacturing skills that had been destroyed by the
25imposition of free trade policies by the British. India emerged from colonialism filled
with resentment about the deindustrializing effects of extractive imperial free trade on
traditional Indian industry while their Brazilian counterparts saw foreign private capital -
as well as the role of foreign powers such as the British in facilitating a free trade regime
- as largely benefitting Brazil, especially relative to the oppression of Portuguese
mercantilism.26 Foreign capital facilitated the development of commodity trade, shipping
infrastructure and utilities that supported the beginning of manufacturing industry in
Brazil, while similar investments in India was seen by Indian nationalists as colonial-led
extraction of natural resources that promoted the deindustrialization of India.
These contrasting beliefs became further embedded in the Brazilian and Indian national
27psyches over the first few decades of the twentieth century." By the end of World War II
Brazil's colonial relationship with Portugal was a fading memory while India had just
prevailed after decades of intense contestation with Great Britain that was explicitly
nationalist and highly organized under the cohesive banner of the Congress Party.
Independence in 1947 provided Indian economic and political actors with the long-
awaited opportunity to return India to its rightful historical position as an industrial nation
and achieve swadeshi (self-reliance), while Brazilians had no such nationalist memory of
past national glories.28
25 Note however that Nehruvian scientific socialism placed the state at the 'commanding heights' of the
economy with Indian private firms largely relegated to manufactured consumer goods. While this paper
focuses primarily on private domestic and foreign capital, the role of the state as a player in the economy
deserves further analysis.
26 As indicated earlier, there is a debate in Brazilian historiography about the role of foreign capital and
indeed, one can also add the precise meaning of 'foreign' in the social context of 6migrd post-colonial
Brazil, that will be explored in subsequent iterations of this research. In India, by contrast, the social
meaning of 'Indian' and 'foreign' is much more clearly and unambiguously delineated during this period.
27 These were embedded in inter-subjectively-held meanings, symbols, narratives and representations.
28 The industrialization plans central to Vargas' Estado Novo had to overcome powerful vested interests
(with the support of the military) that were content to continue with resource extraction while Indian
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Thus different social meanings were ascribed to nationalism and industrial development
in India and Brazil, with divergent industrial policy discourses, regulatory outcomes and
firm-level strategies. The case selection allows for deeper consideration of the concept of
nationalism itself, and how its form and meaning can vary across countries depending on
unique social, political and historical factors. 29 These are examined in the context of the
development and promotion of each country's nascent automobile industry in the post-
World War II period.
III. Indian Business and Government Preferences
Toward Foreign Direct Investment
This section will examine both Indian business and government preferences for foreign
direct investment in the early post-World War II period.30
Indian Business Preferences Towards Foreign Direct Investment
Chapters Three and Four of the dissertation analyzed the rise of the Indian business class,
from participation in merchant trade to capitalist investment in the textile industry. Indian
business actors typically understood colonial rule as favoring locally based British
managing agencies, Lancashire firms and other foreign businesses at their expense. The
insistence on free trade and uneven support for domestic industry was considered a major
inhibitor of their growth prospects and Indian capital made their preferences towards
foreign capital clear as they prepared to enter the post-independence period. During a
meeting of the Government of India Industrial Policy Committee, India's leading
industrialist J.R.D. Tata argued that, given the superior financial and technological
advantages of multinational firms, the 'growth of such foreign controlled interests was a
serious threat to India's industrial progress' as 'nascent industries under Indian control,
nationalist actors, once in power after independence, faced no such resistance: there was broad-based
consensus favoring self-reliant industrial development.
29 This is a key issue that is briefly considered later in this paper, and in much greater detail elsewhere in
the dissertation.
30 As suggested earlier, these preferences were informed by two distinct schemas that emerged at the time,
scientific socialism in India and developmentalism in Brazil.
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with Indian capital, had no protection against foreign established companies and would
be beaten down in competition with such companies.' 3 1 FICCI President J.C. Setalvad
stressed the importance of solidarity amongst Indian capital against foreign firms: 'as we
will have to present a united front to safeguard the rights and interests of the commercial
community and foster the development of Indian industry against the threatened
incursions of foreign vested interests in the post-war period.' 3 2 In the following year his
successor to the FICCI Presidency A.D. Shroff built on Setalvad's comments by asserting
the new role of Indian capital in the policy formulation process and the pursuit of India's
development aspirations:
Till now the major part of the federation's activity has been to safeguard the interest of
Indian trade, commerce and industry and to protect them from the inroads of non-Indian
interests. We are now passing on to a new era when we will have to take on the two-fold
activities of not only interpreting to our own government the needs and requirements of
Indian trade, commerce and industry but to raise this country at an early date to a level
with the other countries of the world.33
Other leading Indian industrialists agreed. Walchand Hirachand warned that 'India has
realized to her cost that British capital and control have stifled India's political
aspirations, crippled her financial strength and contributed only to her economic
subjection.' 3 1
As argued in the previous chapters, these views reflected a long-held position amongst
Indian business. 35 They are also entirely in line with economists' predictions of domestic
firm responses to the MNC threat (Barney, 1991; Caves, 1996; Olson, 1965; Stigler;
1971, Peltzman, 1976; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). However, as we will see they
31 Tata's views were expressed in his capacity as member of the GOI Industrial Policy Committee, and
were reported in The Hindu, October 31 1944. Original source: Mukherjee (2002).
32 FICCI Annual Report, 1945, p.199, cited in Mukherjee 2002:349.
33 FICCI Annual Report, 1946, p.58, cited in Mukherjee 2002:349-50. This statement and others like it that
Indian capital made can be viewed as political statements as Indian capitalists sought to legitimate their role
as 'true' industrialists whose interests were aligned with those of the nation and who had a key role to play
in the wider development process.
3 Statements made on May 2 1945, Walchand Hirachand Papers, cited in Mukherjee 2002:342.
35 From as early 1934, FICCI warned the colonial government that foreign capital will 'fetter the hands of
the future popular government of the country towards industrialization on national lines.' FICCI letter to
the GOI, 1934, quoted in FICCI Proceedings of the Executive Committee, cited in Mukherjee 2002:342.
Editorials in the G.D. Birla-owned indigenous business outlet Eastern Economist similarly held that 'A
policy which lets foreign enterprise operate unregulated" could "only prove to be an unmitigated calamity.'
Eastern Economist, December 15, 1944, p. 658.
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differed entirely from Brazilian firm responses where foreign firms evinced different
social meanings. However, despite these strong positions, Indian capital recognized that
in order to achieve the growth they desired through expansion to new industrial activities
that were closed under British colonialism, they needed access to foreign technology and
manufacturing knowhow, which was almost exclusively held by multinational firms.
Analysis of archival material shows that, like state actors, Indian business believed that
foreign direct investment provided two crucial potential benefits to developing countries:
access to hard currency finance and valuable production technologies. In the immediate
aftermath of the war, Indian business and government actors felt confident that India's
massive sterling balances would preclude the need for external capital. There was also the
belief that, if necessary, developing country firms would be able to access US
government loans for capital equipment purchases. As a result, the main benefit of
engaging with foreign firms was technology, which Indian business sought to acquire
through direct purchases and debt financing with limited foreign equity participation.
The key for Indian business actors as they engaged with multinationals was acquiring
technology without relinquishing ownership and control of the new industrial enterprises
they sought to create, a tension that is recognized in the international business literature
on joint ventures (cf. Hamel, 1991; further discussed in Chapter Eight). In 1945 J.R.D.
Tata and G.D. Birla led a major business delegation to the US and UK, seeking access to
capital goods, foreign technicians and patents and manufacturing rights. The delegates
conveyed their willingness to pay royalties for patents and manufacturing rights, enter
into profit sharing agreements for periods up to 15 years, and equity participation of 25-
30%, albeit with stipulations that the Indian partner should retain managerial control
(Mukherjee, 2002:372). However, Indian business was confronted with demands for
equity participation from US and British firms, with the British wanting 50% shares of
new ventures in exchange for supplying capital equipment and sophisticated technology
in capital good industries, though they were more willing to cede managerial control in
less technology-intensive consumer goods like textiles. Nevertheless, the delegates felt
assured that there was little need for high foreign equity participation rates to secure new
technologies based on the experience of Tata Steel which hired foreign consultants to
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operate their steel mills and train local staff as a successful mechanism of technology
transfer. Even in difficult negotiations where they might otherwise have felt compelled to
concede to high foreign equity participation rates they stubbornly stuck to strict terms.
Thus Birla confidently responded by warning British firms 'that India will seek other
markets if the supply of machinery and technical skill is conditioned by British
managerial control of the Indian industry'. 36 Other members of Indian business such as
M.A. Master, President of the Indian Merchants Chamber, had even stronger reactions
that revealed the social meaning of foreign firms to rising Indian capital:
The participation in the capital and control of industries could not be allowed to become
the condition precedent for the obtaining of technical skill and capital goods. India would
prefer to go without industrial development rather than allow the creation of East India
Companies in this country which would not only militate against her economic
independence, but would also effectively prevent her from acquiring her political
freedom.37
The causal ideas that Master deployed and the cultural symbols in which his rationale
was embedded is crucial to understanding Indian FDI preferences. Indian business not
only saw foreign firms' demands as neo-imperialist attempts to control Indian industry
but also to challenge India's newly earned political independence. Their preferences
towards foreign investment were heavily shaped by their colonial experience, and the
reference to the East India Company reflects the direct link that Indian business actors
made to colonial exploitation, not only by the British state, but also by British managing
agency firms that excluded Indian firms, including the East India Company that had not
been dominant in India since losing administrative control of the colony in 1857. The
historical memory of the East India Company persisted well into the post-independence
period and as Chapters Seven and Eight of the dissertation show, still retains salience in
the current debates around economic liberalization. It is a powerful cultural symbol of the
imperialist role of foreign firms in perpetuating commercial, industrial and political
hegemony.
36 Eastern Economist 22 June 1945, p.822, cited in Mukherjee 373.
37 M.A. Master speech to the Indian Merchant Chamber, 26 April 1945, cited in Mukherjee 2002:371.
212
Indian Government Preferences towards Foreign Direct Investment
Though Nehru and the nascent Indian capitalist class had a complicated, sometimes tense
relationship, the new Indian political leadership held similar preferences towards foreign
capital. 38 Much like Indian economic nationalists had elaborated since the 191h century,
Nehru and most of his cabinet and technocratic colleagues saw control of the economy by
private foreign capital as akin to political control by their states of origin. Further, while
much of India's angst was generated by their erstwhile British colonial rulers, there was
little appetite for swapping formal British colonialism for neo-imperialism under the new
American hegemon. Nehru was asked to give the opening speech to the foreign firm-
dominated Associated Chambers of Commerce (ASSOCHAM), a powerful
acknowledgement of the impending transfer of power as the Viceroy of India was
traditionally invited to open the meeting. Nehru made it clear that the statutory
safeguards, monopoly protections and other privileges that European firms had long
enjoyed would be a thing of the past. This was greeted with glee by representatives of
Indian capital writing in the G.D. Birla-owned Eastern Economist, as it was interpreted as
an "indicator that ... [the] rule of Clive Street [was] over.. .Nehru being called in to read
the requiem to [the] now commoner mortals of [the] once great British empire... [and] to
effect [their] transition from masters to the servants of the people." 39 This statement was
laced with symbolic references. Clive Street in Calcutta was the headquarters of the
powerful British managing agencies, and thus symbolized the commercial dominance of
the British agencies as well as the close relationship between colonial administrators and
British capital, as Calcutta was the traditional seat of the empire.
38 Nehru had long been wary of both indigenous and foreign capitalists, whom he considered in a similar
group with landlords and moneylenders as the traditional oppressors of the poor in India, even before his
transformative trip to Russia in 1927. In principle, his scientific socialist beliefs favored state ownership
and control of leading industries that stood at the 'commanding heights' of modem industrial economies,
though he also saw a role for private ownership as a complement to state controlled enterprises, albeit with
the latter controlling the 'commanding heights' of the economy. Similarly, Nehru's periodic flirtation with
socialist rhetoric was disconcerting for many in the Indian capitalist class concerned about the new
government's commitment to the sanctity of private property rights. However, despite the complexity of his
relationship with private indigenous capital, Nehru's anti-imperialism detailed in the previous chapter left
little doubts about his preferences towards foreign capital.
39 Eastern Economist December 20, 1946, p.9 9 1 cited in Mukherjee 2002:363.
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The shifts in the domestic political environment that accompanied independence coupled
with the perceptions of new post-war economic opportunities gave Indian capital great
confidence that they would soon be embarking on a period of massive expansion and
diversification into manufacturing industry. However, it is crucial to note that neither
Nehru nor his key colleagues in government completely opposed all forms of FDI; much
like Indian capitalists, Indian state actors recognized that foreign capital was necessary to
augment domestic financial resources and for technology acquisition. This was entirely
consistent with the rationalized causal ideas underpinning Nehru's scientific socialist
system of belief, which was based on his admiration of the modern industries of the
West. Nehru's overwhelming objective (his 'fundamental interest', as defined in Chapter
Two) was the development of a technologically sophisticated, self-reliant industrial
sector that would allow India to catch up with the developed world, thus returning India
to its 'rightful' position in the global order. Thus the development goals, causal ideas and
conceptions of technology that constituted Nehru's scientific socialist cultural schema
required the acquisition of modern industrial technologies in the short term. Nehru, like
other scientific socialists recognized that private foreign firms controlled most of these
indispensable technologies,40 so technology acquisition required a strategy of engagement
with multinationals for short term technology transfer coupled with major investments in
scientific research organizations to develop independent technological capacities for the
long term.4 '
Nehru acknowledged this understanding in an April 1, 1949 speech, saying "Indian
Capital needs to be supplemented by foreign capital not only because our national
savings will not be enough for a rapid development of the country on the scale we wish
but also because in many cases scientific, technical and industrial knowledge and capital
40 There were, however, important exceptions. See for example Tyabji (2004) on Nehru's attempts to
bypass multinational pharmaceutical firm Merck in an effort to establish penicillin manufacturing in India
through a state owned company with technology transfer from UNICEF and the World Health
Organization.
41 Nehru's commitment to long-term scientific and technological independence is reflected in the
development of numerous scientific research organizations and most dramatically, India's successful space
program.
214
equipment can best be secured along with foreign capital."4 This statement recognized
the material constraints that India faced in pursuing its development objectives, and
further distinguished between Indian capital's financial and technological needs. Further,
this rationalized understanding of the role of foreign capital was translated into
government policy positions. However, it did not signal capitulation to multinational
firms. Sir Ardeshir Jalal, Planning and Development Member (Minister), led a
government delegation to the US and the UK around the same time as the private sector
Tata-Birla mission where they offered minority foreign capital participation along a 70-
30 share split with managerial control to remain in Indian hands, almost the same terms
being offered by his Indian business counterparts (Mukherjee, 2002:372). Thus both
Indian state and business actors believed that the key to the government's foreign
investment policies and domestic firms' technology acquisition strategies would be
striking a balance between acquiring sophisticated technologies that were held by private
foreign firms while ensuring that the ownership and managerial control of Indian
industries remained in Indian hands. This would be the fundamental causal idea - and
joint ventures the organizational form -- that drove industrial policy and firm strategy in
the post-war import substituting industrialization period and, as the next chapter will
show, the same ideas continued to underpin the cognitive and cultural schemas that
inform Indian FDI policy debates during the liberalization period of the 1990s and 2000s.
IV. Brazilian Business and Government Preferences towards Foreign Direct
Investment: From the Early Republic through the Estado Novo and the Post-War
Period (-1914-1945)
Section II of this chapter contrasted the similarities in economic structure between India
and Brazil that underpinned this chapter's case selection with the differences in socio-
political historical paths that generated radically different beliefs about the role of FDI in
industrial development amongst business and state actors in each country in the late
4 Telegram from American Embassy, New Delhi to State Department, May 23, 1966. National Archives,
RG59.
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nineteenth century. This section reveals how this contrast was deepened and the ways it
manifested in industrial development as both countries moved into the post-war period.
Much as in India, a local industrial bourgeoisie was beginning to emerge during the inter-
war period through a similar transition from merchant trade to capitalist investment. As
indicated earlier, Brazilian commercial actors reaped massive profits from the impressive
late 19th century growth of the coffee trade, which more than doubled between the
founding of the Brazilian republic in 1889 and World War I. Many of these actors
invested these returns to launch metalworking, chemical, textile, and food processing
industries, the latter two of which benefitted significantly from the shortages created by
the war.43 This industrial base served as the foundation for accelerated industrialization
efforts during the inter-war period.
Industrial Development and the Rise of Foreign Capital in Brazil
Both material and ideational factors played a role in Brazilian industrialization.44 First, as
Chapter Five argued was in the case of India, the Great Depression "cracked the
ideological hegemony of the liberal economic model and encouraged a range of
experimental policies that stressed nationalism, growth and domestic import-substitution"
(Sikkink, 1991:41; Blyth, 2001). Second, the collapse in world trade and shortages of
manufactured imports expanded opportunities for local firms. The Brazilian government
was forced to respond to the economic crisis, and post-depression policies of the 1930s
and 1940s coupled with the 'natural' protection' of WWII provided further support to
import substituting industrialization by Brazilian firms that had already begun the
capitalist transition to manufacturing industry.45 However, the implications of these
fractures in the ideational structure for industrial policy and firm strategy were
43 Half of the 16 large Brazilian groups founded before the war were engaged in industrial activities, with
textiles and food processing providing entry opportunities, much as Chapter 4 described occurred in India.
In fact, like India, Brazilian business actors were far more willing to seize these new opportunities that their
British counterparts who remitted the majority of their profit earnings to London rather than reinvesting
them in new areas of economic activity in Brazil. See Evans (1979:109) for an anecdote illustrating this
dynamic, and Amsden (2001) for a broader argument along these lines.
44 This is consistent with the Indian experience described in the previous chapters, as well as the wider
theoretical framework of the dissertation (cf. Sewell, 1992).
4s Many of the largest Brazilian business groups such as Matarrazzo, Klabin and Votorontim began
operations in the pre-World War I period.
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indeterminate with respect to the pursuit of industrial policy and the role of foreign
investment in Brazil. Unlike India where it provided ammunition to Indian economic
nationalists engaged in long-running battles with colonial defenders of the liberal regime,
in Brazil these shifts resulted in a radically different approach to organizing the economy
with respect to the relationship between domestic and foreign capital.
The rise of Getulio Vargas to the Brazilian Presidency in 1930 marked the introduction of
a new approach to industrialization. The Vargas administration responded to the
uncertainty of the time by dramatically increasing the bureaucratic capacity of the central
state. This policy move was consistent with global movements towards Keynesianism in
the advanced industrialized countries in the wake of the discredited liberal free market
hegemony (Blyth, 2001).46 However, it contrasted sharply with the approach advocated
by the orthodox colonial Finance Minister Sir James Grigg of India. As the previous
chapter argued, Grigg found Keynesian ideas 'either silly or vicious' and maintained his
liberal economic belief that agriculture was the real 'vocation' of India even while
recognizing the incredible uncertainty of causal relations in the economy during this
period, the one thing he remained sure of was that 'that India mustn't industrialise herself
too quickly' (Markovits, 1985:48, emphasis added). By contrast, the Brazilian state
increased its participation in the industrial sector in response to the global economic
collapse. Brazil's experience, which was epitomized by the development of the steel
industry, would have major implications for the role of foreign capital in
industrialization.
In the late 1930s Vargas declared that for national security reasons Brazil needed develop
a steel industry that would be under national control, a view that accorded well with the
military. Up until the beginning of World War II Brazil was reliant on imports
supplemented by local production by the foreign-owned firm Belgo Mineira. Imports of
steel were severely disrupted due to war-related supply constraints but the administration
was unable to get Belgo Mineira to expand its production capacity or encourage private
46 However, Brazil's increasing statism eventually turned to authoritarianism during the Estado Novo
period, which lasted from 1937-1945.
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Brazilian firms to enter into steel production. This experience confirmed deeply held
beliefs about the weakness of Brazilian firms, and forced the government into
negotiations with the American multinationals Dupont and US Steel. However,
nationalist pressure from the military restricted Vargas' bargaining position and
eventually scuttled both potential projects. The only remaining alternative was state
ownership, but the Brazilian government found that this would still require foreign
technical and financial support, which the administration secured from the United States
through debt financing from the Export Import Bank (Evans, 1979; Shapiro, 1994).48
The state-owned Companhia Siderd'rgica Nacional (CSN) steel mill was completed in
April 1941 .49 The firm was crucial in a number respects. First, the state's experience with
CSN had a significant role in shaping future engagement with foreign and domestic
firms, as the failure of Brazilian private capital to enter steel production even with
government support suggested the latter could not be counted upon in the promotion of
industrialization. By contrast, the Indian firm Tata fought the British colonial government
for years to enter steel production and after raising public share capital -- in part by
successfully appealing to nationalist swadeshi sentiment - ultimately launched
production in 1907. Tata Steel then lobbied furiously to supply government projects, only
becoming successful due to shortages and supply disruptions of British steel arising from
the hostilities of World War I. Second, the construction of the facility involved extensive
joint planning between Brazil and the US and, along with Brazil's proactive military
cooperation with the Allies during World War II, tied Brazil closely with Europe and the
US and created "a positive precedent for international economic collaboration that would
shape the ideas of policy makers and the public alike" (Sikkink, 1991:43).
Brazil's wartime collaboration stands in striking contrast to the strong negative reaction
by the Indian National Congress to British attempts to enlist India in the war effort. Not
47 It is important to consider whether these are 'legitimacy' issues, or are purely 'material', at least to the
extent that these can be easily separated. That is, the extent to which Brazilian capital was 'objectively'
weak and role of social factors in interpreting their strength.
48 It is worth noting that the National Steel Commission may have had a domestic auto industry in mind,
and opted for technologies that would produce steel sheets for vehicle production (Shapiro, 1994).
49 Dinius (2011) Chapter 1 provides an excellent discussion on the development on CSN.
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only did the Congress oppose any collaboration with the British during the war, Congress
officials resigned en masse from their hard-fought Provincial government posts in 1939
in protest of the unilateral British decision to involve India in the war effort. India's well-
known post-independence role in the Non-Aligned Movement is a further reflection of
this position and adds further contrast to Brazil's pro-US stance during the cold war.
Though Vargas was ousted by the military in 1945, the pattern of industrial cooperation
between Brazil and the US had been firmly established and the belief in the beneficial
role of foreign (versus domestic) capital in advancing the industrial development project
was institutionalized in policymaking practice. This was made clear When Vargas was
re-elected to the Presidency in 1951 he continued his program of state industrial planning
by establishing the Industrial Development Council, which included a sub-commission
on automobiles, trucks, jeeps and tractors that would lay the initial plans for the Brazilian
auto industry with foreign capital playing a major role.
Brazilian Government Preferences towards Foreign Investment
Brazil's increasingly favorable orientation towards foreign investment was strengthened
by participation in the Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Commission,
where many of the rationalized cusal ideas that underpinned Brazil's post-war policies
towards FDI were formed. The commission began work in 1951, the first year of Vargas'
return to office. It aimed "to create conditions for, and eliminate obstacles to, an increase
in the flow of investment, public and private, foreign and domestic, needed to promote
economic development", and placed special emphasis on transportation and electric
power. 50 The commission established the theoretical framework centered on attracting
FDI to establish new manufacturing industries with strong backward and forward
linkages that would shape Brazil's industrial policy over the next three decades.
Vargas committed suicide in 1954 and was succeeded by the Former Governor of Minas
Gerais Juscelino Kubitschek. Kubitschek was a Vargas supporter and adopted many of
Vargas' industrial policy plan including automobile production which would become a
5 Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Commission (Washington D.C.: Institute
of Inter-American Affairs, Foreign Operations Administration, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp.
iii-vi. Cited in Sikkink, (1991:64).
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central pillar of his Targets Program. President Kubitschek's development ideas and
conceptions of modernity were heavily influenced by his overseas travels. Kubitschek
journeyed across Europe after completing medical school in 1930 and later visited
Canada and the United States in 1948. After his European trip he recalled 'It was then
that I became convinced that no countries are condemned irremediably to
poverty.. .There are countries that know better than others the secret of producing more
and better, and at a lower price.' Similarly, after his trip to North America, he recalled 'In
1948, contemplating the North American civilization.. .I understood the part that Brazil
could play in the world, if our development was oriented towards industrialization.'51
Kubitschek's experience coupled with his association with the Vargas development plan
gave him "a clear vision of the kind of future he desired for Brazil" (Sikkink, 1991:124).
The implications of Kubitschek's experience in his overseas travels for his vision of
Brazilian development and modernity paralleled those of Jawaharlal Nehru following his
own travels to Europe and Russia in the late 1920s. However, the means through which
each leader would pursue their nationalist visions were radically different. As Evans
(1979:216) argues, the "nationalist logic of accumulation" in Brazil functioned through
multinational firms.52 Thus while Nehru and his anti-imperialist colleagues in the Indian
government aimed to industrialize India through indigenous firms, Kubitschek and his
colleagues in the Brazilian government sought to pursue their own form of nationalist
industrial development with the assistance of foreign firms. The differences in their
nationalist visions were abundantly clear in their preferences towards foreign investment.
A central plank of Kubitschek's economic program was a new regulatory approach to
foreign investment. Instruction 113 was issued by the Superintendency for Money and
Credit (SUMOC) and introduced by the Department of Foreign Trade (CACEX) in 1955.
It articulated a new policy stance towards foreign investment in manufacturing that was
expected to have two main expected benefits. First, it would promote increased foreign
51 Sikkink, 1991:123; 124.
52 For example, Roberto Campos who was the principal economic adviser to the military government in
1964 "was a devout economic liberal who believed hat a return to competition was the only way out of
Brazil's stagnation. If international firms were the strongest in completion, so be it" (Evans, 1979:216).
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exchange flows to support Brazil's weakening balance of payments position, a particular
concern for Brazilian officials as coffee prices in 1955 fell 30% below peak levels
achieved during the Korean War. Second, it would attract foreign firms that Brazilian
policy officials expected would introduce many of the new 'technologically complex'
industries that the government wanted to promote (Leff, 1968:60). The policy provided
open entry to foreign firms, with none of the restrictions on partnering that prevailed in
India. A key provision of Instruction 113 allowed the issuance of import licenses for
capital equipment without foreign exchange cover, which raised the return on
investments by foreign firms and provided favorable terms on profit remittances. The
policy change had an immediate effect, as FDI immediately doubled in 1956, and
remained strong over the course of the next 5 years (see table below).
Direct Private Foreign Investmentin Brazil, 1947-61
Year $, millions
1947 36
1948 25
1949 5
1950 3
1951 -4
1952 9
1953 22
1954 11
1955 43
1956 90
1957 144
1958 110
1959 124
1960 98
1961 108
Source: Leff (1968:61), Table 13.
The manufacturing sector focus of Instruction 113 and in particular the importance of
automobiles is also revealed in the sectoral distribution of incoming foreign funds (see
table below).
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Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Investment under Instruction 113
Automotive 46
Steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, cement, mechanical
and electrical equipment, pharmaceutical 40
Food products 2
Textiles 4
Other 8
Source: Leff (1968:61), Table 14.
The contrast in the policy approaches in India and Brazil is clear from the 1948 Indian
Industrial Policy Resolution, presented a year after India became independent. While
Brazil instituted policies to encourage the entry of foreign capital and place it at the
center of Brazilian industrial efforts, India's industrial policy regime aimed to regulate
and restrict foreign firms to ensure that they served the purpose of technology transfer but
did not gain significant ownership and control of Indian industry.
The Government of India agree with the view of the Industries Conference [the forum of
interaction between domestic capital and the state] that, while it should be recognised that
participation of foreign capital and enterprise, particularly as regards industrial
technique and knowledge, will be of value to the rapid industrialisation of the country,
it is necessary that the conditions under which they may participate in Indian industry
should be carefully regulated in the national interest. Suitable legislation will be
introduced for this purpose. Such legislation will provide for the scrutiny and approval
by the Central Government of every individual case of participation of foreign capital
and management in industry. It will provide that, as a rule, the major interest in
ownership, and effective control, should always be in Indian hands, but power will be
taken to deal with exceptional cases in a manner calculated to serve the national interest. In
all cases, however, the training of suitable Indian personnel for the purpose of eventually
replacing foreign experts will be insisted upon.53
This policy position continued to hold throughout the 1950s. The Indian government
revised the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution on April 30, 1956 but reiterated the stance
on foreign investment: "The Prime Minister, in his statement in Parliament on the 6th
April, 1949, has enunciated the policy of the State in regard to foreign capital. It is,
therefore, not necessary to deal with these subjects in this resolution."54 These contrasting
policy approaches in India and Brazil had major implications for distribution of industrial
policy rents and resulting market share in India and Brazil. These are illustrated in the
next section through an analysis of how these business and government preferences
5 Government of India, Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948.
54 Government of India, Industrial Policy Resolution, 1956.
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towards foreign investment manifested themselves in domestic firm strategy and market
outcomes as both countries moved towards developing a locally-based automobile
industry.
Indian Business View of the Latin American Approach to Foreign Investment
Finally, and crucially for this comparative analysis, Indian business and government
actors were well aware of the more permissive perspectives on foreign investment held
by their counterparts elsewhere in the developing world, including Latin America, but
were adamant that those approaches would not be adopted in India. In its lead article on
July 27, 1945 the Eastern Economist elaborated cases where American capital gained a
'stranglehold' over South American economies such as Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and
Peru, even while those countries retained their formal political independence. It revealed
how US firms controlled many locally based firms by establishing majority positions on
their boards of directors. This sparked significant fears of the continuation of
imperialism, albeit with a new metropole, and concluded: "It would be suicide for us to
enter into an economic alliance on terms such as these. Having sufficient experience of
the techniques of British political imperialism, we are not going to court the economic
imperialism of their cousins across the sea." 55
This variation in preferences between India and Latin America is further captured by a
diplomatic cable sent from the US Consulate in Bombay on March 20, 1958 entitled
"Reaction to New York Times Supplement on Foreign Investment in Latin America".
The cable reports on responses to a New York Times article that was distributed by the US
Consulate amongst the Indian business community in the industrial and commercial
capital of Bombay. The article notes "the general appreciation of the need for foreign aid
and investment for India's development" amongst Indian industrialists, but reveals that:
At the same time, the business community is not prepared to go to the same lengths as its
counterpart in Latin American countries in attracting foreign investment. The average
Indian business prefers foreign investment which does not entail foreign overall
control. There is also a tendency to suggest that foreign enterprise has a duty to invest in
India and collaborate with Indian enterprise, not so much with a profit motive as with a
view to helping Indian democracy and economy.
5 Eastern Economist, lead article, July 27 1945 cited in Mukherjee (2002:374).
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The cable goes on to provide the specific views of a member of one of India's top two
business houses, noting
Typical of such attitude is the following from Mr. R.D. Birla of the Birla House and
brother of Mr. G.D. Birla who recently led an industrial delegation to the United States:
"...While it is not possible for India, unfortunately, to offer the same facilities and
concessions to foreign investors as is done by some of the Latin American countries,
the need for foreign investment in this country at this juncture requires little
emphasis... We would, therefore, heartily welcome any American investments that might
come forth and contribute to the success of the [the Indian Government's Five Year]
Plan, thereby strengthening the foundations of democracy in this country'.",6
The position of leading Indian economic actors was clear: foreign capital was needed, but
not at the expense of ownership and control of Indian industry. This is a major
conundrum for structural-deductive theories that seek to deduce actors' preferences from
their structural positions. Why did economic actors in similarly positioned Latin
American countries hold such radically different preferences towards foreign investment?
The next section turns to the case of Brazil to reveal the social and historical sources of
these fundamental differences in preferences towards foreign firms.
V. Contrasting Indian and Brazilian FDI Preferences:
Automobiles as the Epitome of Industrial Modernity
The auto industry has been seen as the exemplar of modern industry throughout the
twentieth century. It entails a high degree of organizational and technological complexity
and generates spillovers through production networks in a wide range of complementary
industries. These industries encompass different levels of knowledge and technology
intensity from simple forged and stamped metal parts to complex engineering and
advanced materials that produce a wide range of low, medium and high skilled jobs.
These factors led management theorist Peter Drucker, writing in the immediate aftermath
56 It is valuable to note the emphasis that both the US Consulate, and more interestingly Indian businessman
places on supporting Indian democracy, as it reflects the wider Cold War environment. Unsurprisingly this
was a strong theme throughout the Diplomatic cables files, but what is interesting is the way that Indian
business often deployed the communist bogey in discussions with US government representatives.
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of World War II, to famously declare autos 'the industry of industries'.F5 Automobiles
production lay at the center of 20e century industrialization in the advanced
industrialized countries, not only shaping the industrial landscape but having an equally
important effect on social transformation by propelling the rise of the organized working
class, the consolidation of the middle class and expanding opportunities for the capitalist
class (Okada, 2000). As a result, the auto industry occupied a privileged position in the
socio-technical imaginaries of modernizing business and state actors in both India and
Brazil in the post-war period. It was synonymous with industrial development, modernity
and economic power.
India and Brazil had similar industrial backgrounds and ambitions in developing
domestic automobile industries. Both countries had histories of auto assembly activities
involving the same multinational firms, as GM and Ford had each been assembling
complete and semi-knocked down kits (CKDs and SKDs) in both places since the
1920s.58 Likewise, both countries had a strong desire to move from simple kit assembly
to more sophisticated and higher value-added activities through domestic manufacture
and production. Nevertheless, their radically different approaches to foreign investment
are most evident in this industry.
Launching the Indian Auto Industry
Serious plans for an Indian automobile industry emerged in the early 1930s. As the
previous chapter argued, the idea of was initially championed by Sir M. Visvesvaraya, a
civil engineer, civil servant and prominent scientific socialist who was an influential
voice in elite discussions around the development of Indian industry and a member of the
National Planning Commission. Visvesvaraya traveled to Japan in 1898 where he
5 In his 1946 book The Concept of the Corporation, Drucker stated: "The automobile industry stands for
modern industry all over the globe. It is to the twentieth century what the Lancashire cotton mills were to
the nineteenth century: the industry of industries."
58 Complete and semi-knocked down kits refer to automobiles that are fully (or partially) disassembled for
shipping and re-assembly upon arrival. All the components are included in the kit, and crucially, little
labor, skills or technology is required for their assembly. For this reason, industrial policy planners sought
to move away from CKD and SKD assembly as it was seen as contributing little to industrial development.
Instead they sought to promote full vehicle assembly with as close to 100% locally sourced components, as
this maximized the contribution to technological learning in components manufacturing as well as final
assembly.
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witnessed the industrialization efforts that were taking place under the direction of the
Japanese state during the Meiji Revolution. His experience ingrained in him the belief
that 'industrial life.. .connotes production, wealth, power and modernity'.59 Visvesvaraya
made his views on the importance of the auto industry clear in a 1938 editorial in the
Indian journal Science and Culture: "...if we take the motor car industry as an index of
civilized existence, the USA stands easily first, with over 30 million cars in use; about
one man in 5 possesses a car, i.e. every family possesses a car...in India, there is one car
for every 2,300 persons. This figure gives an appalling picture of the low index of
civilized life in India" (Zachariah, 2005:238, my emphasis). This view of India's
'backwardness' and the perception of autos as the path to modernity epitomized scientific
socialism and shaped Indian policy approaches to developing the industry.
Many Indian industrialists shared this belief in the role of the auto industry not only for
national development but also for the growth of their own corporate empires.
Visvesvaraya developed a detailed proposal for the development of an India auto
manufacturing facility with annual production of 10,000 cars and 5,000 trucks. He
proposed the flotation of a joint stock company named Indian Motors Ltd. in 1936
involving major Indian business actors such as Indian shipping magnate and staunch
economic nationalist Walchand Hirachand, as well as G.D. Birla, J.R.D. Tata and
Purshotamdas Thakurdas, amongst others. None of these business actors had any
experience with an industry as complex as integrated automobile production, so there was
early recognition that foreign firm participation would be necessary in order to access
vehicle design, technology and for technical assistance to setup the manufacturing
facilities. However, consistent with Indian preferences towards foreign investment this
participation would not be on a 50-50 basis as it was feared this would lead to loss of
managerial control. This was a clear legacy of Indian experience with the British
managing agencies. Instead, the plan called for a lump sum payment to launch the
factory, transfer of technical management from foreign to local engineers over a 12-18
month period and fixed term per unit royalty payments for technology.
59 Science and Culture, cited in Zachariah (2005:238).
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The local Indian Motors consortium fell apart as Birla and others decided to enter the
industry on their own. However, Walchand Hirachand continued to pursue the
Visvesvaraya plan and entered into negotiations with Henry Ford himself in Michigan in
July 1939. The Hirachand team's demands were significant: they wanted access to all
new Ford designs, a monopoly in South Asia, support with acquisition of capital
equipment, training and factory design and construction. In return, Ford insisted on
receiving a 51% share of the venture, but this was steadfastly refused by Hirachand who
offered a fixed royalty and maximum $500,000 share sale, albeit with no voting rights
and stringent transfer restrictions, including a right of first refusal and a proviso that
shares could only be sold to another Indian company. Fascinatingly, Hirachand preferred
to have a local rival buy in to his firm than a foreign company. Such were Indian
capitalists' preferences towards foreign firms.
The Ford negotiations ultimately failed, but Walchand was undeterred. He managed to
strike a similar deal with Chrysler for the manufacture of Chrysler, Dodge and Plymouth
passenger cars and trucks purely on the basis of royalty payments with no share
ownership nor board representation by the US firm. Chrysler accepted and the new firm,
Premier Automobiles, was launched in 1944 with an aggressive plan of phased
indigenization with Chrysler's support. Walchand later entered into a similar agreement
with the Italian firm Fiat with similar terms to the Chrysler deal. This resulted in Premier
producing a local version of the Fiat Padmini for the next few decades, which has since
become the ubiquitous taxi in Bombay.
G.D. Birla was also keen to enter into automobile production and eventually struck two
separate deals, one with the US firm Studebaker for the manufacture of trucks, and the
other with Lord Nuffield, head of the UK-based Morris Motors Ltd., to assemble
passenger cars. Birla's auto firm was named Hindustan Motors Ltd., and in the case of
the latter arrangement, Morris "was to have no financial interest direct or indirect in the
capital of this company and have nothing to do with its management or control". The
Managing Director of Morris himself further added: "The basis of this cooperative effort
is that if there is going to be an Indian car manufactured by Indians for the Indian market
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and if the finance is provided from Indian sources the administrative control of the
project should be vested in Indian hands". 60 Nevertheless, Birla launched the firm with
the intention of fully indigenizing production of the Morris Ten. The car was sold in India
under the name Ambassador, and it quickly became the vehicle of choice for Indian
government officials and politicians, a status it retained for the next several decades. The
Ambassador is synonymous with post-war Indian manufacturing industry, and would
become the most potent symbol of the achievements and pitfalls of the Indian ISI period.
Other Indian business houses followed suit. The Tata Group formed a 70-30 share
partnership with Daimler in the early 1950s, and quickly became the leading
manufacturer of trucks. Mahindra and Mahindra similarly partnered with the Willys-
Overland Motors to assemble jeeps, becoming a major supplier to the Indian police and
military; and with Ford for the manufacture of tractors, a partnership that benefitted
significantly when the Green Revolution was launched in the 1960s. These two
partnerships are useful to note as the Tata-Daimler relationship continued until well into
the 1990s, when Tata entered passenger car manufacturing on its own when the industry
was delicensed (following a difficult split with Daimler that is discussed in Chapter
Eight), while Ford was the first MNC Mahindra turned to when they decided to re-enter
sports utility production in the late 1990s. Ford provided assistance in the production of
the now wildly successful Mahindra Scorpio. Thus, as the table below indicates, Indian
capital came to dominate the newly founded auto industry with foreign firms in minority
share positions or acting mainly as technology suppliers.
Indian Passenger & Utility Vehicle Market Share, 1955-1990 (%)
1955 1960 1970 1980 1990
Hindustan Motors (Birta Group with Morris, UK) 38 38 51 48 12
Premier (PAL; Hirachand Group, with Chrysler and Fiat) 28 27 27 19 20
SMP (Birla Group with GM) 12 14 1 0 0
Mahindra and Mahindra (with Ford, Willys, Chrysler) 22 22 21 33 15
Maruti Udyog (with Suzuki) - - 53
Source: D'Costa (Ec Nationalism in Motion, 2006) Table 2 * Excludes commercial vehides e.g.
Taa's Telco with Mercedes, Birla's Hindustan Motors with Studebaker, Ford with
Amalgamations and Ashok Leyland
60 In fact other sources suggested that the Morris was to receive 25-30% of the shares. However, majority
ownership and managerial control remained firmly in Birla's hands. Mukherjee, (2002:378).
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Launching the Brazilian Auto Industry
The pattern of development and the role of foreign capital in Brazil could hardly be more
different. Initial plans for an automobile industry in Brazil were laid in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, when Admiral Ldcio Meira directed the sub-commission on motor vehicle
production under Vargas' 1951-54 administration. Meira's interest in autos had a similar
genesis to that of his Indian counterpart Visvesvaraya. Meira's belief in the powerful
developmental role of the auto industry was sparked during his first trip to the United
States in 1930, where he gained an understanding of the central position the auto industry
held in the vibrant and powerful US economy. Meira "learned that one in eight American
jobs was connected to auto production," and concluded that "'As in the highly
industrialized countries, the automotive industry in Brazil is becoming and will be
without doubt the leading sector of the entire economy, by force of its magnitude,
complexity, and dynamism"' (Shapiro, 1994:39).
Though the automobile production plan that the Meira subcommission developed was not
adopted by the Vargas administration, Meira later shared the proposal with soon-to-be
President Juscelino Kubitschek when the two met during a campaign visit to Bahia in
1955. Meira put forward a convincing argument for the inclusion of auto production in
Kubitschek's proposed state-sponsored industrialization program, the Target Plan of
National Development, which was being promoted through the motto Fifty Years of
Progress in Five that aptly captures the widely-held development aspirations and
optimism of the post-war era. Meira's auto proposal strongly appealed to the soon-to-be
President. Kubitschek needed a modern industry that would capture the imagination of
the aspirational Brazilian public as by the early 1950s railroads - which had been the
foundation of 1 9 th century modernity - was no longer seen as the basis of
industrialization. On the other hand, the successful development of highway
infrastructure had become a sign of the capacity for competent governance by the public
and the Brazilian middle classes that were a key part of Kubitschek's constituency were
clamoring for autos. Kubitschek immediately tested the idea at a political rally later that
afternoon, promising to launch the production of what he termed as a 'national car'. The
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proposal garnered an enthusiastic response and, with Kubitschek's electoral victory in
1956, Meira was named Minister of Transportation and Public Works and charged with
laying the plans for development of an auto manufacturing industry (Shapiro, 1994:28).
From the outset, the Brazilian auto industry was seen as a crucial means of attracting
foreign capital and technology and generating industrial development by acting as the
centerpiece of an integrated industrial structure.61 This view arose from policymakers'
beliefs in economic theories that posited the catalytic role of foreign capital and the
existence of extensive backward and forward linkages between industries and sectors
across the economy. These beliefs were supported by new economic planning tools,
particularly input-output matrices that provided a rationalized framework for assessing
relationships across different domains of the economy. These matrices quantified the
effects of industrial linkages and rationalized Brazil's entry into the production of high-
technology consumer goods. Planners expected that autos would facilitate the
development of complementary industries, and further support emerged from the
recognition of common patterns of sectoral interdependence in other developing and
industrialized economies. "Targeting high-linkage industries became the logical
development strategy" (Shapiro, 1994:40). 62
FDI Preferences in the Brazilian Auto Industry
The Vargas subcommission and the subsequent Executive Group for the Auto Industry
(Grupo Executivo da Inddstria Automobilistica, or GEIA) created under Kubitschek's
Presidency both concluded that foreign firms offered the only route to developing the
industry. Multinational firms initially complained bitterly about the unrealistic idea of
engaging in automobile production in Brazil, given the lack of 'natural' conditions. Ford
was particularly difficult, referring to the idea of automobile production in Brazil as
'utopian' while claiming engines could not be produced in the tropics (Shapiro, 1994:70).
61 Brazilian policymakers had been concerned about the explosion of imports of automotive products, from
$20m to $276m in 1951, before falling to $52m in 1955 as the auto program got going.
62 Brazilian technocrat Roberto Campos authored a section of the Report of the Joint Brazil-United States
Economic Development Commission that stated: "Brazil... offered striking evidence of the
interrelationships of an economy and how accelerated growth in one sector is often the precondition for
faster growth in other sectors" (Ibid, p. 14, cited in Sikkink 1991:65).
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This was the same claim that MNCs made about automobile production in India.
However, these fears were put to rest as eleven firms opted to participate in Brazil's auto
production plan, of which six were controlled by foreign capital, two were 50-50 joint
ventures and three including FNM were controlled by Brazilian capital. The industry was
a major success in terms of vehicle production, which reached 145,000 in 1961, as well
as local content, which averaged 90% in the 1960s. However, as the table below shows,
the industry saw massive consolidation and by 1968 was almost entirely controlled by
foreign capital.
investments by Investments by Firms (1956-60) $US millions Post-1960 Developments
Cr$,miiIIons Ownership & Control
Willys Overland 30,819 Majority Brazilian Capital Ford takes over in 1967
Ford 22,420 Majority Foreign Capital
General Motors 22,159 Majority Foreign Capital
Volkswagon 11,173 Majority Foreign Capital
Mercedes-Benz 8,888 50-50 Foreign-Domestic
Simca 6,454 50-50 Foreign-Domestic Chrysler buys 92% stake in 1966
International Harvester 4,576 Majority Foreign Capital
FNM 3,224 Majority Brazilian Capital Alfa Romeo takes over in 1967
Venag 2,714 Majority Brazilian Capital VW takes over in 1966
Toyota 1,548 Majority Foreign Capital
Scania Vabis 780 Majority Foreign Capital
Source: Adopted from Shapiro (1994) Table 4.3 & A2
The contrast with India in the pattern of ownership of auto industry firms is glaring, and
was a direct outcome of Brazilian government preferences towards foreign capital.
Private Brazilian firms were considered incapable of meeting the technological and
financial requirements of automobile production, a view that was consistent with the
earlier experience with the Brazilian private sector. However, Brazilian firms were no
differently placed in terms of these capabilities than their Indian counterparts. If anything,
Brazil was in a stronger financial position in the late 1950s than India, and the Brazilian
government offered similar financial support to Brazilian firms than Indian firms
63
received. The crucial difference was that, unlike their Indian counterparts, many
Brazilian firms also seemed to share government's views towards the relative roles of
domestic and foreign capital in the industry. This is surprising given the wide range of
potential Brazilian firms that could enter the industry. It is especially puzzling given that
63 Future research will consider why Brazilian actors didn't have greater faith in local firm capabilities
relative to their Indian counterparts.
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the structure of the Brazilian and Indian private sectors looked very similar in terms of
size, organization and sectoral distribution of the leading firms. Further, in addition to the
large business groups Brazil already had a relatively vibrant locally owned auto parts
manufacturing sector. However, just as had occurred a decade before in the steel industry,
Brazilian firms made it clear to the Vargas sub-commission that they were unable to
pursue such an undertaking, even if the state was to provide the financing (Shapiro,
1994:43). Meira did suggest state financing of an auto producers company that could be
passed on to Brazilian private capital but minutes from two Subcommission meetings on
May 7 1952 and Aug 27 1952 reveal that parts producers made it clear that they did not
wish to enter the industry (Shapiro, 1994:64). Instead they were content to carry out
subordinate roles in the industry as suppliers and parts manufacturers.
Despite the fact that Brazilian firms moved aggressively to capture new opportunities in
both the pre-World War I and interwar periods, as seen in the rapid growth of new
business groups, foreign firms captured the lion's share of opportunities that arose in
post-war Brazil. New Brazilian firms were unable to gain a foothold in the post-war
economy even with the dramatic economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s. In this period
the so-called grupos multibilionarios were almost all foreign owned, and "the
development of the automobile industry was to foreign groups in the fifties what textiles
and food products had been to local groups in the pre-World War I period" (Evans,
1979:110). Three of the six foreign groups that entered Brazil in the fifties --
Volkswagen, Mercedes and Willys Overland -- were involved in the production of cars,
trucks or buses (bid). Further, GM and Ford, which had been engaged in CKD assembly,
sale and distribution of cars since the 1920s expanded into integrated local production. It
is worth noting that this dynamic was not limited to autos, as foreign firms also usurped
local groups in seizing the lead in new complex areas of manufacturing such as
locomotives as well as in consumer goods such as radios and washing machines (Ibid).
These were areas where Indian firms were staking out ground: Tata Engineering and
Locomotive Company was the dominant player in locomotives after battles with the
colonial government over preferential treatment to British exporters, and other Indian
groups were seeking to enter consumer electronics industries through majority
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partnership arrangements with foreign firms. More broadly, the general pattern in India
saw Indian business actors increasingly gaining control of formerly British firms, as the
table below indicates. The Indian dominance in directorships would increase and be
reflected in managerial control as British disinvestment rose in the mid-1950s through
1960s.
Foundation Dates for Largest Brazilian Business Groups and Subsidiaries of US Multinational Firms (%)
Pre-WWI 1914-1929 1930-1945 Post WWiI Total
Largest Brazilian Groups 4 28 8 0 100" (25)
Largest Foreign Owned Groups 20 37 17 27 100 ' (30)
Subsidiaries of US MNCs 0 11 21 100' (131)
Source: Evans (1979) Table 3.1
Shifting Ownership and Control of Enterprises in India (1911-1951)
Number of Companies Number of Directors
1911 1931 1951 1911 1931 1951
BrItish 282 416 382 852 1.335 865
Indian 31' 86' 158 ' 262' 826' 1,385
Mixed Control 28 28 79 102 121 372
S&urce: Kochanek, 1974.
The willingness of Brazilian auto parts producers with experience in the industry to
concede to foreign firms also stands in stark contrast to India, where the leading auto
component firms were keen to partner with MNCs and become assemblers. 64 Indian firms
viewed this as the logical next stage of growth, especially during this relatively early
period of the development of the global auto industry. Instead, the GEIA wanted to
encourage a non-vertically integrated industry structure to leave parts sector as 'natural
preserve for Brazilian capital' and to legitimate foreign firm dominance of the industry as
auto assemblers and supply chain integrators. Crucially, Brazilian firms didn't perceive
foreign firms as nearly as much of a threat as their Indian counterparts, but rather much
more as creating new investment opportunities. They interpreted similar material facts
64 By the mid-1950s Brazil had a vibrant locally owned auto components sector and so was expected even
by Brazilian officials to be potential entrants into the industry (Shapiro, 1994). The Brazilian auto sector
had seen some development in the pre-war period, and grew rapidly in the immediate post-war era. Though
by 1944 there were only 38 registered auto parts companies, they produced over 2,000 different
components. These firms suffered at the end of the war as orders were redirected to overseas-based foreign
suppliers and almost half went out of business. However, they organized and received some protection via
the licensing scheme Advisory 288 which allowed the sector to recover strongly to 250 firms producing
8,000 parts in 1952, and 900 registered firms by 1955 facilitating domestic content levels of 30% for
locally assembled vehicles.
233
entirely differently, an outcome that runs directly against the predictions of structural-
material theories (Abdelal et al, 2010). As the President himself argued in the
communication circular 'Relatorio':
Thus, an excellent opportunity would remain for national investors to operate, possibly
on a more economical basis, specializing in the supply of parts and components to
various or all aforementioned 'manufacturers'...recognizing therefore the advantage in a
horizontal industrial structure, from which emerges two types of producers:
manufacturers, primarily foreign, and subcontractors, predominantly national.s
The difference between Indian and Brazilian firms' approach to foreign investment is
further supported by evidence from US Diplomatic Cables from consular officials in
Brazil. In the post-war period it was common practice for US embassies and consulates to
serve as intermediaries between US firms and local business communities. Embassy and
consular officials played crucial roles in providing general information on the economic
environment as well as specific information on local business and government actors as a
means of identifying potential business partners for American companies. For example, a
June 23 1959 cable reporting on a Brazilian firm's interest in the manufacture of brake
components for the auto sector contacted the embassy to seek potential partners in the US
to provide capital participation and technical assistance. While Indian firms were
consistently clear that foreign firms would be a minority partner in joint ventures,
Brazilian firms appear much less concerned, with the Consul General reporting that
"Capital participation is primarily desired by the partners in the local firm [and] the
[Brazilian] partners stated that the potential investor or investors may assume the
administrative direction of the firm, with or without the participation of all or some
members of the [existing Brazilian] firm".6 6 By contrast, the Indian Amalgamations
group, a Madras-based auto component manufacturer, was pushing the government to
enter truck assembly in partnership with the US firm Studebaker, which by this time was
having contractual difficulties with Birla's Hindustan Motors. 67
65 Cited in Shapiro (1994:55).
66 Memo from American Consular General, Sao Paulo to State Department, June 23, 1959. National
Archives, RG59, 811.05132/6-2359, emphasis added.
67 Birla wanted to exit the Studebaker partnership in order to work with GM.
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Ultimately, Brazilian parts manufacturers were edged out of the Brazilian market just like
Brazilian assemblers. As foreign assemblers entered the market, they encouraged their
overseas suppliers to follow suit, resulting in the Brazilian auto components industry that
had been exclusively local before 1955 becoming increasingly dominated by foreign
firms. A 1962 survey suggested that of 156 medium and large auto component firms,
only 24 were foreign but these firms accounted for 52% of the capital stock of the
sample. The takeover process began within the first few years of foreign firm entry, and
followed a pattern that is typical in partnerships between local and multinational firms.
For example, the Brazilian firm Albarus S.A. had been in the market since 1947 and
began supplying transmission components to Ford in 1949. The company signed a
technical assistance contract with the Dana Corporation in 1955, and within 2 years Dana
controlled 63% of the company's shares. Dana employed a common acquisition strategy
to gain a controlling interest, trading shares in Albarus for royalty payments and capital
equipment imported under Instruction 113 (Shapiro, 1994:202). Cash-strapped
developing country firms face difficult choices in these situations: they can either refuse
the new equipment which facilitates an expansion of the business (and perhaps risk losing
their partner in the process, as he will cite the a mismatch in the firms' ambitions), or
agree to expand while ceding ownership of their firm. This is a tactic that MNCs also
tried to use in India, both during the post-war ISI period and especially during
liberalization in the 1990s. However, as Chapters Seven and Eight show they had
significantly less success due to major policy interventions by the Indian government
based on Indian business and government continued preferences for retaining Indian
control of industry. By contrast, the Brazilian government offered little protection to
Brazilian firms and by the mid- 1960s the auto components sector was dominated by
multinationals.
The analysis of diplomatic cables reveals similarly contrasting preferences in the area of
tractor manufacturing. On Nov 16-20, 1959, the Sao Paulo State Secretariat of
Agriculture sponsored a symposium on the Manufacture of Tractors and Agricultural
Equipment that was well-attended by senior representatives of key government agencies
including the GEIA, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDE) and the Bureau
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for Currency and Credit (SUMOC) as well as business figures and others. A key outcome
of the initiative was the view that "The technical and administrative experience of the
motor vehicle and parts industry should be put to good use, without prejudice, however,
to foreign traditional tractor makers who may wish to establish themselves in Brazil."
The symposium generated a set of 18 recommendations, three of which directly pertained
to the role of foreign capital and are specifically worth noting:
1. The motor vehicle manufacturing industry should be financed and managed by private
industry and not by Government-owned or financed companies.
2. Foreign companies can better finance, organize and operate the motor vehicle
industry than purely local firms; those already operating in Brazil as assemblers of
motor vehicles will be given preference over other foreign companies.
3. Local companies can most effectively contribute to the National Automotive Industry
Plan as manufacturers of parts or as sub-contractors to foreign motor vehicle
manufacturing companies.
Not only was there little encouragement for Brazilian firms to become tractor assemblers,
there was an explicit assumption that local firms would at best serve as component
manufacturers or subcontractors to foreign firms.68 Any 'discrimination' would be
directed towards foreign firms that had already set up in Brazil over others that may come
in later, rather than towards Brazilian owned firms! This was precisely the opposite view
that prevailed in India.
Shapiro (1994) attempts to justify the GEIA position by suggesting that neither Ford nor
GM "with whom the Brazilian authorities had the most experience" had licensed
technology nor partnered with local firms elsewhere, adding "It is important to note that,
at the time, no other peripheral country had successfully built up a domestic industry on
the basis of 'national champions"' (Ibid, 43,fn3 1). However, as we have seen in this
chapter, this was the same period when Indian government authorities and Indian firms
were engaged with negotiations with both Ford and GM, as well as Chrysler, Fiat and
several other multinational auto firms. Even though their bargaining positions were
similar, as the extensive literature on bargaining with multinationals would hold (cf.
Encarnation and Wells, 1985), and they faced the same financial and technological
constraints as their Brazilian counterparts, Indian actors had an entirely different
68 Memo from American Embassy, Rio de Janiero to State Department, August 14, 1956. National
Archives, RG59, 823.3331/8-1456.
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approach to foreign investment. These preferences resulted in different outcomes even
with the same US multinational firms that eventually dominated the Brazilian market.
GM had been present in India as a pure CKD assembler since 1928 but despite
government pressure refused to take on an Indian partner in the post-independence period
and shift to integrated production. As a result the government gradually withdrew its
license and GM was obliged to exit the market in the 1950s. On the other hand, Ford
agreed to partner with Mahindra and Mahindra and remained in the country. As already
noted, these outcomes had important long run effects on the development of Indian
manufacturing capabilities in the sector. Mahindra and Mahindra is today is one of
India's largest indigenously owned auto assemblers, and in interviews firm officials
consistently cite the manufacturing experience from the post-independence era as a major
explanation for their current success. The same holds for other leading firms such as Tata
Motors and Bajaj Auto. This speaks to the long-term implications of these radically
different Indian and Brazilian FDI preferences for industry and market structure.
The Brazilian government also ignored the option of Brazilian auto firm ownership
through the state, even though there was already a well-positioned state owned firm in
place. The National Motor Factory (Fabricio Nacional de Motores, FNM) was established
during WWII to manufacture airplane engines for the Allied war effort and with the
transition away from wartime production, provided an option for the Brazilian
government's auto production plans. In fact, in 1948, well before the GEIA was
convened, the firm was assembling trucks under technology license from the Italian
company Isotta-Franschini, producing 50 trucks per year with 30% domestic content.
Though Isotta went out of business in 1951 the Italian government arranged a new
contract for a more technologically advanced truck with Alfa Romeo and by 1956 FNM
was producing trucks with 70% domestic content and was credited with providing a large
boost to the locally owned auto components industry. However, the government decided
that its performance was weak and Meira's GEIA report hardly mentioned FNM. The
final plan ultimately accorded the firm a marginal role in the industrial plan dominated by
foreign capital, and FNM was eventually bought out by its foreign partner Alfa Romeo.
By contrast, as Chapter 7 will show, India launched its liberalization process in the early
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1980s with the creation of a state-owned auto firm with minority participation by Suzuki.
The joint venture Maruti Udyog received heavy financial support and policy protection
and quickly dominated the passenger car segment. Maruti revolutionized the Indian auto
industry by introducing modern production technologies and, much like FNM, facilitating
major capability upgrading amongst Indian auto component producers. Just as the aging
Hindustan Motors Ambassador represented the protectionism of import substitution, the
modern new Maruti-Suzuki 800 symbolized the possibilities of the liberalization era.
Chart 1. Domestic Market Share in India and Brazil, 1971
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Finally, this variation across India and Brazil was not restricted to enterprises in the
nascent auto industry. Similar patterns of ownership prevailed across the industrial sector
with Indian firms consistently having higher levels of market share relative to foreign
firms than their Brazilian counterparts. As the chart above shows, Indian firms dominated
the auto industry market, and were the market leaders in all other technology-intensive
manufacturing industries with the sole exception of pharmaceuticals, while Brazilian
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firms had consistently lower market share than multinationals in every area except
rubber.
The ideas driving variation in firm ownership between India and Brazil in other industries
including pharmaceuticals was the same as described in the auto industry. This is
evidenced by a June 6, 1958 US Diplomatic cable reporting interest from the "well-
known" Sao Paulo-based pharmaceutical laboratory firm Industria Farmaceutica
Endochimica S.A. in "associating with an American laboratory," adding that "For this
purpose it is willing to sell half the shares in the company for approximately US$1.5
million and pass on managerial control to the enterprise with which it associates." 69 This
fits the pattern observed in an extensive analysis of hundreds of similar cables across a
variety of manufacturing industries from 1945 through 1974 and exemplifies the sharp
contrast between Indian and Brazilian preferences towards foreign investment.
This difference in firm ownership between Brazil and India grew sharper over time, even
in the face of common external shocks. Like most developing countries, both India and
Brazil faced major foreign exchange shortages and balance of payments crises in the
1960s, yet they continued to respond in almost opposite ways. Brazil moved to increase
foreign exchange inflows by encouraging greater FDI entry, while India sought to
decrease foreign exchange outflows by restricting foreign firms' ability to repatriate
profits. As the 1960s progressed the Indian government tightened restrictions on FDI. It
also made steps to restrict the growth and expansion of Indian private firms in a bid to
increase control of the economy through state owned firms (plus small scale
reservations). These growing restrictions on foreign investment culminated in the passage
of the infamous Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) FERA was launched by
Nehru's daughter Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1974 and required all foreign firms to
reduce their shareholding to a maximum 40% and tightened controls on technology
licensing. FERA had a major impact on a range of industries. The chart below shows the
extent of the shift. Whereas Indian firms continued to dominate the automobile industry,
69 Memo from American Consular General, Sao Paulo to State Department, May 6, 1958. National
Archives, RG59, 811.05132/5-658.
70 This can be characterized more systematically in later iterations of this chapter.
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they also assumed control of pharmaceuticals as the imposition of FERA appeared to
trigger a collapse of the multinational share of the industry from 77% to 48% in less than
a decade."
Chart 2. Shift in Foreign and Domestic Market Share in the India, 1971-1981
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The pharmaceutical industry is especially useful to consider given the passage of the
1972 Indian Patents Act, which lowered barriers to entry and encouraged massive
innovation allowing chemicals and drugs patented elsewhere to be freely copied,
produced and sold in India. These industry developments are useful to note not only
because India is now a global leader in generic drugs, but also because Brazil also relaxed
its patent regime. However, as the analysis presented in this chapter would predict,
multinational firms were best positioned to capture most of the gains in Brazil. The
71 FERA was a crucial intervention as it allowed many domestic firms to partner with MNCs. However,
there was important variation in the structure of these joint ventures and relationships between partners. For
example, many MNCs did dilute their equity holdings but retained managerial control through clever board
structures and use of preferential shares. Thus many Indian firms were not much more than 'sleeping
partners' in these policy-induced JVs. The political dimensions of this dynamic would become crucial
when FDI liberalization began 1991, both in terms of business politics as MNCs sought to raise ownership
and squeeze out domestic partners as well as the legitimacy that was ascribed to the competing parties as
some of these relationships became public and contentious.
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Brazilian governmant was also nationalist and statist in the 1970s but promoted both state
enterprises and MNCs (Evans, 1979; Newfarmer, 1979). 72
VI. Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the different ways that economic actors in India and Brazil
perceived FDI and the role of foreign firms in supporting post-war industrialization
efforts in the automobile sector. It showed how despite perceiving similar development
problems, identifying a common solution through industrialization and occupying similar
structural positions, India and Brazil pursued radically different approaches to regulating
foreign firms. This variation was driven by divergent historical narratives that produced
contrasting cultural schemas and is epitomized by the industrial policies and firm
strategies that were employed in both countries in the common goal of developing a
locally based auto industry. The analysis challenges theories that rely on deducing
economic interests and policy preferences from actors' structural position and highlights
the merits of an alternative theorization of preferences as social constructs that are
formed through deeply social, historical and political processes.
Foreign firm entry was seen as a necessity in both countries, primarily for the technology
that it was expected to bring as well as the hard currency inflows it represented.
Nevertheless, the regulatory approach to foreign investment was markedly different
despite the two countries' similar structural positions in the global economy. Both
pursued 'nationalistic' policies, but the content and implications of Indian and Brazilian
nationalisms were radically different. Ultimately, the FDI policy regime adopted in Brazil
emphasized domestic production by MNCs behind high tariff barriers as a means of
reducing imports while the rationale of Indian industry rested on promoting domestic
rather than foreign ownership and control of firms in the technology intensive
manufacturing sector.
72 Further, Newfarmer (1979) suggests that by leaving the 'market for firms' unregulated the Brazilian
government in effect facilitated the takeover of many firms/control of industries by MNCs. This non-action
speaks volumes to preferences, and contrasts with the actions in the Indian case that run in precisely the
opposite direction, as exemplified with FERA i.e. not only could MNCs not takeover firms in India post-
1973, in fact the goal was to have Indian firms/actors gain ownership and control of industry and of
previously foreign owned firms.
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This chapter not only challenges structural-deductive theories in the rational choice
tradition, it also offers an alternative set of explanations for constructivist political
economic analyses. Sikkink (1991:51) suggests that the Latin American paradigm of
'developmentalism' emerged as an outcome of nationalist desires for state-directed
industrialization coupled with international demands for openness and the availability of
international finance, especially FDI. She suggests that the preference for heavy industry
embedded in the developmentalist system of thought created a "built-in bias" towards
foreign capital given the technical and financial limitations of domestic industrialists
(Sikkink, 1991:33). However, the preference for heavy industry in the developmentalist
cultural schema was also an important element of Indian scientific socialism, and yet
each system of thought assigned radically different roles to foreign capital. The Indian
case shows that the nationalist desire for modern heavy industry did not have to produce
a preference for foreign capital. Instead, Brazil's relatively benign historical experience
with British merchant firms during its 'classic development' phase coupled with its
growing orientation towards the West and wartime collaboration with the US produced
radically different preferences towards the role of foreign firms in promoting rapid
industrial development. By contrast, Indian actors' colonial experience generated
powerful cultural schemas oriented around anti-imperialism that continued to shape
Indian attitudes towards foreign capital long after independence. Sikkink (1991) supports
her argument by citing the coinciding timing of Brazil's balance of payments challenges
in the early 1950s with the pro-FDI planning as a fortuitous fit. However, as argued
throughout the chapter, India faced similar macroeconomic constraints in the late 1950s
and had the same opportunities to access international finance, but nevertheless Indian
state actors were unwilling to significantly change course. They retained their
commitment to domestic ownership and control of Indian industry.
Finally, the difference between Brazilian and Indian capitalists was similarly stark. Indian
industrialists recognized that foreign investment was important for technology
acquisition, but refused to relinquish majority ownership and managerial control, while
Brazilian capital was far more willing to take on the 'junior' role that Evans (1979)
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identified as a crucial characteristic of Brazilian 'dependent development'. This had
major implications for firm strategy and patterns of ownership and control in the
respective auto industries. The Brazilian auto industry was launched with MNCs having
the dominant role, a position that they enhanced and consolidated over the course of the
first fifteen years. By contrast, Indian firms dominated the auto industry from its
establishment and continued to maintain control throughout the import substitution period
and well into the more recent era of economic liberalization, as Chapter Seven of this
dissertation will show.
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CHAPTER 7
Agency and Creativity in Cultural Schema Construction:
Populist Socialism and Aspirational Consumerism
So much of the thinking within economics and economists was to do with the
government being a predator.. .Now, we have an example where we did this
[liberalization], where we were taking away power from ourselves. No one else told us to
do it. It was totally suo moto [government acting on its own cognizance]. It was actually
because of force of ideas. So in that sense I think that something particular to do with
government policy and so on. Economists' thinking is too simplistic, and in some sense
they devalue themselves by not recognizing the force of ideas, which Keynes did.
Keynes always talked about the force of ideas.
-- Interview with former Senior Economist, Government of India, New Delhi, April 2011.
I. Introduction
Causal ideas are central elements of policy preferences, as this dissertation has argued
and the above quote suggests. However, the role of ideas has been a source of
controversy in the literature over the past two decades. This chapter assesses the role of
economic ideas in the process of preference formation and change. It does so through
analysis of the rise of new causal ideas and the social and cultural systems of meaning in
which they are embedded.
After providing an overarching theoretical framework in Chapters One and Two that
argued that preferences are shaped by cognitive and cultural schemas -- rationalized
causal ideas imbued with historically salient social meaning -- Chapters Three, Four and
Five on Nationalist Origins, Capitalist Origins and the Nehru-Gandhi debates showed
how preferences towards foreign capital emerge through historically-embedded processes
of social construction and political contestation. Chapter Six then introduced the
comparative case of Brazil to challenge 'static' structural-material theories of the sources
of preferences by showing how preferences vary across firm and government actors that
occupy similar positions in the socio-economic structure. Having shown how preferences
emerge and differ across similarly situation actors, the next two chapters outline the
socio-political mechanisms through which foreign direct investment (FDI) policy
preferences change over time.
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This dissertation has shown that preferences are neither fixed nor exogenously
determined but are shaped by socially constructed cognitive and cultural schemas.
However, this raises the following question: if actors see the world through schemas --
widely held belief systems that posit rationalized causal ideas imbued with deep social
and historical meaning -- how do schemas, and hence preferences, change? If preferences
are not unambiguously given, but are developed through a social process in which actors
utilize cultural schemas to interpret the world and their situation within it, what are the
mechanisms through which this process might unfold? Do preferences change through
processes of social learning where actors seek new economic ideas and information to
update their preference orderings via 'rational' processes of Bayesian learning (Bates et
al, 1998; Weingast, 2005)? Or do preferences change through more 'constructivist'
processes where actors adopt new ideas that diffuse through epistemic networks and alter
their belief systems (Dobbin et al, 2007)? That is, does the process occur solely in the
minds of individuals or is there a social dimension where collective social meanings,
cultural symbols, narratives and tropes come in to play. Finally, is there a role for
discourse, debate and political contestation in the process of adopting new policy ideas
and the rise and fall of 'policy paradigms' (Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2008)? And are these
alternative 'sociological' and 'scientific' mechanisms of preference change compatible,
as the three-stage model in Hall's (1993) seminal article argues, or are they inherently
incommensurable, as Blyth's (2011) critique suggests?'
This dissertation argues that while both rational Bayesian and social learning perspectives
in comparative and international political economy rightly stresses the role of causal
ideas, a crucial missing element is the social meaning with which causal ideas must be
imbued, the salient historical narratives in which they must be embedded and the cultural
symbols that must be utilized in conveying causal ideas in order for them to be fully
internalized. That is, ideas that are weakly embedded or do not fit the historical narratives
Dobbin Simmons and Garrett (2007:450) also identify crucial differences in arguing that "Constructivists
and learning theorists agree that changes in ideas lead to changes in policy, although constructivists point to
theory and rhetoric as the source of new ideas and learning theorists point to rational, observational
deduction." Hall (1993) brought these two positions together in his three stage mode of preference and
Kuhnian paradigm change and Blyth (2011) later suggested that they reflect incommensurate positions.
This is elaborated in Chapter Two.
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and collective social memory of a given society have little chance of resonating with
societal actors much less shaping preferences and behavioral outcomes. Imbuing ideas
with social meaning is thus crucial, but it does not happen naturally; it requires
significant agency and creativity on the part of strategic political and economic actors.
These actors, often prominent figures in business or the state with access to valuable
social, political and economic resources, utilize widely understood cultural symbols to
devise and deploy new schemas that posit different roles for foreign and domestic capital
in the nationalist development project (Douglas, 1986; Swidler, 1986; Sewell, 1992).
This chapter thus contributes to the literature on preferences, social learning and the
politics of ideas by highlighting the socio-historical and cultural embeddedness of ideas
along with the role of agency in shaping political and economic outcomes, which are
often downplayed or ignored in rational choice, historical institutional and even some
sociological institutional formulations of the new institutional literature. 2
This chapter will show how preferences change as established cognitive and cultural
schemas become delegitimized by economic and political developments that violate the
promise and expectations of the dominant view. However, it goes beyond existing
theorizing in comparative political economy about the role of policy ideas and legitimacy
(Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002) by stressing the socio-cultural and historical embeddedness of
causal ideas. These developments provide an opportunity for strategic actors to construct
novel cultural schemas by imbuing new causal ideas with historically salient social
meaning. India's rich and dense social fabric, replete with generations-old socio-
economic, ethnic and religious tensions that are continually reproduced through cultural
tropes embedded in the social memory provides the perfect empirical setting to elaborate
this theoretical argument of the source of preferences in cultural schemas.
The chapter builds on earlier arguments by highlighting the agency and creativity
demonstrated by Indira Gandhi as she developed and deployed new cognitive and cultural
schemas: first populist socialism when she first became Prime Minster during the tumult
of the late 1960s, and then aspirational consumerism upon her return to power in 1980.
2 This is a central argument of the 'twin-tensions' framing in the introductory chapters.
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While the analysis of changing schemas and FDI preferences in this chapter remains
largely at the policy level, the next chapter highlights the political contestation that took
place through discourse and debate between state and firm actors and the implications for
preference change. This discursive contestation occurred when the aspirational
consumerist schema that heralded the beginning of economic liberalization in the 1980s
fractured in the 1990s as an increasing number of state and business actors attempted to
recast it ways that would serve their perceived interests. Throughout both chapters the
analysis is oriented around FDI policy, beginning with state actors in this chapter before
shifting to the interaction between state and firm actors in Chapter Eight. The dissertation
thus concludes by highlighting the interaction between FDI policy and firm strategy,
particularly around Indian firms' joint venture strategies with multinational corporations.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the delegitimization of the
Nehruvian scientific socialist cultural schema that rose to the level of a cohesive 'policy
paradigm' (Hall, 1993) that dominated Indian policymaking through the first two decades
of independence, before losing legitimacy amidst the economic stagnation and rising
social and political tensions of the late 1960s and 1970s. This turbulent period, which saw
the emergence of Indira Gandhi's populist socialism, is characterized by political
fragmentation and increasing controls on domestic big business and foreign capital as
Mrs. Gandhi deployed a set of historically salient cultural symbols to articulate
increasingly populist and anti-capitalist rhetoric. Section III considers the brief period of
Janata Party rule after Indira Gandhi's electoral defeat in 1977 and the implications for
FDI policy, including the expulsion from India of two of the most iconic American
multinational firms. Section IV analyzes the return of Indira Gandhi and the development
of the aspirational consumerist cultural schema that would drive the march towards
liberalization from 1980 to the present. This section analyzes the implications of this
schema for changing FDI preferences and the 'pro-business' attitudinal shift that marked
the early stages of India's economic reforms. Section V continues by assessing the role of
Rajiv Gandhi in furthering the aspirational consumerist cultural schema. Rajiv
symbolized of a new Indian modernity that combined large-scale private Indian capital
and foreign technology. His assumption of the Prime Minister's office signaled an
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increasingly global outlook and cemented India's drive towards liberalization. Section VI
concludes with a brief summary of the arguments in the chapter and an introduction to
the next and final empirical chapter of the dissertation.
II. Social and Political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s:
The Decline of Nehruvian Scientific Socialism and Rise of Indira Gandhi's Populism
In 1964 Jawaharlal Nehru became ill and died after holding the office of Prime Minister
continuously since independence in 1947. Nehru's widespread popularity and legitimacy
as the architect of independent India served to consolidate the new Indian nation under
the aegis of secular nationalism and 'socialist' planning after the triumph of
independence and the trauma of the country's partition into India and Pakistan. Nehru
generated a tremendous level of admiration and the high esteem in which he was held at
home and abroad provided broad-based confidence that the Indian democratic experiment
could succeed. Nehru's position was so strong that even the editors of The Times of India
found it striking:
It is a strange phenomenon of present-day [1951] Congress politics that while the rank
and file do not see eye to eye with the Prime Minister.. .they idolize him and applaud his
speeches even when he gets tough with them.. .They want him at all costs because he
alone comes nearest to the Father of the Nation in his personal and political conduct,
and has attained an international stature unique in the history of modern India.3
The Nehruvian scientific socialist cultural schema analyzed in Chapter Five rose to
become a dominant policy paradigm by virtue of its wide social acceptance and deep
institutionalization in the ministries and other bureaucratic and policymaking
organizations of the post-independence Indian state. However, despite his authority,
India's disappointing post-independence growth record meant that the dominant
Nehruvian policy paradigm began to appear vulnerable even before his death.4 Though
the Indian government achieved much in the area of heavy industrial development and
the creation of elite institutions of scientific research and higher learning -- key pillars of
scientific socialism -- mass poverty increased over the period as economic growth
3 The Times of India, Summer 1951, cited in Frankel 2004:704.
4 This is consistent with the predictions of social learning theories such as Hall (1993).
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became stuck at the 'Hindu rate of growth': a steady average of 3.5% that was rendered
effectively stagnant in per capita terms given India's high population growth.
Chapter Five showed how scientific socialism directed attention to state industrial
planning and 'development from above' by coupling public investment in heavy industry
with control of private capital through the extensive industrial licensing system that
became disparagingly known as the 'license-quota-permit raj'. 5 However, while the
Nehruvian scientific-socialist policy paradigm was broadly developmental once
implemented it proved to entaile a fairly shallow commitment to the poor. Beyond
limited land reform and passage of some urban labor law little was done in creating pro-
poor institutions; even core areas of service provision like basic health and primary
education were largely ignored, despite Nehru presiding over a purportedly 'socialist'
regime (Kohli, 2004). Nehru was not alone in sidelining the needs of the hundreds of
millions of desperately poor Indians, as most Congress Party elites were conservative in
this respect. However, since he embodied the developmental approach that bore his name
it was Nehru who ultimately shouldered the legacy of India's abysmal poverty. Nehru
himself came to realize and accept in his last few years in office that India's persistent
poverty cast a pall over his sterling achievements in domestic heavy industrial
development and foreign policy. Scientific socialism had failed to fully deliver on its
developmental promise thus Nehru's legacy was compromised.6 The co-existence of his
genuine compassion, impeccable character and internationally acclaimed statesmanship
with India's widespread squalor and poverty led Barrington Moore (1966) to famously
describe Nehru as 'the gentle betrayer of the masses'.
Economic policy disappointments in the first two decades of independence were
compounded by a humiliating military defeat to China in 1962 and another war with
Pakistan in 1965. These were followed by a major drought in 1965-66 that severely
impacted food availability. As indicated in Chapter Three, monsoon-dependent India
5 The term 'Raj' means regime, and was used to describe British rule. The application of the term to the
peculiar form of import substitution policies pursued by the Indian states thus reflects both the oppressive
constraints it was perceived to represent.
6 In fact even Nehru's policy preferences seemed to begin to shift in the early 1960s.
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suffered periodic famines throughout the British colonial era with each bout killing
millions of India's rural poor. The 1965-66 drought came at the worst possible time, as
the impact of the sudden 17% decline in food grain production was exacerbated by the
reduction of the US PL480 food aid program as the Johnson administration sought to
punish India for its outspokenness against US imperial activities in Viet Nam (Chaudry et
al, 2004; Mukherjee, 2012:14; Frankel, 2005). 7 The situation was exacerbated by
overseas purchases of food grains, military arms and capital goods for hunger relief,
military activities and industrial development efforts. These hard currency expenditures
drained foreign exchange reserves from a peak of $1.9 billion in the mid-1950s, when
India still held the high sterling balances that were discussed in Chapter Six, to less than
$500 million in 1965. The severity of India's macroeconomic position was made
overwhelmingly clear in March 1966 when the central bank's holdings were only $29
million above the legally required import cover (Chaudry et al, 2004). These factors
sparked a major balance of payments crisis that forced India to engage with the IMF and
the World Bank.
There were similarly tumultuous developments in Indian politics. Upon Nehru's death in
1964 Lal Bahadur Shastri won an internal struggle for Congress party leadership and
became India's second prime minister. Shastri was a close supporter of Nehru and a
political moderate who was broadly acceptable amidst the deepening rivalries between
conservative and progressive factions within the Congress, particularly between Nehru's
main rival Morarji Desai and a group of senior party officials that came to be known as
the 'Syndicate'. 8 However, Shastri's administration was curtailed by his own sudden
7 Chaudry et al (2004:61) provide further detail on this episode: "In 1965, with reports of a food shortage
looming across India, US President Lyndon Johnson displayed a strong interest in re-evaluating the US
economic aid programme to India begun by the Truman administration. The President, who became
personally involved in the details of the aid process, was willing to exercise strong 'leverage' before
distributing aid to the leader of the non-aligned countries. The Johnson administration was deeply frustrated
by India's lack of self-sufficiency in food production and its strident criticism of US involvement in
Vietnam. Robert Komer of the National Security Council advised President Johnson, 'Let's tell the Indians
we're not very happy with them either, especially their tendency to take our aid for granted without doing
enough to help themselves or to recognise that we're fighting their war [against Chinese aggression] in
Vietnam"' (Chaudry et al, 2004:61).
8 While Nehru refused to anoint a leader during the several months of the illness that led to his death, he
also appeared to consider Shastri the best choice to ensure continuity of his policies and crucially, to keep
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death in January 1966 and his attempts to implement some moderately liberal reforms
met with limited success, doing little to bolster the legitimacy of the Nehruvian scientific
socialist policy paradigm and attendant development model.9
The struggle for control of the Congress resumed and divisions between the Syndicate
and Desai led the former to choose Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister.
Though Mrs. Gandhi was Nehru's only child and, following the death of his wife Kamala,
his closest confidante, she was nevertheless considered a non-threatening choice by
Congress elders and was chosen despite misgivings amongst more conservative
Syndicate members about her leftist leanings. Instead, Syndicate members "opined that
[Mrs.] Gandhi could serve as a non-threatening PM and 'a convenient instrument' until
significant differences within the senior leadership had been resolved" (Frankel, 1978;
Mukherji, 2012:10). This would prove to be a major miscalculation. Though Indira
Gandhi had little standing amongst the old guard Congress elites, she was hugely popular
amongst the growing young progressive cadres and radical socialist activists in the party.
Even more crucially, she enjoyed tremendous appeal among the Indian masses more
broadly, particularly socio-economically marginalized lower caste Hindus and Muslims.' 0
Her appointment thus symbolized continuity in the Congress Party's rhetorical
commitment to the goals of socialism and secular nationalism (Frankel, 1978).
Desai out of power. However, it is unclear but unlikely that Nehru's real intention was to pave the way for
his daughter Indira Gandhi (cf. Frankel, 2005).
9 In fact, contrary to expectations that his policies would reflect continuity, in his brief 20 months in office
Shastri quietly moved away from Nehruvian planning and towards an incentive rather than regulatory
control approach to private (foreign and domestic) business, indicated little faith in the efficacy of public
versus private sector enterprise, and sought to pay greater attention to agriculture than industry (Frankel,
1978:246-52). Shastri's term in office thus reflected an initial attempt at liberal economic reforms.
10 Mrs. Gandhi's credentials as a nationalist leader were sound having been imprisoned by the British as a
young woman for her political activism during the 1942 Quit India movement. She followed this up with
several years of 'on the ground' party activism while her father was Prime Minister, and she had been given
what was seen as a minor cabinet position as Minister of Information and Broadcasting during the short-
lived Shastri administration. However, the allocation of the information portfolio would in many ways
prove to be foreshadowing: During her time in Shastri's cabinet she was the only one that could attract a
crowd as large as the prime minister. This would apparently serve her well over the course of her first
administration that became increasingly populist, as well as when she returned in the 1980s.
252
Indira Gandhi's Precarious Political Position
Indira Gandhi thus assumed the Prime Minister's office with significant angst about the
stability of her position. The legitimacy of the dominant Nehruvian scientific socialist
policy paradigm, which had defined the nationalist development project and united the
country, was weakening and she was rightly distrustful of her senior Congress colleagues
who hoped to take advantage of her political inexperience (Frankel, 2005; Mukherji,
2012). Most pressingly, she was immediately faced with the macroeconomic crisis that
forced India to enter into negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank.
Indira Gandhi led a team of senior technocrats to Washington DC in the Spring of 1966
to negotiate with the IFIs and the Johnson administration, which under Congressional
pressure had already placed India on a 'short-tether' policy of making desperately needed
food aid conditional on improvements in agricultural efficiency and population control.
Johnson became personally involved because of India's antagonistic stance on the Viet
Nam war and its influence in the developing world as a leader of the non-aligned
movement. He hardened the US position by instructing Secretary of State Dean Rusk that
the US government would only be willing to sanction support to India if it accepted the
recommended reforms and either remained neutral or actively supported US military
activities in South-East Asia (Chaudry et al, 2004). Though Indira Gandhi charmed the
American media and made a favorable impression upon the American public Johnson
was not swayed; instead he tightened the US government response to famine-stricken
India's food aid requests by releasing ships month by month, prompting even the
American Ambassador to India to describe Johnson's move as "a cruel performance"
(Guha, 2008)."
Indira Gandhi and her team were in a bind. The international financial organizations had
joined forces with a politically motivated and hostile US government to push the now-
familiar package of liberal economic reforms that included currency devaluation, trade
" The Ambassador continued by baldy stating Johnson's objective: "The Indians must conform; they must
be made to fawn; their pride must be cracked" (cited in Guha, 2008).
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and FDI liberalization, credit rationing and wage moderating fiscal austerity. Moreover,
there was recognition that the Nehruvian economic policy approach had not worked:
economic growth was low, poverty and social instability were on the rise and the 1957
foreign exchange crisis coupled with the current balance of payments crisis revealed
deep-rooted macroeconomic vulnerabilities in the Indian economy.1 3 Domestic political
weaknesses had also come to the fore. Economic policy failures were challenging the
previously unshakeable image of the Congress Party amongst the wider Indian public as
the party with the capacity to spearhead development and social transformation (Frankel,
1978:389). This is precisely the point where Hall's (1993) model would predict the
beginning of preference change through rational search and experimentation with policy
alternatives.
Despite India's macroeconomic challenges the orthodox prescriptions from the IFIs met
strong resistance from Indira Gandhi and her team. Mrs. Gandhi's lack of policy
experience made her heavily reliant on a tight circle of carefully chosen advisors. The
LSE-educated P.N. Haksar led the group and became her principal secretary and most
important source of guidance.14 These technocratic elites held strong pro-state and anti-
market views and were not keen on the proposed reforms. Not only did the proposals by
the Bank and Fund to liberalize trade and foreign investment run directly counter to the
tenets of scientific socialism, the pressure to adopt these reforms by the Washington D.C.
based IMF-World Bank-US Treasury triumvirate was antithetical to the deeply-held anti-
imperialism upon which the nationalist movement was built. The opposition was so
strong that the highly influential Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari, who had been
12 This was one of the first attempts by the international institutions at providing conditional aid to a
developing country. The World Bank Bell Mission Report made six key recommendations as conditions for
providing India with financing: (1) devaluing the Rupee (2) removal of direct controls on intermediate good
imports (3) increased investment in agriculture and (4) increase agricultural investment (Mukherji, 2012:9;
see also Chaudry, 2004).
13 Hall (1993) would suggest that these empirical 'anomalies and disappointments are [the] first stage of
learning', [which would result in shifts in instruments and settings]. We will return to this later in the
chapter.
14 Indira Gandhi and P.N. Haksar were also both Kashmiri Pandits from the same hometown, attended
university in England around the same time, and had many friends in common. In addition to Haksar, this
circle included T.N. Kaul, D.P. Dhar, P.N. Dhar and R.N. Kao - all Kashmiri Brahmins as well -- who
were known as the Panch Pandava after the five heroic brothers of the epic Sanskrit Mahabharata (Guha,
2008).
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Nehru's close colleague and a major figure in his cabinet for the two decades since
independence, resigned in December 1965 in protest against the initial proposal of US
government-backed reforms.
These anti-imperial preferences would shape India's response to the liberal proposals
from Washington. Despite the weakening of Nehruvian scientific socialism and
overwhelming political pressure from the US, the Indian team resisted many of the IFI's
recommendations. As Krishnamachari's bitter objections and eventual resignation
showed, Bank staff and Indian technocrats understood the crisis through different
interpretive frames that posited radically different causal ideas with different implications
for policy action. India eventually acquiesced to a reform package that included a 58%
devaluation of the rupee given the severity of the crisis and the desperate need for
emergency concessional finance. Chaudry et al (2004:63) argue that "in reality... Indian
authorities were not keen to abandon the strategy of import substitution industrialization"
and maintained many of the tariffs and subsidies that constituted the policy regime. In
essence, "the GOI had reserved the right to continue to pursue an ISI strategy once [the]
harvest improved and the crisis passed" (Ibid:63). "
These preferences against liberal reforms were not restricted to India's technocratic elite;
they were widely held amongst the general public reflecting the depth and breadth of
shared social understandings. As soon as the details of the devaluation became public
there was a powerful backlash from the political and wider social realm. The devaluation
sparked broad-based cross-party resistance in the legislature and wider Indian society.
Prominent commentator Inder Malhotra, The Guardian's India correspondent and editor
of the Times of India, recalled:
All hell broke lose. Public opinion was aroused as never before except against the
Chinese invasion earlier. The entire opposition, from the extreme left to the extreme right,
condemned the devaluation unequivocally.16
15 Guha (2008) following Mukherji (1966) actually suggests that the Indian government went well beyond
the IFIs recommendations in the depth of the devaluation.
16 Statement from Malhotra's (1989) Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography, cited in Chaudry
et al (2004:63).
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The anti-imperialism cries were immediate and strong. Congress Party President and
Syndicate leader K. Kamaraj saw the devaluation as undermining swadeshi self-reliance.
Communist MP Hiren Mukherjee went further by denouncing the devaluation as being
"forced on India 'by the cloak and dagger aid givers of America' while a communist
trade union called it 'a shameful act of national betrayal' (Guha, 2008). The only support
came from the free-market Swatantra Party whose main parliamentary spokesperson
suggested that:
if devaluation constituted a first step in a policy of economic realism in place of the
doctrinaire policies pursued by the Congress government, it would have some desirable
results in boosting the exports and promoting the inflow of foreign capital.' 7
It should come as no surprise that this backlash was framed in anti-imperialist terms.
Devaluation was not perceived by most Indians as an objectively reasonable technical
solution to a macroeconomic crisis, but as India submitting to the United States in the
face of pressure to cease condemning its neo-imperial activities in Viet Nam. The
reaction underscored the deeply embedded salience of anti-colonialism in Indian society.
Despite growing disillusionment with the policy outcomes of Nehruvian planning the
Indian polity still understood the world through an anti-imperialist framework, clearly
demonstrating to the Indian political class that this element of scientific socialism
retained deep salience in Indian society. This public reaction did not go unnoticed by
strategic political actors: Indira Gandhi and P.N. Haksar both recognized the powerful
salience and social meaning of anti-imperialism and would utilize it in the construction of
a new cultural schema in the face of the declining Nehruvianism scientific socialism.
Political Fragmentation and Indira Gandhi's Response:
Populist Anti-Capitalism and Garibi Hatao
Though the 1966 macroeconomic crisis was averted, Indira Gandhi still faced a host of
social and political challenges. She was appointed leader of the Congress amidst growing
internal divisions within the party and external threats as new parties arose to challenge
its political dominance. As the legitimacy of the cohesive Nehruvian secular nationalist
"7 Cited in Guha (2008). The Swatantra Party had the backing of many prominent industrialists including
J.R.D. Tata. However, others such as GD Birla who was historically close to the Congress Party sought to
stake out a more intermediate position.
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policy paradigm declined, regional tensions and secessionist threats emerged from
revolutionary movements, parties and ethno-linguistic groups opposing the political
hegemony of a Congress Party that had ruled India relatively unchallenged since
independence. Political fragmentation forced the devolution of power from the center in
New Delhi to state capitals and legislatures and in the most extreme cases these agitations
were accommodated by the creation of entirely new states. While two new states were
also created under the stability of Nehru's rule, the total number of states only increased
from 14 to 16 between 1956 and 1966. However, in the next decade through 1976
another six states were carved out of existing political units, representing a 37% increase
during Indira Gandhi's tenure. In other cases popular discontent with the deteriorating
economic climate turned to political violence as Marxist and Naxalite movements
successfully organized mass struggles "that fused appeals to regional, linguistic, and
tribal aspirations with promises of ending economic exploitation" (Frankel, 1978:389). 18
This created an internal political crisis as the Congress recognized that "The party's old
ruling formula - a mantel of inclusive nationalism and long chains of patronage fed by
statism - was increasingly incapable of generating electoral majorities" (Kohli,
2004:270).'9
There is no understating the fact that India was in the midst of a tumultuous period. There
was consensus in international opinion that India's unlikely democratic experiment was
set to fail. An American journalist sent to tour the country in late 1966 reported being
struck by 'the bizarre range of India's seething problems of religious fanaticism,
language barriers [and] regional feuds' which led him to predict that 'the breakdown of
law and order will be so complete that the Army will take power, as happened in
neighboring Pakistan and Burma'. 20 The chaotic atmosphere was punctuated by sporadic
18 The Naxalites emerged from a split between Marxist-Leninist and Maoist branches of the Communist
Part of India. This period is the root of today's Naxalite movement which current Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh stated in 2006 constitutes "The single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by
our country" is also organized around the legitimacy of the Indian state to deliver development in Naxalite
regions and the exploitation of mining resources by foreign firms. We will return to the role of the
Naxalites briefly in the next chapter.
19 this in turn fed internal divisions, between the Syndicate and Desai on one hand, and between the older
guard and young turks on the other.
20 Cited in Guha, 2008.
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episodes of political, communal and religious violence across the country that saw
thousands being displaced or killed. While the otherwise patronizing American journalist
cited above might be forgiven for being overwhelmed by the sheer scale and intensity of
India, as many visitors to the country are, even the London Times' veteran India hand
Neville Maxwell penned a series of articles entitled 'India's Disintegrating Democracy'
reporting that 'famine is threatening, the administration is strained and universally
believed to be corrupt, the government and the governing party have lost public
confidence and belief in themselves as well'.2 1
The contrast with the Nehruvian period was striking. Rising ethno-linguistic and religious
tensions, food shortages, inflation, and explosive population growth were creating an
increasingly combustible mix. The political situation reached crisis proportions raising
fundamental questions of socio-economic transformation and the means of reforms that
had not been openly debated since the contestation between Gandhian and Nehruvian
systems of thought during the Independence struggle. The political and economic
imperatives were such that something had to be done. The major question was the
direction of change: liberal reforms advocated by the conservative factions in the
Congress or socialist transformation pushed by younger radicals who impatient with the
party's failure to deliver more broadly inclusive development outcomes.
This was a moment of intense uncertainty. The direction the Congress would take rested
largely with Indira Gandhi but the path she might choose was completely unclear.
Chapter Five detailed how her father's views were carefully developed through years of
reading, traveling and deep introspection as he grappled with the challenges that colonial
India faced, and were widely known through his extensive speeches and writing through
which he contested both colonial liberalism and 'traditional' Gandhianism and worked to
21 Ibid.
22 Yet despite growing recognition of the failures of the policy approach that had been pursued since
independence and awareness of growing disillusionment with Nehruvian scientific socialism, these
challenges did not automatically produce growing preferences for liberal reforms whether through a
rational Bayesian search for alternatives or through proposals channeled through epistemic communities.
These oft-posited mechanisms did not trigger preference change despite observation of strong economic
growth through liberal economic policies in Latin America as well as the availability of liberal economic
ideas presented by rising star Indian economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati.
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convince the people of India of his beliefs. By contrast, Indira Gandhi's views on
economic and geopolitical issues as fundamental as her belief in a market vs. planned
economy or her position on the cold war were largely unknown (Guha, 2008).2 However,
Mrs. Gandhi proved to be a savvy political actor and far less pliable than her senior
colleagues had hoped. Upon consultation with her inner circle of advisors led by the
formidable Haksar -- all of whom considered themselves true believers in socialism, or at
least India's unique Nehruvian statist brand -- Mrs. Gandhi cleverly transformed the
potential crisis of legitimacy that threatened her early undoing into her biggest asset. As
Frankel (1978:392) argues:
Notwithstanding the flood of political abuse pouring in on the Prime Minister in the wake
of devaluation, she still enjoyed one crucial advantage in tapping the deep public
sentiment that had been revealed against dictation or the appearance of any dictation
from the West on questions of national policy. Mrs. Gandhi, after all, was the daughter
of Nehru - India's architect of nonalignment. Her opponents in the Syndicate were, by
contrast, publicly identified with pro-American sentiments. Desai, a fierce antagonist
of communism and the Soviet Union, was by default associated with a personal
preference for the West [and Syndicate leader] S.K. Patil, long outspoken in his
admiration for the capitalist system, made no secret of his sympathies for the United
States.
Indira Gandhi wrapped herself tightly in the mantle of Nehruvian anti-imperialism and
blasted the US for its aggressions in South-East Asia. While Shastri tentatively
experimented with liberal economic policies during his brief stint in office, these did little
to arrest India's economic decline while seeming to widen existing economic inequalities,
exacerbate longstanding social, communal and religious tensions and fuel political
fragmentation. This point that was not lost on Mrs. Gandhi who wrote to a friend saying
the devaluation was " 'a most difficult and painful decision' taken only 'when various
other palliatives which had been tried for the last two years [of Shastri's administration]
did not produce satisfactory results"' (Guha, 2008).4 This recognition of lessons learned
from earlier experiments in the face of the failures of Nehruvian scientific socialism is
consistent with the theories of social learning detailed in Chapter Two and outlined in the
introduction to this chapter. However, while these approaches suggest that actors would
23 Even to this day historians lament the absence of archival material through diaries, personal memos,
letters or notes that might give insight to Indira Gandhi thoughts. Not only did she write little beyond small
notes in the margins of memos, archival access to her personal papers in India remains closed (Guha,
2008).
24 Chibber (2003) also suggests that the short liberal experiment didn't yield much gain, plus had clear
political backlash.
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turn to ideas from epistemic communities or predict a Bayesian search for alternatives,
the Indian experience shows how strategic political actors devise new courses of action
by creating novel combinations of rationalized causal ideas and salient cultural symbols
that are imbued with deep social meaning (Douglas, 1986; Swidler, 1986; Sewell, 1992).
Though Mrs. Gandhi tapped into powerful Nehruvian cultural symbols of anti-
imperialism she did not unconsciously follow a pre-existing cultural script. She revealed
her political ingenuity by assessing the domestic socio-political and economic climate
and making garibi hatao (poverty alleviation) her ruling slogan.2 Mrs. Gandhi allied
with the younger party radicals who considered themselves genuine socialists (as distinct
from the elite statist 'socialism' that Nehru pursued) and she simultaneously labeled the
old entrenched Congress elite as ideological reactionaries, enemies of the poor and allies
of the West. Her justifiable concerns about the strength of her political position within the
party led her to build her own base of support by appealing to the left and re-crafting her
administration through increasingly populist and anti-capitalist symbols and rhetoric. Her
speeches to parliament began to express 'concern for all the minorities of India' and
called for 'a new deal for the downtrodden' while blasting "'businessmen and
industrialists' who had the nerve to talk of worker indiscipline while continuing to 'make
big profits and draw fat salaries"' (Guha, 2008).
Mrs. Gandhi's crucial innovation was to retain the statist orientation of scientific
socialism while jettisoning the elitist elements that drove development from above rather
than below. This approach was at odds with the Congress right wing, 26 the US
government and World Bank, as well as the policy direction of successful peer countries
like Brazil that were averaging 6% growth through FDI-fuelled industrialization.
However, it successfully captured the deep historically rooted social meaning of anti-
imperialism as well as the marginal role that scientific socialism assigned to private
25 She and her advisors would doubtless have been assisted by various forms of political intelligence, such
as information from a survey conducted at the time by India's leading pollster EPW da Costa indicating
that Congress' waning support was due to its perceived lack of charisma and was concentrated amongst the
previously loyal vote bank of minorities, youth and the less educated. This was precisely the group that
Mrs. Gandhi aimed for (Guha, 2008).
26 The divisions within the Congress ultimate led to a split in the party. See Frankel (2004) for details.
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capital, both foreign and domestic, in the development process.27 It is important to stress
that while many of the cultural artifacts that were deployed, such as anti-imperialism and
the rapaciousness of large Indian capitalists, were deeply rooted in Indian social memory,
this did not reflect the application of a pre-existing template or cultural script; it was a
creative display of cultural agency through which socially salient and meaningful
elements were selectively recombined to address a specific political challenge (Sewell,
1992; Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio, 1988).
This was a highly strategic move. As Chapter Four argued, private capital occupied a
historically complex position in the Indian social imagination and Chapter Five
demonstrated the centrality of contrasting depictions of private capital in the contestation
between Gandhian and Nehruvian cultural schemas. While Gandhianism retained an
important role for Indian capitalists as 'trustees of the nation's wealth', Nehruvian
scientific socialism resonated with many as a compelling articulation of the deeply held
suspicion of private capital in Indian society. This sentiment stemmed from centuries-old
historical memory of abuse at the hands of wealth and powerful landlords, traders and
moneylenders that made many Indians ambivalent if not hostile towards domestic
capitalists who, as Chapter Four showed, emerged not from artisanal classes but precisely
from these abhorred trading and moneylending groups. Even among the high status upper
class and caste communities that did not face the power imbalances under which their
lower caste and class compatriots suffered, trading and moneylending activities were seen
as sullied and crude at best. The importance of the social background of the strategic
actors who create dominant cultural schemas is also important. It's likely no coincidence
that Nehru grew up in an elite Kashmiri Pandit community, as of course did Indira
Gandhi as well as Haksar and her other leading Kashmiri Brahmin advisers; Mohandas
Gandhi, by contrast, was raised in a Gujarati bania (trader) community.28 Thus agency
and creativity were central in schema construction in this period, just as argued in
27 Unlike South Korea, Nehruvian scientific socialism in India sought to tame rather than encourage the
private sector. "State intervention had a decidedly regulatory cast: Instead of asking business what it could
do and how the state could help, the state itemized what private business could not do and then raised
numerous barriers to what it could do" (Kohli, 2004:267). See also Frankel (2004) and Rudolph and
Rudolph (1987).
28 Further, there was a counter-narrative around capitalism and communalism, that would be later be
deployed by Indira Gandhi.
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Chapters Three, Four and Five with the creation of 'drain theory' by the late 19* century
nationalists, the resistance by Indian capitalists to colonial attempts to cast their economic
practices as self-serving, backward and anti-modem, as well as in the construction of
Nehruvian and Gandhian schemas that fuelled the independence movement. In each of
these cases, strategic actors demonstrated significant agency by combining different
socially salient cultural artifacts in the development and deployment of new cultural
schemas that aimed to shape their institutional environment. These deeply embedded
social meanings of private capital are essential for understanding the cultural schemas
that shaped FDI preferences during this period and especially during the liberalization
phase analyzed in the next chapter as strategic political and economic actors utilized
these highly charged cultural tropes as resources in FDI policy debates.29
The Policy Implications of the Populist Socialist Turn
Indira Gandhi's strategy was politically successful but it came at a cost. Though she
"provided the winning strategy that revived Congress' sagging fortunes," her populism
would further India's socio-political fragmentation "with significant developmental
consequences" (Kohli, 2004:270). 30 These consequences became clear over the course of
the decade that she remained in power as Mrs. Gandhi successfully sought legitimacy by
stretching the Nehruvian scientific socialism in a populist and anti-capitalist direction.
Indira Gandhi's populist socialism was not a mere rhetorical shift; it was soon reflected in
a broader policy agenda that significantly altered the structure of the Indian political
economy. Following Hall (1993:279), this new agenda was akin to 'third order' policy
change as it went beyond first and second order changes in "policy settings and
instruments" seen in 'normal policymaking' to reflect a more "disjunctive" process
29 As Chapter Two argued, the argument that actors use elements of cultural schemas as resources is closely
akin to Swidler's (1986) formulation of culture as a toolkit of repertoires that are available to actors. The
relationship between my argument and Swidler's (1986) is elaborated further in the next chapter where
these cultural schemas become more contested.
30 One important outcome was that in order to consolidate her position she made political appointments in
bureaucracy that diminished the professionalism and insulation from society that had long characterized the
meritocratic Indian Administrative Service. This loss of professionalism through the erosion of merit as
criteria for professional advancement relative and increasing value of links with politicians marked the
beginning of extensive corruption that the Indian bureaucracy, especially the lower level, has become
infamous for.
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"marked by radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse. It was an
attempt to shift to a new policy paradigm. In particular, the anti-imperialist position had
an immediate effect on government preferences and policy towards foreign capital:
Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals Asoka Mehta recalled that his proposals for joint
ventures between foreign and Indian firms that he considered mutually beneficial were
"shot down one by one" in cabinet meetings at Mrs. Gandhi's behest (Frankel, 1978:393).
The legitimacy of collaborations between foreign and domestic big business was being
directly challenged. The institutionalization of this position was supported by the findings
of two major government commission reports that had a powerful effect on Mrs.
Gandhi's policy approach. The R.K. Hazari-led commission was convened after the 1966
balance of payments crisis and its recommendations ran directly counter to the liberal
prescriptions of the World Bank and the US government by recommending increased
state involvement in the economy as a means of addressing perceived policy problems
and failings. The first Hazari report issued in 1967 called for greater industrial planning
and state guidance in government-determined priority areas while the second, released in
1969, focused on the massive concentration of industry amongst a small number of
private Indian business groups (Hazari 1967, 1969; Mukherji, 2012).31
The Hazari reports led directly to three major policy initiatives.32 All three related to the
monopoly power of private capital, which was a longstanding issue under Nehru albeit
one that the government said much but did little about. Crucially, all three aimed to
delegitimize large private domestic and foreign capital as the vehicles through which
development should be pursued.
The first policy initiative was increasing state ownership of the banking sector, which led
to a wave of bank nationalizations beginning in 1969. This unnerved big Indian
capitalists and foreign investors but supported small and medium-sized entrepreneurs as
state control of the banks led to increased provision of low cost loans to the small-scale
31 The Birla group was particularly identified as having taken advantage of the licensing system.
32 [See Dhar for work of other government commissions that were convened at the time.]
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sector. This was a major demand of the young socialist radicals in the party that allowed
the Gandhi administration to 'democratize' lending thus adding immensely to Mrs.
Gandhi's populist appeal (Kohli, 2004).
This was not the only rationale. It also served to 'curtail the proclivities of businessmen'
who engaged in speculative 'traditional' moneylending practices in the informal rural
financial sector rather investing in 'legitimate' areas of modern capitalist industrial
development (Tyabji, 2010:5). This was a major translation of culturalist discourse and
beliefs into state policymaking practice that was deemed crucial by state actors not
merely because of the abuses that rural poor faced at the hand of usurious moneylenders,
but also because of the drain on industrial capital that resulted as trading and
moneylending groups increasingly gained control of industrial concerns in the cities as
British capital fled in the post-independence era. The state held that many of these
businessmen 'of dubious social origin' (almost invariably seen as arising from the
Marwari trading community, as discussed in Chapter Four) utilized the diversified
business group organizational form to raise finance through the stock markets, use the
cash to buy manufacturing units and strip them of productive industrial assets in order to
take advantage of the higher rates of return that were available through rural
moneylending activities. Capital accumulated in the industrial sector was thus
transformed into rural debts (Tyabji, 2010:5). This de-industrializing drain on industrial
33 Nationalization addressed the clear shortage of capital in rural India, reflected amongst other things in the
high lending rates that prevailed and the dominance of 'traditional' informal moneylenders and
moneylending practices. It also gave Mrs. Gandhi and the Indian treasury access to the savings of the
Indian population, and nationalized banks duly transformed traditionally high household savings rates into
domestic national debt. This source of finance facilitated much of Mrs. Gandhi's populist spending.
Interestingly, as domestic sources of liquidity eventually dried up in the 1980s the state increasingly turned
outside to foreign sources of debt. However, this happened a decade later than most developing countries,
most notably Latin American states, allowing India to avoid the ravages of the 1980s debt crisis.
Nevertheless, a sovereign debt crisis ensued in the late 1980s which promoted the final turn towards
liberalization (Kapadia, 2009).
34 This practice is related to what financial economists have termed 'tunneling' and the concerns of Indian
technocrats are reflected in the normative underpinnings of this contemporary literature (cf. Khanna and
Yafeh, 2007; Bertrand et al, 2002). See Tyabji (2010:5) for further discussion of how these practices were
viewed by Indian technocratic leadership and Chapter Four of Birla (2008) for further background on the
cultural and discursive politics of the speculative and trading origins of Indian capital. That is, the extent to
which these illegitimate behaviors were tied to business actors drawn from specific trading communities,
particularly the Marwaris. This underpinned the development and deployment of powerful cultural tropes
that played a major role in shaping views toward private Indian capital relative to foreign capital during
liberalization in the 1990s.
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capital was anathema to nationalist goals of industrial development and was a significant
contributor to the dim view that Nehru and his colleagues took towards many Indian
'capitalists' who failed to behave like 'true industrialists by investing their wealth in
economic activities that would further industrial development and wider growth,
transformation and modernization of the Indian economy and society (cf. Tyabji, 2010;
Birla, 2008). This distinction between illegitimate speculators and moneylenders and
'true' capitalist-industrialists hearkens back to the late colonial construction of 'Indian
Economic Man' analyzed in Chapter Four, and would once again become crucial in the
politics of liberalization in the post-1991 period.
The second major policy change was the passage of the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade
Practices (MRTP) Act in 1969. The MRTP reflected the recognition that, even though
Nehruvianism explicitly favored state ownership of industry and aimed to tightly control
the private sector through the licensing system, industry had nevertheless become
concentrated in the hands of a small number of major business houses. The Hazari Report
revealed how these business houses managed to coopt the licensing process and acquire
industrial licenses in a wide variety of industries, including 'pre-emptive' licenses in
areas that the group had little intention of entering but wanted to preclude rival groups,
Birla being the most egregious example (Hazari, 1967). While these economic practices
were tolerated under scientific socialism given the focus on large-scale industry and the
agnosticism of some scientific socialists towards private capital that was revealed in
Chapter Five, they were anathema under the new populist socialist approach. The MRTP
placed major curbs on the expansion of big business and was coupled with numerous
informal blockages and bureaucratic harassment of major Indian business houses. 3 The
35 For example, despite J.R.D. Tata's personal relationship with Indira Gandhi and his continued provision
of campaign contributions to the Congress Party, none of his group companies receive approvals for
expansion in the 1970s, including desperately needed modernization of the TISCO steel factory and
expansion of the production capacity of commercial vehicle assembler TELCO from 36,000 to 56,000
trucks per annum. Similarly, the offices of Rahul Bajaj, holder of the license that granted Bajaj Auto a
virtual monopoly in the lucrative two-wheeler sector as the scooters the firm produced with technology
from the leading Italian firm Piaggio enjoyed a ten-year waiting list, was repeatedly raided by the tax
authorities. This reflects the complexity of the relationship between Indira Gandhi and big Indian capital at
this time.
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role of private domestic capital as a preferred vehicle for development was thus further
delegitimized by populist socialism.
The third major policy development was the imposition of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act (FERA) in 1973, the most dramatic effects of which are detailed in the
next section. 36 FERA was the single most important development in the regulation of
foreign capital since independence. The rationalized causal economic logic of FERA
emerged from the MRTP and more broadly from the Indira Gandhi administration's
populist reorientation of Nehruvian scientific socialism. Proponents argued that dividend
repatriation by multinational firms drained India's foreign exchange resources and MNCs
were not adequately contributing to technology transfer. The combination of these fiscal
and technological ideas delegitimized MNC participation in the Indian national
development project. This position fit with the deeply held beliefs about foreign firms as
a 'drain' on the Indian economy that have been stressed throughout this dissertation.
FERA marked the peak of India's restrictive approach towards foreign capital and, as
empirically illustrated in the previous chapter, the law led to a dramatic decrease in MNC
market share across a range of industries.
Finally, these economic policy changes coupled with political fragmentation from the
weakening scientific socialist policy paradigm contributed to the emergence of powerful
new economic players that altered the structure of the Indian political economy. India's
land reforms in 1950s ended the zamindari landlord system and, coupled with the Green
Revolution in the 1960s, created wealthy new groups of what Rudolph and Rudolph
(1987) termed 'bullock' capitalists, particularly in the wheat and rice growing regions of
northern and southern India, respectively (see also Das Gupta, 2007; Frankel, 2005). At
the same time, the socio-political tensions that prompted changes in India's political
structure by devolving political power to the states facilitated the creation and
disbursement of new economic rents. State-level politicians directed these rents towards
favored economic actors in a process that supported the rise of new medium sized
36 FERA was preceded by the creation of a Foreign Investment Board in 1968/9. The Board would become
a crucial site of FDI regulation as India moved towards liberalization of foreign investment in the late
1980s,1990s and 2000s.
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regional business groups. This dynamic gained momentum with the policy changes from
the Hazari Report that curbed the oligopolistic tendencies of the largest business houses
through the MRTP, restricted ownership and control of Indian enterprises by foreign
capital through FERA, and increased access to finance through the recently nationalized
banks.
Thus fractures in political system coupled with economic policy changes created
opportunities for new economic actors with the potential to challenge established
capitalists whose dominance pre-dated independence (Das Gupta, 2007). Even more
importantly, by challenging the 'old' business groups these new groups were accorded a
semblance of legitimacy as underdog challengers seeking to dethrone old groups that
were believed to be monopolistic beneficiaries of protection during the Nehruvian period.
This was especially evident for new groups in the engineering related activities that were
seen as supporting India's industrial development goals more so than those engaged in
wholesale or retail trade. These beliefs about the legitimacy of these actors were widely
held despite the origins of many of these groups in similar rent-seeking behaviors as their
older counterparts. The outcomes of this dynamic would play an important role in intra-
capitalist contestation and the politics of reform as liberalization accelerated in the 1990s
and 2000s.3 7
These categories of capitalist legitimacy that shaped these three major policy initiatives
are illustrated in the table below:
3 Further, while many of these new groups emerged from merchant-trading and money-lending activities
like the older groups described in Chapter Four, this period also saw the founding patriarchs send their sons
overseas for university to prepare them to return and join the company. This would be a feature of the new
medium sized groups that grew in this period to become major players such as Bajaj, Eicher, Mahindra and
Mahindra and later Bharat Forge in the automobile industry and Rambaxy, Wockhardt and Dr Reddy's Lab
in pharmaceuticals. This would have implications for changing views towards FDI as these overseas
educated actors eventually assumed control of these important firms.
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Cognitive & Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in the 1" Indira Gandhi Period (1964-1977)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Large 'monopolistic' business groups Modem: Emerging medium sized regional groups,
that acquire 'pre-emptive licenses'; economic especially those in engineering-related industries;
actors with 'proclivities' for asset stripping and economic actors that invested in industrial
investing in speculative activities; "businessmen development.
and industrialists' who had the nerve to talk of
worker indiscipline while continuing to 'make big
profits and draw fat salaries ".
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial' MNCs that export Modem: MNCs willing to dilute to 40%, take on
profits and refuse to share technology. an Indian partner, share technology, and retain
and reinvest earnings in India.
These developments took place amidst growing social, political and economic turmoil in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, as India concluded a third war with Pakistan, faced yet
another severe drought and was hit by the 1973 oil crisis. More importantly, these policy
measures, which represented Indira Gandhi's transformation of elite Nehruvian scientific
socialism to a populist socialist policy paradigm, failed to generate the expected
economic response as growth remained marginal throughout the period. Internal conflicts
within the Congress between the Syndicate and Mrs. Gandhi led to a split of the party and
snap elections in 1969, followed by another round of elections in 1971 where she was
accused of committing massive electoral fraud. Indira Gandhi now found herself battling
political opposition from the right and the left. These political challenges led to a growing
authoritarianism that coupled with economic policy failures further delegitimized Indira
Gandhi's populist socialism.
The fears of international observers were partially realized when Indira Gandhi declared
emergency rule on June 26, 1975. The momentous decision was a pre-emptive move
while awaiting the judgment on her trial for electoral fraud though in interviews Mrs.
Gandhi claimed that this extreme step was taken not to save herself but 'to save the
country from disruption and collapse'.38 The highly repressive State of Emergency
marked the nadir of Indian democracy. Thousands of opposition members were arrested
268
38 Guha (2008).
and although the military remained in the barracks the period was rife with abuses, many
of which were led by Mrs. Gandhi's son Sanjay. The most notorious were the numerous
rural forced sterilization camps that epitomized the repressive face of the statist
development drive. Altogether the 1970s remain by far the most tumultuous period of
India's political history since the bloody sectarian pogroms that marked the partition of
India and Pakistan.
III. Janata Party Rule:
The Revival of Gandhianism and Implications for FDI Preferences and Policy
Indira Gandhi called general elections in March 1977 as she sought a fresh mandate, but
the Congress Party lost terribly to the Janata Party headed coalition, which eventually
chose right-wing conservative ex-Congress Minister and colonial era freedom fighter
Morarji Desai to be the next Prime Minister. The eighty-one year old Desai had been
Nehru's most important political foe and had twice contested the Congress leadership
after Nehru's death against both the Nehruvian turned quasi-reformist Lal Bahadur
Shastri and later the left-populist Indira Gandhi. The Janata Party ran on the platform
'bread and freedom' and its triumph marked the first time in Indian history that the
Congress Party was ousted from the Prime Minister's office. Their victory was so
devastating that Indira Gandhi even lost her own parliamentary seat.
The Janata Party coalition's successful electoral campaign was organized against Indira
Gandhi and the Emergency but had difficulties in articulating a 'positive' agenda through
a cohesive system of meaning and thought with the legitimacy and appeal to replace
Nehruvian or populist socialist paradigm. Instead the party and cabinet were "a veritable
mish-mash of ideologies: 'some baiting Nehru, others praising him, some talking about
the commanding heights of the public sector, and others brashly championing the
Japanese and American models, some asserting the need for heavy industries, other[s]
clamouring for a 'return to the villages"' (Guha, 2008; see also Kohli, 1987:201). The
party was a heterogeneous mixture that reflected of widespread rejection of Mrs. Gandhi
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and the authoritarian Emergency rather than a group with a coherent platform. The
absence of a unifying cultural schema and a leader with the creativity, legitimacy and
'social skill' to develop and articulate a broadly compelling vision as Jawaharlal Nehru
and Indira Gandhi had done before boded poorly for the party's long-term prospects.39
There were however important developments in the areas of FDI and industrial
development that highlight the utility of the cultural schema analytic relative to
competing theoretical approaches in comparative political economy that downplay the
role of social meaning. The emergence of the Janata Party and the Desai administration's
policy approach reflected a revival of the pre-independence contestation between
Gandhianism and Nehruvianism in the industrial policy arena that was analyzed in detail
40in Chapter Five. The Desai administration rejected the statist scientific socialist
rhetoric that had dominated post-independence Indian politics under the Congress Party
39 Fligstein (2001) defines social skill as the ability to induce cooperation in others by providing motivating
identities and cultural frames. He posits social skill as a mechanism that helps to bring agency into
sociological formulations that made actors agents of structure with little capacity to affect the constitution
of their social worlds. The concept and its analytic usage were heavily influenced by Giddens'(1984) ideas
of 'skilled performances'.
40 Gandhianism provided an encompassing umbrella that served to bring together groups that otherwise
held disparate belief systems and faced contrasting material circumstances. Caste, class and communalism
were important dividing lines that came to the fore in this period and would become central to the dynamics
of the Indian political economy in the liberalization period. Kohli (1987) provides a detailed analysis of the
rise of some of these new caste-based political groups. His interview with Jat leader Charan Singh (Jat
roughly translates as 'sons of the soil' or less charitably 'country hick') who headed the BLD is particularly
revealing. Kohli argues that "Charan Singh's continuing and lasting animosity towards the Nehru family
captures the ideological and cultural spirit which had given rise to [anti-Congress parties] like the BLD.
[According to Singh:] 'Nehruji would bring forward all the western educated Brahmins. He never took me
seriously because I wore a dhoti [loincloth]. I was a Jat and a country fool [Kohli's translation from Hindi]
to him. Shrimati [Indira Gandhi] is not that different. Forget the villages, she does not even know what's
going on in New Delhi. India lives in villages, not in New Delhi." Charan Singh thus epitomized the efforts
of the 'backward cultivating castes' who sought to counter urban bias through anti-urban and anti-industrial
policies. A second and crucial group was the Hindu nationalists such as the Jan Sangh who became central
players in Indian politics in this period. Unlike the 'backward caste' groups like the Jats who's orientation
was around caste-based discrimination, the Jan Sangh had its roots in militant Hinduism that rose in
response to the perceived 'withering of greater India, and therefore with the leaders who presided over this
process - Gandhi and Nehru" (Kohli, 1987:200-1). It is useful to recall that Gandhi was assassinated by a
Hindu militant who held him responsible for partition. This group's economic interests favored free
enterprise and found support in urban and rural propertied classes. In sum, an approach to understanding
preferences as based on cultural schemas does not entail delinking entirely from pluralist class analysis. Of
course, the balance of class interests matters tremendously in politics; this argument aims to show where
those interests and preferences come from and how they ultimately shape political, economic and market
outcomes.
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by reviving and deploying Gandhian language that had been subsumed under
Nehruvianism since the early 1940s.i
This was another illustration of the analytic importance of strategic action. Just as Indira
Gandhi retained certain elements of Nehruvian scientific socialism and coupled them
with her own brand of populism, much as Swidler (1986) argues that actors use cultural
'repertoires' or 'toolkits' as resources for 'strategies of action', so too did the Janata Party
attempt to use selected components of Gandhianism as resources in articulating their own
policy approach. The Janata Party's Statement on Economic Policy cited the "need to
develop an alternative both to capitalism and communism... [by] treading the path of
Gandhian socialism based on political and economic decentralization."4 2 The Statement
expressed opposition to "any economic system which allows individuals or groups
freedom to exploit other," a clear reference to the exploitative power of big private
capital, but also asserted that "at the same time it is not in favour of the state possessing
unlimited power which will destroy all initiative and freedom", thus rejecting the statism
that had been a central pillar of three decades of Congress Party rule. The Janata Party
promised to "do away with the dual society as development would be oriented to the
jobless and the homeless." This "dual society" -_ clearly a reference to the Nehruvian
focus on large-scale technology-intensive industry which had little impact on the lives of
the masses of poor -- would be accomplished in true Gandhian fashion by focusing public
sector resources on rural development through labor-intensive small-scale cottage
industries.
These Janata Party preferences against technology intensive large-scale industry had
major implications for foreign capital, even with the existence of FERA. The 1977
41 From a theoretical standpoint it is also useful to note that, despite the recognition of economic success in
countries like South Korea and Brazil that were growing at near 10% per year, these Indian actors did not
attempt to adopt the trade and industrial policies - including the approach to FDI - that had made those
countries successful. This would be the prediction of the rational Bayesian approach, which will be
discussed in greater detail in the next section.
42 Statement on Economic Policy, adopted by the Working Committee of the Janata Party on December 14,
1977. Cited in Frankel (1978:575).
4 However, it was not a cohesive articulation of Gandhianism, which ultimately had negative implications
for its salience, power and durability, and especially the ability to reach consensus on economic strategy
(Kohli, 1987:201).
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Industrial Policy Statement renounced its 1956 predecessor that was the embodiment of
scientific socialism and the hallmark of Nehru's policy agenda. The Janata Party's
statement criticized previous Congress administrations' focus on large firms and
industries that the Nehruvian policy paradigm placed at the 'commanding heights' of the
economy. Instead, it followed the precepts of Gandhianism by focusing on the
agricultural sector and expanded the list of industries reserved for small-scale firms from
180 to over 500 while promising further support for cottage, household and village
industries. 44 This revival of Gandhianism strategically inverted the modern-anti-modern
dichotomy that was discussed in Chapter Five. A 'return to the villages' was not seen as
backward, as scientific socialists had argued, but rather as (finally) realizing a 'truly
Indian' modernity.
The preferences against large firms on one hand and foreign firms on the other were
related: both were understood in the context of the exploitative power of monopoly
capital that the previous section argued was a powerful trope in the Indian social
imagination. The disparaging references to large-scale industry as monuments to
'irrelevant foreign technology' followed directly on the arguments that animated
Mohandas Gandhi and his economic avatar J.C. Kumarappa in their debates with
Nehruvian scientific socialists in the 1930s and 1940s that were described in Chapter
Five. Gandhianism prescribed an even more restricted role for foreign capital in industrial
policy as the logic of Gandhian development was predicated on small-scale cottage
industry employing traditional knowledge and production techniques rather than large-
scale industries requiring advanced (i.e. foreign) technologies. Further, Gandhi's attempts
to rationalize the position of large capitalists by labeling them with Andrew Carnegie's
terminology as 'trustees' of the nation's wealth did not encompass foreign firms: those
capitalists were tied to societies outside of India. In fact, while the previous chapter
44 Government of India, Statement of Industrial Policy, December 23, 1977.
4 This is a crucial point. As Chapter Five argued, while Gandhianism placed small-scale village industry at
the center of his utopic vision of a 'traditional' Indian modernity, Gandhi provided a role for all Indian
capital. Nehru meanwhile sought to legitimize role of the state in the economy as the main vehicle for
realizing his own vision of Indian modernity by using large-scale enterprise to direct the economy form the
'commanding heights'. Nehru provided some space for large private capital in secondary industries, and
recognized and legitimized a role for foreign capital as providers of capital in order to develop 'modern'
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showed that Nehru recognized the need for foreign technology and was generally
supportive of the Tata-Birla mission to Europe and the US to seek industrial
collaborations, Gandhi reacted strongly when informed of the news.46
The new statement followed on this logic in providing a detailed position on the role of
foreign technology:
Future development of industries in India must be based on indigenous technology as far as
possible... In order to promote technological self-reliance, the Government recognises the
necessity for continued inflow of technology in sophisticated and high priority areas where
Indian skills and technology are not adequately developed. In such areas, the Government's
preference would be for outright purchase of the best available technology and then
adapting such technology to the country's needs.
Crucially, it indicated the Janata Party's preferences for greater restrictions on foreign
firm entry, with the regulatory approach to foreign capital following directly from the
new government's position towards foreign technology:
The Government would also like to clarify its policy regarding participation of foreign
investment and foreign companies in India's industrial development. So far as existing
foreign companies are concerned the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act
would be strictly enforced. [Section 24]
The Janata Party's commitment to these espoused FDI preferences of limiting the
participation of foreign capital in the economy by strictly upholding FERA was soon
demonstrated beyond doubt. Although a significant number of MNCs remained in India
and complied with FERA by diluting their shareholding - albeit in many cases retaining
managerial control through clever board structures - FERA led to the voluntary
withdrawal of many others. However, a small number of firms were explicitly targeted.
These included Coca-Cola and IBM, which became the most famous MNCs to get
'kicked out' of India, not least because of their iconic status.
The symbolism was crucial. Coke and IBM were at the vanguard of American
multinational corporate expansion of the late post-war period, much like Ford and GM in
the early 1950s. Coke was the embodiment of 'Americana' and the global consumerism
that exploded in the post-war 'golden age' of capitalism. But while Coke represented the
industry. However, given the reliance on 'traditional' industry in Gandhianism there was no space for
foreign capital in the Gandhian system of meaning and thought.
46 I owe this insight to a conversation with economic historian Nasir Tyabji.
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nostalgia of 1960s American popular culture, IBM symbolized the future of American
technological superiority that would cement the hegemony of US multinational firms.
IBM was the acknowledged leader of the emerging high-technology computer age that
began with the space program and was steadily revolutionizing all areas of social and
economic life.47 It initially appeared that IBM might avoid regulatory pressure since in
designing FERA Indira Gandhi's administration allowed exemptions for firms that
operated in "high-priority industries" employing "sophisticated technologies".48 These
firms also had to dilute their equity holdings, but were allowed to retain up to 74% equity
shares (Encarnation, 1989:68).49 Nevertheless, just like auto firms seeking to enter India
in the 1940s and 1950s, IBM was pressured to take on a domestic partner; however, IBM
opted to exit the country rather than risk sharing its technology with India's growing
electronics firms, even with the elevated 74% cap posing little threat to managerial
control. Coca-Cola, however, was initially granted a reprieve from any equity dilution
based on the firm's argument that it could not reveal its 'secret ingredient'. This
exemption wasn't to last long.50
An examination of Coca-Cola's expulsion from India by the Janata Party illustrates the
analytic utility of cultural schemas as rationalized systems of meaning and thought that
shape actors' preferences, and the manner in which actors ascribe foreign capital to
categories of legitimacy. Industry Minister George Fernandes, a firebrand trade unionist,
understood Coke not objectively as an undifferentiated manufacturer of soft drinks but as
a potent symbol of all of the problems that foreign capital presented. In an interview with
the Multinational Monitor, Fernandes recalled that the motivation to oust Coke came in
July 1977, shortly after the Janata Party took office:
47 The effect on the Indian technological imagination during this period should not be underestimated, as
this was the moment when the cadre of Indian engineers who went abroad to Europe and the United States,
especially Silicon Valley, emerged. The roots of India's IT 'revolution' can be traced to this dynamic from
the 1970s as seen in early entrepreneurship in the sector, first in hardware and later in software.
48 This represents the importance of sophisticated technology in the Nehruvian developmentalist schema
and the implications for FDI preferences. It also provided significant bureaucratic discretion in determining
which multinational firms would be allowed to retain majority shareholding of their subsidiary in India and
which would be forced to dilute their equity stakes.
49 In fact, MNCs that agreed to export all of their output were allowed to retain 100% foreign ownership.
' Cf. Dhar.
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The idea of getting Coke out struck me when I was the minister of communications, prior
to being minister of industry. I was visiting a village in my constituency. It was summer
and hot, and the first thing I did when I reached that particular village was to ask for a
glass of water. Someone brought me a glass of water, but the district magistrate, who is
the highest district government official, came and prevented me from taking the glass of
water. He said, "No sir, this is not for you, you can't drink this water. We have Coke for
you." I was very upset and angry. I said, "Thirty years of freedom and planning and we
have Coke that has reached the villages, but we do not have drinking water that the
villagers can consume." That is when my mind said something is wrong. 1
Fernandes' interpretation of this episode is best understood in terms of the cultural
schemas that constitute actors' policy preferences. These systems of meaning and
thought posit rationalized causal relationships imbued with historically salient
social meaning that deeply resonate with societal actors and shape their
perceptions of foreign capital. Fernandes explanation of the final decision
provides empirical support to this theoretical claim:
When I entered the Ministry of Industry shortly thereafter, one of the first things I
focused on was the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act stipulation limiting foreign
investors to 40 percent equity in domestic enterprises. I summoned the Coke people and
told them to accept this stipulation. Their answer was that "our technology is so secret
that we cannot share it." I said, "Listen, you have two options. One is to fold up and go,
and the other is to have an Indian partner and to tell him what your technology is. It
is not just having an Indian partner; tell him about your technology." There was supposed
to be technology transfer in all joint ventures, unless the technology was one that we had
no way of assimilating, or one that we needed access to for security reasons. There wasn't
any reply from Coke. Since they wouldn't share the great secret of their technology, the
only option left was to get out.
Fernandes' use of an array of salient cultural symbols is emblematic of the importance of
these artifacts in shaping schemas and preferences. His reaction to Coke and invocation
of FERA remained squarely within the developmentalist discourse of anti-imperialism
and swadeshi nationalist self-reliance (Mazzarella, 2003). Fernandes' preferences
towards FDI were shaped by his interpretation of nationalism and attendant conceptions
of the role of foreign firms in supplying technology, in this case to provide potable water
in India. He was outraged that after "thirty years of freedom" India was still dependent on
foreign firms and technology rather than being self-reliant in as basic yet fundamental an
area as the production of clean drinking water. The situation symbolized the problems
they perceived both with the effects of foreign technology on Indian industry as well as
the way the Nehruvian development model had neglected the rural poor. Fernandes
further argued that Coke epitomized the macroeconomic problem posed by profit
s1 Multinational Monitor, 1995, emphasis added.
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remittances that FERA had been designed to solve, claiming that after twenty years in
India Coke managed to repatriate a massive 250 million rupees on an initial investment of
only 600,000 rupees (ibid).5 2 The antecedents of this view in late 19* century drain
theory of Dadabhai Naoroji and Ramesh Chunder Dutt that informed both Nehru and
Gandhi is clear. 53 It was powerful cultural schemas that provided the causal economic
ideas that linked FDI to flows of finance, technology and industrial development
outcomes and ascribed historically salient social meaning to foreign firms that shaped
what Fernandes interpreted as a problem and motivated him to action.5 4
These preferences towards foreign and domestic firms under the Janata Party are
summarized in the table below:
Cognitive & Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy under the Janata Party (1977-1979)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: Large-scale 'exploitative' and Modern: Rural-based small-scale labor-intensive
'monopolistic' firms at the Nehruvian 'commanding cottage industry firms and agricultural producers
heights' of the economy, and which are 'monuments that accord with Gandhian ideals of a 'true Indian
to irrelevant foreign technology' modernity'.
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial' MNCs that export Modern: MNCs willing to dilute to 40%, take on
profits and refuse to share technology. an Indian partner, share technology, and retain
and reinvest earnings in India.
Exemplars: Coca-Cola and IBM Exemplar: Hindustan Lever
Finally, it is crucial to note the contingent implications for foreign capital and the array of
options Fernandes faced from competing rationalized causal ideas. Rather than pushing
52 This points to the important of competing causal ideas that underpin cognitive and cultural schemas.
Fernandes interpretation was based on an understanding of economic theory that saw FDI as a net drain on
FDI through profit remittances, rather than the liberal economic conception of FDI as a contributor to
industrialization and macroeconomic stability through foreign exchange provision and productive long-
term investment. The indeterminacy between these positions in economic theory facilitates actors ability to
use either as resources in schema construction depending on the social meaning that can be attached. This
will become even more clear in the next chapter when we see direct contestation between cultural schemas
at the societal level.
5 In his writings, Gandhi recalled that he wept when he first read Dutt's account of how the British drained
resources from India in his Economic History of India.
14 Further, it highlighted the differences between the Nehruvian and Gandhian cultural schemas - the
former posited causal relationships between foreign and local firms where the former transferred
technology to the latter, facilitating the achievement of swadeshi self-reliance, which as we will recall from
Chapter Five, Gandhi and other key actors infused with deep social-psychological and historical meaning.
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Coke to expand production in order to provide clean safe water for India's hundreds of
millions of rural poor who lacked access to this crucial resource - as the previous chapter
suggested that the developmentalist schemas guiding the Brazilian government would
likely have led them to do - Fernandes' response was to attempt to coerce Coca-Cola to
share their technology and then expel the firm when it refused.5 This has important
theoretical implications. If preferences are determined by rational observation and
deduction, we might expect Fernandes to have taken a different approach since peer
countries like Brazil had soared ahead in all measures of economic growth, industrial
development and social progress largely due to a reliance on foreign capital. The East
Asian states of South Korea and Taiwan had also experienced rapid growth during the
1960s and 1970s with foreign firms playing key albeit restricted roles that facilitated
technological learning amongst domestic firms while ensuring MNCs did not become
dominant as they did in Brazil.s6 Instead, Fernandes' preferences towards toward foreign
firms, were emblematic of the deeply held anti-imperialist cultural schemas that
continued to shape India's unique approach to FDI.
IV. The Return of Indira Gandhi:
Private Sector Oriented 'Aspirational Consumerism'
The previous section argued that the Janata Party led coalition was cobbled together from
a heterogeneous mix of parties from different points of the political spectrum as
Gandhians, socialists, free market liberals, Hindu nationalists, communists and
5s Certainly this is what a rational Bayesian learning perspective might suggest. That is, policymakers
would look around to see how other countries had addressed these types of technological problems, and
certainly Brazil with its consistent high single digit growth based largely on open invitations to foreign
firms (as well as accumulating significant levels of overseas debt) would have been a model to at least
consider. Instead actors' preferences were shaped by deeply held cultural schemas, and this shaped their
approach to addressing deep development problems, not a rational process of solution search.
5 This lends valuable insight to the question of where preferences come from and how they change. While
it is clear that lessons were taken from the failures of the Nehruvian approach, the particular approach that
was adopted can't be explained by learning via Bayesian updating, since Brazil was growing at an average
of 6% through FDI-fuelled industrialization and the successful role of FDI and exports in East Asia were
also becoming apparent. Nevertheless Fernandes and Janata Party took a different approach that suggested
that even if learned from failures of Nehruvian approach, were pursuing an approach that was informed by
preferences shaped by Gandhian schema.
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conservatives were momentarily united by their common hatred of Indira Gandhi.
However, while they succeeded in defeating Mrs. Gandhi's Congress they failed to
generate a cohesive policy discourse and system of thought under which to unite and
motivate party activists and the wider Indian polity. The Janata Party policy approach
never attained "third order change", was not deeply institutionalized in the policy making
apparatus of the Indian state and thus failed to reach paradigmatic status (Hall, 1993).
Instead, the Janata coalition was fraught with political infighting and its term in office
was marked by the second oil crisis in 1978 and another major drought in 1979, both of
which contributed to balance of payments challenges. The party ultimately lost the 1980
election to a resurgent Congress Party and Indira Gandhi returned to the Prime Minister's
Office, albeit with a radically different approach.57
In her first stint as Prime Minister from 1966-1977, Indira Gandhi stretched the
Nehruvian scientific-socialist model of statist development in a populist, authoritarian
and anti-capitalist direction but upon her return, a chastened yet politically savvy and
ever pragmatic Mrs. Gandhi began reorienting her administration. State-led planning and
the extensive industrial licensing regime that constituted India's approach to import
substituting industrialization was considered a disappointment and authoritarian populism
57 It is worth noting that policy changes can't be explained by external pressure or 'economic realities' even
though India's latest macroeconomic challenges prompted the country to return to the IMF and to accept
the largest loan the IMF had ever prepared. Chaudry et al, 2004; Mukherjee, 2012). However, Indian
authorities were insistent that there be no conditionalities attached and that the Extended Fund Facility
allow for India to continue to pursue its goals under the 7th Five Year Plan 1980-85 (Chaudry et al). This is
important to consider given the policy diffusion literature which posits coercion as a mechanism through
which ideas diffuse, with the IFIs as crucial players in this dynamic (cf. Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett
(2007). Chaudhry et al argue that "In effect, Indian officials had pre-empted much of the Fund's
conditionality by devising their own substantial macroeconomic adjustment programme in the Sixth Five-
Year Plan and the government budget." Kapadia (2009:224) adds that the loan was engineered by an
economic policy team comprised of Indian technocrats who had experience working at the IFIs. The team
included: I.G. Patel, who was then Governor of the RBI was a former Executive Director for India at the
IMF; R. Ventakaraman, Finance Minister; M. Narasihmam, the Executive Director for India at the time;
L.K. Jha, a conservative bureaucrat; Manmohan Singh, then a member of the Planning Commission; Bimal
Jalan, economist and future IMF Executive Director, as well as future Governor of the RBI; Montek Singh
Ahluwalia, an ex-World Bank economist then with the Ministry of Finance; Arjun Sengupta, an economist
who would go on to direct the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office (Ibid). Finally, it is worth noting that
while the IMF loan was large - $6b over 3 years - it was sold by Mrs. Gandhi not as a loan requiring
conditionality but as a 'line of credit' with easy terms. This was to preclude criticisms based on lessons
learned from the 1966 devaluation. In fact the loan was described as based on 'homegrown conditionality'
that was negotiated by a 'highly talented economic policy team' that took the initiative to begin 'informal
discussions' with the IMF in 1979/80 when the signs of crisis became apparent (Kapadia, 2009:223).
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had been delegitimized by the persistence of poverty and the terrible excesses of the
Emergency.58 This was yet another moment when we might expect to observe preference
change, but again it did not occur through either mechanisms of learning through rational
observation nor through wholesale adoption of ideas provided by epistemic networks of
policy experts. Instead, Mrs. Gandhi attempted to create a new cultural schema by
imbuing new causal economic ideas with historically salient cultural symbols that had
widely understood social meaning. The rest of this section illustrates this point.
Indira Gandhi's return signaled a shift in industrial policy and tentative steps towards
economic reform through a growth oriented partnership with Indian big business.59
Though an important strand of the policy diffusion literature explains the adoption of
liberal economic policies through coercion by the IFIs, this move was not externally
enforced upon the Congress government. Mrs. Gandhi "herself shifted India's political
economy around 1980 in the direction of a state and business alliance for economic
growth" (Kohli, 2006:1255). These early reforms marked the first signs of a critical
attitudinal shift on the part of the Indian state from espoused socialism to explicit support
to private domestic capital (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Kohli, 2006a,b).60 This 'pro-
business' shift represented a distinct break from the espoused socialist views of the post-
war period -- both under Nehru's elite 'industrialization from the commanding heights'
and Indira Gandhi's populist politics of garibi hatao - and signaled the beginning of a
58 Interpretation was failure despite some real success in developing a fairly broad industrial base and
crucially, a domestic industry with real capabilities. This would be recognized as an success until much
later in the reforms, in the 2000s and Indian domestic capital began to assert itself and represent the
aspirations of the nation.
59 There may have been signs of a change of direction from as early as the 1976 Budget cf Tyabji interview;
Das Gupta (2007).
60 Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) and Kohli (2006a,b) have argued that the Indian government followed a
distinctly pro-business as opposed to pro-market mode of economic reform (also DeLong, 2003). This
phased approach to liberalization is distinct from a "pro-market" mode (cf. Srinivasan, 2004; Srinivasan
and Tendulkar, 2004; Panagariya, 2006) in that the former mainly benefits established incumbents (e.g.
India's well-entrenched business houses) while the latter favors entrepreneurship and the rise of new
domestic economic actors or sudden "big-bang" exposure to intense foreign competition. The orthodox
pro-market idea being that reliance on the market will lead to an efficient allocation of resources thus
promoting competitiveness, through realization of static comparative advantage in labor-intensive
industrialization and ultimately economic growth (Kohli, 2006a). The proponents of this view argue that
India's uptick in economic growth and productivity pre-date the early reforms taken in the 1980s as well as
the more comprehensive post-1991 reforms. Not only did growth predate the initial reforms, did not
accelerate even with the later reforms and further, as Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) show, the rate of TFP
growth actually slowed post-1991.
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change in the cultural schemas that would reshape actors' preferences towards foreign
capital and generate a new policy paradigm. This shift was apparent immediately through
numerous public statements and crucially, was recognized by major media outlets and
societal actors. A Times of India editorial noted "A change of considerable significance is
taking place in India....the emphasis has shifted from distributive justice to growth" and
the Economic and Political Weekly also reported that Mrs. Gandhi made it clear in her
meetings with industrialists that "what the government was most concerned about now
was higher production".6 1
This explicit turn towards the private sector was completely unprecedented. While
successive Indian governments had long privileged domestic capital over foreign firms,
large-scale private capital was consistently marginalized relative to state-owned
companies under Nehru and increasingly small and medium sized firms under Indira
Gandhi and the Janata Party. Mrs. Gandhi's return thus heralded an entirely new
approach. 62 The pro-business approach explicitly favored domestic incumbents by
gradually removing industrial licensing barriers that eased restrictions on firm-level
expansion in existing as well as new areas of business activity. This process benefitted
large business groups that were better positioned to take advantage of these internal
regulatory changes than new domestic entrepreneurs or foreign firms, particularly as the
former were accorded little policy support and the latter remained constrained by the 40%
holding restrictions of FERA. However, the old pre-independence business houses were
not the only beneficiaries; many of the newer medium-sized regional groups that emerged
in the 1960s and benefitted from the three major policy changes outlined in the previous
section of bank nationalizations, anti-monopoly rules under the MRTP and FERA,
particularly those in engineering and consumer goods industries, were also in an ideal
position to join the ranks of India's most powerful domestic companies.
61 Cited in Kohli (2006a: 1255).
62 Chapters Four and Five discussed the legitimacy challenges that Indian private business faced throughout
the pre-independence period (cf. Basu, 2003). This legitimacy issue also speaks to the merchant trader-
'true' capitalist-industrialist distinction that I will examine further post-dissertation.
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In sum these initial reforms amounted to a complete reversal of the previous strategy that
was predicated on restricting the growth of private firms through extensive licensing.63
The government also began removing price controls, liberalizing capacity restrictions,
easing access to imported capital goods and providing corporate tax breaks while external
trade barriers remained largely unchanged (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004). Domestic
capital was thereby allowed to expand the scope of their operations within India while
being protected from foreign competition.
The 1980 Industrial Policy Statement.
Aspirational Consumerism and Global Competitiveness
The Congress administration issued a new Statement of Industrial Policy elaborating the
government's renewed focus on economic growth, consumption and distribution that was
now to be achieved by increasing the productivity of Indian big business. Two elements
were crucial. First, the statement definitively re-asserted the central role of
industrialization in achieving development and sought to legitimize the role of firms by
clearly identifying its intended beneficiary in 'the 'common man.' This served a dual
purpose. It created a new consumerism that fuelled aspirational desires amongst India's
lower middle class, urban working class and rural poor who constituted the ostensible
'common man' while simultaneously assuaging real demand from the established urban
middle class and the newly enriched 'bullock capitalist' groups in peri-urban and rural
areas (Das Gupta, 2007:229; see also Bardhan, 1998). 64 Creating and encouraging
aspirational consumerism would thus become the central driving force of liberalization, a
dynamic that continues to this day.65
Second, the Statement promoted the view that the post-independence struggles of Indian
industry were due to constraints on international competitiveness, stressing the
importance of technology and firm size for capturing of scale economies and improving
industry and firm performance:
63 The MRTP actually remained in place until the larger package of reforms in 1991.
64 As indicated earlier, these bullock capitalists were empowered by the improvements in agricultural
productivity from the Green Revolution.
65 This view accord wellw ith research on culture and desire in market economies in economic sociology
e.g. Zelizer (2012).
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Industrialisation is a sine qua non of economic progress. Our Government is committed
to rapid and balanced industrialisation of the country with a view to benefiting the
common man in the shape of increasing availability of goods at fair prices, larger
employment and higher per capita income. [4].. .In a number of cases Indian industry
has not been able to compete in markets abroad because the scale of output which is
related to the level of domestic demand is too small to give them the advantages of
modern technology and economies of scale. In cases where a larger production base
would increase the competitiveness of Indian industry abroad. Government will
consider favourable the induction of advanced technology, and will permit creation
of capacity large enough to make it competitive in world markets, provided
substantial exports are likely. The purpose of introducing such a policy would be not only
to encourage exports but also to enable industry to produce better quality products at
lower cost which will ultimately benefit the consumer in terms of price and quality. [24]66
The statement clearly indicates the reversal in the role of private firms in Indian
development justified by appeals to the symbols and promise of 'modern' and 'advanced
technology' that would increase 'the competitiveness of Indian industry abroad'.
However, while the populist redistributive imperatives that dominated Indira Gandhi's
first stint in office were downplayed, they were not entirely jettisoned, reflecting the
evolutionary nature of schema change. Instead the means of achieving these goals were
reoriented and presented as being pursued through support of private business while the
shift was accorded legitimacy by asserting the benefits to the 'common man'. Thus rather
than state-led development where the government doled patronage directly to the poor,
the fruits of development would now be provided by private firms through market
oriented consumerism.
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter an elaborated in Chapter Two, the
recognition of earlier policy disappointments and de-legitimization of the Nehruvian and
populist socialist policy paradigms created an opportunity for the adoption of a new
approach (Berman, 2011). Hall (1993) argued that policy paradigms begin to lose
legitimacy when the causal designations they posit fail to match observations. This
failure to deliver on expectations makes actors more amenable to new ideas though a
process akin to Heclo's (1974) 'puzzling', which directs analytic attention to the potential
mechanisms through which learning occurs and preferences change. 67 Social learning
66 Government of India, Statement of Industrial Policy, July 23, 1980.
67 Berman (2011) suggests that the rise and fall of ideas (i.e. preference change) is a two-stage process.
First, existing ideas are questioned as perceived failures create demand for new ideas thus opening up space
for new causal ideas. Second, new ideas begin to appear to take the place of the old one(s), fill the vacuum
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theories from both rational choice and historical institutional traditions would suggest
that political actors like Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers would consider the 'facts' that
revealed what Hall (1993) referred to as 'empirical anomalies' between expected and
actual policy results. As rational actors they would be expected to 'learn' from this
experience and seek alternatives, whether through a 'rational' search process akin to
hypothesis testing or a more 'sociological' mechanism of learning of new ideas through
epistemic networks, and ultimately respond by altering their policy preferences.
It is certainly clear that Indian policymakers recognized the 'empirical anomalies' that
arose in the 1960s and 1970s: Kohli (2006a: 1255) points to the "accumulating evidence"
that India's economic growth throughout the 1970s had been fairly dismal" as well as
"the important fact that the significance of capitalism [i.e. the market] in the Indian
economy, both in the countryside and in the cities, had grown steadily. The more
apparent this became to Indians, "the more anachronistic became claims of the state
controlling 'the commanding heights of the economy', especially in the face of a poorly
performing public sector." By the time of her return the populist politics of garibi hatao
"was running out of steam" as various anti-poverty programs had failed and the socialist
experiment impaired economic growth; "...by contrast, putting the weight of the state
behind private producers (notably larger landholders) had helped agricultural production,
leading to the green revolution in the 1960s. The economic [as well as the political]
lessons must have been hard to ignore" (Ibid, emphasis added; see also Kohli 1989). 68
The socially meaningful dimension of cultural schemas is central to understanding the
sources of economic interests and policy preferences and is a crucial missing factor in the
left by the discredited idea(s). This leads to a 'marketplace of ideas' as political actors engage in
contestation. This chapter provides an argument that provides a mechanism through which new ideas
appear when old ideas become deligitimized, i.e. they do not arise through rational Bayesian learning nor
simply ideas flowing through epistemic networks but are created as parts of cultural schemas by strategic
actors. The next chapter considers contestation between competing schemas - causal ideas and social
meanings - in the public domain. This process is akin to Heclo's (1974) 'powering'.
68 Further, not only did the Green Revolution provide lessons about the developmental potential of the
private sector, but also about the benefits of foreign expertise and technology in concert with domestic
private capital. Additionally, the Green Revolution achieved success by providing different incentives to
rural producers while maintaining the highly unequal class structure (Kapadia, 2009:207). This was a major
departure from Nehruvian approach and would shape the way that the reforms were pursued in terms of
FDI and the distributional assumptions of liberalization.
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dominant rational choice, historical institutional and even sociological institutional
approaches. Like Mohandas Gandhi and Nehru before her, Indira Gandhi's had both
political and economic objectives. She not only wanted to improve economic growth -
itself a 'fundamental' interest of political actors who need growth to maintain legitimacy
and political power, as argued at the outset of Chapter Two - she also sought to counter
the rise of the Janata Party coalition. The Janata Party had trounced the Congress in the
Hindi-speaking heartland that was Congress' traditional political base by reviving
Gandhianism to successfully contest the weakened and delegitimized Nehruvian and
populist socialist schema that the Congress Party represented. 69 The direction that Mrs.
Gandhi took and cultural content of the political rhetoric that she mobilized were not
arbitrary. As argued in this dissertation, strategic actors create new schemas that not only
embody rationalized causal relations that link means to ends, but which also are imbued
with salient cultural symbols that are deeply historically embedded and have meanings
that are widely understood. As such Mrs. Gandhi retreated from secularism and socialism,
the former which was a hallmark of Nehruvian scientific socialism as argued in Chapter
Five and the latter which reflected her first stint in office, by adopting and deploying
communal and private-sector oriented political rhetoric (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004).
This choice was neither the outcome of a rational Bayesian learning process nor was it a
random shift; it had deep socio-historical roots. Kohli (1989:308) argues that "in India's
political culture.. .the two packages of secular socialism and pro-business Hindu
chauvinism have tended to offer two alternative legitimacy formulae for mobilizing
political support". These 'packages' are analogous to the cultural schemas that this
69 These two should not be seen as necessarily at odds, something that Rodrik and Subramanian (2004:28)
intimate could be the case by arguing that attitudinal change was grounded primarily in political calculation,
and not in a desire to enhance the efficiency of the economic regime. I argued in Chapter Two that
separating economic objectives of political actors is not useful; economic objectives are often seen as a
central element of establishing political legitimacy. For example, Kohli (2004:286) argues that 'fragmented
multiclass' states like India and Brazil worry intensely about their legitimacy, thus much political (and
economic) strategy can be understood as being driven by the need to gain legitimacy. Thus in earlier work
Kohli (1989) argues that Indira's main objective was to counter the perceived threat posed by the Janata
party, which had trounced Congress in the Hindi heartland in the 1977 elections. Her political rhetoric
consequently became less secular and populist and more communal and private-sector oriented. I argue in
this chapter that this is especially clear with Indira Gandhi various strategic moves, and crucially that the
move towards communalist and private-sector oriented language was intimately tied to the rationalized
causal ideas and social meaning of her new strategy.
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dissertation has argued shapes actors' policy preferences. Further, they are comprised of
the cultural elements - scripts, concepts, models, tropes - that Douglas (1986) argued
actors combine through processes of 'bricolage'. Cultural schemas are the symbolic
vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies that
Swidler (1986) suggested comprise strategic actors 'cultural tool kits'. The origins and
evolution of these competing "political cultures" were a crucial element of the political
contestation among Indian business and political actors during the late colonial period
that was described at length in Chapters Five and Six of the dissertation. Rodrik and
Subramanian (2004:28) conclude that "After 1980, Indira dropped the first package in
favor of the second...[and] actively sought to woo the business and industrial
establishment." The causal logic and meaning of aspirational consumerism would play a
central role. This new support for private business would not only affect domestic firms,
it would also have major implications for changing preferences towards foreign capital.
Further, as we will see in the next chapter the move towards Hindu chauvinism and the
politics of caste and religion would have major effects on Indian politics and sow the
seeds of the emergence of the Congress Party's most powerful challenger, the Hindu-
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, in the 1990s.70
FDI and Industry Level Reforms:
Automobiles, Telecommunications and Aspirational Consumerism
The pro-business shift was not simply rhetorical. At the industry level, automobile and
telecommunications sector reforms became powerful symbols of the evolving cultural
schema that placed the logic and meaning of aspirational consumerism at the center of the
reforms. The Indira Gandhi administration's new consumerist bent was reflected in the
slogan 'A television in every village'. 71 The rationale was that communication
technology would facilitate the achievement of India's unrealized democratic and
development potential (Mazzarella, 2003:7). The expansion of television duly entailed
state sponsored entertainment mixing the aspirational fantasy of Bollywood Hindi movies
70 This would coincide with a significant and disturbing rise in ethnic, communal and religious violence in
the 1980s and 1990s.
71 See Mazzarella (2003) for further discussion.
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that transported poverty stricken viewers from their daily drudgery with doses of Indira
Gandhi's speeches. 72
Television was the perfect medium through which to create powerful conceptions of
modernity and progress. TV provided the most effective platform for selling the reforms
as aspirational consumerism provided an antidote to the austerity of Nehruvian planning
and the brutality of Indira's Emergency. Consumption was presented as a rationalized
means to national prosperity through expanding aggregate demand, representing a new
form of nationalism that would take on critical importance as the reforms accelerated and
became more contested in the 1990s and 2000s. This had major implications for
preferences towards foreign capital, as the aspirational goods that were the subject of
television advertisement were overwhelmingly of foreign origin, whether through the
manufacturer or the foreign lifestyle that they represented. The marketing and imagery of
foreign-oriented consumer goods created a demand for the products of multinational
corporations that would be crucial as FDI was slowly liberalized through joint ventures
between domestic and multinational firms as the reforms accelerated in the 1990s.
Revamping India's international image was central to this transformation. India had long
enjoyed a revered position as the leader of the non-aligned movement since the days of
Nehru, but had been superseded by more recent depictions of horrific poverty, economic
stagnation and technological moribundity. Indira Gandhi's own legitimacy had fallen
significantly as she came to represent the fragility of democracy in the developing world
and the dark period of the Emergency. India hosted the 1982 Asian Games, providing the
government with a golden opportunity to project a new image of a competent and
efficient state leading a modern democratic nation into the new era of globalization, not
only outside of the country where India wished to reassert its position as a democratic
developing country leader and had developed an economically important diaspora in the
UK, US and the Gulf, but crucially within the country where its most important
72 She may have set aside the repressive tools of the Emergency, but Indira Gandhi hadn't completely lost
her penchant for populism nor forgotten the lessons learned and experience she gained from her first
cabinet position as Shastri's Minister of Information and Communication.
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constituents were. Import duties on TV sets were temporarily lifted and color
transmission began in 1982. This was followed by massive telecommunications
infrastructure development in 1984, which unsurprisingly was an election year. The
number of transmitters shot up from 20 in 1983 to 192 in 1984, eventually reaching 300
by the end of the decade when satellite television was introduced, the latter providing
further relief from state-run television networks and truly bringing the rest of the world
into urban middle class homes and rural village squares.
While television was an important element of the broad changes that were underway in
Indian society and an important tool in promoting aspirational consumerism,
liberalization was best epitomized by the automobile industry, particularly with respect to
the role of foreign capital. Just as the automobile captured the essence of the post-war
industrial imagination, it once again became the main symbol of India's liberalizing
reforms. Autos represented freedom for Indians much as it had for Americans when the
image of top down convertible whizzing a carefree young couple down the open road
captured the socio-cultural essence of the 1960s; in India, the target was the similarly
idealized nuclear family of 4 that yearned to be free from the overcrowded, unreliable
and unsafe buses and trains to go to work, take children to school and enjoy family
vacations. Finally, the ability to own an automobile was a symbol of individual wealth
and achievement that represented the shift from state based 'socialism' to market based
'liberalism'.
The automobile was the perfect consumer good. It reflected the aspirations of a nation
that felt it had been long denied the fruits of industrial modernity by the repressive and
ineffective Nehruvian license-quota-permit raj. Autos retained its deep social meaning as
the main symbol of industrial development, modernity and progress as well as its
technical advantages for industrialization by generating linkages between large
assemblers, hundreds of medium sized first and second tier component manufacturers and
73 The image of the nuclear Indian family of four was also aspirational as it reflected the state's family
planning drive and links between family size and socio-economic class i.e. it ignored the reality of India's
large and extended families structure. Further, the marketing image of the attractive young couple driving
down the open road with no people in sight, itself a fantasy in overpopulated India, would become central
to automobile ads in the 2000s.
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thousands of small third tier suppliers in the labor-intensive unorganized sector. The
industry remained a bellwether of India's post-independence progress and the outdated
Indian vehicles that continued to stutter down the road were a stark reminder of the
pitfalls of Nehruvian license-quota-permit raj just as the new vehicles would symbolize
the drive towards modernity under the reforms. Crucially, foreign capital was deemed
essential in reviving the Indian auto industry in the new aspirational consumerist schema.
As such, we can assess the social effect of the reforms and changing FDI preferences
through developments in the auto industry throughout the 1980s, as not only would FDI
reforms in autos provide the most powerful symbol of the social changes that the reforms
represented, they would also be the site of much of the political contestation that was to
emerge in the 1990s. 74 This is the crucial role of social factors that receive little analytic
attention in alternative theoretical formulations of preference change in comparative
political economy (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002).
Two Wheelers and Light Commercial Vehicles: Indo-Japanese Joint Ventures
The transformation of the auto sector reflected the socio-politics of Indian reforms. Not
only was it the main symbol of social and economic transformation, it also followed the
institutionalized rules and practices through which the auto industry was initially
established in the 1950s (cf. Dobbin 1993). Liberalization was carried out through
internal delicensing but remained under the FERA rules, which were used to generate the
foreign-domestic partnerships that revolutionized the industry. First, the sector remained
segmented into three subgroups -- passenger cars, commercial vehicles and two wheelers
-- and Indian firms seeking to enter the sector had to have a foreign joint venture partner
as technology provider for their license application to be successful. Thus the institutional
apparatus of the Foreign Investment Board, FERA and the license regime were modified
but not jettisoned altogether, shaping the evolutionary process through which the
government began to deregulate the participation of foreign and domestic capital in the
auto industry.
74 This provides insight into the reasons that FDI and JV conflicts had such deep social resonance. It also
supports the auto industry case selection given the experiences of major Indian finns such as Hero and TVS
as well as the effect of Tata's experience with its long-time partner Mercedes Benz in the 1990s. These
issues are the subject of Chapter 8.
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Though foreign firm participation in the auto industry was subject to a maximum 26%
equity cap, several leading Japanese auto firms sought to take advantage of this policy
shift and enter what was seen as a large and potentially lucrative market. Licenses were
issued in the light commercial vehicle and two wheeler segments, resulting in the
following joint ventures: DCM-Toyota, Eicher-Mitsubishi, Swaraj-Mazda (Matsuda) and
Allwyn-Nissan in light commercial vehicles and Hero-Honda, Escorts-Yamaha and TVS-
Suzuki in motorcycles. The moped assembler Kinetic also partnered with Honda to
produce scooters while Bajaj Auto, the scooters manufacturer that had dominated the
two-wheeler segment for more than two decades, signed a non-equity technical
agreement with Kawasaki to enter larger capacity motorcycle production. 75 Indian firms
wielded managerial control in all these joint ventures with their foreign partners
providing engineering technology, vehicle design, and technical assistance in the
establishment and operation of new production facilities. The institutional arrangements
that governed these collaborations remained intact. Indian firms' preference for retaining
managerial control when engaging in joint ventures with multinationals that stood in such
stark contrast with their counterparts in Brazil remained as powerful and defining an
element of Indian firm strategy as it was in the immediate post-war period, though even
these longstanding firm preferences towards FDI would begin to change as liberalization
accelerated and social contestation around the reforms intensified in the 1990s.
Both the LCV and two-wheeler segments had important social significance. Two
wheelers fit the purchasing capacity of the growing Indian aspirational 'middle class' and
served as the main mode of family transportation as they could accommodate a husband,
wife and two or three children.76 Two wheelers also provided the means transporting light
75 The Indian firms that received licenses were a mix of large and small business groups. DCM, Bajaj and
Escorts were among the most venerable groups in India, Eicher and Swaraj emerged from tractor
manufacturing and thus were beneficiaries of the land reform and Green Revolution boom in the 1950s and
1960s, TVS was a well-established Southern business group that had been an auto component manufacturer
and Hero was India's leading bicycle producer.
76 Two wheelers were the main mode of transport for the emerging 'middle class' with the 'common man'
relying on bicycle or foot. Liberalizing this segment also marked the end of the longstanding Bajaj auto
monopoly that generated 10-year waiting lists due to pent up demand. The pervasive use of the two-
wheeler as multi-member family transportation would later underpin Ratan Tata's purported desire to push
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packages and even agricultural goods, particularly in rural areas. As such, liberalization
of the two-wheeler segment had the largest direct impact in terms of the potential of
Indian consumers to purchase a new vehicle.
Light Commercial Vehicles (LCVs) also had a wide effect on the Indian consumer public
even though the product is ostensibly aimed at the commercial sector. As discussed
earlier, the GOI Statement on Industrial Policy indicated a shift from the Nehruvian focus
on large-scale capital investment and infrastructure projects -- consistent with the
developmentalist views that prevailed globally in the post-war period -- to increasing
levels of consumption amongst the middle class and the poor. This shift is aptly reflected
in the light commercial vehicle segment. The demand for LCVs exploded in the 1980s
for reasons that were intimately tied to the wider social and political dynamic of the
reforms: these were the vehicles that were used to shuttle the consumer non-durable
goods that Indira Gandhi's administration was pushing Indian consumers towards around
the narrow roads of India's overcrowded cities, and from peri-urban distribution centers
to remote villages and towns.
This dynamic stood in contrast to the ISI period when large trucks in the heavy
commercial vehicle segment dominated by Tata's TELCO and Ashok Leyland were in
demand to move steel and cement: the heavy inputs required of state-led infrastructure
projects and heavy industry in the 1950s, and later fertilizer during the Green Revolution
in the 1960s. Light manufacturing industry grew rapidly with the expanded concessions
to the small-scale sector in the late 1960s and 1970s and accelerated with liberalization
and the new market oriented consumerist focus ensconced in the Industrial Policy
Statement that aimed to benefit "the common man in the shape of increasing availability
of goods". LCVs were central to facilitating this availability. Transportation requirements
thus shifted from big capital goods primarily produced by state-owned firms and the old
business groups for use by the government to smaller consumer goods -- soaps, cosmetics,
TVs, radios, electronics - increasingly manufactured by newer medium sized firms and
the Tata Nano project as an inexpensive 'peoples car' that would reduce the unsafe practice of two
wheelers serving as family transportation.
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purchased directly by consumers. The symbolism was clear: heavy trucks represented the
bygone era of high developmentalism whereas LCVs represented the emerging period of
consumerist globalization.
Passenger Cars: Maruti Suzuki
Finally, and crucially, while the LCV and two wheeler segments were opened to
oligopolistic competition between Indian-Japanese joint ventures through the licensing
mechanism, the state reserved the potentially lucrative passenger car segment for itself.
Only a single new firm was allowed into passenger cars, a joint venture between the
state-owned Maruti Udyog and the Japanese firm Suzuki.
The entry of Suzuki into the domestic auto industry is often cited as the single most
important symbol of the entire liberalization process but it owes its beginnings to
decidedly illiberal roots in India's ruling family. Maruti Udyog began as a private firm
formed in 1969 by Indira Gandhi's younger son Sanjay to achieve his dream of producing
an indigenous 'national car'. However, the firm never began production and Sanjay was
later killed in an airplane accident in 1980 while piloting his plane and attempting to
perform a stunt.77 Wishing to see her son's wishes fulfilled, a grieving Mrs. Gandhi had
the firm nationalized and, following advice that success would depend on sourcing
foreign technology, sought a joint venture partner (Okada, 1999).
The prospects for passenger car production seemed bleak. India's road infrastructure was
extremely poor and despite its massive population purchasing power was weak. Further,
the licensing regime that shaped the development of the auto industry resulted in high
levels of vertically integration and an auto component industry that had severely
underdeveloped technological capabilities and physical capacity. The duopolistic
passenger car segment was occupied by the outdated Hindustan Motors Ambassador and
Premier Autos Padmini, with annual production that was limited by the license raj to
77 Sanjay "did three loops in the air, tried a fourth but lost control. The plane crashed a mere 500 yards from
the home he shared with his mother. Both Sanjay and his co-pilot died instantly" (Guha, 2008) Sanjay's
death was a massive emotional and organizational blow for Indira Gandhi as Sanjay was her right hand.
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30,000 and 20,000 cars annually.78 All this had major implications for the potential to
generate minimally efficient economies of scale (cf. Okada, 1999). Nevertheless, the
government set an ambitious target of 100,000 units per year and numerous foreign firms
were approached for proposals to manufacture a small, low cost fuel-efficient car. Most
major auto firms balked at the prospect of partnering with the government, particularly
given the uncertain market prospects, the government's lofty expectations and its
insistence on capping foreign equity participation at 26%. Ultimately, Suzuki was the
only firm to accept the government's terms as it was looking to establish itself in a global
auto industry dominated by its larger Japanese, European and American counterparts.
The Maruti-Suzuki joint venture revolutionized the industry by offering a modern, well-
built and reliable passenger car at an affordable price. It also led a complete restructuring
of the industry. The firm prompted a shift away from vertical integration model that
Indian assemblers still followed but which most global producers had long since
abandoned to the contemporary tiered and modular industry structure. Suzuki also
introduced the famed Japanese organizational processes and manufacturing practices that
allowed Japanese firms to attain global dominance in the 1980s. Maruti-Suzuki diffused
these production methods and revolutionized industry practices by facilitating
organizational learning and technological upgrading amongst a wide range of domestic
suppliers that the Indian state ensured would capture benefits through strict local content
rules (Saripalle, 2005). Thus just as the overpriced Hindustan Ambassador with its
outdated 1950s design and obsolete technology symbolized the failings of Nehruvian
scientific socialism and the license Raj -- not least because of it was the vehicle of choice
for the bureaucratic and political elite that maintained the system that kept quantities low
and prices high -- the Maruti Suzuki 800 became the symbol of the new liberalization era.
Not only did the new car offer modern design, a comfortable ride and fuel efficiency, it
was also available in large quantities and at a price that the growing Indian middle class
was able to afford. The industry was thus completely transformed by passenger cars that
middle class Indians could afford, two wheelers that the 'common man' could aspire to
78 The licensing and FDI restrictions described in the previous chapter resulted in the industry becoming a
domestic duopoly while the Brazilian industry supported many brands with annual vehicle production
levels that were more than ten times higher than India.
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and light commercial vehicles that delivered a wide range of consumer goods that Indians
had been denied for decades.
SECTION V.
Rajiv Gandhi: "Taking India into the Twenty-first Century"
The new aspirational consumerist cultural schema facilitated a complete reorientation of
the Indian political economy. However, not all of the effects were positive. Indira Gandhi
was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984 just as the new auto
sector JVs that were created under her initial reforms were being launched. Her death was
not unrelated to the wider socio-political dynamics that prompted the turn to
liberalization. As indicated earlier, the construction of the new aspirational consumerism
cultural schema had a darker component in the rising communalism, casteism and
religious extremism that Indira Gandhi accommodated if not utilized for political gain
(Kohli, 1987; Frankel, 2004). Mrs. Gandhi's appeal to widely understood communal
symbols and tropes helped to legitimize her new policy approach but also destabilized
India's fragile social balance. It also contributed to growing Hindu-Muslim and Hindu-
Sikh violence peaking in a crisis in the Punjab region of North India. A large group of
Sikh separatist extremists sought refuge in the Golden Temple, the most holy site in the
Sikh faith, and a standoff with the military ensued. The army ultimately stormed the
temple and as many as three thousand people were killed, mostly Sikh pilgrims caught in
the crossfire. The incident was a massive tragedy, and the depth and horror of communal
tension was revealed when news of the assassination precipitated massive waves of
retributive violence against Sikhs by mobs of mostly lower caste Hindus in many cases
led by Congress politicians (Guha, 2008). The mobs looted Sikh homes and businesses
and killed more than a thousand Sikhs in New Delhi alone.
Upon Indira Gandhi's assassination her elder son Rajiv, who had been pressed to enter
politics to support his mother after the death of his younger brother Sanjay, was
immediately sworn in as Prime Minister. Such was the belief in the Nehru-Gandhi family
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that the President didn't even consult with Congress high command officials before
anointing Rajiv as the country's new leader (Frankel, 2004). At age 40 he not only
became the youngest ever Prime Minister of India, but after calling snap elections to
secure a mandate he also entered the Prime Ministers' office with the largest ever
parliamentary majority, reflecting a sympathy vote following Mrs. Gandhi's death as well
as the positive response to the first steps of reforms (Virmani, 2004).79
Rajiv Gandhi was seen as reluctant politician, the complete antithesis of the stereotype of
India's political class. Though Rajiv attended Cambridge University like his grandfather
and great-grandfather Jawaharlal and Motilal Nehru (his mother attended Oxford), he
dropped out and showed little interest in politics, instead becoming an airline pilot and
marrying the Italian Antonia Maino (Sonia Gandhi). With his relative youth and
somewhat rebellious past Rajiv Gandhi was seen as emerging from an entirely different
mold, despite being yet another scion of the Nehru-Gandhi family.80
A new optimism permeated Indian society with Rajiv's entry to the Prime Minister's
Office. The reforms suggested a new permissiveness, tentative at first under the
chastened return of Indira Gandhi, but exploding under the youthful glamor and worldly
modernity of her ex-pilot son Rajiv. While Indira Gandhi launched the reforms that set
the country on a new path, her legacy remained the tumult and turmoil of the 1970s and
especially the repressive Emergency; by contrast, Rajiv Gandhi embodied the enthralling
new possibilities for a young Indian nation with a population that was 75% under age 35.
With his glamorous background as a pilot, disdain for politics and Italian wife he brought
a cosmopolitan internationalism that fit perfectly with the new move towards
liberalization in India as well as the wider process of globalization of which Indians were
79 This was a reflection both of a sympathy vote following Mrs. Gandhi's death as well as the positive
response to the first steps of reforms (Virmani, 2004).
8 Rajiv's rise pushed aspirational consumerism even further. He was an ideal symbol of liberal globalizing
change, much like Gandhi was for his village centered economy, Nehru was for state-led industrialization
and non-aligned foreign policy, Indira was for state-centered populist socialism. Later the elderly
Manmohan Singh would similarly symbolize the rational technical expertise of liberal economics. Rajiv
embodied the modern, globalizing social meaning element of the aspirational consumerist schema; the
highly regarded and technocratic economist Singh would similarly epitomize the rationalized causal ideas
of liberalization.
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increasingly aware. Many Indians believed he was the perfect leader to return India to its
rightful position in the world that was first denied by the East India Company and British
colonialism and later by the failed policies of Nehruvian scientific socialism and the
license-quota-permit raj. This view was succinctly captured by Arvind Virmani, former
Chief Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister:
The political economy of reform in India is driven, in our view, by a generational divide
between those brought up before independence and those born and brought up after
independence. The most important cultural memory of the former was about being ruled
by the British government for a century and (most galling) by the British East India
Company for a century before that. This translated to varying degrees into what we term
the "East India company syndrome," an archetypal fear of foreign capitalists and a
disdain for the domestic variety. In acute form it also encompassed a lack of
confidence in ones abilities relative to white foreigners.. .The post-independence
generation, which was largely free of such hang-ups, reached adulthood in 1965-66 and
middle level positions by 1980-1 (age < 35 years). In the 1984 elections, this generation
gave the Congress party led by 40 year old Rajiv Gandhi the largest majority ever
attained in Parliament. There was a hope among the people that this former airline pilot
could modernise the economy and take the nation to greater heights.
Rajiv's circle of advisors reinforced his image as the symbol of a new Indian modernity.
He entered the Prime Minister's office surrounded by a new group of technocrats who
were young, technologically savvy representatives of the cutting edge new
telecommunications and computing industries rather than career bureaucrats who came
up through the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). These advisors brought an image of
efficiency and competency to government in New Delhi that struck a sharp contrast to the
corrupt reputation that IAS officials had gained during Indira Gandhi's tenure in office.
Rajiv was a major supporter of these 'modern' industries that were closely identified with
the transformation that his administration was promoting:
The beginnings of consumerist liberalization under Nehru's grandson Rajiv Gandhi
coincided with the rise of telecommunications technology as a central figure in official
imaginings of Indian society. From the beginning 'Computerji,' as some of his aides
referred to him, was identified not only with televisual spectacle, but also with the magic
of 'communication' and deregulated consumer markets as mechanisms for overcoming
the stalemates of Indian national development or, as Rajiv's signature slogan had it,
'taking India into the twenty-first century' (Mazzarella,2003:154).
Rajiv was not only credited for the technological changes that were sweeping the country,
from growing availability of consumer goods to the provision of the now ubiquitous
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81 Virmani, (2004:27-28).
bright yellow STD telephone boxes in villages across the country8 2 his popular image as
'Mr. Clean' was only enhanced by remaining aloof, or some might less charitably say
naive, of the political intrigue of New Delhi. He embodied an unsullied persona and
modernizing expertise that was a contemporary parallel to his grandfather Jawaharlal
Nehru when he led India to independence in 1947. Rajiv was thus able to re-energize
many in India's highly professionalized bureaucracy whom had become weary of the
political machinations and corruption introduced by Indira Gandhi.
The excitement Rajiv generated extended well beyond the state apparatus to permeate the
business community and wider society. Both Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi entered the Prime
Minister's office at moments of optimism and excitement, tinged by the sense of new
global possibilities - independence in India and wider decolonization in the developing
world following the end of WWII for Nehru; liberalization and wider globalization
following the global slowdown and macroeconomic volatility from the twin oil crises of
the 1970s for Rajiv. However, while Nehru's socialist leanings and subordination of the
private sector under the planning regime instilled wariness in the capitalist class,
managers closely identified with the business-friendly professionalism and outward
looking approach that Rajiv and his staff brought to New Delhi. Many older members of
the managerial class held an indignant frustration stemming from the restrictions and
bureaucratic inefficiencies of the license raj and a pent up desire to be 'world class' that
liberalization and the move towards a 'free' market offered to provide. At the same time,
younger generations of managers were increasingly studying and working abroad and so
shared Rajiv Gandhi's overseas experience and sense of the possibilities. Thus while
many of these actors were learning new economic and managerial ideas - including the
rationale of strategic alliance and joint venture strategies that would become increasingly
important as liberalization progressed - the arrival of Rajiv imbued their rationalized
82 The expansion of fixed line telephony in India was the brainchild of Satyanarayan Gangaram 'Sam'
Pitroda, a IIT trained engineer who worked with GTE in Chicago before returning to India and founding
the Centre for Development of Telematics in 1984, and becoming Chief Technology Advisor to Rajiv
Gandhi in 1987 and chairman of India's Telecom Commission in 1989. The role of the highly educated
diaspora, particularly engineers, would grow significantly in importance over the course of liberalization.
Diasporas would not only directly affect India through entrepreneurial ventures, but just as importantly by
presenting a new image of Indian's as successful in technology intensive sectors in the US and Europe.
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managerial ideas with social meaning that accorded crucial legitimacy to their
preferences and actions.
With Rajiv in power an outward-oriented approach might no longer be seen as inherently
'non-Indian' or unconfident mimicry of the West, but was itself the means through which
India would achieve global status and goals. It could be presented as just as nationalistic
as the now-presumably misguided drive for swadeshi self-reliance in the previous era.
These business actors' own global ambitions were glamorized and legitimized by Rajiv
Gandhi who provided the appealing new face of Indian modernity and progress. Thus the
mechanism of preference-shaping ideas from learning through global epistemic networks
or studying abroad that are important in the sociological institutional literature play an
important role, but the social meaning that they are imbued with is the crucial factor. All
this fit perfectly with the nationalist approach outlined in the 1980 Industrial Policy
Statement to support domestic business so it could compete in global markets while
limiting foreign firm entry to serving as technology providers to augment the
competitiveness of domestic firms. Crucially, the emotive response that Rajiv generated
was qualitatively different from his mother, and especially his younger brother Sanjay
who was associated with the worse of Indira's repressive abuses. After decades of
socialist, populist and later communalist rhetoric under Nehru and Indira Gandhi, Rajiv
appeared post-ideological.
The Social and Economic Effects of Liberalization
The emerging aspirational consumerist cultural schema that guided Indira Gandhi's and
especially Rajiv's new policy approach not only became institutionalized as a new policy
paradigm, it initiated the beginning of a profound transformational effect on Indian
society and public culture. This societal effect grew over the course of the decade and
into the 1990s and 2000s, and is crucial to understanding the evolving policy preferences
and the wider changes underway in the Indian political economy.83 The importance of
83 This speaks to the theoretical utility of cognitive and cultural schemas as socially meaningful thought
systems that are coupled with rationalized means-ends relationships as this is downplayed in the 'ideas'
literature in political economy and even much of the sociological institutional literature that might
otherwise be expected to rely on stronger notions of societal effects.
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social embeddedness is underplayed in other strands of the social learning, even those
that posit a 'sociological' mechanism (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2001, 2011; Berman, 2011, etc.).
The reforms were carried out under twin banners of liberalization and the emerging
phenomenon of globalization. The conceptual and discursive symbolism of 'liberalization'
resonated powerfully in India given the restrictions and restraints of the various regimes
that governed India in the pre and postcolonial periods. Consider that the arc of the Indian
social memory and historical narrative was dominated by the transition from foreign rule
under the East India Company and the imperial British Raj, to Gandhian asceticism
during the independence struggles, strikes and boycotts of the 1920s and 1930s, to the
restrictions of the Nehruvian scientific socialist license-quota-permit raj following
independence, to the social and political chaos that led to the Emergency under Indira
Gandhi. All these socio-economically constraining forces were finally being unshackled
by the reforms.
The aspirational consumerist lens through which Indians increasingly perceived
globalization and liberalization constituted a direct challenge to the late colonial and post-
independence developmental ideas of Nehruvian scientific socialism and Gandhi's
village economy. The Nehruvian and Gandhian cultural schemas beseeched Indian
citizens to sacrifice for the present in the hope of future plenty, whether material gain in
the case of Nehruvianism or spiritual bounty in Gandhianism. Despite the contestation
between those systems of meaning and thought that dominated the 1920s- 1960s, both
required similar control of material desires.84 This was the nationalist demand.
By contrast, liberalization in the 1980s served as a sedative to the resentment of the
earlier period of state control and provided consumerist relief from the weariness of
conflict from Partition, military defeat to China, three wars with Pakistan, the Emergency
84 Nehru frequently spoke admiringly of the Russian people's sacrifice and deferment of material desires in
the interest of nation building through large-scale industrialization, while other scientific socialists wrote of
the sacrifices that Japanese citizens made during their own rapid industrialization in the late Meiji period.
Similarly, Gandhi spiritual system constantly called for bodily self-sacrifice as central to the return to
traditional Indian (Hindu) groundings. This was posited as a direct challenge to a view of Western
modernity that manifested in materialist demands.
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and sporadic bouts of sectarian bloodshed. This moment marked the beginning of the
construction of 'liberalization' as a powerful discursive symbol in Indian society with a
resonance that echoed Nehru's call for socialism at the height of the anti-imperialist
struggle. The development discourse was transformed from state control of industry from
the 'commanding heights' to human rights, democracy and social progress. The latter still
connoted material prosperity and economic growth through industrialization, but by
unleashing entrepreneurial energies of private firms through the market rather than state
ownership and control of industry as under Nehruvian scientific socialism. 85
Rajiv Gandhi's ascension to power was not just symbolic, it contributed to the changing
preferences in government and had immediate policy impact as his administration
accelerated the scope and pace of reforms through a wave of industry de-licensing. In
March 1985 a third of all industries (SITC 3-digit level) were exempted from license
requirements. Further, as the table below shows de-licensing took place and the rules
governing technology transfer agreements were significantly liberalized. However, trade
barriers were largely maintained reflecting the internal orientation of the reforms.86 Rajiv
is thus popularly credited with India's initial reforms and is identified with liberalization
and the dismantling the license-quota-permit Raj and the expansion of technology
inflows by business actors and the general public alike. Even though Indira Gandhi
launched the reforms, her legacy remained the political chaos of the 1960s and the
excesses of the Emergency in the 1970s.
85 This produced a binary discursive narrative of the smothering state with its self-serving politics, corrupt
and overwhelming bureaucracy, and vested interests of the license-quota-permit Raj vs. the transformative
potential of the market. Old developmentalist discourse was being trumped by a new liberalization
discourse designed for the new youthful generation of an aspirational Indian society.
86 Rodrik and Subramanian (2004:38) describe the internal reforms of the 1980s as follows: "The four
major internal liberalization measures that were implemented in 1985 and 1986 involved: (i) Eliminating
the licensing of 25 categories of industries subject to certain fairly onerous conditions; (ii) extending
delicensing to large companies in 22 industries which were previously restricted by the Monopolies and
Trade Restrictive Practices Act (MRTP) and Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA); (iii) allowing
companies in 28 industries to expand the scope of their operations into related activities; and (iv) allowing
companies that had reached 80 percent capacity utilization to expand their capacity up to 133 percent of
that reached in any of the previous years. Apart from the first, all the remaining measures essentially
allowed incumbents to operate more freely rather than facilitate the entry of new domestic firms and
promote competition. Even the limited reduction in protection of capital goods industries served to increase
the effective protection of incumbents in final goods industries."
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Table 1: Internal De-licensing
1980 1985 1990
Number of industries de-licensed 0 41 44
Percentage of real output de-licensed 0 45 53
Percentage of employment de-licensed 0 42 46
Mean applied tariff (%) 120 144 135
Source: Adapted from Aghion, et al (2006) table 1. Industrial performance data is based on an unbalanced
panel at the state level. They are included to indicate (1) the dramatic rise in industry output and (2) the
capital-intensive nature of the structural change that occurred with the reforms.
Finally, Rajiv was not only credited with reforms, but also with the positive economic
growth that characterized the early reform period of the 1980s. The table below shows
the decline in growth during Indira Gandhi's first stint as Prime Minister and the recovery
in the 1980s, particular the role of industrial growth in the recovery in the 1980s.
Crucially, though industrial growth was high in the Nehruvian period, it was largely
concentrated in the public sector and didn't demonstrate wider economic growth
generating capacity through linkages with other parts of the economy. By contrast, Indira
Gandhi's second round as Prime Minster as well as Rajiv's stint saw a return to high
industrial growth but this time primarily in the private sector, with much broad economic
growth outcomes (Kohli, 2006a; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; De Long, 2003).
Table 2: Economic Growth (1950-90)
1950-64 1965-79 1980-90
GDP growth 3.7 2.9 5.8
Industrial growth 7.4 3.8 6.5
Agricultural growth 3.1 2.3 3.9
Source: Adapted from Kohli, 2006a: Table 1
VI. Conclusion
This chapter considered the competing mechanism of social learning through which
rational choice, historical institutional and sociological institutional perspectives suggest
that preference change occurs. The chapter argued that while each of these perspectives
provides an important insight to the mechanisms underpinning the process of preference
change but they are all incomplete. The rational Bayesian learning perspective rightly
points out that actors recognize when causal ideas underpinning preferences fail to match
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outcomes, but finds little evidence to support the mechanisms preference change through
the process of information search, observation and 'hypothesis testing' this approach
posits (Hall, 1993). Similarly, constructivists direct important attention to the role of
epistemic networks in the diffusion of new ideas that shape preferences, but too often
ignore the agency and creativity through which actors adapt causal ideas to fit their social
and political environment. Instead the chapter stressed the role of strategic actors in
responding to political and economic challenges by constructing new cultural schemas
that imbue fresh causal ideas with historically salient social meaning. While most of the
analysis in this chapter was at the level of the state and policy the next chapter shifts to
the level of state-society interactions to highlight the role of discourse, debate and
political contestation in the adoption of new ideas that produce preference change
amongst state and business actors and the implications for FDI policy and firm strategy.
The argument of this chapter can be summarized as follows. Theories of social learning
from rational choice and historical institutionalism both posit policy failure as a catalyst
for preference change. However, this chapter showed that while the recognition of
previous policy failings was crucial it did not automatically produce nor adequately
explain the process of preference change either in 1966 when Indira Gandhi became
Prime Minister, 1977 when the Janata Party defeated Congress nor in the 1980s when
Mrs. Gandhi returned and Rajiv Gandhi later assumed office. Instead, the empirical
analysis shows how preferences change as strategic actors construct novel yet deply
historically embedded cultural schemas that posit alternative causal ideas embedded in
historically meaningful narratives, salient cultural symbols and tropes. These schemas
are new but they are not created 'from scratch'; instead they reflect creative
recombination of pre-existing historically embedded and salient cultural tropes that are
widely understood. This "capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts" is
the very definition of agency (Sewell, 1992:19). Further, successful schema construction
is a highly creative process, as "part of what gives cultural practice its potency is the
ability of actors to play on the multiple meanings of symbols - thereby redefining
situations in ways that they believe will favor their purposes. Creative cultural action
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commonly entails the purposeful or spontaneous importation of meanings from one social
location or context to another" (Sewell 1999:51).
The chapter showed how Indira Gandhi and other political actors utilized publicly
available symbolic vehicles "through which people experience and express meaning"
(1986:273). These cultural artifacts are available in the 'cultural toolkit' to craft strategies
and solutions to evolving political and economic challenges (Swidler, 1986:273; Douglas,
1986). Indian political actors used these symbols and tropes to legitimize and
delegitimize foreign and domestic economic actors through competing policy strategies.
This creative process is akin to what pragmatists like Herrigel (2010; 2011) posit, but
power was a central element that pragmatists ignore. Power and culture operate together
as actors "make continuous use of their considerable resources in efforts to order [social]
meanings" (Sewell, 1999; Fligstein and McAdam 1995; 2008). This dynamic is apparent
throughout the narrative provided in this chapter and is even more evident in the next
chapter as business actors increasingly participate in political contestation over the
legitimacy of domestic versus foreign capital in the pursuit of Indian industrial
development.
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CHAPTER 8
Constructing Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy
in the Liberalization Era (1991-2012)
I. Introduction
This final empirical chapter analyzes political contestation over FDI rules during the
course of the liberalization period (1991-2012). It shows how economic actors seek to
present themselves as legitimate instruments through which the development ambitions
of the Indian state and wider society can be realized. This process involves significant
agency and contestation between competing economic actors. Indian economic actors
legitimate themselves and delegitimize others by creating and deploying cognitive and
cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern' business actors. These categories reflect
socially constructed cognitive and cultural schemas, which this dissertation has defined as
rationalized causal ideas that are imbued with historically salient social meaning. These
categories and schemas serve as interpretive frames through which actors determine the
legitimate role of foreign and domestic firms in the project of national development. They
play a powerful role in shaping actors preferences, particularly in the context of
environmental complexity and uncertainty that characterize periods of institutional
change and economic reform.
The chapter and the wider dissertation contribute to the growing inter-disciplinary
literature in institutional theory by bridging insights from macro-institutional comparative
political economy and micro-organizational economic sociology. It argues that
institutions are key devices through which actors are legitimized, but institutions
themselves are created through active socio-political processes of human agency. This
chapter and the wider dissertation aim to promote new understandings of the mutual
constitution of preferences, actors and institutions in order to provide richer explanations
of socio-political behavior and long run economic outcomes. The theoretical framework
elaborated in Chapter Two demonstrated how actors' rationalized beliefs about causal
means-ends relationships provide the substantive content of their policy preferences. This
is a central argument of institutional strands of comparative and international political
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economy (Hall, 2005; Blyth; 2001; Abdelal et al, 2010). These rationalized and socially
meaningful causal beliefs are akin to what economic sociologists and organizational
theorists refer to as 'institutional logics' that aid cognition, particularly under conditions
of environmental complexity and uncertainty (Dobbin, 2004; Thornton, Ocasio and,
2012). However, while these logics represent widely shared understandings of legitimate
goals and how they should be pursued, they are not simply taken-for-granted by passive
actors (Battilana and Dorado, 2010); the process through which agents acquire those
beliefs underpins the always-contested socio-political dynamics of preference formation
(Hall, 2005:155). This chapter and the wider dissertation thus contribute to inter-
disciplinary institutional perspectives on how rationalized causal ideas rise and fall over
century-long periods of time (Fligstein, 1990; Dobbin, 1994). It is clear that these socially
meaningful causal ideas operate across macro-institutional and micro-organizational
levels, yet economic sociology and political economy literatures addressing these
different levels of analysis are rarely brought together. Recent work such as Wry, Cobb
and Aldrich (2012) attempts to do so within the organizational studies literature by
linking the resource dependence and institutional logics literatures as a way of theorizing
the effects of power and contestation within a complex institutional environment. This
chapter has similar theoretical ambitions, albeit by integrating economic sociological
insights with a political economy approach.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II lays out the theoretical
framework that guides this chapter by elaborating the role of culture and cognition in
category construction and deployment. Section III marks the acceleration of liberalization
in 1991. It presents the rationalized causal ideas that underpinned both state and firm
preferences towards foreign direct investment. Section IV marks the beginning of
analysis of the backlash that emerged amongst leading Indian economic actors. It shows
how the causal ideas described in Section III are imbued with salient social meaning as
actors develop and deploy competing representations of domestic and foreign business
practices in the domain of FDI policy contestation. Section V embeds this conflict
amongst business actors in the wider political dynamics of the mid-late 1990s. It charts
the rise of a new political party that challenged and displaced the dominant Congress in
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part though deploying cultural resources as weapons in the raging FDI debates. Section
VI sees the imposition of a major policy rule known as Press Note 18 that dramatically
alters the institutional environment that shapes market interactions between domestic and
foreign firms in joint venture relationships. It analyzes the causal ideas and social
meanings that underpin PN18's creation through a brief comparative case study of two
Honda joint ventures, and then considers the reaction to the policy change by foreign and
domestic firms. Section VII describes how competing actors develop and deploy new
socially meaningful causal ideas in the 2000s in response to state intervention and new
market developments. The chapter ends with a brief summary and conclusion in Section
VIII.
II. Culture and Cognition:
Rationalized Causal Ideas and Historically Salient Social Meanings
This research points to the origins and evolution of rationalized causal ideas and the
cultural meaning systems in which they are embedded. It analyzes the effect of these
ideas and meanings on FDI policy and firm strategy: business and state practices that
together shape the wider institutional environment. The dissertation identifies the origins
and evolution of these ideas from the late 1 9 th century through the present. It shows how
these rationalized causal ideas emerge from economic theories that posit causal
relationships between FDI and development outcomes. However, as this chapter and the
wider dissertation show, there are competing theories and causal ideas at play in both the
scholarly and policy discourse that shape actors beliefs about the economic effects of FDI
that in turn structure the wider institutional environment. Two causal ideas are crucial.
The first holds that foreign capital contributes to industrial growth and development
through knowledge and technology spillovers that benefit domestic firms (Blomstrom
and Kokko, 2003). 1 By contrast, a similarly compelling logic posits foreign capital as
Chapter Two detailed the nature of these spillovers and the mechanisms through which the literature
suggests they might occur, but they are briefly recounted here. Spillovers generally refer to the transfer of
managerial practices, production methods, marketing techniques or any other forms of knowledge
embodied in goods or services. Mechanisms may include knowledge transfer through observation and
imitation of production processes or marketing methods by domestic firms, learning through movement of
labor from MNCs to domestic firms or interactions with MNC managers or technicians in a variety of
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crowding domestic actors out of oligopolistic markets through abuse of monopoly power,
especially with respect to multinationals superior access to finance and technology
(Amsden and Hikino, 1994).2 These represent competing theories that numerous studies
in the scholarly and policy literature have been unable to resolve (Aitken and Harrison,
1999; Gorg and Greenaway, 2004). However, while it may produce deadlock in scholarly
debates, this indeterminacy facilitates political contestation between economic and
political actors wielding competing causal ideas as they battle to shape the policy and
institutional environment in their favor. This is an area of interest to political economists,
economic sociologists and organizational theorists.
Chapter Two argued that if the "complexity of causal economic relationships in the social
world" creates uncertainty that precludes actors from determining their preferences
analysts must turn to the cognitive and cultural mechanisms "that agents rely upon when
determining their actions...in order to maximize their outcome[s]" (Beckert, 1996:814).
It suggested that rationalized causal ideas are a crucial cognitive element of preferences
that allow actors to construct means-ends relationships. As the next two sections show,
the importance of causal ideas in shaping actors preferences is increasingly well-
recognized in literature from across rational choice, historical institutional and
sociological strands of the new institutionalisms (Beland and Cox, 2011). However, there
is a second cultural element of preferences that receives less analytic attention.3 This
cultural dimension plays a complementary role by providing the socially meaningful and
spaces including industry associations, workshops, training sessions, etc. Knowledge spillovers to domestic
firms may also occur through the entry of foreign suppliers or service providers (e.g. consultants) as a result
of foreign firm entry. Domestic firms may also benefit through supplier relationships with MNCs,
particularly those that encourage time or quality-based efficiency improvements.
Just as there are multiple mechanisms through which positive spillovers might occur, there are also a
number of channels through which domestic firms might be disadvantaged by foreign firm entry. These
include loss of markets due to competitive effects of more efficient MNCs or loss of skilled labor through
poaching due to MNC entry. Domestic firm's production costs may rise due to loss of scale. Market losses
may increase average costs due to loss of scale-based efficiencies while skilled labor losses also negatively
impact efficiency (cf. Aitken and Harrison, 1999).
3 Interestingly this dimension is recently being integrated in the economic sociology and organizational
studies literatures, highlighting the analytic utility of bring these literatures into productive conversation.
This is elaborated in the recent Special Issue of The Academy of Management Journal "Organizations and
their Institutional Environment - Bringing Meanings, Value and Culture Back In." 2010, Vol. 53, No.6 of
which Suddaby et al (2010) provides the introduction.
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historically rooted cultural symbols, narratives and tropes that are essential for motivating
human action.4
The relationship between the cognitive and cultural dimension of preferences requires
further elaboration. The growing consensus in the new institutionalisms in economics
(North, 2005), political science (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 2002) and sociology (Dobbin, 1993)
on the role of causal ideas, such as those provided by economic theory, is consistent with
my argument that preferences are comprised in part of rationalized causal ideas.
However, a crucial missing element in many new institutional conceptions of preferences
is the social meaning with which causal ideas must be imbued, the salient historical
narratives in which they must be embedded and the cultural symbols and tropes that must
be utilized by actors in conveying causal ideas to others in order for them to be fully
internalized. That is, ideas that are weakly embedded or do not fit the historical narratives
and collective social memory of a given society have little chance of resonating with
societal actors much less shaping preferences and behavioral outcomes. Imbuing ideas
with social meaning is thus a crucial element of preference formation, but it does not
happen naturally; it entails significant agency and creativity on the part of strategic
political and economic actors. These actors, often prominent figures in business or the
state with access to valuable social, political and economic resources, utilize widely
understood cultural symbols and historically salient narratives to devise and deploy new
schemas. These schemas underpin categories that posit legitimate roles for foreign and
domestic capital in the national development project (Douglas, 1986; Swidler, 1986;
Sewell, 1992). This dissertation thus contributes to the new institutional literature on
preferences, social learning and the politics of ideas by highlighting the socio-historical
and cultural embeddedness of rationalized causal ideas along with the role of agency in
shaping political and economic outcomes. This crucial social and historical dimension of
4 This cognitive element operates primarily in the mind of the individual, as compared with inter-
subjectively held social meanings and cultural symbols that are shared across members of a group.
Economic sociologists see these as complementary analytic approaches to understanding agency and
cognition (DiMaggio, 1997; Dobbin, 2004; Beckert, 1996). A growing literature in comparative and
international political economy is engaging with the theoretical architecture of cognitive frameworks (cf.
Abdelal et al, 2010) but less so the social and cultural, with some political scientists see this separation as
epistemological issue (cf. Rathbun, 2008). This dissertation aims to demonstrate how the two can be
productively integrated.
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preferences is often downplayed or completely ignored in rational choice, historical
institutional and even some sociological institutional formulations of the new institutional
literature.
Categories, Culture and Cognition
The construction of cognitive and cultural categories is a crucial mechanism through
which these socio-political processes occur. The classic works of Emile Durkheim and
Max Weber provide a social-psychological mechanism of cognition through which actors
make sense of the world. Durkheim (1915) argued that the human mind creates categories
in order to map the complexity of their environment. These frameworks are not only
situated in the individual consciousness, they are inter-subjectively shared across
individuals and groups through institutions and social interactions. The creation of
cognitive categories is thus itself a social activity (Dobbin, 2004). Durkheim (1915)
provided the social underpinnings of cognition by identifying the human inclination to
collectively make sense of world by classifying things and attaching meaning to them
(Dobbin, 2009). This approach has been central to research programs in behavioral
economics, cognitive psychology and other social scientific disciplines (DiMaggio, 1997;
Mullainathan et al, 2008; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Behavioral economists have
adopted ideas of 'coarse sorting' to show how actors group situations into categories to
which they apply standard inferential models. Economic sociologists have illustrated the
role of categories in directing financial flows and policy rents to market actors
(Zuckerman, 1999). However, categories like wider institutions don't just constrain
action; they also serve as enabling cultural resources for strategic action, as scholars from
across the disciplines have increasingly shown (Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio, 1997; Fligstein
2001; Mullainathan et al, 2008).
For policymakers and other societal actors struggling to make sense of the complexities
of the economy, the politics of foreign direct investment often comes down to a single
question: who are the legitimate economic actors through which development goals of the
state should be realized? That is, whose activities and business practices contribute to the
pursuit of modernity? While these end goals themselves are objects of societal
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contestation, a central element of the process is determining the means through which
policy ends should be achieved and the nature and identity of the actors that should
receive policy support. This provides insight to long-run historical variation in policies
that swing from support of British managing agency firms in late 19th century, to
emerging Indian firms and multinational corporations in the early 20th century as
perceptions of Indian capital were transformed from 'traditional' to 'modern' while
multinational firms emerged as an entirely new 'modern' organizational form. Both
became increasingly favorable to British colonial and nationalist actors amidst the
growing delegitimization of the managing agencies. This evolution continued as support
for Indian state-owned firms relative to private capital grew in the 1950s, and the
variation is most sharp during fluctuations in support for foreign and domestic firms in
the post-1991 liberalization period.
Chapter Two argued that preferences towards FDI are not determined by rational
calculation nor given naturally by structural position. Preferences are shaped by cognitive
and cultural schemas: rationalized causal ideas imbued with historically salient social
meaning. These schemas serve as interpretive frameworks through which state and wider
societal actors classify foreign and domestic firms as legitimate or illegitimate
instruments of development in the presence of environmental complexity and uncertainty.
The legitimacy of these actors in the eyes of state and society in turns determines the
shape of the policy and institutional environment. Capitalist legitimacy is determined by
institutions, both formal (e.g. legal rules) and informal (e.g. culture and norms). These
serve to both enable and constrain by legitimizing or delegitimizing domestic and foreign
firms as the economic actors who are advancing the goals of the nation. This legitimacy
determines whether their activities should be supported or restricted by state policy.
However, these categories are not given a priori, they are products of social and political
contestation between business and state actors.
Cognitive and cultural schemas not only apply to Indian state and societal actors, they
also serve as an interpretive frameworks for business actors in developing their own
strategies for engaging with multinational firms and for multinationals considering their
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entry strategies and mode of engagement with Indian firms. Schemas are particularly
important as cognitive devices given competing causal ideas on whether multinationals
have positive or negative effects on domestic firms, and crucially, the institutional and
organizational mechanisms, such as technology partnerships and equity joint ventures,
through which gains can be maximized and risks minimized. The indeterminacy of
competing causal ideas generates environmental complexity and uncertainty. Cultural
representations imbue ideas with salient social meaning that allows firms to make sense
of this complexity by categorizing other business actors' practices and behavior, such as
in their joint ventures relationships, as legitimate or illegitimate. This element is crucial
as it not only helps firms formulate their business strategy, by determining whether and
which MNCs are 'legitimate' and could serve as valuable partners; it also underpins their
political strategies, by determining which domestic firms and practices are legitimized or
delegitimized in the policy arena. Cognitive and cultural schemas thus underpin strategic
practice and political engagement, and hence inter-firm contestation in the both the
market and policy domains.
Much of the political contestation observed in markets reflects economic actors
competing to legitimize themselves and their activities, practices and strategies in the
eyes of the state and wider public as a means of gaining access to valuable resources.
This not only means self-promotion, it is a competitive process that requires efforts to
delegitimize others in the policy domain. This is a crucial element of socio-political
contestation, albeit an area where economic sociologists have paid less attention
(Fligstein, 1990). The state thus serves as the domain of political contestation. This
approach allows us to make sense of what would otherwise seem to be idiosyncratic
fluctuations in policy, which in the political economy literature is too often unhelpfully
ascribed to 'competing interests' and 'the push and pull of politics'.
The cognitive and cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy are summarized in the table
below and expansively elaborated in the analysis in the rest of this chapter. Crucially,
each of these categories is underpinned by a set of causal ideas that rationalizes the
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business practice, but this idea is imbued with historically salient social meaning that
accords or denies legitimacy.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1870-2012)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: 'bazaar traders and speculators' Modem: 'captains of industry'
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modern: 'technology providers'
1. Illegitimate Indian economic actors
a. These economic actors are characterized by 'traditional' business practices that are
oriented towards short-term profit gains from trading, speculation and money lending.
They do not invest in legitimate long-term economic activities such as manufacturing
industry that contribute to national development; instead, they profit from economic
activities that keep the Indian economy trapped in underdevelopment and backwardness.
They do not partner with foreign firms as a means of long-term technological learning
and upgrading, but rather as a short-term speculative profit opportunity.
2. Illegitimate foreign economic actors
a. These economic actors are characterized by 'traditional' business practices that are neo-
imperialist. In the late colonial period they focus on commercial trade in overseas imports
rather than investing in local manufacturing. The East India Company is the exemplar. In
the contemporary period they reflect multinational companies that displace local firms
through unethical business practices and market power. They contribute to the
subjugation of India in the global economy.
3. Legitimate Indian economic actors
a. These 'modern' economic actors are 'captains of industry' that strive to develop new
manufacturing industry that contribute to national development. They heroically
persevere in the face of adversity from colonial authorities or powerful multinationals and
contribute to India's economic advancement. They seek productive collaborations with
foreign firms to gain access to new technologies. The Tata Group is an exemplar.
4. Legitimate foreign economic actors
a. These 'modern' economic actors develop technology-intensive industries in India that
provide a multiple benefits to a wide variety of domestic actors: high wage skilled labor,
technology transfer to local firms and financial support to the balance of payments. They
are willing to collaborate with Indian firms, hire local managers and ultimately contribute
to the industrialization and 'modernization' of the Indian economy.
The next section shows that preferences towards domestic and foreign capital depends on
the extent to which these actors are categorized as 'traditional' or 'modern', that is, as
regressive agents or forces of social and economic progress. Business actors thus fight to
present themselves in a form that the state considers modern and progressive while often
painting their opponents and their business practices as traditional and backward.
Political actors similarly compete to define the social meaning of 'traditional' and
'modern' and thus to legitimize the actors they believe will best achieve the development
goals of the nation. The outcome is thus agency and contestation over FDI rules. The
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brief historical narrative in the next section illustrates this link between cognition and
meaning-making through classifications of legitimate and illegitimate capitalists that
came to the fore at crucial moments of Indian economic history, particularly during
attempts by the state to impose new institutions. It provides the empirical and theoretical
frame for the discussion of the liberalization period that begins in Section III.
III. The Acceleration of FDI Liberalization (1991-1998)
The previous section reiterated the theoretical argument that actors make sense of their
environment through cognitive and cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy. The table
above summarized these categories that were developed over the course of the historical
narrative of Chapters Three through Seven. It provides an empirical and analytical
framework to assess the current period of economic liberalization (1991-2012). The
deeply institutionalized cognitive and cultural categories of the late colonial and early
independence periods -- and the legitimizing and delegitimizing social meanings, cultural
symbols and tropes that structure them -- persist into the current period of economic
liberalization. Crucially, they play a central role in shaping preferences towards foreign
direct investment by imbuing the rationalized causal ideas that underpin the economic
reforms with historically salient social meaning. This generates enthralling policy
contests over FDI rules between competing economic actors.
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh's famous July 1991 announcement of a massive
acceleration of economic reforms saw the removal of the Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act (FERA) that previously capped foreign equity participation at 40%. The new rules
allowed up to 51% foreign equity participation in 35 'high priority' industries. Crucially,
prioritization was accorded to industries where foreign technology was deemed necessary
for increasing the competitiveness of Indian industry, reflecting the salient social
meaning of 'technology' as a cultural symbol and, as Chapter Two argued, a 'black box'
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that serves as a vessel for politics. 5 However, while this entailed significant liberalization
of foreign direct investment by allowing multinational corporations unprecedented access
to the Indian economy the equity cap meant that MNCs could only enter India though
joint ventures with domestic firms. This would lay the foundation for massive tension and
contestation between and among foreign and domestic firms over the next two decades.
These conflicts occur at both the organizational and wider institutional level,
underpinning the importance of a theoretical and analytic approach that bridges these
levels of analysis. This is a central contribution this dissertation aims to make to political
economy.
Domestic and Foreign Firm Reactions to India's FDI Reforms
The FDI reforms triggered a feeding frenzy as MNCs flooded into India, attracted by the
promise of a 250 million strong 'aspirational consumerist' Indian middle class.6 This
group was expected to devour the foreign products that they had long been denied by the
import substituting license-quota-permit raj. This was aptly reflected in the rate of FDI
inflows, which rose rapidly from a mere $75 million in 1991 during the macroeconomic
crisis, to $974m in 1993 before ultimately peaking at $3.6 billion in 1997 when the Asian
Financial Crisis struck.
5 Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars would further suggest that this reflects the analytic utility
of interrogating the socio-politics of 'technology' in the Indian "socio-technical imaginary" (Jasanoff et al
2007; Jasanoff and Kim, 2009)
6 Most FDI at this time was market-seeking rather than resource or efficiency-seeking i.e. entering India to
take advantage of the growing domestic market rather than using India as an export platform or resource
extraction. This strategy was shaped in part by the mode of liberalization, which was not only phased with
respect to FDI entry, but also to trade liberalization. India's tariff and non-tariff barriers thus precluded a
pure export strategy. This is an important contrast with China, which also had heavy restrictions on FDI
that mandated joint ventures as a means of facilitating technology transfer to domestic firms, but
nevertheless heavily promoted exports, particularly through special economic zones (SEZs) located in the
South-eastern provinces. as was being pursued in China at the same time, by contrast.
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It is important to understand the mood of the time.7 This was a period of tremendous
global economic optimism, not only for the Indian government, business and wider
public but also for multinational firms. From the MNC perspective the early 1990s
marked a peak in the euphoria around 'globalization', a brave new era when the entire
world market seemed to be opening up due to the now-familiar combinational of
technological and regulatory developments that transformed global markets and systems
of production.8 In contrast to the 1950s and 1960s when developing countries were
generally resistant to MNC entry as described in Chapter Six and classically represented
in Raymond Vernon's (1977) Storm Over the Multinationals, the new economic mantra
was attracting foreign investment and 'allowing markets to work' as the means of
achieving development goals. Latin American countries were going through massive
IMF-led structural adjustment and market opening following the debt crisis of the early
1980s, the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989, and the 'shock therapy' market reforms that
afforded MNCs immediate access to many potentially lucrative ex-Soviet markets were
already underway. Further, the Gulf War was ending and the internet-fuelled economic
boom of the 1990s was a welcome relief after the 1991 US recession. This underpinned
the enthusiasm and high expectations with which many foreign firms entered the massive
Indian market. Not only was India one of the last major economies to open after forty
7 Consideration of the affective mood that prevailed is crucial given the theoretical and analytic focus on
the rationalized causal ideas and salient social meanings through which actors interpret the complexities of
their institutional environment.
8 [This was before the East Asian Crisis revealed the dangers of deep inter-connections as well as before the
backlash against globalization exemplified by the Seattle protests at the WTO meeting in 1999, and MNC-
led labor abuses of the late 2000s.]
314
years of restrictive policies since the 1951 Industrial Policy Resolution, it also offered a
total market size of a close to one billion people. Liberalization was a potential bonanza.
Multinational corporations were not alone in their optimism. Indian capital was similarly
seized by the new possibilities that the reforms represented. Many Indian business actors
felt liberated from the decades of stringent controls under the license-quota-permit raj.
The government was finally lifting the raft of regulations that had shackled Indian private
capital since the imposition of the licensing regime in 1951. Even though internal
liberalization had been underway for the past decade, the stagnation of reforms and
somber political mood of the late 1980s following the Bofors arms deal scandal that
engulfed the Rajiv Gandhi regime led many to fear a relapse to suffocating controls.
Chapter Seven illustrated how Rajiv Gandhi's youthful internationalism embodied the
early reforms and empowered Indians with a vision of new possibilities. However, with
the scandal, electoral loss and ultimately assassination the prospects of 'taking India into
the twenty-first century' seemed forever lost. Instead, the new Narasimha Rao
government shocked the entire country with the announcement of a massive wave of
economic reforms that dwarfed the efforts of the previous Gandhi administrations. India
was finally shedding its insular and autarchic legacy and moving towards renewed
engagement with the global economy.
The institutional form that the reforms took was a crucial factor in the domestic firm
response. While MNCs could only enter India through partnerships with local firms,
industry-level delicensing meant that for the first time, Indian companies were free to
enter almost any industry of their choice. They had the option to partner with foreign
firms if believed it was beneficial but there were no regulatory requirements. This was
significantly different from the limited liberalization in the early 1980s that was analyzed
in Chapter Seven. While industrial license allocation was expanded under Indira and
Rajiv Gandhi, licenses were still required for market entry and the likelihood of an Indian
firm's application being accepted was greatly enhanced by having a foreign technology
partner. In this respect, alliances were effectively required. By contrast, post-1991 market
entry was free for domestic firms. The crucial question thus became Indian firms'
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preferences towards FDI: would they opt to partner with MNCs or enter new industries
on their own? What causal ideas would guide their strategies and practices? How would
this affect their political behavior in shaping the policy rules that govern these
relationships?
The Rationalized Causal Ideas of Joint Venture Formation:
The Implications of Phased Liberalization for 'Learning Races'
The rationale of the reforms for Indian business and state actors was the technology-for-
markets bargain that is familiar from management theory and international economics
(Fagre and Wells, 1983; Kobrin, 1987; Kogut, 1988; Ramamurti, 2001; Luo, 2001).9 In
addition to hard currency finance, MNCs can provide modern production technologies
and managerial practices. These are expected to provide broad-based distributional
benefits through a variety of spillover effects. For domestic firms, preferences towards
FDI are shaped by the prospect of capturing spillovers a number of mechanisms
including demonstration effects, participation in buyer-supplier relationships and skilled
labor mobility. However, economic actors recognize that there is significant uncertainty
in the ability to benefit from the mere presence of MNCs in the economy. Joint ventures
are a rationalized option as they represent an organizational mechanism to reduce the
uncertainty of technological and organizational learning and maximize the benefits of
spillover effects.
The strategic choice to partner with multinational firms was thus consistent with the
rationalized causal relationship that posited multinationals as sources of tacit knowledge,
technology, and finance, all of which were scarce resources for Indian firms. This view
further held that Indian business groups, long shackled by the restrictive industrial
licensing regime described in Chapter Seven, could gain necessary new capabilities from
MNC partners to enter additional areas of production and even attain competitiveness in
the global economy. This has two crucial elements. First, Indian groups could partner
9 A similar belief motivated Indian firms to enter joint ventures in the immediate post-independence periods
of the 1950s-60, as illustrated in Chapter Six through comparative analysis with Brazil. There are other
theoretical arguments for the existence of joint ventures that go beyond the resource-based and
organizational learning perspectives (Barney, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), such as
transactions costs approaches (Williamson, 1975,1985; Henisz, 2000).
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with multinationals in their existing areas of activity in order to upgrade their capabilities
and more effectively navigate an increasingly competitive market environment. Firms
could also utilize the joint venture mechanism as a strategy for entering new areas of
production where they may have little prior experience, a mode of corporate expansion
through unrelated diversification that was facilitated by the institutions of the ubiquitous
pyramidal family-controlled business group (Amsden, 2001; Schneider, 2009). Both of
these causal ideas were based on organizational-level upgrading by Indian firms, and thus
were deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Indian state seeking increased industrial
growth.
In line with these rationales, the immediate liberalization period saw a spike in joint
venture formation that was led by India's largest business groups, as the chart and table
below show:
The Growing Importance of Financial and Technical Collaborations (1973-93)
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Distribution of Approved Technical Collaborations among the Large Business Groups (1993)
Technical
Business Group Collaborations
Tata 62
Birla 45
Larsen and Toubro 22
Reliance 21
Kirloskar 14
Ranbaxy 14
Goenka 12
Modi 12
Escorts 10
Chidambram 10
Mafatlal 10
Shri Ram 10
Thapar 10
Source: Table 11, ISID, 1994
However, despite this rush to form joint ventures, there is an inherent tension between
cooperation and competition in the rationale of these technology-for-markets
arrangements. Foreign firms may not only form joint ventures for regulatory compliance,
but also as a strategy to learn from their domestic partners and reduce the 'liability of
foreigness' (Zaheer, 1995). MNCs seek to take advantage of their partners' market
knowledge of local preferences and tastes, established distribution networks and
critically, political connections (Hamel, 1991; Henisz, 2000). These hybrid organizations
are thus dynamic and unstable as both the management literature (Inkpen, 1997) and
interviews and public statements from Indian and MNC joint venture partners confirm.
Crucially, both sets of actors are cognizant that collaboration may well turn to
competition given the asymmetric rate of internalization of partner capabilities. This
inherent instability creates a 'learning race': the pressure is on to extract resources from
the partnership that each firm considers would make it a success while preparing to
compete directly with the partner in the not-too-distant future (Hamel, 1991). This
tension is further heightened in institutional contexts like India where joint venture
formation was policy induced through enforced equity caps on MNC entry. This creates
additional policy uncertainty about when the FDI caps may be raised. This was the
scenario in post-1991 India where FDI liberalization was phased. This recognition of the
dynamic and unstable nature of these hybrid organizations and the regulations that
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mandate them generates environmental complexity and facilitates massive conflict and
contestation over the rules that should govern these arrangements, as the upcoming
sections will show.
Finally, while the rationalized technology-for-markets rationale outlined above
represented the legitimate approach to joint ventures for Indian firms, it is important to
note that many observers cite the existence of a competing albeit illegitimate rationale
that was held to underpin joint venture strategies and practices of many Indian groups.
This delegitimized view reflects the category of Indian business actors who were "mere
traders" simply "along for the ride" that the interviewee in the previous section
suggested. Given the requirement that MNCs enter with Indian partners, as well as the
previous 1974 FERA regime that forced MNCs to divest to maximum 40% holdings,
many Indian firms were engaged in joint ventures merely as 'sleeping partners'. This
'financial' as opposed to 'technological' rationale of joint venture partnering is
reminiscent of the delegitimized 'orientation' of many of the emerging Indian capitalists
who were castigated by the early Indian nationalists at the turn of the twentieth century
and later by Commerce Minister TT Krishnamachari in the 1950s. Just as Indian
economic actors seized the opportunity to gain control of manufacturing firms as the
British managing agencies disinvested their Indian holdings -- albeit for all the 'wrong'
reasons by stripping these industrial assets to engage in speculative and moneylending
activities in the non-industrial sector -- so too were modern day Indian groups seen as
mere speculators through their financial investments in FERA firms. These practices
were seen as incommensurate with the behavior of 'true' industrialists seeking to build
manufacturing capabilities for global competitiveness.
This interpretation of some Indian business groups' 'financial' rationale delegitimized
their perceived strategies and practices and became a focal point of conflicts over MNC
entry. Crucially, from the policymaker's point of view the legitimate causal economic
rationale of phased FDI liberalization was supporting technology transfer to Indian firms
while facilitating broader expansion of the industrial sector, not facilitating joint venture
formation as speculative financial investments. Thus the government's approach to FDI
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liberalization would only be deemed successful insofar as domestic and foreign played
their required roles: legitimate MNCs providing technology through policy-induced joint
ventures and legitimate Indian firms making efforts to absorb these technologies, improve
their capabilities and expand their scale and scope of production. These are illustrated
below, with the arrows depicting key axes of contestation.
Competing Causal Ideas & Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1991-2012)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Rationale: enter JVs as financial investment Rationale: enter JVs for technological learning
Traditional: 'traders' and 'speculators' Modern: 'captains of industry'
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate 'Western Economic Man'
Rationale: learning race Rationale: JVs as mutually beneficial exchange
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments'; unethical Modern: ethical JVpartners and technology
partners that withhold technologies providers
These competing causal ideas lay at the crux of tension and contestation over FDI rules
and joint ventures that emerged in the arena of business politics. The arrows in the table
indicate the dimensions of conflict between and among domestic and foreign firms. The
existence of multiple causal ideas contributes to environmental complexity (Battilana and
Dorada, 2010). This poses a challenge for decision-making: in the context of
environmental complexity, how might policymakers who set the rules that govern FDI
and joint ventures differentiate between these causal ideas? The socially and historically
embedded factors that shape the cultural characterizations of economic actors as
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' were essential to the interpretive frames that actors used to
make sense of the complexity of the institutional environment. Competing causal ideas
were deployed in political contestation that emerged around FDI and joint ventures, but
these rationalized causal ideas were indeterminate for shaping actors preferences towards
FDI. As the next section shows, a crucial element lay in how firms represented
themselves and their counterparts as legitimate or illegitimate economic actors in the
realm of policy contestation.
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V. FDI Liberalization and Capitalist Backlash:
The Bombay Club, 'Cowboy MNCs' and 'One Night Stands'
On an otherwise average afternoon in Bombay's posh Oberoi Hotel, few paid much
attention as one of India's leading businessmen entered and walked briskly towards a
private room in the Belvedere Club. However, heads began to turn as one after the other,
heads of India's most powerful business groups walked into the hotel and headed for the
same room. This group of business actors included Nusil Wadia, Hari Shankar Singhania,
Bharat Ram of DCM, L.M. Thapar, M.V. Arunachalam, Rahul Bajaj, B.K. Modi, C.K.
Birla and Jamshed Godrej amongst others.' 0 The venerable family-controlled pyramidal
business groups that these actors represented all pre-dated independence and emerged
from the ISI period amongst the top ten in India (see table below). The group met
informally to discuss a variety of issues arising from the reforms. Topping the list was the
complaint that Indian and multinational firms were not competing on a "level playing
field", a term that would become a powerful cultural symbol in the FDI debates. These
leading Indian businessmen argued that MNCs enjoyed numerous competitive
advantages relative to their domestic counterparts. These included lower costs of capital
as Indian firms faced onerous domestic borrowing rates as high as 21% and, due to Indian
financial market regulations, could not access international capital markets on similar
terms as MNCs. Indian business further argued that their manufacturing capabilities had
been stunted by decades of under the repressive license-quota-permit raj. Contrary to
critics who labeled these groups bloated beneficiaries of the protective regime, 'Bombay
Club' capitalists argued that in fact the license raj limited their ability to upgrade
production capabilities in the post-independence period thus impeding their ability
compete on even terms with their foreign counterparts now that the government was
opening the market. Indian capital thus claimed to have been harmed by important
substitution rather then helped by protection. After long consultations amongst
themselves - and eventual discovery by journalist Sucheta Dalal who dubbed the group
the 'Bombay Club' -- the group prepared a briefing note outlining their position and
10 These meetings have been documented in numerous press article. See for example Outlook and
Singhania's own article "A Milestone reached, an agenda unfinished".
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presented it to then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh on November 10, 1993. The note
was released to the press after the meeting in New Delhi, sparking a vigorous debate in
the public realm.
Assets of Select Large Indian and Foreign Business Groups (1989-1990)"
Rank Group/Family Assets (R. Crores)
1 Birla 7,235
2 Tata 6,851
3 Reliance (Ambani) 3,241
4 Singhania 1,938
5 Thapar 1,782
7 Bajaj 1,228
9 Laursen and Toubro 1,130
11 T.V.S. Iyengar 929
12 Uni Lever (MNC) 925
21 Mahindra & Mahindra 620
22 Goenka 570
The Bombay Club's note sought to legitimize their complaints by asserting their global
ambitions: "The aim of Indian industry is to be as competitive as any of its peers in the
world. Its vision is that it becomes multinational, in fact a world player." The note further
suggested that in order to achieve this goal the range of economic reforms must be
widened and its pace accelerated. However, with respect to competition in the domestic
market and the liberalisation [sic] of FDI, the note urged the government to strengthen
Indian enterprises "to enable them to play their rightful role in the industrial development
of the country." To do so, it argued that "Indian industry needs a conducive environment
that allows it to raise resources competitively, and which addresses itself to the issue of
stake-holding, so that there is an additional incentive for growth and capital formation".12
One of the main members of the groups Hari Shankar Singhania later justified the
" Mazumdar, 2010, table 4. One crore = 10,000,000 rupees. Not all of these groups were members of the
Bombay Club.
12 Hari Shankar Singhania: "A milestone reached, an agenda unfinished", Hindu Business Standard, April
24, 2011
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/hari-shankar-singhaniamilestone-reached-an-agenda-
unfinished/433280/
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Bombay Club reaction by arguing that "Indian entrepreneurs [represented by the old
business houses] have been working relentlessly over the years against all odds - pre-
independence, immediately after independence and post-reform - towards achieving the
aim of making the Indian economy stronger and ushering in a welfare society."" These
were clear efforts to project a self-image as legitimate 'captains of industry'.
This was a powerful public statement that the Indian state and public could not ignore.
However, given the existence of competing causal ideas and representations of 'old
protected traders' versus 'modern captains of industry' it was initially unclear how
observers would interpret the claims of these leading business groups. The affective
response in India was heightened by a spate of high profile takeovers and proponents of a
symbolic 'level playing field' for Indian firms cited an increasing number of high profile
cases of MNCs 'unfairly' displacing successful Indian firms. The most famous was Coca-
Cola's purchase of Parle, the hugely successful maker of the "Thums Up!" brand of cola
that, ironically, had risen to dominate the Indian market after Coca-Cola was infamously
'kicked out' in the 1970s when the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was first
passed. Coca-Cola returned to India in 1992 in partnership with the confectionary giant
Brittania but soon began to pressure Parle owners Ramesh and Prakash Chauhan to sell
their stake in the firm. Neville Isdell, then Coke's lead executive in India and later
Chairman and CEO of the firm, recalled that younger brother Prakash was in favor of the
sale, revealing his fears for Thums Up's continued competiveness with the entry of Coke
and Pepsi: Prakash reportedly told Coca-Cola's marketing manager 'When elephants
fight, the grass gets trampled!'14 By contrast Ramesh was reluctant to "relinquish the title
of India's soft drink king" but "Ramesh finally relented, but not happily. He and his wife
"sobbed at the contract signing in Atlanta" (Isdell and Beasley, 2011:146).
Coca-Cola's paid US$60 million for Parle, widely considered a pittance given Thums
Up's massive popularity and dominant 60% market share. Coca-Cola's intention was to
13 Ibid, Singhania, 2011.
1 Prakash Chauhan believed that Parle would be unable to compete with Coca-Cola's seemingly endless
resources, a belief that received wide credence as disparities in lending rates to which Indian firms and
MNCs had access, as the Bombay Club and Tarun Das argued.
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buy Thums Up and then kill the brand in order to promote other lines in its product
portfolio, a common corporate strategy employed by deep-pocketed consumer goods
firms to establish market power.' 5 However, upon purchasing Thums Up! Coca Cola
found that consumer tastes had evolved during its enforced absence such that Indians
preferred the flavor of the local Thum's Up! brand to the classic American beverage. In
order to compete with Pepsi, Coke was forced to resurrect the Thums Up brand and
return it to the product lineup, where Thums Up! proceeded to outsell Coke by to 3:1. It
seemed that the grass might have been able to survive the elephants' feet after all. 16
The irony of Coke being 'kicked out' of India for failing to share its 'technology' as
captured in the 'secret ingredient' and returning to buy out the very firm that rose to take
its place by developing its own apparently superior 'technology' was not lost on Indian
business, government and the wider public. The sale of Parle in November duly marked
the deepening of the domestic reaction to FDI reforms. Crucially, the Coke-Parle case
would serve as a powerful example of MNCs using their financial muscle to displace
successful domestic firms, hence fitting into the historically salient cultural category of
MNCs as illegitimate neo-imperial instruments.17
Despite recognition of this growing political backlash from India's leading industrialists
and a growing challenge from a newly consolidating political rival the Hindu-nationalist
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Congress nevertheless pushed ahead with the reforms.
In 1996, the 'automatic approval' route for FDI was significantly expanded and foreign
" Interestingly, consumer tastes had evolved during its enforced absence such that flavor of the Thum's
Up! was preferred to Coke. In fact, in order to compete with Pepsi Coke later resurrected the Thums Up
brand.
16 This surprising market development raised the issue of Indian capitalists 'self-confidence', an issue that
would become increasingly salient in the 2000s. In the Parle case, it begged the question of why the
Chauhan brothers didn't try to compete with Coke and Pepsi. More substantively, was this the way that
'true' captains of industry would be expected to behave? Would they exit the market or remain in business
and try to compete? Were the Chauhans 'true' industrialists or mere banias, junior partners that facilitated
extractive merchant trade? How should they be categorized?
17 This view was only deepened by the widely held belief that Coke paid massive bribes to re-enter India as
a wholly owned subsidiary when the 51% FDI cap still stood. My interview with the lobbyist that famously
represented Coke did little to dispel this view. Further, the categorization of Coke and its return to India
was further was strengthened as it did so without making any clear legitimacy-enhancing contribution to
the Indian economy in terms of technology, new products, etc., and as such were analogous to the British
managing agencies of the colonial era and exemplified by the East India Company.
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equity caps were raised.' 8 This removed the regulatory requirement that forced MNCs to
enter India as minority joint ventures partners; they could now launch new firms with
majority equity ownership or dispense with the need for local Indian partners altogether
through wholly owned subsidiaries.
Crucially, this also meant that many MNCs in existing partnerships with Indian firms no
longer needed to remain with their local partners for regulatory purposes: they were now
free to exit these partnerships and strike out on their own if they so desired. MNCs
strategic decision-making was, of course, also dependent on its own rationalized causal
beliefs. The decision would depend on whether the benefit of having a local partner to
navigate the Indian environment was perceived to outweigh the advantages of complete
managerial control. This raised the 'dynamic learning race' tension in the joint venture
rationale discussed in the previous section (Hamel, 1991). This new round of phased
liberalization dramatically altered the institutional environment for MNCs and local
firms. Indian firms faced the prospect of direct competition with MNCs for the first time
in decades. Ultimately the deepening of the liberalization process significantly shifted the
balance of power in many joint venture relationships towards the foreign partner.
The Capitalist Backlash Intensifies: 'Cowboy' MNCs and 'One night stands'
The debate heightened dramatically on March 19, 1996 when Tarun Das, Director-
General of the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) made a speech entitled 'MNC
Strategy Needs Rethinking' that shook the Indian business world. In his speech, Das
championed the cause of domestic firms against the "cowboy tactics" of multinational
firms, a thinly veiled reference to American firms. Das asserted that MNCs had no real
interest in mutually beneficial cooperation with their domestic partners implying that they
just saw them as "one night stands". 19 According to Das, the MNC strategy was
18 Automatic approval was widened from 35 to 111 industries and foreign equity caps raised under four
distinct categories: Part A-up to 50%, Part B-up to 51%, Part C-up to 74%, and Part D-up to 100%. See
appendix for details. This industry-level variation in liberalization provides scope for exploitation in future
analysis.
19 Media reports suggest that the impetus for this strongly worded reaction from Tarun Das, head of the
Confederation of Indian Industry, arose from powerful council members representing firms in technology-
intensive electronics, autos and consumer goods industries. The timing was also noteworthy, as the
statement was made during the run-up to a general election, as will be discussed momentarily. See Javed
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increasingly to take advantage of the liberalized FDI rules to neglect existing joint
ventures, to which the MNC has only shared 'obsolete' technologies, while launching
new firms operating in the same field as wholly owned subsidiaries. Unencumbered by
their old Indian partner and having gained knowledge of the Indian market and
institutional environment, the new MNC subsidiary would be endowed with greater
financial and technological resources and proceed to outcompete the abandoned joint
venture, thus destroying the value of the Indian partners' investment. MNCs were thus
portrayed as rapacious neo-imperial instruments reminiscent of the British managing
agencies and the East India Company.
Das detailed his complaints by identifying a several "trends" that can be grouped into two
related sets of concerns with MNCs. First, their general approach to entry into the Indian
market; and second, their unethical behavior towards their Indian JV partners. The first
set of concerns speaks directly to the distinctions between 'trading' versus
'manufacturing' business practices, 'short-term speculative' versus 'long-term' strategies
and 'orientations', and finally the powerful social meaning of 'technology' that this
dissertation has argued characterized the politics of industrialization since the late
nineteenth century. According to Das:
The first trend is the sales approach towards India as distinct from manufacturing.. .to
access the market through minimum production on the ground and maximum
production at home, wherever that is. A byproduct of this approach is to rely on
continued import of components rather than India-made components and parts. The
second trend is focusing on the short-term rather than the long-term. Strategy seems
to be to generate profits quickly rather than go for the long haul, be patient, stay in India
and build credibility as a steady process. The third is to bring in technology and products
which are being phased out in the home country of the MNC. Not to bring in state-of-art
technology or the most modern products.20
This was a powerful political statement that skillfully deployed historically salient
cultural symbols, narrative and tropes to characterize MNCs as rapacious and abusive
neo-imperial instruments with little interest in furthering Indian development. The core of
his arguments is practically indistinguishable from the 'drain theory' that Dadabhai
Naoroji and R.C. Dutt deployed in the period 1870-1900 (cf. Chapter Two). The behavior
Syed, "Tarun Das Breathes Fire on MNC Entrants One[]Night Stand", Economic Times, 20 March 1996.
20 Das, Tarun "MNC Strategy Needs a Rethink," Text of Press Briefing, March 20, 1996.
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of contemporary MNCs was akin to the short-term and exploitative 'trading' orientation
of the British managing agencies and the East India Company, particularly with respect to
the preference for production abroad rather than in India. Das' framing was crucial as he
represented MNCs as bad for India writ large, not just Indian capitalists. As Dobbin
(2004) argues, this follows Marx's view of capitalists as representing their interests as not
just good for them, but good for society writ large (Roy, 1997). Das continued by
outlining a further set of 'trends' that directly addressed unethical behavior in MNC-
domestic firm joint venture relationships:
The fourth is to leverage an Indian partner to get into India on a 50/50 or 40/40 basis, to
get sanctions and approval quickly and then having reached a certain minimum level of
comfort in India, to want to move quickly to 51% equity holding. Another trend is that
inspite [sic] of having a Joint Venture company with an Indian partner, the MNC
sets up a 100% subsidiary without any partner and where it has total
control.. .Another trend is the "Cowboy" approach of landing in India, hastily choosing
a partner, making a mistake and then wanting to break the relationship.
These arguments were highly salient as they hearkened back to the abuses Indian firms
suffered at the hand of the East India Company and British managing agencies in the late
19th and early 2 0 th centuries through business practices that were legitimized by the
colonial state under the guise of 'free trade' and used to dominant the Indian market. The
claims of contemporary Indian actors thus had deep resonance in the Indian social
memory: imperialist British managing agencies had been replaced by neo-imperial MNCs
exploiting the unfair rules of globalization. Das further cited the trend of MNCs ignoring
competent Indian managers to hire expatriates who have "little understanding of India,
Indian culture, Indian ethos, Indian Government or Indian Industry." Once again, these
were precisely the business practices of the most hardline British managing agencies who
refused to change their hiring practices even well into the twentieth century when well-
qualified Indian managers were in abundance (Misra, 1999). Just as the managing
agencies then defended their decision by citing weaknesses in the "character" of Indian
managers (Misra, 1999), so did Das argue, the "Orientation [of these expat managers] at
best is inadequate." 22 Cultural discourse, symbols and tropes are powerful tools of
capitalist contestation for both Indian and foreign economic actors (Swidler, 1986).
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2 Ibid, Das (1996).
12 Ibid, Das (1996).
Das' claims of unfair MINC business practices were taken seriously, not least because the
CII was considered the most 'forward looking' Indian industry association (Kochanek
1996; Pederson, 2000; Sinha, 2005; Kantha and Roy, 2006). This speaks to the
importance of identity in establishing capitalist legitimacy. CII's membership was
heavily drawn from the 'modern' technology-intensive engineering industries such as
electronics and automobiles that were generally considered, 'outward oriented', 'sunrise'
industries and beneficiaries of the reforms. In this respect the CII stood in stark contrast
to its main rival FICCI, whose members were considered representatives of the
'traditional' commercial trading groups and 'sunset' industries (Kochanek, 1996).23
Further, the large business groups in FICCI were seen as disproportionately controlled by
socially conservative Marwaris, who rose in Calcutta in the late colonial period by
leveraging capital from illegitimate and comprador trading and rapacious moneylending
activities and using it to purchase profitable industrial concerns. This is precisely the
caste-based community of economic actors that Chapter Four argued were delegitimized
as economic actors with 'traditional' orientations who engaged in economic practices that
were speculative, focused on short-term profits, and based in trading rather than
legitimate manufacturing activities. Chapter Seven showed how these caste-based
cultural tropes retained their social meaning through the import substitution period, and
as this chapter will argue they played a powerful role in shaping the interpretive frames
that governed the terrain of contestation over FDI liberalization. Any doubts about
whether these cultural tropes retained salience in the liberalization era were put to bed by
interviewees, such as a former business press editor who dismissively referred to FICCI
23 Members of the 'Bombay Club' were somewhat more difficult to categorize. On one hand they were
drawn from old business groups that were seen as beneficiaries of the import substituting license-quota-
permit raj. On the other hand, they included groups in both low and high technology industries, such as
Bajaj and Mahindra and Mahindra. This reflects the complexities and fragmentation in the process of
schema construction and categorization that DiMaggio (1997) and Zerubavel (1997) identify. Further,
many of the Bombay Club members such as Rahul Bajaj and Hari Shankar Singhania were Marwaris, and
the vocal and opinionated Bajaj was seen as the group's Bombay Club. However, Bajaj was also perhaps
the most powerful actor in the CII. This reflects the contradictions inherent in cognitive and cultural
categories and schemas. However, rather than reducing the utility of schemas as interpretative frames that
actors utilize to make sense of their institutional environment, these contradictions provide opportunities
and footholds for contestation through the development and deployment of competing representations.
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members as "traders" and "milk vendors."24 CII 'industrialists', by contrast, came from
different geographic regions, particularly from the West and the South, and diverse
ethno-linguistic communities that had long been seen as more socially 'progressive'
relative to the dominant Marwari community. They were also seen as better educated,
many having obtained degrees in science and engineering fields overseas. These factors
accorded Tarun Das and the CII significant legitimacy in stating their anti-MNC claims.
While Tarun Das's 'outburst' surprised many given CII's 'forward looking' image, the
reaction shocked some political observers and the press as the CII was closely associated
with the ruling Congress Party. Das enjoyed a close relationship with senior 'reformist'
bureaucrats and Congress officials such as Principal Secretary A.N. Varma and Finance
Secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia, and the CII often referred to itself as a 'junior
partner' of the government in the press and its own official history (Kantha and Roy,
2006).2' The CII-Congress Party were so closely aligned with the Congress that the 1992
budget was often considered 'the Tarun Das budget' based on rumors of his close
participation in its design. This apparent contradiction raised immediate questions about
the strategic political motive of Das' anti-MNC remarks in the Indian business press:
Das' close friends, Finance Secretary Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Principal Secretary in
the Prime Minister's Office A.N. Verma, were shell-shocked by the salvo. Congress
leaders went into a huddle, debating whether they should incorporate the CII's new-found
love for swadeshi in the party's election manifesto. It was evident that the CII was
pressuring the Congress to take a fresh look at its TNC policy if it returned to power. And
making the right noises if the BJP won the elections. Above all, a band of big Indian
industrialists was asking for some form of protection against TNC rivals...[based on
serious accusations that] many recent TNC entrants were in India for short-term 'one-
night stands', adopting a marauder-like 'cowboy' approach, palming off obsolete
24 Interview C21, New Delhi, March 2011.
25 The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) played an important and oft-noted role CII rose to
prominence during the reforms, promoting liberalization by proactively engaging with policymakers using
well-prepared technical reports, a first in the history of Indian business-government relations. The
association's professional and "modern" approach fit with the views of new reformist bureaucrats,
particularly those in the powerful Ministry of Finance led by ex-World Bank economists Manmohan Singh
and Montek Singh Ahluwalia (nor Prime Minister and Head of the Planning Commission, respectively).
CII seized an opening in the "political opportunity structure". (Sinha, 2005) The organization grew rapidly
from a small engineering association to challenge the historically dominant Federation of Indian Chambers
of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Association of Indian Chambers of Commerce (Assocham). CII
took advantage the government's new attitude as well as organizational weaknesses arising from infighting
within both FICCI and Assocham. (Kochanek, 1996; Sinha, 2005). It quickly became a self-proclaimed
"junior partner" to the government (Kochanek, 1996; Sinha, 2005; Pedersen, 2007).
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technology and attempting to muscle out their joint venture Indian partners by trying to
hike their equity-holding to more than 50 per cent.26
The situation raised both economic and political challenges for Congress officials. How
should they interpret this salvo from many of Indian industry's leading lights? What
causal ideas might allow them to make sense of this confusing and dramatic
development? Were these business actors simply bloated old business groups that were
long beneficiaries of protection under the license-quota-permit raj who were not
complaining as they faced real competition, or were these domestic firms that were
genuinely trying to develop new capabilities and were being abused by neo-imperialist
MNCs? This was a situation of severe environmental complexity and uncertainty that
highlights the importance of rationalized causal ideas and categorization as cognitive and
cultural devices that helped actors make sense of complexity and determine their
preferences (DiMaggio, 1997).
Constructing Interpretive Frames under Environmental Complexity:
Ideas, Cognition and Meaning
Rationalized causal ideas are crucial elements of interpretive frames through which actors
make sense of the institutional environment, as both the macro-institutional 'ideational'
literature in comparative political economy and the micro-organizational literature in
economic sociology argue (Hall, 1993, 2005; Blyth, 2002; Dobbin, 2004; Greenwood et
al, 2008; Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012; Suddaby
et al, 2010; Wry et al, 2013). However, this dissertation has stressed that an analysis of
the process through which rationalized causal ideas shape actors' preferences and
outcomes is insufficient without attention to the social meanings and cultural symbols
within which these causal ideas are embedded. First, the issues that Das and the Bombay
Club raised during this period of accelerating FDI liberalization (1991-1996) highlighted
a well-recognized indeterminacy in economic theories of FDI: does FDI help domestic
firms by facilitating technological learning via spillovers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 2003)
or hurt domestic firms by displacing them in oligopolistic markets (Amsden and Hikino,
1994)? These represent competing causal ideas that numerous studies in the scholarly and
26 Outlook India, 'The Ghost of the Bombay Club'. April 10, 1996.
http://www.outlookindia.com/rintarticle.aspx? 2 01149 Last accessed February 23, 2013.
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policy literature have been unable to resolve (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Gorg and
Greenaway, 2004). This dissertation argues that in the context of this indeterminacy, the
social meanings with which competing causal ideas are imbued and cultural symbols that
are attached play a crucial role in determining which causal ideas 'prevail' in policy
contestation. This is where cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy play a key role:
how does the perceived nature of domestic and foreign firms shape external actors'
interpretations and ultimately their preferences? Should MNCs be seen as neo-imperialist
'cowboys' or should the complaints of Indian capital be dismissed as coming from
illegitimate economic actors?
Interviews with corporate attorneys at one of India's leading law firms that represented
many MNCs (as well as major Indian groups) in their joint venture disputes and provided
further insight to the process:
[Indian partners get squeezed out of JVs with MNCs because of a].. .mismatch of capital
and expectations.. .he [the MNC] may be looking at a partner either because he is forced
to take a partner because of local regulations or he needs someone to provide him local
support.. .few years down, if relationship is not going well, and regulation changes which27
permits you to go from 50 to 100 [% equity share].. .you would dump your partner.
This would appear to confirm the widely held belief in the use of strong-armed MNC
strategies. Nevertheless, stridently pro-reform observers sought to dismiss the charges as
coming from old, bloated groups long protected from competition who were now facing
the real market competition. One of my interviewees, an ex-senior official in the Finance
Ministry in the early 1990s characterized the typical opponents of liberalization as groups
like "The Birlas. In general the Marwaris. Who had done extremely well out of the old
system." 28 These were the business actors that the ex-business editor interviewee cited
earlier identified as "old world businessmen" who were "living off the past".29
The neoliberal rationale of liberalization suggested that allowing 'the market' to work
would impose discipline and to ensure optimal welfare outcomes the weakest firms
should be allowed to fail. This was the benefit of market reform - to weed out the
27 Interview E12, April 27, 2011 New Delhi. Emphasis added.
28 Interview A9, New Delhi, April 2011.
29 Interview C21, New Delhi, March 2011. FICCI businessmen were specifically singled out.
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inefficient firms that had only survived through decades of unproductive rent seeking in
the import substituting license-quota-permit raj period. On the other hand, it was difficult
to dismiss the anti-MNC charges as many of India's most respected firms seemed to be
facing these challenges with foreign firms. Not only was there the salient example of
Parle's Thums Up! and Coca-Cola that suggested the existence of real threats in the face
of deep-pocketed multinationals, but even India's most illustrious business house, the
Tata group, seemed to be caught in a similar bind.
As Chapter Three argued, Tata was synonymous with economic nationalist triumph of
Indian firms ever since the launch of Tata Steel in 1907 against the colonial state and
British managing agencies. Tata epitomized the 'true' capitalist industrial group, and
Chairman Ratan Tata was seen as India's leading 'captain of industry', much like his
uncle J.R.D. Tata who consolidated the group's position as India's largest business house
in the post-independence period (1938-1991).30 One of Tata's lead group firms, Tata
Motors, entered into a joint venture with Daimler in the early 1990s to assemble
Mercedes Benz cars. Tata and Daimler had a four-decade long relationship dating back to
the early 1950s when Daimler played a key role in providing the technology that allowed
Tata to enter commercial vehicle assembly, a segment in which the group was
immediately successful and continues to dominate today. Tata's truck manufacturing laid
the foundation for the firm's now globally recognized capabilities in the automobile
sector that allowed it to produce the first fully indigenously designed passenger car, the
Indica, in 1997, and later the now world-renowned 1 lakh (US$2,000) 'people's' car, the
Tata Nano. The corporate attorneys provided further insight to the process through the
Tata-Daimler case:
Or secondly, like Tata's case, it came to pumping in more and more capital. And Tatas
[sic] is not a small group. It's not a small group. It's in the top three in India. But
beyond a point they say 'how much money can we sink into one car company. We've put
in so many hundreds and thousands of crores' I don't know the exact number...'so many
thousands of crores and the last five years we have been running losses.' Because in
India, typically you expect if I put in any money today three years later I should be
making a profit. Daimler said 'No, we build a market in five years, next five years you
start at breaking even, fifteenth year or twelfth year you make a profit'. And Tata was
30 The Tata Group traded the top position with the Birla group in the first few decades after independence,
and then with the Reliance Group in more recent years.
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like 'No you didn't tell me that! [laughing] You never told me on day 1 that I would have
to wait 12 years to make my profit [and] until that time I just keep putting more and more
money in. that doesn't work. So if more money is required you put it. If you put it
then I get diluted down.' Those have been some of the classic reasons [that JVs go from
50-50 partnerships to majority MNC owned and controlled.]"
This case became increasingly common in the mid-late 1990s and had a powerful effect
on Indian perceptions of these complex market dynamics. It aligned perfectly with the
Bombay Club complaints that MNCs faced lower costs of capital and thus enjoyed an
unfair advantage in their partnerships with local firms - an advantage they exploited
through unethical business practices of squeeze out local partners by pressing for
accelerated investment schedules and when the Indian firm could not respond in kind,
buy them out. It also resonted with the bullying tactics that Tarun Das' suggested that
MNCs used to displace their local partners. If this could happen to one of the lead firms
of the prestigious Tata group that for a hundred years had symbolized the potential of
Indian private firms and stood at the vanguard of Indian industry, and with a 'blue chip'
partner whom they had worked with for close to five decades, what did it mean for
smaller Indian firms and their joint venture partnerships?
Categories of Legitimacy in FDI Liberalization Debates (-1991-1998)
'Backward' and 'traditional' Indian firms
that are simply 'sleeping partners' in
foreign-domestic joint ventures. These
actors are simply 'traders' and
'speculators'.
Ostensible representatives: 'old' trading
groups from the East. Drawn heavily from
the Marwari community. Seen as located
primarily in wholesale and retail trade,
low-tech manufacturing, etc.
'Forward looking' and 'modem' Indian
firms that seek to acquire new capabilities
through joint ventures. These are 'true'
industrialists.
Ostensible representatives: CII, Das, 'new'
industrialists from the West, North and
South. Drawn from Parsi, Gujarati, and
other ethno-linguistic groups. Mid-high
technology Auto, Telecommunication,
Pharmaceutical ike Hero and especially IT
firms are the exemplars e.g. Infosys.
Foreign Multinational firms employing 'cowboy Multinational firms that are willing to
Economic tactics'; push local partners out of joint introduce new technologies and share them
Actors ventures; refuse to introduce cutting edge with Indian joint venture partners
technology; only in India for 'one night
stands'.
Example: Daimler
31 Interview E12, April 27, 2011 New Delhi. Emphasis added.
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VI. The Rise of the BJP and the Wider Politics of India's Economic Reforms
These developments in the business sphere were not divorced from wider developments
in Indian politics. After all, this was a period of dramatic social and economic change
with distributional frictions that were directly reflected in the political realm. The
acceleration of external liberalization occurred at a moment when the Congress Party --
which had enjoyed almost complete dominance of Indian politics, ruling all but six of the
almost fifty years of Indian independence -- faced a formidable new challenger in the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Many analysts saw the rapid rise of the BJP in the 1990s as a stunning development in
Indian politics given its close links with the militant Hindu nationalist cultural
organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which had long been considered to
lie outside of the accepted value structure of Indian politics (Nayer, 2000). The BJP was
built on an extremely conservative system of beliefs that rejected "[the longstanding]
pseudo-secularism" of elite Indian politics that it held was "designed to appease the
32[largely Muslim] minorities" (Ibid). This was a direct challenge to the Congress'
longstanding goals of secular nationalism that Chapter Five argued was a cornerstone of
Nehru's vision of a modern Indian state. However, as Chapter Seven showed, the reforms
and the emergence of the BJP reflected wider developments in Indian politics that saw
more explicit appeals to caste made by Congress under Indira Gandhi (Kohli, 1987;
Frankel, 2004). Thus the BJP's communalist political strategy was hardly unprecedented.
The BJP distinguished itself in the economic realm by rejecting both the state-oriented
Nehruvian scientific socialist as well as more recent market-oriented liberalization
developmental models that the Congress had pursued, on the basis that both were based
on foreign systems of thought that were inconsistent with Indian cultural traditions.
32 The rise of the BJP is associated with a series of major incidents and general upturn in communal
violence between Hindus and Muslims. Incidents include the destruction of the Babri Masjid as well as the
2002 Gujarat pogrom where over 2,000 Muslims were killed. The violent dimensions of rising
communalism are not unrelated to the economic liberalization process that this chapter describes. The two
are part of the wider socio-political dynamics of contemporary India. This is an important point that should
not be lost in this analysis of elite business politics.
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Instead the BJP successfully resurrected the economic nationalist concept of swadeshi
(self-reliance) and reintroduced it to the Indian political and popular discourse.3 3 This
appeal to a 'true' Indian indigenous thought had well-established roots going back to
Gandhianism. Chapters Three and Five described the rise of swadeshi as a cultural
symbol with powerful social meaning in the late colonial period and the central role it
played as a symbol of Indian anti-colonialism and economic nationalism. However, the
swadeshi idiom had been somewhat discredited by the perceived failures of autarchic
post-independence state-led import substitution to make Indian industry 'world class'.
The shoddy manufactured goods that Indian firms produced under the license raj became
symbols of the misguided tenets of swadeshi self-reliance.
Chapter Seven showed how the term completely fell out of the political vernacular with
the 1980 return of Indira Gandhi and her 'pro-business rhetorical and policy approach
(Kohli, 2006a,b). However, the rise of the BJP demonstrated the enduring value of the
swadeshi cultural symbol as a political resource. Crucially though, while the term
retained salience, the content and social meaning of the Swadeshi cultural symbol was not
immutable. As the theoretical framework established in Chapter Two argued, culture and
cultural symbols are neither fixed, static, nor deterministic. Swadeshi was transposed and
redefined from its late nineteenth anti-colonial meaning under drain theory, and early
twentieth century manifestations in Gandhianism and Nehruvianism to suit the
contemporary political purposes of the BJP. The reinterpretation and deployment of
Swadeshi in the 1990s is an excellent depiction of how strategic actors can appropriate
reformulate and utilize cultural symbols as political resources with subtle but powerful
new content and social meaning by (Douglas, 1986; Swidler, 1986; Sewell, 1992;
Wedeen, 2002). This not only highlights the importance of agency, it also challenges
depictions of culture as static and deeply ingrained 'values' or cognitive orientations that
characterize cultural approaches in the new institutional economics (Greif, 2005). The
way this manifested in the causal ideas and social meanings of FDI policy is detailed
further below.
33 The resurrection of Swadeshi was accomplished with the support of the affiliated Swadeshi Jagaran
Manch (Forum for Swadeshi Awakening or SJM)
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This agency and creativity was apparent in the role of S. Gurumurthy, a key figure in
BJP-affiliated Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM). Gurumurthy held that both Nehruvian
state planning of the 1950s and 1960s and consumerism of the 1980s and 1990s were
impositions of a Westernized Indian elite. This elite referred to the Congress leadership in
general, and the Nehru-Gandhi family in particular. It was epitomized by Rajiv Gandhi
and the new breed of reformist technocrats who dominated New Delhi in the 1980s. The
group of 'reformist' Congress elites retained control of the state apparatus under the
Narasimha Rao administration of the 1990s. In an self-penned article entitled "Making
India a Super Power: we need a rapid build up in national pride and self-confidence",
Gurumurthy argued:
For a nation like India, politically subjugated for centuries by alien conquest, and
socially unsettled by invasions, the idea of becoming a super power is no ordinary
thought.. .When India attained freedom.. .India was swiftly marginalised in a [Cold War]
world which respected only power. But, within India, the Indian leadership did the other
way round - it persuaded the people not to pursue their age-old values, but, accept the
Anglo-Saxon ideas and institutions in the main. It folded back the philosophic lead
shown by Gandhi, Aurobindo and Tilak. Their definition of the Indian identity was
substituted by the western ideas of secularism and socialism. Since then, for over four
decades, the Left-Socialist parties and intellectuals mounted a vicious attack on the
Indian past, and virtually delinked the Indian polity, economy, history and education
from its past and turned to Anglo-Saxon values. 34
This was an bold and savvy move, as Gurumurthy sought to appropriate the Congress'
biggest source of cultural power and legitimacy -- the bridge to the West that the
cosmopolitan Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajiv Gandhi represented -- and use it against
them. 35 This attempt to reorder the meaning of the Congress' elite western orientation and
expertise was a powerful move of cultural agency. Gurumurthy linked this critique
directly to the liberalization debate, accusing the Congress of merely switching from one
Western system to another:
... with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Indian establishment swung to the other
extreme - from socialism to market capitalism. It was again in tune with its lack of self-
34 S. Gurumurthy, "Making India a Super Power: we need a rapid build up in national pride and self-
confidence." http://www.tribuneindia.com/50yrs/final.htm
3 It is useful to note that even though the BJP-style Hindu nationalism has long been considered upper
caste, the BJP sough to strategically increased its appeal to lower caste groups in the 1990s as a means of
increasing its voter base. That said, much of this anti- Western elite had long been part of lower caste
movements, as Kohli (1987) has shown. See Chapter Seven for further discussion of this point.
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confidence - if it is not communism, it has to be capitalism. And we began to witness a
massive effort to globalise - which means westernise [sic] - the Indian economy. The
persons and parties who grossly maladministered the national economy suddenly turned
'reformers' and they paraded themselves as the new messiahs as if someone else was
responsible for the wrongdoings in the past which needed to be reformed. Thus,
Congressmen, that is those who needed to be reformed, styled themselves as 'the
reformers'. Just as socialism was an ideology earlier, globalisation too became an
ideology. Now anyone who dissents against globalisation is being labelled as
backward-looking and anti-modern. Thus, just as we adopted socialism without a
debate as to its viability in India and discarded it, we have adopted globalisation without
any debate.36
BJP Preferences towards FDI: "Computer Chips, not Potato Chips"
The BJP's discursive politics had major implications for the FDI debate. Gurumurthy and
others in the BJP and SJM not only argued that the Congress' foreign social and
economic models were unsuited to Indian cultural conditions, but crucially, that they
hindered indigenous entrepreneurialism. In principle, BJP swadeshi economic
nationalism was diametrically opposed to liberalization and globalization. Swadeshi still
stood for the protection of domestic industry from foreign competition just as it had
during the independence movement described in Chapter Five. However, the BJP imbued
the swadeshi cultural symbol with new meaning arising from what the party claimed
were indigenous Hindu cultural values. These values were predicated on a rejection of
Western individualism and consumption patterns, a view which drew on the resonance of
Gandhian asceticism.: This was a direct attack on the aspirational consumerist cultural
36 Further, "Again, what India and Indians critically need is a measure of national pride and self-
confidence. Without both, no nation can prosper. It is unfortunate that the English-educated Indians have
repeatedly failed to generate personal or national self-confidence. Instead, they began to deprecate
everything Indian. In the process, they deprecated each other, resulting in all-round self-deprecation. This
trend has to be reversed. If we deprecate ourselves, as we have been habituated to, no one is going to
respect India. The atomic test by India triggered our national pride in a big way, but we threw cold water on
it. We have to build, and not waste, such achievements whether it is the Param Super Computer, or PSLV
launch, the Tata Car or Kamini nuclear reactor working on thorium. A rapid build-up of national pride and
self-confidence will yield a quantum jump in economic advancement. Trade is a matter of psychology."
(Ibid).
37 The self-reliance and self-rule of Gandhian swadeshi and swaraj meant control of own body and
(earlthly, fleshly, material) desires, which he connected to independence. "On the basis of this analogy, the
desires of Indian consumers were understood as one of the deep foundations of foreign domination.
Therefore, sublimating these desires for the greater good of the nation became, for Gandhi, ever Indian's
first duty. In his own words: 'How can Manchester be blamed? We wore Manchester cloth, and that is why
Manchester wove it.' Citing Gandhi 1997:101". [REF] This austere elements of the Gandhian cultural
schema supported consumerist repression of the purportedly developmentalist license Raj and facilitated its
acceptance by the Indian public. However, the limit was eventually reached in the late 1970s, much as it
did elsewhere in the developing world around the same time. This prompted Indira Gandhi's strategic
promotion of what Chapter Seven terms 'aspirational consumerism'. Interestingly, Nehru had similar views
towards asceticism, as he praised the strength of will and personal restraint he witnessed amongst the
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schema that Chapter Seven argued underpinned the economic reforms. Instead, the BJP
interpretation of swadeshi was reoriented and deployed to address the liberalization
debate, with Hindu nationalist actors arguing that swadeshi represented full internal
liberalization and a rejection of the license raj and its restrictions on Indian
entrepreneurship, while promoting selective external liberalization to limit the areas
where foreign collaborations would be allowed. This position was underpinned by the
slogan: "Yes to Computer Chips, no to potato chips". The rationale was that FDI would
only be promoted if it included leading technologies. No more "palming off obsolete
technologies" on JV partners as Tarun Das had argued. This period thus reflected the
BJP's construction of a competing set of causal ideas and social meanings to challenge
the Congress Party. Thus the lines in the economic and political battle lines were drawn:
domestic firms reacting against MNCs and the BJP's Hindu nationalism posing a
challenge to Congress Party dominance.
For political analysts and observers, these two developments did not seem unrelated. Not
only did Das' statements appear strategically timed as he made them in the run-up to the
1996 general elections, the purported connection between leading domestic industry and
the growing swadeshi campaign was highlighted when CII President Rajiv Kaule invited
the BJP's most strident swadeshi campaigner, former party president Murli Manohar
Joshi, to attend the CII's annual general meeting. Joshi made a name for himself (along
with the ultra conservative Shiv Sena) as a strident opponent of the massive Enron energy
project in the Congress-controlled state of Maharastra. Enron's entry into India was
extremely high profile, and the Clinton administration saw it as central to its Indian
foreign economic policy. Joshi famously asserted that energy-starved India would rather
use candles than Enron power. The Enron project ultimately collapsed amidst allegations
of massive corruption, further fuelling the view of MNCs as unethical business actors
(and Congress officials as corrupt). To the Indian public, the industry association
appeared to either be using the upcoming elections to pressure the Congress to revise its
joint venture policies or positioning itself in the event of a BJP victory.
Russian people during his 1928 trip. This similarities and differences in Gandhian and Nehruvian politics is
the subject of Chapter Five.
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The ensuing public discourse served as something of a referendum on the reforms. Senior
BJP official Yashwant Sinha stated that in the event of a BJP victory:
There'll certainly be a directional shift in reforms and the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy.
We'll look at the list of areas open to FDI at present and make changes where necessary. All our
policy shifts will come in the budget. Everything will be clearly defined. This is nothing that
India should be ashamed of. Many countries have similar restrictions. But let's not scare the
foreign investors more.. Swadeshi means competition with clearly defined rules. The Japanese
car industry was first developed at home. If we want our industry to compete with world-class
products on Indian soil by lowering tariffs, we owe it to them to give them world-class
infrastructure and interest rates and procedures that are comparable with the rest of the world. We
have chained their feet and told them to swim. 38
BJP-promoted Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy (-19%-1998)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: 'traders' and 'speculators' who enter Entrepreneurs whose 'feet have been chained" by
JVs as speculative investments stifling Congress regulation
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate 'Western Economic Man'
'Neo-imperial instruments'; unethical partners that Modem: ethical JV partners and technology
withhold technologies and displace Indian firms providers
The BJP's political rhetoric was directly linked to the cultural categories of capitalist
legitimacy outlined in this chapter. It sought to legitimize domestic firms, and
delegitimize MNCs. The language matched that of Indian capitalists in calling for 'clear
rules', suggesting unfair behavior on the part of foreign firms. The BJP electoral
campaign also successfully linked liberalization and flood of foreign goods with a
critique of the aspirational consumerism amidst widespread poverty. In addition to the
debates over the reforms, the Narasimha Rao led Congress was beset by scandals and
ultimately lost the general elections to the Hindu Nationalist BJP-led coalition in 1996.
38 Paromita Shastri 'Cola, Chips and Pop-Con.' http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?205245 Though
at the same time Sinha and colleagues also stated the need to reduce bureaucratic hassles and red tape that
impeded foreign investment "The foreign investor doesn't want to come in due to the hassle factor, for
being shunted from ministries to departments. If you have a transparent regime of time-bound clearances,
investments will come. But if you have a fast-track project that is not cleared in seven years, that's the
worst publicity the country can get." (Ibid).
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Though the coalition fell apart in 1997, the BJP regrouped in 1998 and remained in office
until 2003.39
VII. 'Leveling the Playing Field' through Press Note 18
The new BJP government followed through on a number of its belligerent campaign
promises, the most dramatic of which was the nuclear tests codenamed 'Operation Shakti
[power]' in May 1998. The symbolism of the test name is apparent, not least because of
the contrast with the first Indian nuclear test conducted under Indira Gandhi in 1974
codenamed 'Smiling Buddha'. The test came at a severe cost as it shocked the world and
led to sanctions by a number of countries including the United States, with whom India's
diplomatic relationship rapidly deteriorated.
This was not the only area where India sought to flex its muscle. The political
contestation around FDI liberalization led to the imposition of a set of policy controls on
Indian joint ventures through an administrative order known as Press Note 18 in
December 1998. Press Note 18 directly addressed Indian firms' complaints of 'MNC
bullying' by requiring foreign joint venture partners to obtain a "non-objection
certificate" from their Indian collaborators in order to exit the joint venture and launch
new operations through wholly owned subsidiaries in the "same or allied field" as the
existing partnership.
39 This BJP shift vis-a-vis previous formulations can thus be summarized as follows. Up to this point,
competing causal ideas and arguments about the legitimacy of economic actors had largely been structured
by the dichotomies of foreign-domestic and traditional-modern. The BJP effectively advanced a vision of
economic progress and modernity that was rooted in their own competing conception of Indian tradition,
which challenged what they saw as conceptions of modernity that embedded in foreign/Western values.
40 The language of the Note left room for significant business-government negotiation and bureaucratic
discretion. Much of the issue requiring regulatory intervention arose because many contracts didn't include
'conflict of interest' clauses, and the notion of 'jeopardy' emerged as a key legal concept. Defining the
"same field" and "allied" field(s) has been a source of frustration for firms and delight for corporate
lawyers. In principle these were limited by PN 10 1999 to the four digit National Industrial Classification
(NIC) code level for the 'same' field and the three digit NIC code for 'allied', but in practice the vagueness
of the policy language has facilitated significant discretion by the government, even if may have also been
exploited by domestic firms in a number of cases. However shifts in the breadth and scope of interpretation
over the course of the reforms provides an indication of evolving FDI policy preferences.
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I. Automatic route for FDI and/or technology collaboration would not be available to those who
have or had any previous joint venture or technology transfer/trade-mark agreement in the
same or allied field in India. RBI, therefore, have to stipulate necessary declaration before
applications for the automatic route are taken on record.
II. Investors of Technology to the suppliers of the above category therefore will have to
necessarily seek the FIPB/PAB approval route for joint ventures or the technology transfer
agreements (including trade-mark) giving detailed circumstances in which they find it
necessary to set-up a new joint venture/enter into new technology transfer (including trade-
mark).
III. The onus is clearly on such investors/technology suppliers to provide the requisite
justification as also proof to the satisfaction of FIPB/PAB that the new proposal would not in
any way jeopardize the interests of the existing joint venture or technology/trade-mark partner
or other stakeholders. It will be at the sole discretion of FIPB/PAB to either approve the
application with or without conditions or reject in toto duly recording the reasons for doing
so.
This policy move dramatically shifted the balance of power towards Indian joint venture
partners as it effectively trapped MNCs in their existing joint venture relationships and
placed them at the whim of their local partners. Even more importantly from the
standpoint of the theoretical argument being advanced in this dissertation, it would
contribute to a crucial shift in the terms of the debate that reflected conflicting causal
ideas and the malleability of the social meanings and symbols that competing actors
deployed as they struggled for policy resources in the political domain.
Joint Venture Politics at the Firm Level: Hero-Honda and Kinetic-Honda
This subsection briefly outlines a link between the macro-institutional analysis that has
been conducted thus far to firm-level politics.4 ' The Hero-Honda joint venture in the two-
wheeler industry H-H exemplifies the rationale underpinning the creation of Press Note
18, and the company's fortunes has served as a dominant narrative that has been
continuously deployed in the business media and interviewees when discussing the new
regulatory regime. This major development in FDI and JV rules is closely associated with
many partnerships with leading Indian firms and MNCs, but one of the most salient is a
dispute within the Hero-Honda joint venture in the two-wheeler industry, where
observers claim that Honda sought to exit the joint venture but Hero refused to grant
4 Future work will delve more deeply within the firm to truly link the macro-institutional analysis to the
micro-level through consideration of sub-firm level dynamics in domestic-foreign joint ventures. It will
address the way that macro-level institutions shape internal firm dynamics through comparative case
analysis.
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them the non-objection certificate.4 As Chapter Seven discussed, the Hero-Honda joint
venture dates back to the initial round of economic reforms under Indira Gandhi in the
early 1980s that saw the issuance of new industrial licenses and liberalization of foreign
technology partnerships.
The Hero-Honda joint venture was widely seen as a success, as the firm grew rapidly
from its launch in 1984 to dominate the newly created motorcycle segment that grew at
an average of 20-25% in the 1990s. However, despite the joint venture's commercial
achievements, Hero claimed that because Honda insisted on conducting all of its R&D in
Japan, no product development capabilities were transferred to the joint venture. As a
result, if the JV were to break up Hero would be unable to continue to produce
motorcycles on its own and would potentially collapse. Hero in effect claimed that the
Honda JV had failed to facilitate sufficient learning in the domestic partner. Honda was
portrayed as behaving 'unfairly' by not holding up its end of the technology-for-markets
bargain. The case thus epitomized the core "learning race" tensions within JVs around
technological capabilities and competitiveness as well as the view of domestic firms as
legitimate business actors seeking to upgrade for competitiveness and MNCs as rapacious
and unethical business partners.
The dispute was interpreted through these contrasting representations of the two firms.
The Munjal family-controlled Hero group has been identified by heterodox political
economists as one of the best examples of the medium sized groups that emerged as
beneficiaries of the new small and medium scale industrial clusters supported by the
Green Revolution and related policies under Indira Gandhi discussed in Chapter Seven
(Das Gupta, 2007:157). However, Hero and the Munjal family successfully promoted a
vision of themselves as 'captains of industry' who rose through entrepreneurial endeavor
to become the world's largest bicycle manufacturer despite the restrictions of the license-
42 A prominent view amongst industry insiders in the late 2000s was that government helped to broker a 10
year deal that kept the firms together. The validity of this rumor was strengthened by developments in the
joint venture in 2007 and 2011, when it was ultimately terminated. Throughout the period the firm was
under a microscope of media - and likely government - attention.
342
raj. The Hero Group's own website describes the rise of the firm "After the partition in
1947, the Munjal family migrated to India [from present-day Pakistan] and started a small
business of manufacturing bicycle components in Ludhiana, Punjab in North India at a
time there were great bottlenecks of industrial infrastructure and investments.. .By the
1970's, Hero Cycles was the worlds largest bicycle manufacturing company."44 Further,
the firm was viewed as having done so well that one of the world's leading motorcycle
manufacturers Honda chose Hero as a partner during the first wave of liberalization in the
early 1980s.45 According to Money Outlook India "Brijmohan Lall Munjal's
entrepreneurial success is unparalleled. Relocating to India after the Partition, he started
by manufacturing bicycle components; in barely a few years he'd established the Hero
brand name. In 1984, he upgraded to motorcycles, launching India's first four-stroke bike
in collaboration with Honda, and has never looked back."46 This is a common view in the
Indian business press, and Munjal himself describes Hero's rise in similar terms:
The move from bicycles to motorcycles was natural progression. Our extensive
understanding of customers and the markets we'd acquired, coupled with in-house
engineering expertise, facilitated the step-up. The group had an abundance of in-house
talent that needed to be channelised, which required a larger playing field. We had a
well-established supply chain and many of our vendors upgraded to cater to our
motorcycle requirements. Honda was looking for an Indian partner, and we discovered
that we had similar philosophies. At Hero Cycles, we were already pursuing just-in-
time inventory management techniques; and we were assuming the responsibility of
our dealers' profitability and growth, which was in line with Honda's principles. It was
43 As an example of how capitalist firms depict themselves/agency in the cultural construction...The Hero
Group's own website describes the rise of the firm "After the partition in 1947, the Munjal family migrated
to India and started a small business of manufacturing bicycle components in Ludhiana, Punjab in North
India at a time there were great bottlenecks of industrial infrastructure and investments... By the
1970's, Hero Cycles was the worlds largest bicycle manufacturing company." Further, Hero presents itself
as a firm that seized the opportunity to partner with Honda so as to enter new areas of investment and
production when the license regime was relaxed and the economy began to be opened to foreign investment
in the early 1980s. [See http://www.herocorp.com/history.htmnl emphasis added. Last accessed March, 5
2013.] These economic actors thus attempt to be agents of their own cultural construction, just as argued in
Chapter Four (cf. Birla, 2009).
4" See http://www.herocorp.com/history.html emphasis added. Last accessed March, 5 2013.
45 Interestingly, Hero claims that Honda chosen them because they had already implemented key elements
of Japanese lean manufacturing in their bicycle plants. This demonstrated Hero's 'modem' orientation as
well as compatibility with Japanese manufacturing culture. An alternative view, however, suggests that
Honda chose Hero over groups with deeper manufacturing experience in machinery precisely because it
would ensure a long-term bargaining advantage such as the one it pressed home by retaining R&D in
Japan.
46 Himalee Bahl & Sonal Sachdev "We're Honda's golden goose. Interview with Brijmohan Lall Munjal,
chairman Hero Group." http://money.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?878 10
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this common philosophy that led Honda to partner us after having interacted with all
the two-wheeler companies here.47
Hero was seen as having successfully utilized the technology agreements and the joint
venture to make the leap from bicycles to motorcycles by utilizing JVs to work with
foreign firms to gain new technological capabilities - precisely the legitimate approach to
foreign investment that the government sought to promote through its phased approach to
liberalization. Further, Munjal presented Hero as an attractive partner to Honda because
of its mastery of modern managerial and production techniques that widely seen as the
key to Japanese manufacturing dominance in the 1980s. The fact that a conflict was
brewing in an otherwise commercially successful joint venture played directly in to the
view of MNCs as 'bullies' who sought to "dump" their local partners as soon as they
could establish wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Honda's experience with its other joint venture partner in the two-wheeler segment added
credence to Hero's claim. When Honda entered India in the early 1980s, in addition to
Hero it also formed a joint venture with moped manufacturer Kinetic Motors to produce
scooters.48 Unlike Hero which had no experience with mechanized vehicles, Kinetic had
significant experience in motorized two wheelers as it was already India's largest
producers of mopeds. The prospects for the Kinetic-Honda JV initially seemed bright as
scooters were the principle mode of private transportation in the pre-liberalization period.
Kinetic-Honda was bringing a technologically advanced product to a market that had
long been dominated by Bajaj Auto's heavily outdated Piaggio-licensed design. The firm
initially did well, maintaining 44% of the scooter market and 15% of the total two-
wheeler segment. However, with the liberalization of the two-wheeler segment and
increased economic growth, consumer demand shifted towards the full sized motorcycles
41 Ibid, Bahl & Sachdev.
48 The Indira Gandhi administration segmented the industry by engine capacity and issued separate licenses
to prospective Indian manufacturers, most of which were Indian-Japanese partnerships (see Chapter
Seven). Interestingly, Munjal notes that he also considered entering the scooters segment, but opted not to
based on his interpretation of the relative technological intensity of each product. "At one point, I was
tempted by the Honda scooter (Kinetic Motors later launched this scooter as Kinetic Honda.) What decided
it was the dearth of motorcycles in the Indian market in 1984, and the antiquated technology. Once the
choice was made, I was all for the four-stroke technology-although many urged me to opt for the more
popular two-stroke bikes. Other players, however, waited a while before venturing into four-strokes. Hero
Honda owes its success to its timely decision to opt for a motorcycle and building it on a four-stroke
technology platform." (Ibid, Bahl & Sachdev)
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that the TVS-Suzuki, Escorts-Yamaha, Bajaj-Kawasaki and Hero-Honda partnerships
produced. This was an unanticipated development reflecting market uncertainty that
created a wedge in the fortunes of these firms. While Hero-Honda quickly became the
market leader along with TVS Suzuki, Kinetic-Honda fortunes went in the opposite
direction with market share falling to 22% in mopeds and just 5% in the overall two-
wheeler segment.
Indian Two-Wheeler Market (2001-7)
Manufacturer Unit Unit Growth Market Change in
Sales Sales Share share
(2001-2) (2006-7)
Hero Honda Motors 1,371,325 3,339,896 144% 40% 7.4%
Bajaj Auto 1,198,120 2,379,512 99% 28% 0.1%
TVS Motor Company 872,572 1,513,764 73% 18% -2.5%
Honda Motorcycle & Scooter 55,669 713,889 1,182% 8% 7.2%
India
Yamaha Motor India Pvt. 238,569 294,407 23% 4% -2.1%
Suzuki Motorcycle India Pvt. 0 67,164 -- 1% 0.8%
Kinetic Engineering 152,938 16,949 -89% 0.2% -3.4%
Kinetic Motor Company 106,479 52,760 -50% 0.6% -1.9%
LML Limited 167,650 0 -100% 3.9% -3.9%
Royal Enfield (Unit of Eicher) 24,136 32,261 34% 0.4% -0.2%
Majestic 83,869 25,584 -69% 0.3% -1.7%
Electrotherm India 0 7.982 -- 0.1% 0.1%
(electric scooter) I I I
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), 2008
In the early 1990s when Kinetic's market performance began to decline, the Firodia
family agreed to allow Honda to expand its share of the joint venture to 51% in the hope
that this would incentivize the Japanese giant to invest. At the beginning of the decade
Kinetic's turnover of 1.21 billion rupees was on par with TVS Suzuki and Hero Honda at
1.4 and 1.5 billion rupees respectively. However, by 1999 TVS and Hero had grown
several times over to 10.2 billion and 11.5 billion rupees respectively, while Kinetic's
turnover had barely doubled. The Firodia's claimed that despite ceding majority share
and control, Honda failed to invest sufficient resources into the firm, particularly through
advertising and new product development, thus impeding the joint venture's growth.
Unlike the Tata-Daimler case, the argument was that Honda under-invested in the
Kinetic-Honda joint venture thus ensuring its weak performance and inevitable failure.
Kinetic was in a difficult position: like Hero it was dependent on Honda for scooter
technology and, despite the firm's ambitions, the JV agreement precluded Kinetic-Honda
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from entering the rapidly growing and lucrative motorcycle segment as Honda already
had a presence through the Hero partnership. Honda summoned Arun Firodia to Japan
and gave him a stark option: sell his share to Honda, or buy Honda out.49 Firodia, like
many Indian business group patriarchs, was reluctant to lose the family firm and managed
to raise the finance to buy Honda's share. Honda's exit surprised many industry observers
given its position as the world's leading scooter manufacturer. Observers wondered why
Honda was unable to replicate its motorcycle success in India. However, things became
ominously clear a few months later in April 1999 when Honda announced that it was
forming a wholly owned subsidiary to produce scooters. Crucially, the Kinetic-Honda
partnership was terminated before PN18 was put into place, whereas PN18 was seen as
significantly reshaping the distribution of power in the Hero-Honda joint venture. All this
served to legitimize the plight of Indian domestic firms relative to their 'neo-imperialist'
multinational joint venture partners. The chart below shows the categories of capitalist
legitimacy, with the red arrow illustrating the direction of contestation between
competing representations of legitimate and illegitimate domestic and foreign business
actors.
Categories of Legitimacy in FDI Liberalization Debates (-1998)
'Illegitimate' 'Legitimate'
'Backward' and 'traditional' Indian firms 'Forward looking' and 'modem' Indian
that are simply 'sleeping partners' in firms that seek to acquire new capabilities
Indian foreign-domestic joint ventures. These through joint ventures. These are 'true'
Economic actors are simply 'traders' and industrialists and 'captains of industry'.
Actors 'speculators'. They are rapacious actors Exe tar: Hero
that hold MNCs to ransom.
Multinational firms employing 'cowboy Multinational firms that are willing to
tactics'; push local partners out of joint introduce new technologies and share them
Foreign ventures; refuse to introduce cutting edge with Indian joint venture partners
Economic technology; only in India for 'one night
Actors stands'.
Exemplar: Honda
49 This story of a large Indian group being unceremoniously summoned to Japan by their powerful Japanese
joint venture partner is similar to that faced by Bharat Ram of DCM in his light commercial vehicle (LCV)
joint venture with Toyota (cf. Bharat Ram, 2011).
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VIII. India Loses it 'Shine':
Declining Growth, FDI Contestation and the Rise of 'Self-Confident' India Inc.
By the end of the decade the euphoric mood that marked the beginning of the
liberalization in 1991 began to wane, and a deep malaise took over the enthusiasm of the
early reform years as FDI inflows and economic growth slowed. As the head of the
major US-India Business Council noted in an interview, 'the shine had come off of
India'. There were both internal and external factors. The Asian Financial Crisis had a
major depressive effect on the global economy, particularly on international capital flows
and India also came under international sanctions from the nuclear test conducted by the
chauvinistic BJP government. The mood was further dampened as many MNCs market
size predictions didn't hold. In 1991 MNCs raced into India with fanfare to the allure of
the 250 million 'middle class' that was expected to display both the consumer taste and
purchasing power of their Western counterparts. This expectation failed to manifest. In
addition, MNCs disappointment with the increasingly anti-FDI rhetoric of the mid-late
1990s that culminated in the imposition of Press Note 18 killed much of the appetite for
new collaborations.
Press Note 18 also began to be seen as problematic by domestic actors. As Chapter Two
argued, the rationalized causal idea of FDI as a driver of economic growth through
capital inflows had long existed in the institutional environment. This idea became
increasingly dominant as worries about India's declining growth performance grew.
PN18 quickly became a lightning rod and a focal point of debates on FDI, and FDI in
turn became the bellwether of the wider process of economic reforms and economic
50 See USIBC interview; Mazzarella (2003:215-6; 264-5).
51 However, this causal assessment of MNC performance was somewhat offset by the growing idea that
perhaps MNCs didn't understand Indian 'culture' and consumer taste, and that domestic firms retained an
important asset in this area. To the extent that this rationale resonated with some MNC managers it
rationalized the need for taking on a local partner, even though FDI caps had been lifted, and even in the
face of the highly restrictive Press Note 18. Further, FDI caps were only one part of the complex Indian
regulatory environment. Indian companies were still valuable assets for navigating the political and
bureaucratic maze: local cultural understanding mattered. This view was rationalized by managerial
theories such as the 'liability of foreignness' (Zaheer, 1996) as well as the growing institutional literature in
international management (cf. Peng et al, 2008, 2009; Kostova et al, 2008). No longer was the idea that
West is always right, now it was about how to 'learn locally'. This had Implications for value of perception
of value of JVs.
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growth. The causal relationship between FDI inflows, economic growth and the reforms
was not a fringe technocratic discussion that was restricted to members of the business
and policy community; it was a central political issue that permeated mainstream political
discussion, just as had been the case in the mid-late 1990s when the BJP was in its
ascendancy. 52
The GOI initially attempted to play down the implications of PN18 as a disincentive to
investment in the years immediately following its imposition, as seen in the 2002
Planning Commission Report in the section of FDI policy:
Subject to these foreign equity conditions a foreign company can set up a registered
company in India and operate under the same laws, rules and regulations as any Indian
owned company would. Unlike many countries including China, India extends National
Treatment to foreign investors. There is absolutely no discrimination against foreign
invested companies registered in India or in favour of domestic owned ones. There is
however a minor restriction on those foreign entities who entered a particular sub-
sector through a joint venture with an Indian partner. If they (i.e. the parent) want
to set up another company in the same sector it must get a no-objection certificate
from the joint-venture partner. This condition is explicit and transparent unlike
many hidden conditions imposed by some other recipients of FDI.53
This statement is also noteworthy given the references to China, as Indian policymakers
and business actors had increasing angst about the higher levels of economic growth that
its larger neighbor to the east was experiencing (even though a mere 1-2%), which was
attributed to export growth in its FDI-fuelled manufacturing sector as Andrew, Jackson
and Maddox (2013) have showed through quantitative analysis of news stories in the
business press.
Despite the attempts of the GOI to play it down, PN 18 caused huge controversy upon its
implementation. The policy conferred significant bargaining power to domestic JV
partners, and critics - both Indian and foreign - pointed out that many Indian firms were
using the threat of invoking PN 18 to wrangle financial concessions.
52 This remained the case throughout the 2000s up to the present. In fact, in September 2012 the Congress
Alliance teetered on the brink of collapse over the controversial and long-awaited liberalization of FDI (up
to 51%) in retail sector. FDI politics were thus central to wider political contestation.
53 GOI, Planning Commission 2002 Report.
348
Constructing Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in the context of PN18
The key issue for policymakers in interpreting and adjudicating conflicts around FDI
policy rules that evolved in the liberalization period was determining who were the
legitimate parties, not only along the axis of domestic firms or multinationals, but
crucially amongst domestic economic actors. In the context of the complexity and
uncertainty surrounding the validity of claims and counter-claims by multiple sides over
the course of the period, policymakers' preferences were not only shaped by the largely
indeterminate rationalized causal ideas deployed by both sides, but by the social
meanings with which competing causal ideas were imbued and the corresponding
implications for the legitimacy of the economic actors deploying them. Once again, two
categories of capitalist legitimacy were posited in the policy debate, which are aptly
reflected in an interview conducted with a senior government official who provided his
view on the distinction between Indian firms that truly wanted to partner with MNCs in
order to gain new technologies, and those that were merely 'traders' and 'speculators':
It depends on the orientation of the people in the company actually. This is, I am
talking lets say mostly about manufacturing companies, there is a depth, and there are
certain things, you have to learn going from the less sophisticated to the more
sophisticated. So the ambition to learn the most difficult ones, and then to go beyond
and say maybe I can invent a few myself, that orientation makes a difference. Between
those who want to learn and those who are just trading. Who say give me something I
can produce it at low cost and sell it in the market and I'll make a lot of money. So there
is a trading orientation and there is a production orientation among the local
managers. And this is an important distinction.54
My interviewee went further to locate the emergence of this illegitimate group of
capitalists as an outcome of the pattern of India's economic reforms: and when asked to
make sense of the backlash that emerged against MNCs, he went on to demonstrate,
without prompting, how the categories of legitimacy I have outlined in this dissertation
served as an interpretive cognitive and cultural framework that helped him make sense of
the complex dynamics at work and ultimately shaped his preferences towards FDI policy:
[With the 1991 economic reforms] Much more opportunity was thrown open for Indian
companies, Indians to start new things as previously it was controlled [by the industrial
licensing regime] ... Now the new people who could now come in, were not the old
manufacturers. These were traders. [Who said to themselves:] 'Here's an opportunity,
ok, someone's willing to invest, because India is opened up, I'll also put a little share
5 Interview C29, April 2011, New Delhi.
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along with it, I'll ride along for a while, its allowed.' They are not really interested in
absorbing much technology. They weren't technology types.. .They were the traders
really.55
This distinction emerged repeatedly across interviews with senior policymakers as well
as managers of leading Indian manufacturing sector firms. These categories and the
cultural symbols and tropes that underpin them that emerged from this fieldwork are
summarized in the table below and serve as the main area of analysis in Chapter Eight of
the dissertation. The arrow illustrates the axis of contention between competing
representations.
Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1998-2005)
Illegitimate Indian Economic Man 4...... Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: 'Ragged Bazaar traders' trapped in Modem: 'captains of industry'
ties of caste and kin; just 'along for the ride'
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modem: technology providers
As in the 1990s, much of this debate was played out in the media, which as one of my
interviewees, a senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance suggested "is a legitimate
realm for political contestation". 56 The two sides of the debate were eloquently presented
by Amit Mitra, Secretary-General of FICCI and Pallavi Shroff, Managing Partner of
India's most prestigious law firm Armachand. In a self-penned article in April 2003,
Mitra argued that:
Press Note 18, issued on December 14, 1998, corrected a serious policy anomaly that
could have ruined the future of many small shareholders, weakened some major financial
institutions and brought disaster to hundreds of Indian private promoters...The simple
issue is, if a foreign direct investor or technology collaborator had formed a joint venture
with an Indian partner under whose leadership a great brand name was created,
shareholders garnered and financial institutional loans generated, can the multinational
simply walk away and form a 100 per cent equity company of its own through the new
policy of the 'automatic FDI route', leaving the Indian company in the lurch? Suppose
Honda were to walk away from Hero overnight and stop the supply of technology
while creating its solely-owned Honda, what would happen to the shareholders of the
Hero Honda brand? What would happen to the loans from [domestic] financial
institutions like IDBI, IFCI and ICICI? And what would happen to the promoters of Hero
[The Munjal family] in the future? Similarly, imagine Suzuki walking away from TVS
overnight because 100 per cent equity has been allowed in that sector. Many such success
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55 Ibid.
56 Interview, April 2011, New Delhi.
stories of joint ventures would be ruined in a jiffy.5 7
Mitra's statement strategically addressed the PN18 controversy. By identifying a broad
base of constituents that benefited from PN18, he sought to legitimize the distributional
implications of PN18 while reinforcing the view of MNCs taking advantage of Indian
firms. PN18 was not just about protecting the Indian capitalists like the Munjal family,
the effects of policy were presented as good for everyone. Rahul Bajaj similarly claimed
that its not 'the Indian industrialist' who should be protected. As Dobbin (2004) and Roy
(1997) have argued powerful capitalists present their own interests as in the being in the
best interest of all in society. Mitra sought to justify PN 18 by citing the cases Hero-
Honda and TVS Suzuki in the automobile industry as well as Pfizer in pharmaceuticals
and ITC and BAT in tobacco. He argued that in these and 'hundreds of other cases' the
government played the effective role of broker and arbiter between the parties and noted
the difference in outcomes with Kinetic-Honda which was terminated by Honda before
the imposition of PN18.
The FIPB would then play the role of an arbitrator and could require the foreign company
to seek a 'no objection' certificate from the original Indian partner. In this context, if we
look at the case of Hero Honda or TVS Suzuki, we find that they reached amicable
settlements within an orderly transition process with a win-win option for both. In recent
times, we saw the government play a very effective honest broker's role in the case of
TVS Suzuki, with no rent-seeking or promoting any private angle. This was precisely the
intent of Press Note 18 and it happened almost ideally. I recall the trauma of the parting
of ways between Kinetic and Honda since there was no Press Note 18 at that time and
Kinetic suffered on all of the above counts, understandably.
By contrast, Pallavi Shroff expressed strong opposition to the existence of PN18 by
deploying a set of legal ideas:
Press Note 18 contradicts the Indian government's promise to create a 'foreign
investment' friendly environment in India. To put it in a nutshell Press Note 18: (a)
restricts the foreign investor's right to do business; (b) seeks to legislate on matters that
are within the contractual domain; (c) creates an unequal and disadvantageous
position for foreign investors; and (d) raises a plethora of legal and interpretational
issues.58
57 Amit Mitra, Secretary-General, FICCI, 'Should Press Note 18 be Scrapped?' April, 2003.
http://getahead.rediff.com/money/2003/apr/09debate.htm
58 'Should Press Note 18 be Scrapped?' April, 2003.
http://getahead.rediff.com/money/2003/apr/09debate.htm
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Shroff s arguments deploy the concept of 'contract' as a legitimating legal device that
presumably levels the playing field between otherwise unequal bargaining partners. It
directly counters the view that Mitra forwards of the state playing the role of arbiter. For
Shroff, market-based institutional mechanisms of contract and courts can suffice. The
argument thus spoke directly to the legitimacy of the Indian state intervention in
contractual relations between private parties.
Mitra later responded to the legal ideas that Shroff deployed in an October 2004 article
entitled "Retain Press Note 18" in the Financial Express.
The philosophy behind Press Note 18 is to safeguard the interests of shareholders, small
and large, and the investments of financial institutions and promoters against any
predatory investments in India by the parent MNC in the same line of business. In
developed countries, commercial joint ventures (JVs) do have a conflict-of-interest clause
that prevents any sudden reversal of long-term business contracts. In the absence of such
a conflict-of-interest clause in most Indian JVs, it is necessary that the application of
Press Note 18 continues especially for agreements entered into prior to 1998, so that
existing JVs can be suitably amended and restrictive clauses in them are re-negotiated. 59
Having addressed the legal ideas, Mitra went on to catalogue the abuses that Indian firms
were subject to in their joint venture relationships:
It would be pertinent here to list some of the totally one-sided terms that MNCs have
imposed on their Indian JVs. These include restrictions on sourcing and pricing of
components and exports; denial of separate brand identity for products manufactured by
the Indian JV; denial of copyrights and patents; restrictions on sub-licensing of
technologies to other Indian companies etc. It is, therefore, imperative that Press Note 18
continues to be in existence.60
While Mitra's arguments sought to address the legitimate role of private law and state
intervention, there was a second perhaps more crucial element of Shroff's argument. In
addition to asserting the legitimacy of a private sphere of contractual relations, Shroff
sought to invert the view of MINCs as unethical partners and domestic firms as victims,
by arguing that the shift in the balance of power leads domestic firms to "mercilessly"
abuse foreign partners by extracting high exit prices as a condition for providing the non-
objection certificate.
59 Amit Mitra, "Retain Press Note 18." Financial Express. Oct 7, 2004.
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/retain-press-note-18/53522/
* Amit Mitra, "Retain Press Note 18." Financial Express. Oct 7, 2004.
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/retain-press-note-18/53522/
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Unfortunately, the sweeping effect of Press Note 18 is that even where a venture has
been terminated, a foreign investor with a new proposal to invest in the same or allied
field with a new partner in India, would be disentitled for the automatic route and would
have to approach FIPB/PAB for approval for the new venture. Foreign investors with
existing ventures in India have to prove that a new proposal would not in any way
jeopardise that venture's interests. From practice, it appears that the only way this can be
proved is by way of a no-objection certificate from the Indian partner. Needless to
mention this no-objection certificate has become a weapon in the hands of the Indian
partner. The Indian partner uses it mercilessly to extract greater exit value or
challenge termination which is otherwise legally and contractually valid. Press Note
18 clearly restricts a foreign investor's right to do business and denies it the equal footing
and treatment that it ought to be assured by the government. The Indian partner, despite
contracting otherwise, may refuse to give the foreign partner a 'no objection certificate',
in which case, there is very little that the foreign partner can do, except maybe take
recourse of the courts for specific performance.61
This statement strategically invokes the view of domestic Indian partners as rapacious
and unethical business actors, a view that this dissertation has argued has deep historical
roots in the late colonial and early post-independence periods. This delegitimizing view
saw Indian business actors not as 'true' industrialists, but as rapacious business actors
with the wrong 'orientation'. They had no real interest in developing manufacturing
capabilities, they were just "along for the ride." As one of my interviewees, a former
senior bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance noted drily, "they take a bribe".62 This
conception completely inverted the foreign-domestic firm relationship from earlier
periods. The claim was given historical resonance by characterizations of the behavior of
illegitimate Indian economic actors who eschewed efforts to acquire new technological
and organizational capabilities from their foreign partners, but rather entered joint venture
arrangements purely as a speculative financial investment to take advantage of
regulations requiring JV formation. The argument was that these 'sleeping partners' were
the reason that many MNCs opted to exit their JVs to 'go it alone'. This view of 'lazy'
Indian capitalists with little interest in production hearkened back to cultural tropes that
were ascribed to many rising Indian business groups in the late colonial and early
independence period, and once again the charge was disproportionately leveled against
Marwari-controlled business groups. Press Note 18 had become the single most
contentious and charged issue in Indian FDI politics.
61 Pallavi Shroff, 'Should Press Note 18 be Scrapped?' April, 2003.
http://getahead.rediff.com/money/2003/apr/09debate.htm
62 Interview B4, New Delhi, April 2011.
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As a result multinational firms claimed they were disempowered victims and began to
lobby for a 'level playing field', reflecting the multiple meanings that competing actors
seek to imbue in cultural symbols. The view is perfectly illustrated by the political
cartoon below that shows the foreign manager being held to ransom by his Indian
partner.63
WISH I COULD
JUMP AND TAKE
TH OTHER BOAT.
BUT FOR THE
S ARKS ANb
THE FTTERS
Mitra closed his arguments by addressing the potential for opportunistic behavior on the
part of Indian firms by asserting a continued role for state intervention in JVs.
The FIPB has been taking a liberal view in allowing 100% wholly-owned companies in
case of new applications by foreign companies where commercial relations with Indian
corporate bodies have ceased to exist over a reasonable period of time. Similar
reasonable views can be incorporated in the guiding blueprint for the application of
Press Note 18. This would establish a win-win situation for all stakeholders.
63 The Hindu Business Line "Press Note 1: An act beyond the contract", June 29, 2007.
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/06/29/stories/2007062950210800.htm
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Press Note 18 is Dead: Long Live Press Note 1
These debates between domestic actors coupled with intense lobbying by European,
Japanese and American firms and diplomats - reportedly even including German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder" -- ultimately forced a reconsideration of Press Note 18.
In October 2004, the powerful Committee of Secretaries, representing senior bureaucrats
in each Ministry, considered three alternatives. First, that it adopts a hands-off approach
and let joint ventures partners sort out quarrels on the basis of legally enforceable
agreements; second, continues with a reformed Press Note 18; and third, freeing new
ventures from the diktat of Press Note 18 while allowing older ventures to remain
protected by it. Following the meeting, Finance Secretary D. C. Gupta suggested to the
media that "We favour it being toned down. The proposal will now go before the
cabinet."65... Ultimately, PN18 was replaced by PN 1, which retained essentially the same
provisions for JVs that predated January 1 2005 but held that new ventures would have to
rely on contractual clauses. This served to protect Indian partners in existing joint
ventures but excluded new joint ventures.
The replacement of Press Note 18 with Press Note 1 did not completely quell the
controversy -- for example, reports of abusive MNC behavior continued, such as between
the Korean LG and Indian HCCL but it did prompt a decisive shift in the debate. Over the
course of the next few years the Foreign Investment Promotion Board increasingly ruled
in favor of MNCs, and the view became that PN 18/PN 1 had outlived its time. Once again
however, these changing preferences were outcomes of rationalized causal ideas that
were imbued with salient social meaning. In addition to the negative case of rapacious
and opportunistic Indian firms with the 'wrong' orientation, another powerful view that
arose held that 'true' Indian industrialists had become so successful that they no longer
needed government protection. This is the final dimension of the debate that this chapter
will consider.
" "Press Note 18: Foreign Funding Rules to be Made Easy"
http://teleradproviders.com/nbn/story.php?id=NzkzOA== Last accessed March 14, 2013.
65 "Press Note 18: Foreign Funding Rules to be Made Easy"
http://teleradproviders.com/nbn/story.php?id=NzkzOA== Last accessed March 14, 2013.
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From Swadeshi Self Reliance to Self Confidence:
'Indian Economic Man' is transformed to 'Davos Man'
A new representation of Indian firms arose as the 2000s progressed. Rather than being
seen as victims of abusive MNCs who needed government support to 'level the playing
field', the discourse in Indian business and policy circles increasingly depicted Indian
firms as 'mature' and 'self-confident'. A number of important factors can be identified in
this changing view. First, economic growth recovered strongly from the early 2000s,
peaking at 8% by the 2008 financial crisis. Second, rather than focusing on fending off
MNCs at home, Indian business was increasingly investing abroad, becoming
multinational firms in their own right. Outward FDI from India exploded from US$677m
in 2000 to US$18.6b in 2008.66 Further, Indian business groups made a number of high
profile acquisitions headlined by the Tata Group's $11.3b purchase of Corus Steel in
2007, which was the largest foreign acquisition by an Indian firm. Tata followed up with
the $2.3b purchase Jaguar Land Rover in 2008. Both of these followed Indian-owned but
European-based Mittal Steel's massive $35b acquisition of Arcelor Steel in 2006. These
acquisitions resonated powerfully across India not only because of the size of the deals,
but also because of the nature of the acquired firms: the steel and automobile industries
stood at the pinnacle of global economic power, and Corus and JLR were powerful
symbols of British industrial might that now belong to Indian firms. The former colony
had turned the tables on it erstwhile imperial rulers.
This new self-confidence was not only evident in media depictions of Indian firms, it
reflected a sentiment that had been growing since the late 1990s amongst Indian business
elites. As a CEO of major Bombay ad agency noted in explaining the changing
environment in India:
The other thing which I think has happened.. .is that we really have grown independent
of British thought now. So we.. .suddenly rediscovered...our confidence and said,
'Oh, its okay.' You know, its okay. It's okay not to understand the difference between
Strauss and Stravinsky. You know, its okay. If I like the kind of music that I have liked
since childhood, its perfectly fine. My identity is not under any kind of crisis.. .So as a
66 Data from the Reserve Bank of India "Outward Indian FDI: Recent Trends and Issues"
http://rbi.org.in/SCRIPTs/BS SpeechesView.aspx?Id=674 Last accessed May 13, 2013.
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culture, after that two hundred years of British rule, the culture is not very self-respecting.
Now we have begun to respect ourselves, saying 'it's okay'.67
This self-confidence was in full evidence in a 2005 interview with Venu Srinivasan, head
of the powerhouse engineering business group TVS, when asked to comment the license-
quota-permit raj and India's traditional 'fears of the foreign'.
I think coming to the quota raj, the problem was that we didn't believe in ourselves,
everything was attributed as the Government's problem-that is the Government had to
do something for us, not we for ourselves. I think post-quota raj what improved was that
we started doing things for ourselves, we started improving our companies and we
realised that we could compete. 68
Srinivasan went on to consider TVS' joint venture with Suzuki that Mitra cited as part of
the rationale for PN18 noted the conflict that emerged in the JV, but crucially in doing so
he signaled the ambitions of TVS as a 'captain of industry'.
We had a difficult situation [with the TVS-Suzuki joint venture]. Because the
aspirations of the partners were very different in the long run. In the long run, they
wanted to control the venture, make it a Suzuki company. And in the long run, TVS
wanted to make it a TVS company, a TVS product.
And finally, when asked directly whether he should be considered one of the "first
swadeshi pioneers after the reforms", Srinivasan stated:
certainly, we established the principle that an Indian company with aspirations
could work a joint venture to its advantage by developing capabilities, taking the
fundamental basis that we got from Suzuki. Of course, we got into motorcycle
manufacturing and established ourselves with the help of Suzuki, then started
developing products on our own and got our independence. So, it's possible in joint
ventures for a local partner to come out the winner; in most joint ventures, the
foreigners end up taking the local partner because the local partner didn't have the
strategic aspirations...
67 Cited in Mazzarella (2003:144)
68 "We showed that an Indian firm with aspirations could work a joint venture to its advantage", Financial
Express Jan 05, 2005. http://www.indianexpress.com/oldStory/62076/ Last accessed May 21, 2013.
69 Ibid. The interview concluded with comments directed at the Press Note 18 controversy. Srinivasan
justified the rationale of the policy intervention, but noted that it was contingent of the 'aspirations' of the
domestic firm: "Well Press Note 18 gives protection in the sense that say, a partner comes in and starts
another venture and undermines the current venture. So, I think it was a very good thing in that sense, but
beyond that unless we have the capability to design and make our product..." While this media interview
was conducted in January 2005, in an interview with head of another large Indian automobile engineering
firm noted that given his observations of the competitive challenges that TVS faced in the market even with
its well-known R&D and engineering capabilities, he would never seek to enter the mass motorcycle space
(Interview F2, Chennai, May 2011).
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This final statement provides empirical backing for the argument made in this chapter
that business actors not only seek to legitimize themselves, but also to delegitimize
others. Srinivasan's comments not only sought to legitimize TVS by trumpeting its self-
belief and 'long-run aspirations' relative to MNCs, but the statement simultaneously
delegitimized other domestic firms by placing them in a binary category of firms with no
ambition. This view was not only pervasive in the discursive politics of the period, as this
chapter has showed, it also hearkens back to the language that British colonial actors used
when characterizing 'Indian Economic Man' as evincing "no economic ambition, only
longing for nirvana" (Birla, 2009:2).
This view of 'self confidence' and the 'maturity' of 'India Inc.' absolutely permeated the
business media through the late 2000s, and was expounded in detail by numerous
interview respondents. Thus when Press Note 1 came under greater pressure it was seen
by many as having past its time. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion
issued a discussion paper in 2010 seeking feedback from the public on whether PN1
should be removed, a significant number of responses indicated that it should be scrapped
based on the two causal ideas presented in this section: PN1 either protects illegitimate
and rapacious domestic firms that have no interest in technological learning and in any
case it is completely unnecessary for the 'true' capitalists industrialists that represent
'India Inc.'. These 'captains of industry' have 'matured'. They are no longer 'Indian
economic man', as colonial actors portrayed them a century ago. Instead, as one of my
interviewees triumphantly effused, 'global Indians' now represent India Inc.: "[Ratan]
Tata is very self-confident. He is a globalizing Indian [and] today [Bombay Club
spokesman Rahul] Bajaj is a leader of the global Indian economy... All are global Indians
today." The metamorphosis is complete: 'Indian Economic Man' has become 'Davos
man'.
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IX. Conclusion
This was the final empirical chapter of the dissertation. It completed the empirical
trajectory of the dissertation by analyzing political contestation over FDI rules during the
course of the liberalization period (1991-2012). It argued that economic agents' policy
preferences are socially constructed through processes of sociopolitical contestation. This
process involves economic actors deploying competing causal ideas, meanings and
representations as they seek to establish themselves as the legitimate actors through
whom the state's development ambitions should be pursued. Socially embedded actors
struggle to shape the institutional domain to their advantage by legitimizing themselves
while simultaneously delegitimizing their adversaries in the institutional domain.
Indian economic actors legitimate themselves and delegitimize others by creating and
deploying cognitive and cultural categories of 'traditional' and 'modern' business actors.
These categories and schemas serve as interpretive frames through which actors
determine the legitimate role of foreign and domestic firms in the project of national
development. They play a powerful role in shaping actors preferences, particularly in the
context of environmental complexity and uncertainty that characterize periods of
institutional change and economic reform. The chapter demonstrated the theoretical and
empirical scope of the analysis conducted in the wider dissertation in order to
demonstrate how analytic attention to long run sociopolitical dynamics reveals
continuous processes of socio-political contestation. The chapter and the wider
dissertation have argued that in order to understand the sources of economic policy
preferences and make sense of policy contestation we must understand the ways in which
socially embedded agents continuously interact with their institutional environment by
seek to establish their legitimacy and entrench dominant positions through continuous
political contestation. The next chapter provides a brief summary and conclusion of the
argument of the overall dissertation.
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusions
The dissertation addressed a fundamental question in the social sciences: Where do
economic interests and policy preferences come from? The dissertation interrogated the
processes through which interests and preferences shape political and economic behavior,
government policy, firm strategy and ultimately market outcomes. It addressed this
question by analyzing political contestation over foreign direct investment (FDI) rules in
India from the late colonial period through the present (1870-2012).
This dissertation employed extensive archival and field research to find that conventional
theoretical approaches that naturalize economic interests and deduce economic actors
preferences from their socio-economic structural position are inadequate to explain the
dynamic shifts in government and firm preferences towards FDI over the course of
India's modern economic history. It argued that attention must be paid to the ways in
which actors make sense of the complexities of their institutional environment. The
dissertation showed that preferences are social constructs that are shaped by cognitive
and cultural schemas: rationalized causal logics imbued with historically salient social
meaning. It argued that these schemas posit causal and historically meaningful
relationships between the role of domestic and foreign firms and development outcomes
and thus serve as interpretive frameworks through which business, state and societal
actors make sense of the complexities of the economy. The dissertation thus makes two
key contributions to the comparative political economy and economic sociology
literatures. First, for the former, it highlights the role of culture and social meaning,
which are often underplayed or ignored in comparative political economy and political
science more broadly. Second, for the economic sociology literature, it showed that
preference formation is not a passive process; agency and contestation are central in what
is a highly creative and conflict-ridden process. The rest of this conclusion provides a
brief recap of these arguments.
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The dissertation showed how rationalized logics emerge from economic theories that
posit causal relationships between FDI and development outcomes. However, it argued
that there are competing theories and logics at play in both the scholarly and policy
discourse that shape actors' beliefs about the economic effects of FDI. The dissertation
identified two crucial causal ideas. The first holds that foreign capital not only contributes
to industrial growth through investments in areas that advance industrial development,
but also as well as indirectly through a variety of spillover effects that benefit domestic
firms and the wider economy. However, a similarly compelling rationale suggests that
foreign capital might constrain industrial development by crowding domestic actors out
of oligopolistic markets through abuse of monopoly power. This dynamic would hinder
the acquisition of new technological and organizational capabilities by domestic firms
that would advance the wider development project. These competing theories remain
unresolved in the policy and scholarly literature. However, this indeterminacy facilitates
massive political contestation between economic and political actors wielding competing
causal ideas as they battle to shape the policy and institutional environment in their favor.
Second, the dissertation argued that while the importance of causal logics and ideas in
shaping actors preferences is increasingly recognized in literature from across rational
choice, historical institutional and sociological strands of the new institutionalisms, there
is a second cultural element of preferences that receives less analytic attention. This
cultural dimension plays a complementary role to causal ideas by providing the socially
meaningful and historically rooted cultural symbols, narratives and tropes that are
essential for motivating human action. The identification of this cultural dimension and
demonstration of the role it plays in preference formation, political contestation and
policy and market outcomes is a major contribution this dissertation seeks to make.
These cultural devices provide salient representations of foreign and domestic firms that
have deep historical resonance in Indian society. These representations see foreign firms
either as 'traditional' economic actors that serve as neo-imperial instruments that prevent
India from achieving widely-held industrialization ambitions or instruments of
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development that introduce modem technologies and managerial practices to the
domestic economy. Similarly, Indian firms are categorized as either economic actors
orientated towards 'traditional' trading and moneylending activities that have long been
considered as rapacious, abusive of the poor and constraining industrialization or as
modern 'captains of industry' that heroically overcome the constraints imposed by the
colonial state, import substitution and monopolistic multinational firms to boldly strike
out into new areas of industrial production. The legitimacy of these actors in the eyes of
state and society in turns determines the shape of the policy and institutional environment,
that is, whether their activities should be supported or restricted by state policy. However,
these categories of capitalist legitimacy are not given a priori, they are products of social
and political contestation amongst business and state actors.
The cognitive and cultural categories of capitalist legitimacy are briefly outlined in the
table below and expansively elaborated in the analysis over the course of the dissertation.
Each of these categories is underpinned by a causal logic that rationalizes the practices of
the given business actor, but the logics are imbued with historically salient social
meanings that accord or deny legitimacy.
Cognitive and Cultural Categories of Capitalist Legitimacy in India (1870-2012)
Illegitimate Indian economic actors Legitimate Indian economic actors
Traditional: 'bazaar traders and speculators' Modern: 'captains of industry'
Illegitimate foreign economic actors Legitimate foreign economic actors
Traditional: 'neo-imperial instruments' Modern: 'technology providers'
Finally, the construction of cognitive and cultural categories is a crucial mechanism
through which these socio-political processes occur. This is an important point to make in
the political science literature that focuses on contestation but pays less attention to the
social and cultural embeddedness of economic and political actors. However, categories
like wider institutions don't just constrain action; they also serve as enabling cultural
resources for strategic action. This is a crucial contribution to the sociological literature
that recognizes culture and social meaning but often plays down the role of agency. The
dissertation showed that much of the political contestation observed in markets reflects
economic actors competing to legitimize themselves and their activities, practices and
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strategies in the eyes of the state and wider public as a means of gaining access to
valuable resources. This not only means self-promotion, it is a competitive process that
requires efforts to delegitimize others in the policy domain. This is a crucial element of
agency and socio-political contestation. This approach allows us to make sense of what
would otherwise seem to be idiosyncratic fluctuations in policy, which is all too often
unhelpfully ascribed to battles between 'competing interests' and 'the push and pull of
politics'.
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